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Abstract. 
 
This Thesis adopts a variety of different approaches in order to throw light on French 
perceptions of the British at the turn of the twentieth century. Introduction, chapters one 
and two set these in the broader context of nineteenth-century attitudes, in particular the 
genre of invasion literature, and the corpus of work produced by writers from the Ecole 
Libre, Paris. Not straightforwardly Anglophobic or Anglophile, both drew upon similar 
British stereotypes, and were shaped by French self-perceptions and internal concerns. 
The impact of the 1898 Fashoda incident and 1899-1902 Boer War upon French 
attitudes generally and these strands is considered, before analysis of French diplomacy. 
This departs from the contending ideas that the French Foreign Minister, Delcassé, 
determinedly sought an alignment with the British from June 1898 onwards, or that 
across 1898-1901 he was presumptively hostile to Britain, suggesting instead a self-
interested opportunist agenda pursued irrespective of others in policymaking circles. 
Chapter five takes up John Keiger’s suggestion that the Paris press may have been less 
hostile towards Britain before and during the Fashoda incident than is often depicted, to 
broaden its evidential base, and push it further, arguing that French anger over Fashoda 
was in part directed against other, often domestic, targets and its Anglophobia was 
largely retrospective. Chapter six pursues this story into the early months of the Boer 
War, pointing to how French press opinions, if emboldened by the tide of international 
criticism of British policy, again strongly reflected internal preoccupations. The French 
who volunteered to fight on the Boer side in the war might represent an avowed kernel 
of Anglophobic opinion. Chapter seven, however, concludes that their motivation had 
more to do with asserting a certain vision of France, not least at home, something clearly 
understood by them and the French press of the time.  
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Cross Channel Reflections : French Perceptions of Britain 
from Fashoda to the Boer War.  
 
Introduction.  
How did the French view Britain in the years preceding the Entente Cordiale of 1904? 
The end of the 1890s is commonly portrayed as a period of peak Anglophobia within 
France. Only a few years before 1904, there was no shortage of colourful invective 
suggesting that reactions evoked by Britain were predominantly negative ones of fear, 
resentment and envy. This was the era of invasion literature and cartoonist Willette, 
whose “V’la les English” edition of satirical magazine Le Rire, lampooning British 
cruelty and cant, is often cited.
1
 The comments of ardent nationalist Captain Driant on 
the nature of “ce pays maudit” in 1903 were only the culmination of sentiments 
expressed throughout his series of Anglophobic war novels of the 1890s: 
Après des siècles de libéralisme, l’Angleterre avait remis ses destinées à un 
ploutocratie avide et sans scrupules. Son aristocratie avait abdiqué sa fierté, sa 
grandeur, son indépendance entre les mains des maniers d’argent. Sa democratie 
froidement indifférente à tout qui ce n’était pas son interêt et son bien-être… 
l’Angleterre du XXe siècle était devenue la Carthage moderne. Elle en avait la 
cruauté, les convoitises, la foi punique, le mépris des traités… Elle allait finir 
comme Carthage.
2
  
 
There was, however, another side to the story. Educator, Liberal economist and political 
commentator Emile Boutmy had been moved in 1891 to comment that: 
During the last 150 years a prejudice in favour of the English has grown up 
among the French, and is increased, I believe, by a humble minded retrospect of 
their own character and history. Whenever a Frenchman discusses the political 
system of England the words which occur to him are respect for traditions, 
moderation, wisdom, regular exercise of political power and legal resistance.
3
 
 
The striking contrasts between such viewpoints on much the same subject lay in the 
differing purposes of the authors, something as much relevant to how they felt about 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Jacques Lethève, La Caricature et la Presse Sous la IIIe République  (Paris, Armand Collins: 1961), 
118-119 and Robert & Isabelle Tombs, That Sweet Enemy The French and the British from the Sun King 
to the Present (London, William Heinemann: 2006), 447-448, and see pictures 1.1-1.5. 
2
 Capitaine Danrit, La Guerre Fatale France Angleterre (Paris, Ernest Flammarion: 1903), Vol 3, 29, 73 
& 74. 
3
 Émile Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, France, England, United States (London, Macmillan & 
Co: 1891. Translated E.M.Dicey), 37. 
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their own country as any abroad. More generally, François Crouzet summed up the 
situation of the student of any country foreign to himself as follows:  
L’observateur voit, pense, et juge en fonction des preoccupations de politique 
intérieure de son propre pays: Il cherche à l’étranger des réponses aux questions 
qui se posent chez lui, ainsi que des armes utilisables pour les polémiques 
internes.
4
 
 
Any study of French perceptions of Britain must therefore avoid the temptation to offer 
a smoothly homogenous account. Contradictory and complex, French views of the 
British reflected domestic agendas and conflicts as much as they did any real knowledge 
of Britain itself. French perceptions can be read through a wide range of sources- the 
works of academics and publicists, but also novels and popular literary works, paintings 
and postcards. The press, too, is of importance, ranging from mass circulation dailies to 
more elite publications.  
 
It would probably be true, however, that the French were in this period less obsessed 
with the British than they were with the Germans, who had so humiliatingly defeated 
them in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. The case of Germany has therefore 
attracted much historical attention. Claude Digeon traced the challenges presented to 
French intellectuals after 1871 in simultaneously being confronted by the unpalatable 
nature of German success, and coming to terms with learning lessons for themselves 
from that success.
5
 Self-consciously aiming to avoid the same ground, Allan Mitchell’s 
trilogy on the early Third Republic began in close analysis of the control exercised by 
Bismarck over French governments in the 1870s. Later volumes went on to address the 
more voluntary, and less direct, impact of Germany as a model to follow or avoid when 
reshaping the French church, army and education up to 1898, and its influence on 
                                                 
4
 François Crouzet, “Problèmes de la communication franco-britannique” in Revue Historique, Vol 254, 
(July-September 1975), 113. 
5
 Claude Digeon, La Crise Allemande de la Pensée Française (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France: 
1959). 
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French social reform.
6
 All of these were most concerned with how (perceived) German 
ideas affected the methods of elite groups within France. Mitchell’s final volume 
characterised French reactions to Germany as “a mixture of apprehension and 
admiration”.7 At a popular level, the situation has been summed up in the terms “Avec 
l’Allemagne, tout est simple: C’est un pays ennemi. La France n’oublie pas la défaite de 
1870”.8 No politician would have dared publicly to resign future prospects of recovering 
the provinces lost to the German Empire. No reliable travel figures are available for the 
period, but Theodore Zeldin suggested, on the basis of the notably small numbers of 
visitors exchanged in the 1920s between France and Germany, that the number of visits 
from one country to the other must have been constrained for decades beforehand.
9
 
 
Anglo-French relations did not carry the same emotional charge. The rise of Germany 
was facilitated by a French defeat pinpointed in a particular moment within living 
memory, whereas the genesis of British ascendancy, well established by the 1860s, had 
been more gradual, and was not so closely linked to such a complete and sudden 
humiliation of France. As J.E.C. Bodley reflected in 1898, “three generations have gone 
by without the armies of England and France meeting in battle array…there is no man 
living who has fired a shot in warfare between the French and English nations”.10 
Although some French took Britain, like Germany, to be a success potentially offering 
directions for French development, less odium usually attached to the embracing of 
British ways, fraternisation between British and French elites making it easier to be open 
                                                 
6
 Allan Mitchell, German Influence in France after 1870 (London, University of North Carolina Press: 
1979), Victors and Vanquished; German Influence on Army and Church in France after 1870 (London, 
University of North Carolina Press: 1984), The Divided Path German Influence on Social Reform in 
France after 1870 (London, University of North Carolina Press: 1991). 
7
 Mitchell, Divided Path (1991), 67, relative to the German model for social reform, 278-279 adding that 
1903 proposals for social reform potentially attributable to German influence would be much more 
palatable when labelled Belgian in origin. 
8
 Lethève, Caricature (1961), 113. 
9
 Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Intellect Taste and Anxiety, Vol 2, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 1977), 86-87 and 117. 
10
 J.E.C.Bodley, France (London, 1898), 59-61, quoted by Tombs, Sweet Enemy (2006), 307. 
 9 
about fully expressing ideas imported from across the channel. Unlike in the case of 
Germany, it was possible in late nineteenth-century France to entertain publicly any of a 
wide range of different shades of opinion on Britain. Study of the British in the French 
imagination consequently entails an encounter with a range of attitudes the layers and 
breadth of which were not directly distorted by the trauma of 1870-71, and which 
perhaps more faithfully illuminate the differences between those within France whose 
perceptions were recorded. 
Notable Historiography. 
 
Existing studies of French perceptions of Britain tend to fall into two categories. The 
more generalised cover longer periods, which inhibits any overall argument except on 
broad, qualified lines. They usually include British views on France as well as the 
French on Britain.
11
 P.M.H. Bell’s self-confessedly “synthetic” work on Anglo-French 
relations as a whole, if seeking to integrate a “cultural” approach, for the period up to 
1914 emphasises high politics. Only a few pages are devoted to the impressions mainly 
of those exiled to Britain or sufficiently wealthy to visit, or be educated at, Oxford.
12
 
Bell covers a more truly “popular” conception of Britain and the British only for the 
period after 1914 when more prolific diaries, memoirs and letters by or featuring Britons 
in France made such impressions easier to evidence and sustain. More recently, Tombs 
has provided a long-term model against which the events and attitudes of a particular 
short period can be tested or compared. The Zola-Viztelly trial and French views on 
Wilde lead Tombs to conclude that overdrawn moral differences formed part of French 
discourse on Britain. This point can be re-evaluated and developed in the light of French 
                                                 
11
 Crouzet, “communication franco-britannique”, Revue Historique, Vol 254, (1975), 105-134,  Zeldin, 
France 1848-1945, Vol 2, (1977), the themed essays of François Crouzet & Douglas Johnson, Britain and 
France: Ten Centuries (Folkestone, Dawson & Son Ltd: 1980), Philip Michael Hett Bell, France and 
Britain 1900-1940, Entente and Estrangement (Harlow, Longman Group: 1994), Roberto Romani, 
National Character and Public Spirit in Britain and France 1750-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 2002) and Tombs, Sweet Enemy (2006), took between 40 to 1000 years each.  
12
 Bell, France and Britain (1994), viii & 15-19. 
 10 
perceptions of events in the Sudan and South Africa.
13
 However, Tombs still identifies 
contradictory but simultaneous trends- The 1880s & 1890s having seen the blossoming 
of British-inspired sport within France at “a time of relative Anglophobia”, he concluded 
on this period by detecting a lack of “bitterness and real hatred”, at least in personal 
relations.
14
 Fabrice Serodes, covering 42 years, explores the degree to which 
Anglophobia impacted on the decisions of French leaders. Long-term though such 
feelings may be, he avers them to have been of little intrinsic importance, becoming 
significant only in so far as they affected the “hommes politiques” who took the 
decisions.
15
 
 
The second category of studies tends to concentrate study on specific aspects of Anglo-
French relations, most often focusing on intergovernmental relations without attaching 
much weight to popular views.
16
 Works by M.B. Hayne, John Keiger, Paul Lauren, and 
Christopher Andrew variously analyse French policymaking and foreign policy, in Quai 
d’Orsay centred, often comparative, narratives where the main importance of French 
popular perceptions of other nations lies in their influence (or lack of it) on 
governmental policies.
17
 Popular sentiment was consequently a minor factor. Policies 
actually executed owed far more to the stances of a very small number of men, in the 
Quai d’Orsay or abroad in the Diplomatic Corps. Consequently, those stances, in any 
case easier to trace as those of literate individuals who committed their evolving 
                                                 
13
 Tombs, Sweet Enemy (2006), 400. 
14
 Tombs, Sweet Enemy (2006), 410 & 428. 
15
 Fabrice Serodes, Anglophobie et Politique de Fachoda à Mers el-Kébir (Paris, Harmattan: 2010), 7. 
16
 One exception was Marius-François Guyard, La Grande-Bretagne dans le Romain Français 1914-1940 
(Paris, Libraire Marcel Didier: 1954) examining Britain as constructed by French writers. 
17
 Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (London, Macmillan: 
1968), Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press: 1976), M.B. 
Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War 1898-1914 (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press: 1993), John F.V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (London, Macmillan 
Press: 1983), commissioned as part of a wide ranging “Making of the Twentieth Century” series with 
corresponding volumes on Germany, Italy, Russia and Britain, and John F.V. Keiger, France and the 
World Since 1870 (London, Arnold: 2001), which was self consciously part of a series, paralleled by 
Michael A.Barnhart, Japan and the World Since 1868 (London, Arnold: 1995) and John W. Young, 
Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century (London, Arnold: 1997). 
 11 
thoughts to paper, assumed a far greater importance than the wider attitudes of a largely 
ignored French public whose feelings have sometimes been characterised as ones of 
apathy where foreign relations where concerned.
18
 Serodes addressed this in part by 
discussing at length the opinions not just of leading politicians and diplomats but also 
men of the navy, army and the press - if still primarily interested in the reach and 
influence of Anglophobia, as opposed to other sentiments involving Britain. 
 
Some older works have addressed public opinion but they too tend ultimately to focus 
on high politics and diplomacy.
19
 E.M. Carroll’s 1931 survey represents a genuine 
attempt to move “Public Opinion” to centre stage, in the general context of all French 
foreign affairs across a 44 year period.
20
 However, it was traditional barometers of 
electoral results, known political affiliations, or the extent to which this or that public 
demonstration attracted bodies that Carroll depended upon to complement his close 
reading of Paris newspapers.
21
 Its age also handicaps it.
22
 Arguably, Carroll’s is a 
“problem based” study as much as a work of specifically French history, a point 
reinforced by its only occasional references to French attitudes of a longer and more 
underlying nature.
23
 Finally, as Carroll himself was aware, his sources could give only 
                                                 
18
 Christopher Andrew & A.S. Kanya-Forstner, “The French ‘Colonial Party’: Its Composition, Aims, and 
Influence, 1885-1914” in The Historical Journal, Vol 14.1 (March 1971), 126, asserted in explaining the 
influence of the pre 1914 Parti Colonial that “French people and their parliaments were almost totally 
apathetic to foreign and colonial affairs”. 
19
 For example, Bertha Leaman, “The Influence of Domestic Policy on Foreign Affairs in France, 1898-
1905” in The Journal of Modern History, Vol 14.4 (December 1942), 449-479, and Brynjolf Hovde, 
“French Socialism and the Triple Entente, 1893-1914” in The Journal of Political Economy, Vol 34.4 
(August 1926), 458-478. 
20
 Bell, Britain and France (1994), 259, deems Carroll “still useful”. 
21
 For example, E.Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870-1914 (London, 
Frank Cass & Company: 1931), 192-193 interpreting electoral decline of the nationalists in Paris and 
parliament, 1900-6 as evidence of public opinion successfully resisting extremism, and 113 on 
membership of Ligue de Patriotes in the 1880s. 
22
 Carroll, French Public Opinion (1931), 7-Prefectoral reports of regional opinion were in 1930 not 
publicly available for the period after 1870- and the scale and nature of bribery relative to the Paris press 
remained a subject of uncertain speculation for Carroll-contrast Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 45, 
and Keiger, France and the World (2001), 37-8, describing the corruption, with particular reference to 
widespread Russian bribery of French newspapers at the time of the 1912-3 Balkan wars. 
23
 Carroll, French Public Opinion (1931), rare references to long term artefacts including 4-5 Carroll’s 
own discussion of the issues involved in his work and 195, referring to schooling/school books. 
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an approximate idea of opinion, conceding, relative to the Tsar’s 1898 call for a 
disarmament conference, that: 
The reaction of the most important papers showed that the press could not be 
expected to furnish the necessary leadership for the mostly inarticulate elements 
which insensibly were developing a saner point of view in regard to France’s 
relations with Germany.
24
 
 
Form and Questions. 
 
Existing historiography provides a useful starting point for this study, which proposes to 
focus on a short period running from 1898-1903. This juncture is of interest for several 
reasons. Firstly, the Fashoda crisis dominated foreign affairs in autumn 1898 and the 
Boer War put the British towards the forefront of everyone’s attention. These events 
generated visceral Anglophobic animosity, the extent and nature of which merits re-
examination, in light of the rapprochement which took place around 1903. Conversely, 
going beyond Serodes’ preoccupation with Anglophobia, one must ask how other 
constituencies responded. What of the reactions to Fashoda and the Boer War of 
commentators who had been broadly Anglophile? More generally, the events of these 
years afford the chance to analyse the ways in which long standing attitudes, 
exemplified by the legacy of Hippolyte Taine, impacted upon particular moments of 
crisis and were possibly changed by them.  
 
Secondly, the period 1898-1902 with hindsight constituted a pivotal juncture in Anglo-
French relations. Prior to the Fashoda incident, few even inside the Quai would have 
forecast the advent, less than six years later, of an Entente Cordiale. The crisis and the 
Boer War saw a radical shift in French perceptions of both what was desirable and what 
was achievable, catalysed by British feelings of insecurity engendered by the war, and 
the growing military strength of a German leadership unwilling to commit itself to 
closer diplomatic links with France or Britain. Played out against a backdrop of factional 
                                                 
24
 Carroll, French Public Opinion (1931), 184. 
 13 
politics and longer lasting conceptions of Britain, a distinct shift towards a pro-British 
position became perceptible in France’s upper echelons. 
 
Of especial pertinence to the period of 1898-1902, a third issue was that of how far 
“official” French thought diverged from public opinion. Unrest among radical 
nationalists, sharpened by the Dreyfus affair and visible at the time of the Fashoda 
incident, was exacerbated during the Boer War. In contrast, the French government, 
despite some pro-Boer noises for public consumption, remained studiedly neutral and 
determined to avoid antagonising Britain. That said, buttressed by a tide of popular 
feeling manifested in postcards and by the departure of French volunteers to fight for the 
Boers, it was the press of both left and right that (albeit with differing motivations) 
called for official action that was never forthcoming. Study of the “official” press 
together with Quai archives suggests how and to what extent the French government 
pursued neutrality in the conflict. It also provides a revealing picture of its relationship 
with popular currents that ran in contradiction of official policy. Carroll’s was the last 
full length systematic study of the Third Republic’s press, public opinion and foreign 
policy, 80 years ago, leaving that field open for re evaluation in light of more recent 
historical research.
25
 
The Nineteenth-Century Background. 
 
The kinds of attitudes which emerge in the short period covered by this thesis need to be 
viewed in the light of a number of traditions of viewing Britain that had been apparent in 
the nineteenth century. Some characterisations of Britain were already well established 
by 1800. Notions of British arrogance, or the “Nation of shopkeepers” attributed to 
Napoleon, were adumbrated by the 1550s French traveller who found the British given 
                                                 
25
 Carroll, French Public Opinion (1931), was followed by articles of more limited length and scope such 
as Leaman, “Influence of Domestic Policy”, Journal of Modern History, Vol 14.4 (1942), 449-479, and 
Rachel Arié, “L’Opinion Publique en France et l’Affaire de Fachoda” in Revue d’Histoire des Colonies, 
Tome XLI (1954), 329-367, describing newspaper reports across the three years of 1896-1898. 
 14 
“only to vanity and ambition and merchandise”.26 The idea of “Perfide Albion” was 
likewise centuries old.
27
 Romani agrees that depictions of the British across 1750-1914 
were marked more by continuity than change.
28
 Having emphasised the essential 
continuity before and after 1815 in British perceptions of  the French and vice versa, 
Tombs argues that by the 1850s, despite changes in British attitudes, the French still had 
much the same “concrete set of ‘English’ stereotypes” as in 1814.29 At a time when 
opportunities for travel were, for most people, severely limited, material published by 
those who had encountered or studied the British remained highly influential. The same 
ideas might be re-worked through successive authors, even ones functioning from 
opposing political perspectives. Jules Michelet (1798-1874)’s notions of Britain as a 
place where an extreme wealth co-existed with extreme poverty were successively taken 
up by early socialist and feminist Flora Tristan (1803-1844), exiled 1848 revolutionary 
Alexandre Ledru-Rollin (1807-1874), exiled former Communard Jules Vallès (1832-
1885), but also by Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893).
30
 The lessons drawn from these 
observations were very different. Ledru-Rollin took this stark economic inequality as 
decisive proof condemning government by aristocracy and economic individualism, 
whereas Taine saw in English noblemen natural leaders of the type that France had -
unfortunately- lost with its ancien regime, and the inequality as an engine of change.
31
 
As Tombs points out, Anglophilia and Anglophobia, more often than not agreeing on the 
existence of a particular British phenomenon, were two sides of the same coin, differing 
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from each other only in how (for example) British phlegm might be evaluated.
32
 Despite 
Taine’s lack of an explicitly Anglophobe agenda, what he wrote was not inconsistent 
with negative judgements, or could be re-worked so as to tease out or emphasise the 
negative connotations. 
 
The host of characteristics stereotypically associated with Britain (the fog, the rain), the 
British (the big teeth, feet and appetites) and their behaviour (the physical exercise, 
predilection for pragmatism and facts as opposed to theory) all passed through the hands 
of Taine, in the extensive Histoire De La Littérature Anglaise (1863) and Notes sur 
l’Angleterre (1871).33 Although Taine spent little time in Britain, preferring to go there 
to confirm theories already formed from his book-reading rather than to conduct open-
ended research, his works went through many editions and remained highly influential.
34
 
Like Michelet, who had opined “as is the nest, so is the bird”, Taine interlinked ideas of 
environment and climate with his impressions of national character, so creating a 
deterministic system that proved very attractive and convincing to his French readers.
35
 
The “perpetual English miracle” that emerged from Taine’s pages owed much to a 
gentry and aristocracy marked by “prestige, authority, devotion to the public good, 
patronage of the dominated classes and intellectual curiosity”, its younger scions set 
loose by rules of primogeniture from “lazy mediocrity” to make their own way in the 
world.
36
 Zeldin suggested, for Guizot and others from the 1820s to the 1870s, that 
sympathy for Britain often “involved admiration for the aristocracy”, at most making 
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England “a model only for a small class of snobs”.37 Whilst Taine’s work had something 
in common with Guizot and much to imply by way of comment on French society by 
comparison, Taine’s refusal to admit that Britain offered a model capable of any 
effective emulation gave his work an air of pessimism, describing as it therefore did a 
blind alley.
38
 
 
These figures and others fed into a persisting broad Anglophilia which tended to be 
centrist/liberal, whilst broad currents of Anglophobic thought were at their strongest on 
the extreme left and extreme right, but certain undulations in the prevalence of 
Anglophile/phobe attitudes appeared across time. After the Catholic excesses of Charles 
X had provoked overthrow of the Bourbon restoration in 1830, the liberal July 
Monarchy marked a shift towards an official Anglophilia. Anglophobe commentators 
may have been “a noisy minority”, yet the animosity in France towards the Guizot and 
the King for their Anglophilia still became widespread as the monarchy’s fortunes 
waned in the 1840s.
39
 Anglo-French relations during the Second Empire ricocheted 
between mutual invasion scares, and the two nations allying in the Crimean War in the 
1850s, then culminated in British non-involvement in the expedition of Napoleon III to 
Mexico, and abandonment of the Emperor to his fate in 1870.
40
 French indifference 
during the Third Republic’s early years was markedly altered in 1882 by the British 
occupation of Egypt, creating an issue that poisoned Anglo-French relations for the next 
16 years.
41
 It was in the 1880s and 1890s that nationalism and Anglophobia lost ground 
on the left, to become the preserve of the radical right. With a few notable exceptions 
such as Paul Déroulède, French nationalists of the right were commonly Anglophobe, as 
well as Germanophobe and anti-Semitic.  
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Across the political spectrum, that a “sense of apartness shaped British identity” was not 
lost on the French, for whom the British remained “self-sufficient, suspicious of 
continental ideas... solitary and unsociable”.42 Close geographical neighbour as it may 
have been, Britain retained its strange and foreign feel. First thrust into exile in 1898, a 
bewildered Émile Zola wrote “I am landing here, as if cut off from men, in a distant 
world”.43 In different circumstances, this otherness might carry quite different 
connotations, but remained strong. Paradoxically, given that homosexual practices 
remained illegal in Britain, for André Gide crossing the channel with his male lover 
“signified a rupture with convention, a crossing of repressive boundaries, in short a 
sexual liberation”.44 Marcel Proust, it has been argued, in equating homosexuality with 
the foreign and the exotic, “uses English references to bring out the otherness of 
homosexuality”, and “associating it with things English, even making English a kind of 
coded language as spoken by his homosexual characters”.45 
 
This sense of strangeness persisted, as did a severely limited geographical scope to 
French visits to Britain. Zola, despite the need to conceal himself, almost entirely stayed 
in London.
46
 The popularity of Scotland, with that of Walter Scott, having faded by the 
mid nineteenth century, visitors’ impressions were disproportionately dominated by the 
“circuit classique Douvres-Londres-Oxford”, with a few excursions to Windsor and 
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Eton.
47
 There were exceptions to this rule. Edmond Demolins visited Scotland every 
August from 1892-6 because he was invited to attend and speak at the Congress for the 
British Advancement of Science in Edinburgh.
48
 Scott still possessed a residual allure 
evidenced by the trip, in between long stays in London and Oxford, made to Scotland by 
Jacques Bardoux, but he was deeply depressed by this “affreux pays” and wished never 
to return.
49
 Pierre De Coulevain’s later venture from London to Bath was covered in the 
tellingly entitled L’île inconnue, (1906).50 
 
Polarising views on the nation on both sides of the political spectrum by 1898 was 
Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew in the French army accused in October 1894 of spying for 
the Germans on the basis of a handwritten “bordereau”, containing information on 
French artillery and found by a French spy in the German embassy. Dreyfus was 
convicted and sentenced by Court Martial two months later to degradation and 
imprisonment on remote Devil’s Island, his case then subject to continued investigation 
by Colonel Georges Picquart, who in 1896 established the real author of the bordereau 
as Dreyfus’ fellow officer, Major Esterhazy. Dreyfus’ brother Mathieu, ascertaining the 
same culprit’s guilt, mustered support which resulted in a Court Martial for Esterhazy, 
whose acquittal in January 1898 turned the “case” into the “Affair” when Zola provoked 
a libel trial by publishing in L’Aurore an open letter to President Faure alleging 
dishonesty and incompetence amongst those involved in the initial investigation and 
Court Martial. Deeply divisive controversy ensued as it emerged that much of the 
evidence against Dreyfus had been forged by Colonel Henry, who committed suicide 
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whilst in custody on 31 August 1898, the decision to revise the case was taken by 
government, Dreyfus was brought back from Devil’s Island to face a fresh trial at 
Rennes in August 1899, was re-convicted (with extenuating circumstances) by 5 votes to 
2 in September, then set free, to carry on pleading his innocence. Dwarfing the man and 
the intrinsic value of the intelligence were the issues that hung upon the affair - the 
deliberate falsification of evidence, the extreme reluctance on the part of the army to 
reverse its first verdict, anti Semitism, and what kind of nation France was becoming. 
Right-wing nationalists sided with the army, right or wrong, as a personification of the 
nation and its honour, taking precedence over the fate of one individual. The hate of 
Jews apparent in many cases extended to Britain as well as Germany, both being 
accused of funding the Dreyfusards to undermine the French army and nation. The left, 
demonstrating how far they had travelled since the days of republican/revolutionary 
nationalism, stressed the rights of the accused, happily finding fault with the practices of 
an army whose officer corps remained disproportionately Catholic, conservative, and 
wealthy. After January 1898, the British, practically everyone from the Queen 
downwards, sympathised openly with Dreyfus, Francophobes taking the affair as 
evidence of France’s vainglorious, militaristic atmosphere and inadequate commitment 
to proper justice.
51
 
 
It was against this fractious, if not febrile, background that the Fashoda Incident erupted, 
in September 1898. Forming a context for the reactions expressed from 1898-1902, the 
nineteenth century had provided an evolving and fulsome series of perceptions. Two set 
of cultural products embodying such perceptions are analysed in chapters 1-2. So-called 
invasion literature, which fantasised future wars between Britain and continental powers, 
took a presumptively Anglophobe line. In contrast, the large body of work produced by 
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the commentators of l’Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques was reputedly Anglophile, if 
with important qualifications that are not always fully appreciated. Chapter 3 details the 
Fashoda Incident and Boer War, together with responses to them from the authors 
discussed in chapters 1-2. Shifts of attitude within French policymaking circles are 
detailed in chapter 4. The journey of the Quai d’Orsay, the Parti Colonial and foreign 
Minister Théophile Delcassé to the Entente via realisation that France might for practical 
purposes be better off working with British goodwill, rather than continuing to incur the 
animosity of both Germany and Britain, remains controversial in historical debate. Here, 
an attempt is made to elucidate and explain the thinking of Delcassé throughout his early 
years at the Quai. These chapters in turn contextualise the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter 5 considers the response of the Paris press to Fashoda, seeking to push further 
arguments already made by Keiger that, at least during the crisis itself, many 
newspapers were not as Anglophobic as has often been claimed. By way of comparison, 
chapter 6 investigates the Paris Press’s reactions to the early Boer War, to nuance what, 
on the face of it, seem almost uniformly negative depictions of Britain. An important 
aspect of French attitudes, that they were shaped at least as much by internal French 
preoccupations as any objective perception of Britain, comes to the fore here, and re-
emerges in chapter 7, which, centres on the French volunteers who fought in the war on 
the Boer side, evaluating their views, and those of French officialdom and the press on 
the volunteers. 
Defining Terms 
 
Anglais, Angleterre, Anglophile and Anglophobe are terms which crop up repeatedly in 
primary and secondary sources. If, as Serodes asserts, Anglophobia of the sort aired by 
Driant in 1903 sought to legitimate itself as “une révolte légitime contre un ordre du 
monde trop déséquilibré”, then the anti-Americanism which emerged in the 30 years 
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after 1919 can be interpreted as its spiritual successor.
52
  This renders helpful Toinet’s 
grappling with the distinctions between engaging in reasoned criticism of some specific 
American thing, and a “systematic opposition-a sort of allergic reaction-to America as a 
whole”.53 Such a pathological response, she averred, was rare in France, but “Anti-
Americanism” was still a live concept by virtue of extraordinary American sensitivity to 
any “criticism per se”, Serodes stressing the systemic aspect of Anglophobia, to which 
he, too, added British sensitivity to criticism.
54
 However, the definition and scope of 
Anglophobia or Anti-Americanism varied from one political perspective to the next. 
Anglophobia too might cover a wide spectrum of opinions, but for present purposes 
might be defined as an overarching tendency to place an uncomplimentary or negative 
interpretation upon successive things, persons or events solely or mainly because they 
are British rather than by virtue of their intrinsic merits. In the same way, Anglophilia 
might be similarly overarching, but tending to welcome or praise anything British. 
Underlining the porousness of such concepts, though, neither current, if to have much 
meaning at all, can reasonably be inferred from only one instance, or be deemed 
incompatible with reasoned observations about particular things, persons or events. Such 
criticism might meld inextricably with Anglophobic currents, even in the case of 
Willette.
55
  
 
                                                 
52
 Serodes, Anglophobie (2010), 83, and Fabrice Serodes, “L’Anglophobie est morte! Vive 
l’antiaméricanisme? Is antiamericanism the son of Anglophobia? Continuités et ruptures d’un anti-
hégémonisme” in Cosmopolitique, 5 Mai 2005 on www.sens-publique.org/spip.php?article174.  
53
 Marie-France Toinet, “The Lawyer’s Verdict” in Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik & Marie-France 
Toinet, The Rise and Fall of Anti Americanism A Century of French Perception (London, Macmillan: 
1990), 219. 
54
 Toinet, “Lawyer’s Verdict”, Lacorne, Rupnik & Toinet, Anti Americanism (1990), 220 and Serodes, 
Anglophobie (2010), 19-25. 
55
 CF. Serodes, Anglophobie (2010), 32 “Toute critique contre le Royaume-Uni ne peut... être qualifiée d’ 
‘anglophobe’ sinon le concept ne voudrais plus rien dire”. See Picture 1.4, which, though emotively 
Anglophobic in execution, clearly had at its core the not unreasonable observation that British rule over 
Ireland had been in complete disregard of the wishes of the Irish themselves-who were thus oppressed and 
martyred. 
 22 
The terms Anglophilia and Anglophobia, whether employed now or in 1900,  retain at 
their semantic (and, arguably, conceptual) heart the English rather than the Scottish, 
Welsh or Irish, echoing French use of “Anglais” or “Angleterre” as terms actually 
meaning “British” and “Britain”. Regional differences within Britain were, it would 
seem, usually less important to French commentators, journalists, politicians and 
diplomats than the distinction between Britain and France.
56
 Whilst we should remain 
mindful of these anomalies, for the sake of avoiding repeated qualifications “Anglais” 
and “Angleterre” (except where the context of the source demonstrates otherwise) have 
for practical purposes been taken as synonymous with “British” and “Britain”.  
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Illustrations (1). 
Introduction : Pictures 1.1 - 1.4. Cartoons from “V’la Les English”, Le Rire, 23 November 
1899.  One of several prolific cartoonists active in 1898-1902, Adolphe Willette (1857-1926), 
sometime illustrator for La Libre Parole Illustré, was not only an avowed anti Semite but also 
produced this Anglophobic special edition for Le Rire. Opening with a semi naked Joan of Arc 
meeting her end amongst a stack of burning faggots, Willette amongst other things castigated 
British brutality in India, epitomised by the game hunter using a live native child as bait to 
attract crocodiles, British drunkenness and the hypocrisy of claims to treat women respectfully 
in the depiction of the poor young girl cowering on the ground outside a bar, and British 
subjugation of Ireland, symbolically portrayed as a woman being crucified.  
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Picture 1.5 Cartoon from “V’la Les English”, Le Rire, 23 November 1899, as reproduced in 
Jacques Lethève,  La Caricature et la Presse Sous la IIIe République (Paris, Armand Colin: 
 26 
1961), 119, with an incarnation of British lack of empathy. Rather than pity or assist the starving 
Indians before them, the tubby British officer and his wife, unmoved by their plight, choose to 
take photographs after the fashion of tourists.  
 
Chapter 1: Picture 2.1 Driant’s vision of the future – The Royal Navy succumbs to French 
submarine power. 
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1: Invasion! Britain and the British in French Future War 
Literature.  
 
Introduction 
By the end of the nineteenth century, a new and popular genre of fiction had emerged. 
Mass literacy and an increased emphasis on the nation, in the case of France facilitated 
by the 1881-2 Ferry Education Reforms, created a demand for sensationalist fiction that 
imagined war. Similar circumstances in other West European countries made so-called 
“invasion literature” a truly international phenomenon.57 These were novels in which an 
author created a hypothetical future war scenario centring on an invasion, often a 
seaborne one of Britain. In any given story, ultimate victory would generally tend to go 
to which ever side the particular novel’s reading public belonged to. Failing that, the 
novels pointed to, and illustrated the dire consequences of, defects in the military 
establishments of their own authors’ nations, in order to put the case for whatever 
remedy the author favoured. With one retrospective eye on the particular constellation of 
alliances that later entered World War One, most historiographical attention has tended 
to focus on British novels, especially those which imagined German invasions.
58
 Most 
prominent and enduring, The Riddle of the Sands (1903) by Erskine Childers (1870-
1922), was very successful in its time and, still in print, is in Tombs’ opinion the best 
written novel of its genre.
59
 However, British invasion literature was distinguished more 
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by its quantity than its quality, William Le Queux (1864-1927) perhaps being more 
representative, paid by the number of words he produced, as from 1893 he churned out 
between 1 and 12 books of all kinds every year, giving a lifetime’s total of nearly 200.60 
His self-consciously plain prose proved immensely popular, with invasion literature in 
his hands and those of many other lesser practitioners showing little pretension to 
subtlety, literary sophistication or depth.  
 
Childers’ Riddle of the Sands (1903) was significant not least because, in the context of 
preceding invasion literature, it signalled a gradual change of opponent in British 
minds.
61
 The shift towards regarding Germany instead of France as Britain’s main 
enemy was replicated by Le Queux in his The Invasion of 1910 (1906), among others; 
Ramsden finds that, from some 31 invasion novels published in Britain from 1900-1914, 
only five involved invasions of Britain from countries other than Germany, and none of 
these appeared after 1904.
62
 British invasion literature can therefore be interpreted as 
evidence of growing Anglo-German antagonism in the decade before World War I. As 
the novels transformed into or inspired plays and films, their authors also aspired not 
just to reflect official British policy, transformed in 1903-4 by the Entente Cordiale, but 
actively to influence it. Starting with George Chesney’s (1830-95) Battle of Dorking 
(1871), a novel inspired by fears of Prussian military power so recently demonstrated 
against France, British invasion literature tended to advocate army reform, in particular 
conscription.
63
 Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910, explicit in its propaganda for National 
Service, was written in collaboration with Field Marshal Roberts, who subsequently 
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promoted the book.
64
 Whilst their aim was not to be achieved in peacetime, the theatre 
staging Guy Du Maurier’s play An Englishman’s Home (1909-10), featuring as barely 
disguised a set of Germans-as-invaders as the Lord Chamberlain would allow, later 
served, literally, as a recruiting station for the Territorial Army.
65
 The advent of Britain’s 
Secret Service Bureau (forerunner of MI5 & 6), its first head Captain Vernon Kell in 
correspondence with Le Queux, has also been attributed to the impact of that author’s 
Spies of the Kaiser (1909).
66
 After 1906, senior British ministers-Asquith, Grey, 
Haldane, Churchill-as well as intelligence officers, seem to have taken seriously, and 
occasionally acted upon, the supposed German spying and plans of invasion so 
vociferously publicised by Le Queux and his ilk.
67
  
 
According to I.F. Clarke, the most extensive chronicler of turn of the century future war 
literature, Germany had in turn been a relative latecomer to popular invasion literature, 
producing little of its own before 1895.
68
 This situation changed when the Germans 
began to develop their own fleet, and to answer the British, the most prominent 
examples including Max Heinrichka’s 100 Jahre deutsche Zukunft (1913), August 
Niemann Der Weltkrieg-Deutsche Traume (1904) positing a joint French-Russian-
German invasion of Scotland, and Karl Eisenhart Die Abrechnung mit England (1900) a 
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German intervention against Britain in an Anglo-French war.
69
 Somewhat less 
confrontational in their conclusions, Ferdinand Grautoff’s 1906 Der Zusammenbruch 
der Alten Welt (1905) and Karl Bleibtreu’s Die Ofensiv Invasion gegen England (1907) 
both foresaw the main consequence of an all-out war between Britain and Germany as 
the weakening of both powers, to the benefit of others outside of Europe.
70
 
 
However, what should not be overlooked is that before the Triple Entente had taken 
shape French and Russians were as likely as Germans to be the invaders imagined in 
Britain. Plans to build a channel tunnel in 1882 prompted a flurry of pamphlets, tracts 
and novels alarmed at the ease of access such a tunnel would potentially allow to an 
invading French army, especially if covertly assisted by French emigrants living in 
Britain.
71
 If anything, knowledge of the 1893-4 Franco-Russian alliance cranked fears 
up to new heights during the next 10 years.
72
 Prolific author Louis Tracy had joint 
French and German invasions in The Final War (1893) and The Invaders (1901), but 
even more strikingly, later Germanophobe Le Queux began his career as an ardent 
Francophobe and Russophobe.
73
 The Poisoned Bullet (1893) featured a joint Franco-
Russian invasion, consciously exploiting fears generated by the Franco-Russian link. 
The Great War in England in 1897 (1894) found the Russian flag flying over 
Birmingham town hall. Chief villain of England’s Peril : A Story of the Secret Service 
(1899) was Gaston Le Touche, head of a French Secret Service operating from the 
embassy in London.
74
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French Invasion Literature. 
 
Although invasion literature in France predated Germany’s, its form followed rather 
than led developments across the channel. In particular, Chesney’s 1871 novel was the 
self confessed template for the anonymous Plus d’Angleterre (1887), and seems to have 
been influential on the genre in France as a whole. The spark that turned most French 
writers’ hitherto relatively sober imaginings of future war away from Germany and 
towards Britain was the 1882 British occupation of Egypt. In addition to Plus, the 
ensuing decade saw an outbreak of Anglo-French conflicts, notably Camille Debans, Les 
Malheurs de John Bull (1884), and Pierre Ferréol, La Prise de Londres au XXe Siècle 
(1891). It was not only the target of these new works that changed but also their tone. 
Les Malheurs was described as “a violently chauvinistic tale describing the total 
destruction of the British Empire” by Clarke, who notes that much the same violence 
and chauvinism recurred in Plus.
75
 The title of George La Faure’s Mort Aux Anglais 
(1892) left little room for ambiguity.  
 
Whilst the British consistently produced far greater quantities of future war novels than 
the French, such invasion literature was hardly less popular (or lucrative) in France than 
in Britain.
76
 Any judgements as to the quality of its readership must necessarily be at 
least as speculative as to its reach, but Cornick casts French invasion literature as one 
form of adventure novels aimed not only at adults but their offspring, forming “a prime 
source of adolescent distraction”.77 
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France’s nearest equivalent to Le Queux was Captain Emile Augustin Cyprien Driant 
(1855-1916), who published nearly 30 novels across a quarter of a century. Many of 
these were multi volume efforts. As a serving French army officer up to 1906 Driant 
customarily wrote under the pseudonym Capitaine Danrit. The militaristic, nationalistic 
and somewhat romanticized conservatism apparent in his work found its roots in his life. 
Having from 1875-7 passed through St Cyr, Driant emerged as an infantry officer, from 
1884 serving in Tunisia under General Boulanger. He continued this connection once 
back in France, to the extent of serving as Boulanger’s ADC, marrying one of his 
daughters Marcelle in 1887, and in 1892 publicly defending the memory of his now 
deceased father in law in the columns of Le Figaro. Following 4 years as instructor at St 
Cyr appointed Chef de Corps at Troyes in July 1899, Driant remained there until the end 
of his military career in garrison, creating the Ligue Anti Maçonnique for men and the 
Ligue de Jeanne d’Arc for women. In the political climate after the separation of Church 
and state, Driant had little further prospect of peacetime advancement, now that control 
of army appointments had shifted to the Minister of War, the dedicated anti clerical 
André.
78
 Passed over for promotion for 5 successive years after 1900, Driant left the 
army on 31 December 1905.
79
 Abandoning any restraint in expressing his political 
views, Driant was elected Deputy for Nancy in 1910, under the umbrella of Catholic-
Conservative Action Libérale. In politics he concentrated on military affairs, notably the 
debate over extending the length of conscription, before rejoining the army in August 
1914, ultimately to be killed in the Bois des Caures on 22 February 1916, the second day 
of the German offensive at Verdun.
80
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Testimony to the popularity of French invasion literature, like Le Queux Driant 
published prodigious amounts, beginning with the 3 part, 6 volume La Guerre de 
Demain (1888-1893). This opened with a surprise German attack on France, treating at 
length various tactical aspects of the ensuing war.
81
 Later novels, also divided into 3 
volumes, imagined the invasion of Europe by Africans led by the Ottoman Empire-La 
Guerre au Xxe Siècle; L’Invasion Noire (1894) - as well as Japan/China/India in 
L’Invasion Jaune (1909). In the intervening years, some of his shorter works evoked 
Napoleon and highlighted the new inventions, especially aircraft and submarines, that, in 
contrast to Jules Verne’s peaceful innovations, changed and intensified warfare.82 Whilst 
lacking the influence on official policy enjoyed by Le Queux, Driant’s work did reflect 
and shape a current of popular Anglophobia. As Tombs asserts of invasion literature: “if 
English books were nightmares of vulnerability, French books were fantasies of 
revenge”.83 This was certainly true of La Guerre Fatale France-Angleterre (1902-3), 
whose last volume first appeared in the same year as Erskine Childers’ Riddle of the 
Sands. This 3 volume series represented an Anglophobic apogee in Driant’s oeuvre.  
 
Driant was by no means alone as a prominent author of French future war literature. 
Originally published in the early 1880s, Albert Robida’s (1848-1926) La Guerre au 
Vingtième Siècle (1887) imagined an attempted invasion of Europe by an unspecified 
“enemy” in early 1945.84 Although taking a French hero, and based in the concerns of 
the 1880s, this concentrated on the future inventions and weaponry that would shape the 
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war rather than on any national enemy.
85
 Of more immediate relevance to its time, the 
“very successful Plus d’Angleterre (1887)”, appearing 15 years before Guerre Fatale, 
went through 6 editions in less than a year, and was even translated for publication in 
Britain, exciting a short pamphlet by way of rebuttal.
86
 Such exchanges were two way. 
British speculation from The Sun, in December 1899 imagined a complete 
dismemberment of France by 1910 with Britain annexing the north and west. This 
provoked angry responses from Paris newspapers.
87
 The French press also kept interest 
in the invasion novel alive by publishing occasional short stories. One of these was 
Henri de Noussanne’s La Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe, which appeared in Le Monde 
Illustré on 10 March 1900. Described by Clarke as a “most enthusiastic account of the 
defeat of the British in a future war”, this made its way to the Foreign Office in London 
under cover of a report by Sir Edmond Monson, British ambassador in Paris.
88
 
 
Three Case Studies. 
 
As Clarke suggests, the anonymous tale of 1887 laid out an “apocalyptic vision of 
triumph and revenge in which the British suffered a swift and humiliating defeat”, 
setting up “a formula of vengeance and victory” followed by other authors writing in the 
same vein.
89
 In the three cases of Plus d’Angleterre (1887), La Guerre Anglo-Franco-
Russe (1900) and La Guerre Fatale France-Angleterre (1902-3), the action starts 
outside continental Europe or metropolitan Britain, reflecting the colonial nature of most 
of the differences between Britain and France. In all three stories, those extra European 
confrontations ultimately entail warfare in Europe and a successful French invasion of 
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southern England, culminating in an entry into London, then the imposition by France of 
a peace treaty upon the British.
90
 By far the longest and most detailed of the three were 
Driant’s 1,350 pages, but this book displayed obvious parallels with the first, suggesting 
a fundamental continuity of attitudes on the parts of both the authors and their readers. 
 
In Plus d’Angleterre and Guerre Fatale French interests are served by a generous dose 
of good luck, especially relating to Germany. Both depict Germany as self-interested 
and acquisitive, but, at the point of crisis in the imagined Anglo-French confrontation, 
too preoccupied with coincidental opportunities to profit from Austrian decline to 
intervene in favour of Britain. Where Plus forecast an Austrian internal collapse, Driant 
staged the death of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor, both scenarios enabling German 
territorial acquisitions in the east which compensated for losing Alsace Lorraine to 
France.
91
 Russian strength was a further contributory factor in Guerre Fatale. The 
outcomes of the books also bear strong similarities, and not merely in French acquisition 
of new territory. Britain, “rejetée au rang de puissance secondaire” in Driant’s story, is 
obliged to pay an indemnity of 10 milliards, reparations that, in similar fashion to Plus, 
go to finance a channel tunnel, its island end to be permanently garrisoned by French 
troops from Deal to Dover.
92
 
 
All three pieces put forward a simple, linear narrative that ended in at most 6 months in 
a definitive destruction of British power, a military occupation of London, without 
French armies needing to penetrate much further north or west as the subjection of the 
rest of Britain was taken for granted, to be shortly followed by the relegation of Britain, 
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stripped of much of its Empire, to subordinate status. Driant’s L’Invasion Noire had 
taken this a stage further by splitting mainland Britain into its 3 constituent kingdoms, 
England to be run by a Danish King, although Plus and Guerre Fatale satisfied 
themselves with an independent Ireland. Equally, the language of the novels, like that of 
Le Queux, was plain and uncomplicated, the most notable exception to this being the 
technical descriptions. Although Plus more than once alluded favourably to the effects 
of Melinite used by French artillery, by far the lengthiest of these appeared in Guerre 
Fatale.
93
 Its plot heavily depended on the employment of submarines, weapons of the 
future. Much space was therefore devoted to description of these, and tactics in their 
employment, especially in volume 2, “ce livre consacrée à la glorification de sous-
marin”.94 However, Driant, having the military background that he did, punctuated the 
entire work with pontification on everything from torpedo boat development to 
comparative bayonet lengths.
95
  
 
This description of what was, essentially, hardware, together with the prose, 
complimented the woodenness of Driant’s characterisations and subplots, which were 
also reliant on a series of happy coincidences.
96
 The hero Argonne’s “haine feroce” for 
Britain was only natural and inevitable for a Breton and someone in love with Irish 
nationalist Maud Carthy, “la jeune fille dont l’incomparable beauté, attristée par cette 
souffrance intérieure, incarna bientôt à ses yeux l’irlande héroique et martyre”.97 The 
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depiction of Guerre Fatale’s principal villain, the fat intriguer Walter Smith, was 
equally flat and one dimensional. Plus had taken this a step further not only by 
dispensing with fictitious characters altogether but in its almost complete disengagement 
with any individual people at all. Indeed, hardly anyone was named throughout the 
entire book, and when they were it was often because they were already historical 
figures.
98
 Once past the introductory chapter, contemporary figures were referred to 
merely by their job title, even “l’orgeuilleuse vieille reine” who could only have been 
Victoria.
99
 This curiously depersonalised tone, casting the conflict in terms of wider 
forces and groups, was replicated by Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe to some extent, 
although lack of space here may have prevented long digressions on the characters of 
Marchand, Kitchener, Cromer, Jamont and others who fleetingly appeared in the plot. 
 
Britain and the British in French Invasion Literature. 
 
The tone of all 3 works, unsurprisingly, was hostile towards British power, foreign 
policy and, in large measure, the British themselves. Unlike some of the German 
authors, they had no hidden agenda in depicting their wars with Britain, and no reason to 
present a continental invasion of Britain as anything other than an unambiguously good 
thing.
100
 The impersonal approach of Plus d’Angleterre did not stop prolonged 
justifications as to why France should fight Britain. Its opening 21 pages explained why 
“L’ennemi, c’est l’Anglais... Il faut ouvrir les yeux ou périr”.101 Common views of 
French history were offered, detailing events across the entire century from the English 
oligarchy financing the rest of Europe to fight Napoleon, to Britain finding excuses for 
Bismarck’s behaviour in the 1887 Schnaebelé incident and fermenting a Franco-German 
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conflict that would be in the interests of neither combatant.
102
 Contemporary grievances, 
such as British coastguards’ “brutalité sans pareille” towards French fishermen in the 
Channel and off Newfoundland, intertwined with this history.
103
 These particular 
behaviours on the international stage are supported, despite a complacent British 
disregard for the warnings of Chesney’s “fiction ingénieuse la bataille de Dorking”, by 
“l’orgeuil imbécile du gros de la nation… jingoisme… était un institution nationale… 
tout étranger, un être inférieur, méprisable”.104 Centuries of colonial thefts then 
economic exploitation, sucking the rest of the world dry whilst giving nothing in return, 
would make the defeat of Britain “une déliverance générale”.105 According to Plus, 
France had particular reason to instigate such an end. British arrogance and “l’insolence 
des journaux” founded an undying, perpetual, hatred for the French amongst all British; 
“Cette main est anglaise. Nous la connaissons depuis des siècles, brutale ou hypocrite, 
toujours la même, ne se crispant jamais avec bonheur qu’autour de la gorge d’un 
français”.106 
 
Such a rendition of stock grievances and British characteristics was largely absent from 
the briefer Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe which saw in its war a retributive lesson for 
Britain, but modified and expanded upon in Guerre Fatale. Although Tombs maintains 
that in general invasion literature “did not go in for stimulating visceral national hatred”, 
in addressing this particular novel Crouzet and Cornick seem nearer the mark in 
highlighting “des passages d’un violence indicible contre les britanniques”, or even 
judging it “shot through with a violent hatred of the English”.107 Driant combined 
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contradictory ideas of British condescension, stiffness, unsympathetic nature, concern 
for form, brutality and pursuit of money in the hero Argonne’s comment that: 
Partout où passe l’Anglais, il se fait détester pour sa morgue dédaigneuse, son 
manque absolu de tact et de savoir vivre. Ultra correct chez lui, sur toute la surface 
du globe son avidité est en quête d’une proie, son impudence s’exerce... quand il 
attaque aux faibles, ce qui est devenue pour lui un habitude lucrative, il devient 
odieux.
108
 
 
Similar self-consciously contradictory sentiments about “cette Angleterre hostile… mais 
insaissable, rapace mais prudente, arrogante mais pratique” riddle the entire novel on 
repeated occasions.
109
 To these qualities were added hypocrisy, egoism, international 
banditry, and a hitherto convincing veil of bluff that concealed the real weakness of 
“l’idole aux pieds d’argile”.110  
 
Driant showed least restraint in creating the fictitious villain Walter Smith, a character 
who followed in the footsteps of Guerre de Demain (1888-93)’s British “John Byde, a 
pantomime spy with long teeth, side whiskers, an impossible French accent and an 
immense arrogance, who operates in the German interest with a comical lack of 
success”.111 A Le Queux British secret agent was “quintessentially a gentlemen”, an 
affluent and upright man who tended to turn to spying as an amateur activity, and solely 
for the sake of national defence in the face of underhand foreign machinations.
112
 In 
contrast, Driant’s British spy is a self-made man, acting for money, and treacherous to 
the core. He is the immoral product “de mère anglaise et de père inconnu” in a 
Whitechapel “établissement interlope demi taverne et demi tripot”.113 Cosmopolitan and 
ruthlessly acquisitive, Smith married in Africa the widow of a multi-millionaire whose 
death he might have caused, the widow in turn disappearing during an Indian mountain 
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expedition when Smith learned of her desire to control her own fortune, then he made 
another fortune in Australia where he married a Greek. This corrupt “oiseau de proie” 
settled in Egypt, to become “un agent précieux de la politique secrète anglaise” across 
the Mediterranean.
114
 Whereas Plus merely attacked French Anglophiles, Driant went 
much further, in hating cosmopolitanism of any kind.
115
 “Les cosmopolites et les sans-
patrie” were the most open to British bribery, and hence employment as spies.116 
Smith’s career allowed vent for Driant’s sentiments. Speculating in Cuban property 
across 1897-8 had enabled Smith to acquire US naturalization. When apprehended by 
Argonne in the act of spying on defences in Tunisia, he was thus able to plead his status 
as US consul in Cairo to secure his release.
117
 Smith’s daughter Eva, born of his Greek 
wife in 1884, most embodies this to Argonne (and Driant) repulsive “monde 
cosmopolite qui n’a pas de patrie et qui sert celle qui lui rapporte le plus”.118 She is cast 
in express opposition to Maud Carthy, Argonne’s fiancée. Of a “Levantine” and worldly 
appearance next to “cette grâce virginale” of Maud upon whom she threatens revenge, 
Eva (for reasons Driant did not bother to explain, and despite her full involvement in her 
father’s spying) fell in love with Argonne but was foredoomed never to win him.119 In 
further happy coincidences, Eva, at a crucial point in the plot, saves Argonne from the 
machinations of her father, but Driant spared himself the distasteful (or perhaps 
impossible!) task of redeeming her by having her jump off the top of a cliff to her death 
at the end of Volume 2.
120
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Whilst Driant made great play of Britain’s use not only of spies, but “mercenaries”, he 
was occasionally able to concede some merit.
121
 Allegations of British cowardice 
prompted by “les mouchoirs blancs des soldats d’Edouard VII” in their attack on 
Bizerta, or previously in South Africa where “il y avait des soldats anglais chez lesquels 
le métier de prisonnier était une vocation”, were balanced by later acceptance that a long 
serving kernel of their army would fight vigorously once on home ground, of the 
enthusiastic (if ineffective and badly led) public school and Oxbridge cadet volunteers, 
the loyal “mutisme” of the London press, and the patriotic civil population in Kent 
refusing to give any information or help to the invaders.
122
 Driant’s perceptions of the 
characters of the British Generals, i.e. Roberts: “un homme froid, perspicace at sachant 
regarder en face d’une situation difficile”, Buller: “le type de veritable Anglais qui, 
lorsqu’il a un but à atteindre, se met des oeillères comme les chevaux, pour ne rien voir 
sinon ce but”, and the unscrupulous, cruel, “chef sans entrailles” Kitchener, were not 
entirely negative.
123
 However, none of this went far in mitigating a perpetual and mutual 
antipathy, “la haine qui séparait les deux peuples”, which had persisted despite their 
fighting side by side in a Crimean war brought about by “une diplomatie perfide” on the 
part of Britain.
124
 Argonne’s first officer might confess “j’admire l’Angleterre… un 
animal bien enformé... Il est solide, entrainé, insolent, cruel et grossier” but his desire to 
exterminate superseded any feelings of admiration.
125
 The topographical detail with 
which Driant wrote about British sites, and the physical trappings within the Houses of 
Parliament in Volume 3, suggested that he had actually been to England. This paralleled 
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the author of Plus on Hastings, Tunbridge Wells and the land surrounding them.
126
 
However, familiarity with the British was no solution for peace. Instead, Driant opined, 
“le Français de Londres déteste encore plus l’Anglais que le Français de Paris, le 
connaissant mieux”.127 Further, “la haine de l’Anglais” was with justification universal 
across all European nations.
128
 
 
Although Driant was quite clearly writing in a long established Anglophobe tradition, he 
drew on broadly Anglophile or neutral observations too. Taine, Boutmy or the 1899-
1903 London-Thames paintings of Claude Monet could have inspired him temporarily 
to frustrate the actions of his French invaders with “un de ces brouillards, comme il en 
tombe si fréquemment en Angleterre”.129 Likewise, references to British drunkenness 
were to find their echo in the later work of Pierre Hamp.
130
 On more specific issues, 
Driant echoed many other writers. Ironically, his suggestion that what the British army 
needed was promotion “des plus méritants et non des plus riches”, and conscription to 
fill the ranks, on the first point reflected what was already happening, and on the second 
exactly what a long line of British writers, from Chesney to Le Queux, had been arguing 
for decades.
131
 In Plus, the British Parliament was derided for its intolerance towards 
minority views, greeted by “tumulte, comme savent faire les chambres anglaises: 
grognements, cris de chien, de coq, d’âne, etc”.132 The pressure of invasion forced a 
pragmatic departure from parliamentary precedent. “La constitution pour les Anglais 
n’était qu’un habit de cérémonie qu’ils savaient jeter bas aux heures de crise”, so a 30 
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MP commission was appointed to negotiate with the French.
133
 Driant made exactly the 
same point about “ce pays des antiques traditions et des vieilles perruques” when an 
armed stranger entered parliament for a first time, and the “formalisme rigide qui avait 
toujours présidé aux actes de la vie politique ployait devant les nécessités du moment” to 
allow both houses to mix in debate over whether to surrender London.
134
  
 
In highlighting the flexibility and the tradition of the British constitution, Plus and 
Guerre Fatale showed the imprint of Taine and Boutmy, but their depiction of British 
class and society owed more to Michelet’s focus on social inequality. The start of Plus 
found “la plèbe…cette mob anglais” of the East End still loyal to the sovereign, if 
sceptical of her ministers, later to be wooed by Socialists, to invade the Admiralty and, 
driven by hunger, to pillage the docks.
135
 This was all aggravated by “la plus grosse de 
ces crises industrielles” that periodically drained the economy for, in implicit contrast to 
France, “l’Angleterre n’était qu’une immense usine employant des millions 
d’individus”, millions who could not eat if the factories shut.136 Conscious of class 
antagonisms, the invading French General’s proclamation declares “nous ne voulons pas 
conquérir votre sol… La République Française ne veut pas faire la guerre au peuple 
anglais” but only on “cette minorité qui vous opprime”.137 A particular glee was to be 
derived from British rather than French divisions deciding the outcome of a war as “le 
peuple allait jouer en Angleterre le rôle dont il était coutumier chez nous dans les 
grandes crises, mais avec bien plus d’âpreté”.138 Guerre Fatale varies only slightly from 
this line; here, there is greater expansion on the indifference of British “ploutocratie 
avide et sans scrupules” and army officers towards the common man, and the economic 
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problems result not from chance but French naval disruption to British imports.
139
 
Driant’s message was therefore slightly different from the wider moral point about 
British industrialisation made in Plus. It remained more focussed on the need to develop 
a powerful navy capable of blockading Britain. Otherwise, Driant’s disruption initially 
ferments strikes which, driven by starvation, only later transform into riots, fires and a 
welcome for the arriving French invaders.
140
 The imagined contrast between “la foule 
des révoltés hurlant à la faim et entourant un gouvernement désarmé” and “l’armée 
française… cent mille soldats disciplinés, confiants dans leur chefs, enfiérés par le 
souffle de victoire” epitomised an ideal to which France ought to aspire as much as what 
the writer thought of Britain.
141
 
 
Heroes and Villains: the French in French Invasion Literature. 
 
Guerre Fatale and to a lesser extent Plus articulated contrasts between British and 
French characters, and opinions on what the French were, or ought to be. At the heart of 
it, and explaining British lack of conscription or “soldats digne de ce nom”, were, Driant 
felt, the differences between “d’un côté un peuple mercantile, de l’autre un peuple 
guerrier”.142 In reflecting that “les siècles avaient transformé les armes et les costumes, 
ils avaient laissé intacte l’âme des deux nations”, Driant subscribed to the notion of 
immutable national character.
143
 French character was epitomised in the spirit of “la 
lutte face à face, poitrine contre poitrine, voilà la guerre rationelle, saine, morale où la 
victoire est au plus brave, au plus fort, la vraie guerre française en un mot”.144 The 
bayonet, “L’arme blanche, l’arme française”, symbolised this most, as bayonet wielding 
French professional soldiers successively killed the best of the British defenders, struck 
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fear into the hearts of British militia and volunteers who fled at the sight of them, and 
finished off Lord Roberts’ last stand.145 In that sense, Guerre Fatale combined the best 
innovations that science had to offer warfare with a fundamental and insuperable élan 
which had no need of modern weapons, both to the advantage of France.   
 
Whereas Plus had little in the way of characterisation, merely “presenting an idealized 
vision of a dedicated nation triumphing over the despised enemy”, Driant had ample 
space to create fictional heroes.
146
 The submariner Henri d’Argonne and Vice Consul at 
Malta, Raoul Petitet, are introduced at the very start of Guerre Fatale, collectively 
representing the naval officers and diplomats who, alone amongst the French, in contrast 
to the politicians, come to face to face with and understand the brutality and arrogance 
of the British.
147
 Both issue from well-established families and are social equals.
148
 
Argonne remains central throughout Guerre Fatale, especially in volume 2 captaining a 
submarine whose crew – a Meridional, a Basque, and a Flamand “de l’autre extrémité de 
la diagonale française”- is a French nation in miniature.149 Equally symbolically, their 
attachment to their officers is deemed of crucial importance, underlining the need for a 
nation to be united and behind its established elites. Argonne himself is resourceful, 
intelligent, bold and always one step ahead of his opponents, as well as showing a 
humane and paternalistic side, saving a Breton submariner from alcoholism and later 
scrupulously refusing to put foreign passengers in irons when on a packet boat under 
threat of sinking from a British cruiser.
150
 Seemingly coming along for the ride, on the 
submarine, Petitet shows a fear of diving that highlights Argonne’s courage, but 
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otherwise he acquits himself well as a secondary hero.
151
 Suggesting the unity between 
armed forces and civilian population Petitet latterly rejoins his old regiment, and thus 
fights on the land as part of the invading force in volume 3.
152
  
 
In singling out Britain, both heroes depart from the received wisdom that France’s real 
enemy was to be found across the Rhine. The question of whether Britain or Germany 
presented the greater threat was one only touched upon as Driant seems to have regarded 
the answer as a foregone conclusion. Partly, the debate was born of inter service 
rivalries. It is an army officer, Dufau, who initially maintains “la querelle définitive et 
décisive à régler, c’est la querelle avec l’Allemagne”, until the British attack on Tunisia 
changes his mind with his dying words “l’ennemi, c’est l’Anglais”.153 Germany 
otherwise was depicted as acquisitive, and ready to dishonour its international 
commitments to suit its own interests, with Italian policy all but determined by German 
actions.
154
 Most of Smith’s spies and saboteurs are also Italian, his amorality further 
underlined by the most prominent, Gigas, being a Sicilian Mafios.
155
 
 
Although “La race française est la race guerrière par excellence parce qu’elle est riche 
en audacieux”, this did not mean that all Frenchmen were heroic like Argonne and 
Petitet.
156
  Where an individual Frenchman does go wrong in Driant’s story, it is through 
weakness, not evil intention. Louis Dhurr, a promising army Lieutenant, was led into the 
web of British spies not by an active desire for treachery but as a result of gambling 
debts into which he was trapped by British spymaster Baron Glosher, “l’homme qui 
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connaît le prix de consciences”.157 The cost to Dhurr of avoiding a scandal was his theft 
of mobilisation plans from the safe of his Colonel.
158
 Becoming a spy under duress, 
Dhurr deserted, and remained one in large measure out of a misguided love for Walter 
Smith’s daughter: “elle a poussé au déshonneur l’homme qu’elle aime, elle lui retire cet 
amour même et le laisse rouler dans l’abîme”.159 No match for the worldly and 
manipulative Eva, Dhurr remains in thrall to her until news of her death leaves him with 
no reason to carry on spying when the need of his nation calls him back to his proper 
duty. Having confronted, subdued and branded Glosher on the face with the word “spy”, 
Dhurr revenges himself on the British by spying on their defences, then, with the help of 
Argonne, rejoining the army to fight in Britain.
160
 At the side of Petitet, Dhurr 
rediscovers his original Frenchness, earning praise for his disregard for death, affording 
Driant the opportunity to glorify war in a romanticised tableau of Dhurr leading a 
bayonet charge to recapture his former regiment’s flag, then, having earned forgiveness 
from the lips of the dying Colonel, himself smiling in “la mort libératrice”.161 Driant 
explicitly narrated Dhurr’s story as a path of remorse, expiation and redemption 
facilitated by the forgiveness of Argonne then the Colonel, in the spirit of “la religion 
chrétienne, une religion de pardon”.162 In this way, Dhurr, and by implication all 
Frenchmen, can be led astray, but retain some element of a fundamental nature in 
contrast to the British, and can be welcomed back at any time into the fold of their 
generous and paternalistic nation. 
 
France’s heroes stood to be undermined by other villains, politicians in particular. This 
theme had already appeared in Plus, which opened with equivocating ministers saying 
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nothing or denying the possibility of war, even as hitherto disparate deputies united 
when faced with the international crisis, eventually to force the government’s hand.163 
At this stage, before the end of the Boulanger crisis and the advent of the Dreyfus case, 
the democratic and patriotic aspects of the Republican tradition had yet to separate, with 
the result that Plus shows the leader of the left pressing the minister, demanding a 
British apology and moving to vote credits for war.
164
 Conversely, France’s position 
risked being undermined by credulous speculators on the Bourse, and at least one 
presumably anti Republican deputy of the right, “très connu par ses nombreuses amitiés 
dans l’aristocratie anglaise”, backed by an Anglophile Liberal press.165 La Guerre 
Fatale singled out Anarchist protestors rejected by the “vrai peuple de Paris”, but was 
critical of all politicians as such, whatever their allegiance.
166
 It was they who had failed 
to foresee the nearest and most dangerous foe for what it was.
167
 Foreshadowing later 
German invasion literature critical of the Reichstag, Driant blamed the Third Republic’s 
political system for French weakness, in the form of constant changes “de plan et de 
tactic navale…par suite de l’instabilité ministérielle”, and indecisive legislators who had 
not acted on the idea of a French canal to connect Mediterranean and Atlantic.
168
 
Despite the patriotic inspiration of France’s mass army, even its system of conscription 
as it stood in 1902-3 was not above criticism.
169
  
 
Driant idealised war in part because of its perceived capacity for reconciling hitherto 
truculent internal interests, hence his story has newly united deputies and Senators 
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voting credits, the press suppressing all but officially sanctioned news of the war and 
mob rule forcing “cette bande cosmopolite qui avait empoisonné la presse française” to 
alter their line.
170
 During the conflict, Driant’s war had a cathartic effect on France as “la 
hideuse politique ne divise plus les Français… La France se réveille”.171 The process of 
national re-awakening did not end with the peace, however for “Le danger, l’effort 
commune, la victoire surtout avaient fait disparaître les vieilles querelles qui longtemps 
avaient bouleversé le pays”.172 In the absence of political ambition on the part of the 
returning victorious French general, war served as an antidote to workers’ “chimeriques 
illusions du partage des biens et de l’égalité à l’outrance”, and, with the flight of 
internationalists and cosmopolitans from the country, Driant had accounted for all of his 
villains, leaving Argonne and Petitet to marry, and their country to prosper free of 
British power.
173
 This dream of sectional, class and political unity in France ran through 
much of Driant’s work, whether the main enemy was British, German or other, and was 
clearly therefore of great intrinsic importance to him irrespective of the particular 
conflict being imagined.
174
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Popular Invasion Literature in France, a product of widespread literacy after 1880, offers 
insight into how Britain and the British were regarded by that large section of the French 
public that bought and read Le Monde Illustré or such works as Plus d’Angleterre and 
Guerre Fatale in the quantities that they did. These works suggest lines of fundamental 
continuity in perceptions across a 16 year period encompassing the turn of the century, 
and possibly even beyond 1903. Attitudes towards Britain featured prominently, but so 
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did internal French preoccupations, not merely ones to do with narrow issues directly 
bearing on the armed forces but a wider scepticism about the politicians of the Third 
Republic and the need for national unity, in an essentially conservative vision of social 
order and a chauvinistic rejection of internationalism. Further, Plus and Guerre Fatale 
attacked not just British policies but the British themselves, suggesting a broader 
Anglophobia that underpinned criticism of British actions on the international stage. On 
the face of it, a lack of real animosity might be inferred from the disclaimer fronting 
Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe (1900), remarking that the British had so long been 
publishing and reading fictitious accounts of their own defeat at German or French 
hands that they should not be offended by a new French story doing the same.
175
 This, 
however, was qualified by the comment that Britain and Empire were on the verge of 
inevitable decline, and indeed the nature of the story itself, here and elsewhere. Driant’s 
work was not even the most extreme when compared to the invective of Mort Aux 
Anglais, which hinged upon the Gulf Stream being reversed, and the British population 
therefore frozen to death.
176
 By the time of Guerre Fatale, new contexts and warfare 
were beginning to emerge, but the old stereotypes continued in large measure to 
reappear.
177
 Invasion literature acted as a gauge of immediate concerns whilst at the 
same time falling squarely within one of several already established French discourses 
on Britain. 
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2: L’Ecole des Sciences Politiques and the British. 
 
Introduction.  
Very different from the popular genre of French future war novels, which were usually 
strongly Anglophobic in tone, were the more academic and high-minded works of the 
group of writers associated with the Paris based Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques 
(ELSP). Taking their lead from Taine, and his many publications, and his intellectual 
disciple Émile Boutmy (1835-1906), they included individuals like the historian Albert 
Sorel (1842-1906) and liberal economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (1843-1916) and, from a 
later generation, the historian Elie Halévy (1870-1937), who lectured at the school from 
1898 until shortly before his death. 
 
Lacking such direct institutional links to the ELSP, “the conservative sociologist and 
educator” Edmond Demolins (1852-1907), director of La Revue de la Science Sociale, 
was heavily influenced by the empirical, concrete and comparative methods of Fréderic 
Le Play (1806-82), who was one of the first supporters of ELSP.
178
  The ideas of Taine 
and Boutmy were reflected in Demolins.
179
 As such, his writing, testified to the 
circulation of ELSP ideas and interests amongst a wider French public. In A quoi tient la 
supériorité des Anglo-Saxons (1897), Demolins set himself the goal of explaining the 
success of Britain, its Empire and the USA. In so doing, he chose to concentrate on one 
particular aspect of British life, education, again a typical preoccupation of the ELSP. 
Although methodologically inferior to most ELSP work, Demolins’ book set out to be 
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populist.
180
 It thus succeeded in being “best-selling”, receiving a widespread circulation 
according to the second edition’s preface, stating that supplies of the first edition had 
been “exhausted within a few days”. The book thereafter ran into at least ten editions in 
less than two years before translation.
181
  
 
The influence upon French perceptions of Britain of Boutmy and the ELSP was not 
restricted to the school itself. Boutmy found time only to lecture on English and 
Constitutional history from 1872 or 1874-1886.
182
 Between the tasks of attracting staff, 
setting up a library, administration, producing propaganda for the École, and the 
demands of his own domineering brand of micromanagement, for Boutmy “la tâche en 
effet est écrasante”.183 He therefore published little until 1885.184 Among the copious 
publications thereafter were essays comparing the British, French and American 
constitutions compiled in 1891, articles in the Annales des Sciences Politiques on the 
British Empire and the English language in 1899, and the book Essai d’une Psychologie 
Politique du Peuple Anglais au XIXeme Siècle (originally published 1901). Hurried 
along by the decline of his eyes and his health, his further full length volumes included 
Eléments d’une Psychologie Politique du Peuple Américain and Les États-Unis et 
l’Impérialisme (both 1902).185 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu wrote from the 1870s across 
numerous subjects including finance, collectivism, depopulation and women, as well as 
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demonstrating a strong commitment to colonial expansion.
186
 His L’Administration 
Locale en France et en Angleterre (1872) aired several ideas that others, including 
Boutmy, were still echoing 30 years later. Halévy wrote extensively on the impact of 
Methodism in British history and politics, starting with two essays in the Revue de 
Paris.
187
  
 
Especially important because of his close interest in Britain was Jacques Bardoux 
(1874-1959), who had spent time at Oxford University in 1895.
188
 A prolific 
commentator from a conservative Republican family, and son of Senator Agenor 
Bardoux, his embeddeness in the establishment is illustrated by the list of guests at his 
1899 wedding which included politicians Waddington, Ribot, and President Loubet, and 
ELSP lecturers or supporters like Casimir Périer, P. Leroy-Beaulieu and Sorel.
189
 
Jacques Bardoux’s link to the École was formalised following Boutmy’s death, when 
“En 1908, il professe avec éclat, à l’École des Sci-Po un cours sur l’histoire de la 
politique étrangère du peuple anglais”.190 Sharing the haut-bourgeois origins of many of 
the Sciences-Po graduates, Bardoux came like many of them to be involved in politics at 
the highest level, underlining that ELSP influence was much stronger than the relatively 
small numbers of its pupils might suggest.
191
 
 
Bardoux wrote regularly for the Journal des Débats, including from 1903 a series of 
articles on Britain.
192
 These formed the basis for his second major publication on 
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Britain, Essai d’une Psychologie de l’Angleterre Contemporaine: Les crises 
belliqueuses, (1906), which was dedicated to the editor of Le Journal des Débats.
193
 
These were followed before 1914 by Essai d’une Psychologie de l’Angleterre 
Contemporaine: Les crises politiques: Protectionnisme et radicalisme, (1907) which 
also contained significant amounts of material on pre-1905 affairs, L’Angleterre 
radicale essai de Psychologie sociale (1913), Croquis d’Outre-Manche (1914) and 
various other books more specifically devoted to British politicians, royalty, literature 
and pensions. Throughout, the impact of the ELSP was apparent. Bardoux was clearly 
aware of and impressed by the works of other École writers, acknowledging “le beau 
livre de M.Boutmy” in a discussion on English empiricism.194 The “Angleterre” chapter 
he contributed to a volume on international Socialism was edited by Boutmy’s successor 
as ELSP director, and Paul’s brother, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu (1842-1912).195  
 
Sciences Po, a seat of Anglophilia in Paris? 
 
The ELSP writers have acquired a reputation for concerning themselves extensively 
with British affairs, and as Anglophiles.
196
 Part of the centre-conservative constituency 
identified by Crouzet as favourable to Britain and admiring of its institutions, the ELSP 
was held by Zeldin to be a mainstay of a renewed Anglophilia, exemplified by Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, one in a long line of Orleanists “deeply impregnated by 
Anglophilism”.197 Osborne agreed that “the Sciences Po was founded in 1871-2 by a 
group of liberals, anglophile to a man, and largely Protestant in religious background”, 
their teaching “liberal, anglophile... in the vein of Guizot and Tocqueville”, Keiger 
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adds.
198
 Prochasson goes further in observing the “noticeable Anglomania” amongst 
most intellectuals that played a key role in the foundation of ELSP.
199
 Hutton summed 
up Boutmy himself as “an admirer of English culture and society”, whilst Jacques 
Bardoux, in turn influenced by Boutmy, was a prime example (as cited by Bell) of the 
“favourable trends” in French opinion of Britain.200 Christophe Charle asserts that ELSP 
represented an “Anglophile current” but very much “a minority one” that had to take 
care to distance itself from the foreign policy of what was, at least until the Entente, a 
rival/antipathetic power. It was in his judgement wary of a broader, popular 
Anglophobia (as for example manifested in the French invasion literature studied in the 
previous chapter).
201
  
 
These judgments deserve further examination and, potentially, qualification. Drawing 
attention to the large number of foreigners attending the École by 1906, Boutmy’s 
eulogist might depict him as an epitome of French universalism and generous 
conceptions, according a place of honour “aux idées génerales, aux faits internationaux, 
à la science universelle”.202 However, if the amount of time and energy Boutmy devoted 
to study of the British denoted any degree of Anglophilia, this was not apparent to 
Austen Chamberlain, an ELSP pupil in 1885-6, to whom the directeur appeared “no 
great lover of the English”.203  
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On the face of it, the protestant flavour of the ELSP might imply anglophile leanings. 
Not a Protestant himself, Boutmy nevertheless had many friends who were. These 
included Guizot, who served as ambassador to London presiding over the first Entente 
Cordiale of the early 1840s, then passed the years of the Second Empire writing about 
British religion and history, as well as the philosophers Edmond Schérer and Ernest 
Naville.
204
 Protestants such as Casimir-Perier, Scheurer-Kestner, Jacques and Jules 
Siegfried (1836-1922) subscribed funds to the ELSP, where teaching techniques owed 
something to Protestant ideas of method rather than instinct.
205
 Protestant moral 
education influenced ELSP pedagogy: “Elle doit être théorisée afin de fournir aux 
maîtres et aux enfants un encadrement doctrinal et pratique”, in “Une science destinée à 
former des individus libres et autonomes, emplis du sens moral et capables de regarder 
le réel”.206 The practical and utilitarian bent of the Sciences Po education, chosen by 
Boutmy and imposed by the needs of the concours, finally, echoed the pragmatic 
English national character as imagined by Boutmy and others. However, Britain was not 
the only nearby Protestant nation with practical lessons to offer the French mind, or to 
give grounds for fear. Elements of that mind firstly accused French Protestants 
“d’affinités pro allemandes, mais ils sont repris dans les années 1880 où on représente 
les réformés comme les fourniers d’un insatiable colonialisme anglais”.207  
 
A first point to bear in mind is the broader 1870s and 1880s context in which the ELSP 
was founded and matured, years in which Germany, and not Britain, was the country 
that, directly or by example, most deeply influenced French politics, changes to the 
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army, and social reform.
208
 The circumstances of the ELSP’s birth were themselves a 
good example of this German influence. At the time of the Franco-Prussian war, the 
progenitor of the École, Émile Boutmy was, according to Pierre Favre in his survey of 
French Sciences Politiques, “trente cinq ans, sans fortune, professeur subalterne dans 
une école privé d’architecture” and “un obscur publiciste”.209 In 1870, he resolved to 
fight for France, only to fall into a hole and injure his knee. Thus rendered helpless, 
Boutmy suffered “une année d’infinie douleur et d’humiliation sans égale mais aussi une 
année de crise intime”.210 News of France’s defeats in the war, catalysed by enforced 
weeks of physical inaction imposed by the injury, prompted him in February 1871 to 
write to Ernest Vinet castigating “l’ignorance française derrière la folle declaration de 
guerre” in 1870. 1866 had represented a triumph of German universities over Austrian, 
so now the key to France’s success was to be found in education. Hence Boutmy 
conceived of his “grande oeuvre patriotique” as to found an École des Sciences 
Politiques in Paris.
211
 Initial publications on the proposed École were influenced by not 
only by Vinet, with Boutmy in June 1871 co-writing a piece on it, but by Taine, in 
Journal des Débats on 17 October 1871 who emphasised the need to teach the facts and 
statistics essential for any “idée nette ou opinion autorisée sur les affaires publiques”.212 
Taine and Boutmy concurred in feeling that “French education had been too long given 
over to abstractions and antiquity”, and linked this to the triumph of the University of 
Berlin in 1870-1. This was their rationale for the importance of practical and up to date 
knowledge.
213
 
 
                                                 
208
 See especially the Mitchell trilogy German Influence in France (1979), Victors and Vanquished 
(1984), and Divided Path (1991).    
209
 Favre, Naissances (1989), 22 & 21. 
210
 Favre, Naissances (1989), 39. 
211
 Favre, Naissances (1989), 29, De Foville, “Notice Historique”, Séances, Vol 65 (1911), 40, and 
Levasseur, “Boutmy”, Sciences Politiques Annales, tome 21, (March 1906), 141. 
212
 Levasseur, “Boutmy”, Sciences Politiques Annales, tome 21, (March 1906), 147. 
213
 Osborne, “Social Science”, Historical Reflections, Vol 8 (1981), 54. 
 58 
With this background, it was not surprising that, when the ELSP opened in 1872, 
Vanneuville noted “une double référence à l’Allemagne... comme modèle scientifique 
général et comme modèle spécifique en matière d’enseignement des sciences 
politiques”.214 The desire of Boutmy, Taine and others to graft onto the French 
education system modifications inspired by Germany was institutionalised in Le Société 
de l’Enseignement Supérieur from 1880.215 So while Britain, outside of Cambridge and 
Oxford, had, according to one ELSP article, little to offer, “par contre, tout est à admirer 
en Allemagne”.216 In acknowledging the generally negative comparisons of Britain 
made, it was the best that Boutmy, in 1894, could do to remark on “ce paradoxe qu’en 
Angleterre de bons resultants puissent être obtenus alors que les programmes sont 
insuffisants et incohérents”.217 Germany therefore constituted a powerful rival model 
and example for those associated with Sciences Po to investigate and advocate.   
 
ELSP – a Diversity of Views? 
 
Despite his continuing influence over Boutmy’s intellectual life, Taine remained content 
to let the younger man perform the practical task of running the ELSP. A second point to 
consider is the extent to which Boutmy’s views, Anglophile or otherwise, infused those 
teaching at the ELSP. Asserting control of his own creation on its founding in 1872, 
Boutmy took personal responsibility for selecting, approaching and persuading or 
cajoling others to join the academic staff of the École. Boutmy showed exceptional 
perspicacity in who he “discovered”, according to Levasseur (focussing on Ribot, Sorel 
and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu) and De Foville, 30 years after the event still readily able to 
remember his own recruitment.
218
 Having successfully wooed early career academics 
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with few publications or lecturers, many of them (like De Foville himself, at the 
Ministry of Finance) from governmental or political circles, Boutmy then offered 
“quelques avis bienveillants”, such as guidance on their content, tone, diction and 
gestures.
219
 Contradicting his authoritarianism in other areas, Boutmy encouraged his 
staff, as relatively unestablished academic figures, to try new approaches to their 
subject, to study outside of their speciality, or to propagate their views outside of the 
École.
220
 His policy (consciously reflecting German practices, according to Vanneuville) 
was to allow “une extrême liberté de pensée et de langage” to his lecturers.221 In sum: 
Boutmy assistait parfois aux leçons et donnait en suite des indications sur la 
diction, même sur le ton et le geste qui conviennent au professeur, mais on 
sentait chez lui le souci…de ne pas modifier la personnalité de son disciple, de 
l’aider simplement à se développer suivant ses tendances naturelles.222  
 
Thus, it is difficult to ascribe a single École “approach” to politics, religion or much 
else, beyond a blanket characterisation of Boutmy, Sorel, P.Leroy-Beaulieu and Albert 
Vandal as “conservative”.223 Taine’s manifesto for the ELSP, in laying emphasis on 
practical knowledge, maintained that “science engenders prudence and careful study 
diminishes the number of revolutionaries by diminishing the number of 
theoreticians”.224 However, the ELSP founders espoused not so much a strictly 
“conservative” agenda as one opposed to political extremes from whichever side.225 
Boutmy himself has been variously interpreted as a Liberal Conservative hostile to 
plebiscites or democracy, “a liberal of the Orleanist tradition”, “an Anglo-Saxon style 
                                                 
219
 De Foville, “Notice Historique”, Séances, Vol 65 (1911), 44, and Favre, Naissances (1989), 38. 
220
 E.g. Favre, Naissances (1989), 43, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, 42, Henri Gaidoz in his ethnographic studies, 
and 47. ELSP funding and articles went into L’Économiste française, founded in 1873 by Paul Leroy-
Beaulieu then edited by him until 1916. 
221
 De Foville, “Notice Historique”, Séances, Vol 65 (1911), 44, and Vanneuville, “Mise en forme”, 
Politix, 15. 59, (2002), 75. 
222
 Levasseur, “Boutmy”, Sciences Politiques Annales, tome 21, (March 1906), 164. 
223
 Keiger, “Patriotism”, Tombs, (ed), Nationhood (1991), 260. 
224
 Osborne, “Social Science”, Historical Reflections, Vol 8 (1981), 56, citing Journal Des Débats, 17 
October 1871, CF. Tint, French Patriotism (1964), 72. 
225
 Dominique Damamme, “Genèse Sociale d’une Institution Scolaire” in Actes de la Recherche en 
Sciences Sociales, Vol 70 (Nov. 1987), 33, citing  Boutmy’s letter to Vinet, Quelques Idées,  25 February 
1871, and Journal Des Débats, 17 October 1871. 
 60 
Liberal”, and a proto Ronald Reagan figure, frowning upon any infringements of the 
state, by way of public welfare, upon individual freedom.
226
 
 
From this, it was only to be expected that contradictions would arise between the 
lecturers of the school. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, professor of contemporary history at 
ELSP from 1881, visiting Russia in 1867 and publishing three works on it in the 1880s, 
ultimately succeeded Boutmy as director of the École in 1906.
227
 His other main 
speciality was the study of anti-Semitism, linking it to anti-Protestantism and anti- 
Clericalism then deriding all three as intolerant and hateful in his “ouvrage célébre et 
courageux” of 1902.228 This sat awkwardly with the overt racial undertones of Boutmy’s 
criticism of Americans in the same year. Analytical deconstruction of their institutions 
and society mixed with fulminations against “the reject scum of European society” being 
exported to the USA, where “only the negroes, as an inferior and spineless race, have 
allowed themselves to be tied to the soil”.229 
 
The kinds of subjects treated by ELSP writers evolved over time. Initially, Boutmy 
denied any strictly vocational aspect to his endeavour, stating “L’École n’est à aucun 
degré une école professionnelle. Elle ne prépare pas à une carrière”.230 However, 
bringing the ELSP’s first, lean, years to an end necessitated a degree of 
professionalization. The emphasis moved away from science towards preparing pupils 
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for exams.
231
 The story of the early ELSP amounted to “l’histoire de la mutation rapide 
d’une institution qui à l’origine voulait développer et diffuser une véritable science 
expérimentale du politique et qui devint une école professionale aux ambitions plus 
limités”.232 Boutmy (though briefly willing to contemplate nationalisation of the ELSP) 
remained committed to the private status of the ELSP.
233
 The message was not lost on 
Austen Chamberlain, who noted that Boutmy “and those associated with him attributed 
a part of France’s misfortunes in 1871 to the rigid control exercised over education by 
the government of the second Empire” and had therefore determined to create a private 
venture “where the truth could be told fearlessly, uncontrolled by the wishes or 
necessities of the government of the day”.234 Reflective of what ELSP writers would 
espouse as typically British strengths, Boutmy’s creation exemplified the virtue of 
“l’initiative privée, qui est hardie, active et souple”.235 Consequently, the most important 
of the original 200 stockholders in the school were bankers and industrialists such as 
Édouard André and the Siegfrieds.
236
 Financial support also continued from commercial 
figures such as Bouccicaut, no doubt encouraged by the tones in which P.Leroy-
Beaulieu lauded the paternalism and community spirit of the new Bon Marché 
department stores and how these “are not only places of sale, they also become places of 
gathering: women meet each other here as formerly men did at the barbershop”.237 This 
commercial interest seeped into the ELSP’s teaching after 1891 when “le directeur se 
préoccupa de la formation de jeunes gens aptes à remplir des functions dans les grandes 
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enterprises industrielles et commerciales, banques, chemins de fer” and accordingly 
framed a new series of courses to meet this need.
238
 
 
What did remain consistent about the École was its determination to make its teaching 
modern, its approach pragmatic, and a conscious, systematic creation of as 
comprehensive a range of contemporary courses as possible, all in one place, for 
example presenting a wide range of “langues vivantes” such as English, German, 
Russian, and Turkish.
239
 Perhaps more specifically linked to Britain in the imagination 
of Boutmy and others like him was the consistent aim of consolidating the position of a 
wealthy ruling elite (to match the English aristocracy). From the start, Boutmy had, apart 
from any pretensions to scientific positivism, aspired to “refaire une tête du peuple”, to 
promote “le gouvernement par les meilleurs” who would then set the tone for the rest of 
the French population.
240
 The ELSP would act as the instrument by which practical 
knowledge of how to govern effectively would be imparted to “those classes who should 
rule”.241 The central aim of the ELSP was to produce “competent judges of political 
questions, capable of solid discussions on these and capable of leading opinion”. In 
practice, this resulted in very restrictive admissions to a fundamentally elitist 
undertaking, whose fees only the wealthy could afford.
242
 More than ensuring the 
national survival of France, the ELSP served the class interest of groups, their traditional 
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privilege now threatened by Democracy, who must develop “mérites éclatantes et utiles” 
in order to invoke “le droit de plus capable” to maintain their leadership.243  
   
ELSP shows of interest in Britain and a potential conceptual affinity for what Boutmy 
perceived as distinctively English ways should not be confused with pro-English 
sympathies on the part of ELSP writers. In the eyes of commentators such as Drumont 
or Maurras, any Protestant affiliations stood to make the ELSP subversive, such that 
there would have been an inherent contradiction in teaching that was “liberal, 
Anglophile and patriotic by temperament”.244  Thus the ELSP attitude towards Britain 
had to be more ambiguous than the unqualified École line by the 1890s favouring Slavs 
and national self determination in the Balkans.
245
 The level of interest in Britain did, 
though, increase as the immediate shock of the 1870-1 defeat faded, and this was 
reflected in the amount published, most of it positive if still tinged with criticism, from 
the mid 1880s. Likewise, once ELSP had become established as a model in its own right 
by 1900, the need for and usage of a German model ceased.
246
 
 
Defining Les Anglais – a Race Apart?   
 
Where the authors of invasion literature did not much preoccupy themselves with what 
made an Englishman, Frenchman or Italian, instead hanging certain characteristics on 
those labels as a form of shorthand, ELSP writers, following the lead of Taine, were 
inclined to dig deeper into notions of national character. The use of race as a tool to 
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define peoples was common by the 1890s.
247
 For example, Paul Bourget, highlighting 
the essentially Anglo-Saxon nature of the USA, asserted that “Among the truest and 
most indestructible facts, the most fundamental is that of race”.248 This implied an 
essentialist, possibly even determinist, view of what peoples were like and might do. 
Given its provocative title, and proceeding from sweeping conclusions as to “Anglo-
Saxon” dominance of the world, Demolins’ work might seem the most obvious example 
of immutable race being placed at the centre of an analysis of Britain. 
 
The tracing of Anglo-Saxon history back to the fifth century, the insinuation of a 
consistent “Anglo-Saxon” mentality, particularistic, uncompromisingly independent and 
strongly attached to agriculture, pointed to an essentialist view of that race. Social 
Darwinian overtones arose in Demolins’ repeated references to “the struggle for life” 
and to the ideas of competition between racial groupings, such as Anglo-Saxons and 
Celts or Normans. These corresponded with national groupings to only a limited 
extent.
249
 Concepts of racial degeneration, in the form of “overworked short sighted 
abortions incapable of any vigorous or energetic efforts”, were happily borrowed from 
the Kaiser as a means of illustrating why German education should not be a model.
250
 
French “only sons, spoilt and tied to their mother’s apron strings”, lost the struggle for 
life once they were in “competition with the more strongly nurtured offspring of large 
families” from abroad. Local agriculture or industry might depend on foreign workers, 
but at the expense of “our very nationality being submerged under the invasion of the 
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foreigner”.251 Reminiscent of Drumont’s works, Demolins wrote in apocalyptic terms of 
how the French were destined “to be ousted and crushed as completely as mere Red 
Indians”, whereas the Anglo–Saxons were a group “whose progress no human force can 
now stop”.252  
 
Conversely, the implication of Demolins presenting English education as a model to be 
imitated was that the French could, by mobilising themselves, salvage their chances in 
“the struggle for life”. The answer was to emulate the Anglo-Saxons and adopt their 
practices of self-help and enterprise. Racial terminology, used by Demolins to classify 
and divide people into groups, became more a rhetorical device than something that 
truly propelled his arguments. These rested more on social mores or customs prevalent 
within groups defined by racial (or national) labels, in other words values that would be 
amenable to change, primarily through education. Indeed, race was first of the reasons 
expressly dismissed by Demolins for dénatalité in metropolitan France, given the 
variation in the birth rate from one region to the next, and the high reproductive rates of 
French settlers in Quebec.
253
 Instead, Demolins referred to the sedentary lifestyle and 
overwork in schools as one cause that “only acts on the highly educated classes” in 
debilitating pupils.
254
 Critical of recent French volumes highlighting the threat from 
Jews and speculators as works of “violent passion” lacking in “calm reason”, Demolins 
thus assigned a less central role to race in his analysis of “Anglo-Saxon Superiority” 
than might have been implied by the title of his work.
255
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In the ELSP as a whole, other permanent factors were held to mark the British apart, 
shaping their temperament and institutions. This followed from the work of Taine, 
whose very first proposed course “Géographie et Ethnographie” aimed to correlate soil, 
climate and religion to the nature of the state in any given country.
256
 In being “chiefly 
interested in what is called national character”, Osborne adds, “Boutmy’s work as a 
historian is essentially derivative from Taine”, causing him to paint “a flattering picture 
of the English”, and “the Anglo-Saxon tradition as one which was liberal and open, a 
model for France to imitate”.257 Boutmy’s English People offered a narrative of British 
racial development that was the conceptual parallel of Anglo-Saxon Superiority.
258
 
However, the main themes Boutmy identified were psychological and linguistic rather 
than biological. More important to Boutmy was the weather leaving “deeply scored 
characters and hereditary marks” on the British, whose fertile soil and constant moist 
atmosphere forced labourers to exercise, hence an abundance of “big, vigorous, men”.259 
An appetite for hard work was a natural result; “Les exigences du climat les obligent au 
mouvement. Les promesses du sol les exhortent au travail”.260 It was in his eyes no bad 
thing that in Britain “the struggle for existence” (echoing Demolins rhetoric) eliminated 
“the infirm, the feeble, the timid and the idle”.261  
 
What Boutmy observed as “the gratuitous passion of effort for the sake of effort... 
heedless of the result” could be a virtue when applied to work, or harmless when limited 
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to vigorous sport.
262
 A less happy consequence was that the British had come to colonise 
their near neighbours in Ireland by “conscientious massacres... subjection by barbarous 
laws” and degrading local language and elites.263 Englishmen, for ever “haughty and 
taciturn”, lacked sympathy and were disinclined to explain what they were doing, or 
mingle with their subjects, unlike the French relative to their “Celtic countries”.264 
Equally unfavourable was Boutmy’s assessment of “the bestiality of the larger part of 
the nation” for whom unthinking “sport, betting and drinking” were the most 
appreciated pastimes.
265
 The dull weather that offered minimal visual stimulation 
formed “des hommes pratiques”, and also, paradoxically, made the British not merely 
monosyllabic but poets admirable for their “extrême condensation dans les idées”. The 
end result was work “à la fin en jets abondants et magnifiques”.266 British artists were 
notable not for reproducing their real, outer, world of fog, mist and blurred outlines, but 
rather vivid depictions of their own life “from within”.267  
 
Similar melanges of ideas, some Anglophile and others not, emerged in the writings of 
other ELSP writers. Bardoux, too, dwelt on weather and geography, seeing a land where 
nowhere was more than 45 miles from the sea, fog hung on the hills and the people 
suffered a “monotonie des couleurs dans ces paysages presque aussi verts en hiver qu’en 
été, l’égalité de température”.268 The Highlands provided the most emphatic case of all: 
“L’Écosse, sans doute, offre de fort beaux sites, la campagne est originale, imposante 
même par sa solitude et sa pauvreté. Mais la tristesse qui s’en degage est trop profonde 
pour moi”.269 In disdaining the British climate, Bardoux followed in the footsteps of not 
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only Boutmy but Taine, who regarded it as one of the three main areas in which France 
was superior.
270
 Like Boutmy, Bardoux could engage in apparent racial discourse, but 
reference to “le Staffordshire, cette region anglo-saxonne aux têtes solides et aux esprits 
pratiques” as a means of distinguishing behaviour there from that in Yorkshire appears 
primarily to have been a rhetorical gesture.
271
 
 
Again, weather and geography served as explanatory tools. The grimness of fog, cold 
and urban smoke, according to Bardoux, provoked spontaneity and “souplesse de la vie” 
in the imagination.
272
 British attitudes towards war shaped by their weather, comprising 
long periods of reserve alternating with “une combativité singulièrement dangereuse”, 
always sustained by “une résolution croissante, et qui ne cède jamais”, when the 
occasion demanded it, could make them disagreeable opponents, or potentially “a solid 
ally”.273 Like Boutmy, Bardoux saw both positive and negative consequences. British 
will power was accompanied by firmness and energy but also insensitivity. By 1906, 
Bardoux echoed Boutmy’s earlier conclusions in summing up his view of English 
character as “Extérieurement des perceptions rares, intérieurement des sentiments 
refoulés: telle est la définition psychologique du temperament anglais”.274 
 
Elie Halévy, whilst influenced by Taineian structures, nevertheless sought to depart 
from the Boutmy and Demolins lines in eschewing their social Darwinist overtones.
275
 
Halévy also discarded geography, Britain’s island status, as sufficient explanation for 
Britain’s religious and political situation, though he did acknowledge the influence of 
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“an oppressive and wet climate” in shaping circumstances favouring religious 
revivials.
276
 Boutmy’s Englishman, deprived of “habitually rich and varied sensations”, 
sought “refuge in the inner life...in his own consciousness”, hence a strong religiosity.277 
Halévy went further, in judging the British “grave, reserved, silent and melancholy”, 
showing a religiosity even in tolerance and, in contrast to the French, none of the 
frivolity that enabled “the temperament of the free thinker”.278 An absence of state 
oppression, which might otherwise radicalise the religious, meant there had been no 
revolution to parallel that of 1789 undergone by the “Cartesian French”.279 
Britain as a French Model and a Mirror. 
 
For these liberal conservatives, such an absence of revolution might commend Britain as 
an example to be followed. Osborne affirms that ELSP writers: 
tended to see in the experience of England, the model, the object lesson for their 
compatriots. England seemed to them to have found the optimal balance of 
individual freedom and social stability, national greatness and prosperity.
280
 
 
The idea of Britain acting as some kind of model for the French to emulate (or reject) 
was, by the 1870s, nothing new, and could be traced back via Montesquieu, Benjamin de 
Constant, Charles de Montelambert and eighteenth century philosophes to at least 
1688.
281
 More than this, Britain functioned in the French imagination as a reflection of 
France and French preoccupations (the idea taken up by Crouzet’s observer).282 
 
Whilst there can be little doubt that Britain functioned as somewhere onto which the 
ELSP writers could project their own criticisms of France, there were limits to the 
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extent to which the Britain was viewed as positive model. Thus, there were limits to the 
Anglophilia of the ELSP writers.  
Politics and Government. 
As far back as 1872, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s extended comparison of France and Britain 
had contended that, from the County level down, English local government was “sans 
regularité, sans symétrie” and hardly a “system” at all, in contrast to the French 
départements, consciously organised in search of the “chimère” of uniformity.283 Britain 
was made up of administrative units with immense variations in size and population, 
often hangovers from long gone historical circumstances. Governmental structure in 
London, “antique comme la société où elle se trouve”, was no exception to these 
imperfections and irregularities.
284
 Yet British local government worked well, with large 
assemblies able to function efficiently, without tumult or long discussions unlike their 
French counterparts. The explanation lay in the complete contrast between “l’espirit 
public des deux pays”, Leroy-Beaulieu going on to note that neither the mechanisms nor 
the cogs of government matter unless the spirit of the people was “vigoreux et sain”.285 
So his work may have been an explicit reflection upon France, but he proved much 
more ambivalent about taking Britain as a model to be copied, commencing with the 
judgment that to copy a neighbour’s constitution “serait la preuve d’une étrange légèrete 
d’espirit et d’une singulière inexpèrience”.286 However, Leroy-Beaulieu still deemed it 
expedient to examine from across the Channel “des inventions heureuses qui se peuvent 
aisement transporter, sans troubler profondément les habitudes prises”.287  
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Much of what Leroy-Beaulieu had to say was echoed by Boutmy nearly 2 decades later. 
In his work on constitutions, also comparative, he ventured that the want of internal 
consistency within English Common Law “is enough to make a Frenchman shudder, 
possessed as he is with a spirit of love for all that is precise, exact and explicit, so 
passionate that it is like a French legislative instinct”.288 In his examination of this and 
the Treaties, Compacts and parliamentary Acts taken as making up the four pillars of the 
British constitution, Boutmy repeatedly stressed the apparent lack of logicality, and the 
contrast to the French approach, which consisted of “one single document, conceived all 
at once, promulgated on a given day, and embodying all the rights of government and all 
the guarantees of liberty”.289 In his view: 
During the last 150 years a prejudice in favour of the English has grown up 
among the French, and is increased, I believe, by a humble minded retrospect of 
their own character and history. Whenever a Frenchman discusses the political 
system of England the words which occur to him are respect for traditions, 
moderation, wisdom, regular exercise of political power and legal resistance.
290
 
 
The English law and constitution may have been a shambling, internally inconsistent 
series of ad hoc arrangements but they were durable. Boutmy placed emphasis on the 
flexible spirit of the constitution, which entailed a “freer and more supple law” able to 
accommodate “slow changes, transitions which follow and reflect the natural progress 
of events”.291 Not so much stable as perpetually “in a state of motion and 
oscillation…its solidity comes from its pliability. It bends but does not break”.292 The 
express contrast was made with the “inordinately explicit and scrupulously literal” 
French law drawn up by “logicians, engineers and artists”, as more brittle and 
susceptible to overthrow than the British.
293
 Casting the constitution as site for 
conflicting political forces to meet, Boutmy concluded: “a French constitution may be 
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likened to a town defended by a single wall without any redoubts inside it…The two 
Anglo-Saxon constitutions on the other hand are well provided with these internal 
defences”.294 A British constitution had the capacity to absorb changes without 
wholesale upheavals being necessary, whereas any breach at any one point of a French 
constitution would render the whole invalid, leaving the way open to revolution.  
 
Boutmy’s analysis did not imply that the English political system could merely be 
transferred to French soil. For him, English laws and politics would have been 
impossible to replicate in France. For a start, geography had shaped the development of 
Britain and the USA:  
The two countries in which political liberty has flourished spontaneously are both 
beyond the reach of the great military powers of the continent-one, thanks to its 
insular position, the other, thanks to its still more protected situation beyond the 
Atlantic.
295
  
 
Deep rooted temperamental and intellectual differences presented a second 
insurmountable obstacle, inasmuch as “We cannot be struck by a turn of mind quite 
foreign to French ideas”.296 The 1689 Bill of Rights predated Voltaire and Rationalism, 
thus lacking their philosophical, humanitarian character. “Traditions and sources” not 
“Principles and axioms” gave British political life the substance as well as the 
appearance of institutions, in contrast to those of the 1790s and after in France.
297
 
Consequently and thirdly, British laws and government could result only from a process 
of long drawn out, organic growth, and so cannot ever be replicated by one conscious 
action. In Boutmy’s words, “So the English have left the different parts of their 
constitution just where the wave of history had deposited them”, with no attempt at a 
coherent, consistent, whole.
298
 This early start to the British constitution had enabled it 
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to escape “from the despotism of logic,” whereas any political system postdating the 
Rationalism of the Enlightenment, including those in France after 1789, could only be 
created with rational criteria in mind.
299
 Rousseau had in a sense opened a Pandora’s 
Box which meant that no country could ever set about consciously emulating the British 
system. Finally, echoing Leroy-Beaulieu’s public spirit argument, came the assertion: 
I have pointed out, above all – and this is a warning against the snare most 
dangerous to Frenchman – that constitutional mechanism has no value or 
efficiency in itself, independently of the moral or social forces that support it or 
put it into motion.
300
 
 
Elements of both writers were to be found in Bardoux, who agreed that English law was 
“le plus parfait exemple de l’incapacité”, a law not so much left to the interpretation of a 
judge but one of a series of precedents with no pretension to uniformity or logic.
301
 He, 
however, edged the emphasis of the discourse back towards public values.  
A New Set of Values: the English Gentleman 
Taine’s notion of the English “gentleman”, made up of “coeur” as well as class and 
education, and of “l’admirable équilibre de la société et des institutions anglaises”, 
remained influential.
302
 Leroy-Beaulieu, Boutmy and Bardoux saw the key to Britain’s 
success in the spirit of social responsibility prevalent among the upper and middle 
classes. This was apparent in several ways, not least a fair-minded determination to 
administer and enforce law free from bias of class. Leroy-Beaulieu praised the impartial 
justice of English JPs, buttressed by a need to take public opinion into account, 
remarking “Il n’y a en Angleterre aucun juge qui hésitât à condamner le plus haut 
fonctionnaire sur la plainte fondée du moindre des paysans”.303 The recruitment of 
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volunteer special policemen would be possible only “dans un pays où le respect des lois, 
l’énergie individuelle, le courage civique, l’habitude de manifester ouvertement ses 
opinions sont des qualités fort repandues”.304 The vision presented was essentially a 
paternalistic one, inasmuch as rural “riches propriétairs” manifested real “sympathie 
pour les populations environnantes”, who reciprocated with “un sentiment de confiance 
et d’adhésion”.305  
 
Boutmy, on the other hand, emphasised “the fundamental individualism... rightly said to 
be one of the attributes of British genius”, interpreting this to mean the typically 
unsociable Englishman, not “conscious of the ties that bind humanity together... to a 
large extent a recluse... more aloof from the world in which he lives and the 
neighbours... than men of any other nationality”.306 Such temperament did not altogether 
preclude the notion that “the English unite for action” when necessary, but this 
minimised the scope for state interventions: “The English feel the vigour of their public 
spirit. They have experienced the vigilance of a free press and the powers of 
associations and of public meetings”, meaning that the authorities will “use the powers 
left them only with moderation and for the good of the country”.307  
 
The idea of a “moral elite” especially appealed to Bardoux as a means of explaining the 
stable, workable, politics of Britain.
308
 Time and again during his months in Oxford, he 
returned to the theme of how the English “perform their social duties better than any 
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other people”.309 Bardoux was deeply affected by speeches in the hall of New College 
attended by 1,000 undergraduates, remembering it as “one of the noblest sights at which 
I have ever been present”, ending with an exhortation to put students and working men 
into contact.
310
 He commented: 
 I retired sad and touched. I thought of certain undertakings at Paris which are 
organised by students and supported with difficulty while no one ever gives them 
a word of encouragement…Moral superiority can never be recognised without a 
certain pang. Can it be that the passion for ideals in France is slumbering?
311
 
 
Bardoux, in contrast to Boutmy, veered towards the notion of the wealthy bettering their 
social inferiors, something he felt was lacking in French elites. Given Oxford’s 
unsystematic lectures, meagrely attended by students, Bardoux re-interpreted the 
purpose of the university, “above all a school of political sciences”, in the following 
terms: “an exclusively moral and political education is given to the youth of 
Oxford…but the moral sense and political obligations are the two foundations of a free 
society”.312 
 
Whilst this was consistent with later themes of English “écoles de caractère”, to 
Bardoux’s mind the Oxford ethos was motivated by a preponderant concern for the 
“social question”.313 Religiosity spurred Oxford students to civic responsibility, as 
witnessed in a “young Anglican priest holding a discussion on Socialism” and hoping 
the church will utilise “the social movement…to anticipate its dangers”, and a 
clergyman’s speech at “a socialistic meeting” in Somerville.314 Fostering excursions to 
Oxford of London workmen, motivated by fear of a Socialism created by a “social hate”, 
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demonstrated that the aristocracy “have had sufficient intelligence to foresee and 
sympathy to understand”.315 Equal approval went to philanthropic enterprises that he 
visited in London and Manchester during the summer vacation, funded by donations 
from students, and manned by volunteer undergraduates there to “give in exchange for 
their board a certain number of lectures” so as to acquaint the workmen with 
“intellectual and artistic joys”.316 From this came Bardoux’s later explanations for the 
survivability of the British aristocracy: its ability to include a wide variety of opinions 
within its ranks, and the way primogeniture gave rise to numerous, relatively poor but 
hard working, “cadet lines”.317 
 
Not all aspects of Bardoux’s Oxford peers pleased him, but he retained in mind 
preoccupations nearer to home. Reflecting French anxieties about issues of dénatalité, 
he noted that Britain lacked “our family life with its profound bonds of union and its 
lofty conceptions of mother”, reacting with displeasure to his fellow students’ attitudes 
on this score.
318
 In common with Taine, Bardoux keenly noted an outward morality. 
Landlords participated in surveillance of the hours kept by undergraduates, most 
students were too “timid” to push their luck against the discipline of the Proctor, and a 
student’s fiancée, rather than an opportunity for immorality, always proved “a surer 
guardian of his morality than the university police”.319 According to Bardoux, the 
subjects invariably broached by those who met him as a French newcomer in 1895 were 
“When will France declare war on Germany? What is her position on the Egyptian 
question? And what do you think of Zola or the Latin Quarter?” the last of which seems 
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to have irritated him immensely.
320
 In other ways, his impressions were more in accord 
with other French commentators. Excessive consumption of alcohol occurred on “last 
day of the eights” when “numbers of students must have been brought home in 
wheelbarrows”.321 It was with no little disgust that he later remarked on the spectacles of 
“the abuse of strong drink” by six students who had left behind them a soaked piano and 
58 empty beer bottles (which Bardoux was presumably sufficiently fastidious to want to 
count).
322
 
 
Bardoux therefore presented a favourable picture of Oxford that was nuanced as to both 
the inadequacy of the academic education available, and the behaviour of the students. 
Demolins, on the other hand, did not hold back in asserting the lessons that he drew, 
shifting the emphasis away from something political and communitarian towards the 
values of “Individualistic formation”.323 The key to British success, Demolins 
repeatedly asserted, lay in the creation of individuals able “to take care of their own 
welfare” animated by “a devouring spirit of initiative”.324 This had little to do with the 
ethos of social responsibility revered by Bardoux in Oxford.
325
 The nature of this self-
reliance was epitomised by the school headmaster that Demolins met, described as tall, 
muscular, energetic, more like “a pioneer, a squatter of the Far west” than his sombre 
and scholarly counterparts in France.
326
  
 
                                                 
320
 Bardoux, Memories (1899), 22 & 23. Bardoux arrived in Oxford on 30 April 1895, barely one month 
after Grey’s House of Commons declaration on ownership of the Nile. The works of Émile Zola had been 
the subject of well-known obscenity prosecutions in Britain, directed against the author’s English 
translator Henry Viztelly in 1888-1889- Hemmings, Zola (1977), 151-152, Richardson, Zola (1978), 160, 
and King, Garden (1978), 232-246. 
321
 Bardoux, Memories (1899), 59-61. 
322
 Bardoux, Memories (1899), 81. 
323
 Demolins, Anglo Saxon Superiority (1898), 78. 
324
 Demolins, Anglo Saxon Superiority (1898), 49 & 102. 
325
 E.g. Bardoux, Memories (1899), 30-32. 
326
 Demolins, Anglo Saxon Superiority (1898), 52. 
 78 
A further leading theme was agriculture, as the Anglo-Saxons had always ultimately 
prevailed over Celtic, Norse, or Norman rivals by a firmer “implantation of the race into 
the soil”.327 This pattern was now being repeated by settlers in the USA and British 
Empire, a progressive and overflowing civilisation transforming new territories, 
whereas in Algeria there lived a mere 300,000 French to 250,000 Europeans of other 
extractions.
328
 Demolins dissected “An English training college… to found in different 
countries those agricultural concerns by means of which the Anglo-Saxon race is 
gradually taking possession of the world”.329 Therefore his third preoccupation was 
education, being one way in which appropriate attitudes could be inculcated in France, 
and a field in which Britain could function as a model.
330
 A complete overhaul of 
French values was required, for “the great obstacle to reforming our schools is to be 
found in our social state, in our very customs and manners which urge our youth to 
embrace ready-made careers” in government employment.331 Such reforms must be 
attempted, Demolins opined, and must be made to succeed because otherwise the 
French, still receiving the education of the past, would be doomed “to swift failure and 
ultimate fall”.332 
 
The British Educational model(s). 
 
Whereas wholesale constitutional or political reform on English lines remained off the 
ELSP agenda, it was in the field of education that Britain was seen as most promising. 
Two principal models emerged.  
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A Quoi Tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? blamed the parlous state of French 
education for a whole range of current ills, from dénatalité to a French failure to exploit 
their colonies properly. Overwhelming it all was France’s declining international 
position. The ambiguous feelings entertained by Bardoux and Boutmy towards Britain 
tipped in Demolins’ case towards angst at the preponderant Anglo-Saxon threat to 
France, in a fashion that called to mind Driant’s antipathy rather than any Anglophilia. 
Demolins’ work began with a map, demonstrating “the extraordinary power of 
expansion of that race” with vast areas of the world, including the USA and the British 
Empire, shaded in as “Anglo-Saxon” territory, and others, such as Egypt and Argentina, 
marked as “parts that are only threatened”.333 The preface to the first French edition 
(reproduced in the English translation) bluntly stated of Anglo-Saxon superiority: 
We all have to bear it and we all dread it; the apprehension, the suspicion and 
sometimes the hatred provoked by l’anglais proclaim the fact loudly enough. We 
cannot go one step in the world without coming across l’anglais, we cannot 
glance at any of our late possessions without there seeing the Union Jack.
334
 
 
Germany was not the quintessential enemy, but Britain. The reason why the Anglo-
Saxon should be so dominant and feared accounted for Demolins’ interest in the British, 
and justified the creation of his book. Where Bardoux was to express the comparison 
between Oxford and what French education had to offer in terms that were often 
melancholy or envious, Demolins portrayed a more explicit “striking contrast”, centred 
on the mission of English education designed “to form the man, the whole man”.335 In 
this mission, to shape independent and self-relying men able to “confront and conquer 
the hardships which await the settler in a new country”, lay the secret of Anglo-
Saxon/British dominance.
336
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Drawing on what he had learned in Britain, Demolins stressed the independence and 
self-reliance engendered in school by a heavy employment of experiential and empirical 
methods.
337
 This acted as a direct mirror on French schools, according to Demolins, 
dedicated to the “chauffrage” (cramming) of vast amounts of knowledge, not necessarily 
durable, for the day of the exam, a process unavoidably entailing “skimming the surface 
of things rather than judiciously understanding them”.338 These exams served to secure a 
career in state employment: the vast number of applicants for such work necessitated 
harder exams, more cramming and even more emphasis in school on academic learning, 
at the expense of anything else. Demolins further contrasted the “sovereign contempt of 
the body evinced by our educational system” and “our detestable regulation gymnastics” 
with the “calmness and self possession” induced by British emphasis on sport and 
games.
339
 Entirely absent from the French curriculum were lessons in, and practice at, 
the manual trades and skills, from the construction of furniture or bridges to gardening 
and first aid, that would be absolutely essential to any potentially isolated colonist, 
thrown back on his own resources.
340
 In a critique of French attitudes, he contrasted the 
prevailing atmosphere in France where the highest status was accorded even by 
merchants or manufacturers to employment in the army, magistracy or any other state 
appointment.
341
 This “aversion shown by the French for independent callings” meant 
that the young were “repeatedly told that there was nothing else respectable, nothing 
else worthy of their ambition” other than officialdom.342 Education was a key 
component of Demolins’ inversion of this system of values, criticising the static nature 
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and predictable promotion paths of such non-productive “ready-made situations”, and 
espousing the “dignity and freedom” of independent occupations.343 
 
British education epitomised exactly the private enterprise that Demolins’ world view 
glorified.
344
 Echoing the independence of the future settlers, the school he saw was 
private, if supported by “men of mark”, many of them already in the colonies and able 
to give practical guidance on the difficulties to be overcome there.
345
 Demolins’ analysis 
did not overlook class, but here it served to propagate Anglo-Saxon dynamism. This 
practical education, and the desire to colonise, was not just for the desperate lower 
classes, or junior “cadet line” aristocrats driven to hard work by relative poverty, but to 
the sons of any and all “rich and well to do families”, happy to abandon their “calm and 
peaceful existence” at home.346 Thus, the able and wealthy were just as committed to 
free enterprise as any other Anglo-Saxon. Conversely, for the inevitably many 
Frenchmen whose exam results left them with no choice but work outside of the state, 
they approached that prospect half-heartedly, and were left ill-equipped by their 
education. “French training, excellent for the training of officials, is of no value in 
forming independent, resourceful men, able to cope with the difficulties of life”.347  
 
To the extent that the key Anglo-French difference lay in behaviour and attitudes, 
Bardoux’s views in Memories of Oxford agreed with Demolins. The inherent self-
confidence of the British was repeatedly apparent to Bardoux and, again, reflected on 
France, but was based more in national pride and history than the self-reliance espoused 
by Bardoux. Hence French institutions boasted nothing to compare with the “moral 
force” of Oxford, no choirs, no parks, and “none of these old palaces, the sight of which 
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exalts the soul no less by their beauty than by the memories which they recall”.348 
Bardoux reflected that “the national airs of Oxford are better than the verses of Bruant”, 
songs of Waterloo and Mandalay leaving him “moved and charmed: a little jealous, 
however, of the care their forefathers took to surround their youth with things noble and 
beautiful. Ours did not spoil us in the same way”.349 Similarly emotive language 
repeatedly evoked more generally the traditional atmosphere that Bardoux sensed, in the 
“nobility and loftiness of the architecture”, there “before my dazzled eyes”, students 
who “have a certain monastic stamp” and staff conducting extended ceremonies of 
mediaeval origin.
350
 Modernity, in the form of the election of two MPs for Oxford, 
prompted the remark “What a strange city is this Oxford, wherein one is continually 
going from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, and vice versa”.351  What to 
Demolins was evidence of British self-reliance (sports such as cricket) became for 
Bardoux an occasion to draw comparison with “Greek athletes”.352 Bardoux accepted 
that there was always the probability that traditions might go too far, likening the 
conferring of degrees to the ceremony from Molière’s La Malade Imaginaire, with the 
waspish comment “I really believe that the cultivation of these reminders of the Middle 
Ages has its limits and that one sometimes runs the risk of becoming ridiculous through 
excessive respect for them”.353 However, the prevalent tone was favourable, if not 
overtly romanticised. 
 
Although the contrast with France was plain, if “an Oxford college without traces of the 
past would be a contradiction in terms” it followed that such a college could not simply 
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be created in France.
354
 Bardoux’s educational model did not lie in a direct replication of 
Oxford itself, but of the consequences of the attitudes he had witnessed there. It was the 
concern for “the social question” that most interested him as a lesson. The poor 
themselves, in the form of “the herd of men and women” crowded together in the “fetid 
atmosphere” of a Whitechapel pub around which swarmed an “ignoble crowd of sickly 
children and ugly hags” excited his opprobrium.355 What Bardoux admired was the 
paternalistic desire amongst those at Oxford to improve the lot of others by 
philanthropic efforts, which he hoped would be emulated across the Channel. 
 
Following Bardoux’s return from Britain, he founded, and from October 1899 acted as 
the first secretary general of, the Fondation Universitaire de Belleville.
356
 The aim of 
this enterprise was similar to that of the Oxford institutions he had seen in 1895. 
Belleville enjoyed support from Boutmy in March 1901 at an event organised at the 
Sorbonne, as well as that of Daniel Halévy.
357
 It was openly admitted by Bardoux’s 
biographer that “il n’a rien inventé: il est inspiré des University’s Settlements de 
Londres (Toynbee Hall) des centres d’instruction créés dans les faubourgs pour 
l’enseignement mutuel et l’éducation sociale.”358 Belleville also offered English 
language courses, among many others, and English tea at lectures, although how far it 
remained closely based on an English model was not clear. 
 
Where Bardoux attempted social engineering in the form of educating the working 
classes, Demolins too did not limit himself to mere observation, but acted on his 
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convictions in founding in 1899 his own École des Roches, in Normandy.
359
 Like the 
ELSP, this was a private school, directly modelled on the educational ideas Demolins 
had found in Britain, ideas which retained a lasting impact well into the new century.
360
  
 
Conclusion. 
 
It is evident that there were limits to the extent to which leading ELSP men were 
interested in Britain either intrinsically as a subject for study or as an object of 
admiration or emulation. Rather, writing about Britain more often than not enabled them 
to reflect upon French concerns. The writers formed a group of diverse opinions which 
Boutmy allowed them full rein to express, inside and outside the ELSP. Neither he nor 
Taine, for all their influence, had exclusive sway over ELSP attitudes. Taine’s view on 
the superiority of education in Britain relative to France was agreed by Bardoux and 
Demolins who both actively imported educational ideas from Britain to train character, 
but did so to ends that were very different from one another.
361
 Over time, the aims, 
interests and domestic preoccupations of these ELSP commentators evolved. There was 
no uniform approach. One Republican law professor complained to Boutmy of the 
Sciences Po staff that “I have seen the liberal elements, few in number at the start, 
successively replaced by reactionary elements”.362 This was reflected in ELSP 
supporters and pupils.
363
Attitudes varied greatly, even within the works of individual 
writers. Some undoubtedly Anglophile material was published, but much of it was 
tempered not least by reservations about British foreign policy. In the case of Demolins, 
                                                 
359
 Tombs, Sweet Enemy (2006), 406, likening it to Bedales. The school still exists – 
www.ecoledesroches.com Many of its web pages reiterate a Demolins dictum “Plus tôt l’adolescent sera 
traité en adulte, plus tôt il le deviendra”. 
360
 For example, on Jerome Carcopino, education minister under the Vichy regime- Julian Jackson, France 
The Dark Years,1940-1944  (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 2001), 156-157. 
361
 Crouzet, “Communication franco-britannique”, Revue Historique, Vol 254, (1975), 120, listed the 
constitution, religion and education as 3 major “choses supérieures” identified in Britain by Taine. 
362
 Keiger, “Patriotism”, Tombs, (ed), Nationhood (1991), 260, quoting from a letter of Émile Agave, 
February 1879. 
363
 Keiger, France and the Origins (1983), 31 and Keiger, France and the World (2001), 27. The spread of 
Republicanism and anti clericalism in state universities, especially after 1898, continued to encourage 
support from conservative elements for the ELSP, with its teaching often sceptical of the Republic. 
 85 
the antipathetic undertones of A Quoi tient la superiorité des Anglo-Saxons? and the 
presumptions it made about the threatening nature of British power were hardly less 
extreme than those of the most far-fetched invasion literature, however admiring 
Demolins may have been at how the Anglo-Saxons had achieved their leading position.  
 
In contrast to the popular novels studied in the previous chapter, and to much of the 
popular press coverage of Britain, ELSP studies on Britain tended to be consciously 
written for an educated audience, people who could grapple with complex trade figures 
or understand the abundant references to classical civilisations.
364
 Prochasson suggests 
that the ELSP was at the core of a movement that was inherently a minority one in a 
wider society that was predominantly Anglophobe.
365
  
 
In many ways, the writings of Boutmy, Demolins, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and (in their 
early forms) Bardoux and Elie Halévy, represented a culmination of long nineteenth-
century trends of thought, but as French preoccupations changed over time, so did what 
writers looked for and perceived in Britain. With the pragmatic and the up to date 
always in mind, ELSP lecturers were not indifferent to the tide of current events. Shortly 
after Bardoux’s sojourn in Oxford and the publication of A Quoi tient la superiorité des 
Anglo-Saxons? , the dramatic Fashoda Incident of 1898, followed by Britain’s 1899-
1902 war with the Boers, were bound to call into question pre-existing attitudes towards 
Britain.  
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3: Fashoda, the Boer War and their place in Future War 
Literature, Sciences Politiques and French postcards. 
 
Introduction. 
Having examined some of the context of French attitudes towards Britain, this chapter 
will consider the particular events of 1898-1902 as a preliminary to assessing how they 
interacted with those attitudes, and the nature of the response to them at the French 
Foreign Office, in the Paris Press, and among those French in, or travelling to South 
Africa in the relevant period. 
 
The Fashoda Crisis, 1898. 
 
The roots of the crisis lay in colonial rivalries in Egypt, still nominally a part of the 
Ottoman Empire. France had historically enjoyed special links with Egypt dating back to 
Napoleon’s Nile Expedition of 1798 and to the 1840s. European involvement in Egypt 
increased throughout the century, marked most clearly by the opening of the Suez Canal 
in November 1869. Designed by a Frenchman, de Lesseps, and obstructed by British 
diplomats, once completed the Canal was most used by British traffic as highway to 
their far eastern colonies, its control the object of intrigue on the part of the British 
government.
366
 Persistent financial problems on the part of successive Egyptian 
Khedives enabled Disraeli to acquire a 40% share in the canal in 1875, complementing 
the already considerable role of Anglo-French banks in lending the Khedive money. 
Indigenous resentment against foreign involvement in Egypt erupted in 1881-2 into a 
Nationalist revolt in the Egyptian army, and riots directed against European 
expatriates.
367
 When the British raised the possibility of a joint intervention in Egypt to 
protect their nationals, Freycinet proved unable to persuade the Chambers to vote the 
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necessary credits for French participation in an initial encroachment into Egyptian 
territory.
368
 Having moved into Tunisia only the previous year, the French had enough to 
deal with there, and elsewhere.
369
 Britain was thus left to act alone, landing troops and 
defeating the Egyptians in September 1882. The hopes of the Republic subsequently 
rested on the ostensible nature of British occupation, supposedly a temporary one 
designed to protect European nationals, and then to secure the province itself from the 
influence of the radical Islamic regime of the Mahdi, to the south. In reality, the British 
came to see retention of Egypt as a crucial safeguard for their route to India. Given 
British incursions into East Africa, these strategic considerations were reinforced by the 
idea of linking British colonies by constructing a railway to run from Cairo to the Cape 
of Good Hope.  
 
By the early 1890s, there was little sign that any British administration, Conservative or 
Liberal, was inclined voluntarily to vacate Egypt. The position of the Liberals, asserting 
British monopoly over the upper Nile against incursion from any other European power, 
was most notably declared by Grey in response to a parliamentary question on 28 March 
1895.
370
 Conservative adherence to this policy was affirmed by a more forthright, if less 
well publicised, warning from Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury in 
December 1897.
371
 Pressure from French colonialists within and outside of the Quai 
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d’Orsay impelled more action in response to these stands than diplomatic protests. In the 
hope of forcing the British to discuss the issue of Egypt, three expeditions were 
contemplated, for a launch east from the French Congo to the Nile. The first two having 
been diverted, the third under Commandant Jean-Baptiste Marchand set off from France 
in June 1896 with orders to occupy Fashoda, an abandoned fort on the upper reaches of 
the Nile in Sudan.
372
 A subordinate and more distant objective was to frustrate British 
north/south railway construction, “couper la fameuse ligne anglaise du Caire au Cap par 
une ligne française de Loango à Djibouti”, by instead linking France’s West African 
colonies to their single enclave in the east, Djibouti.
373
 
 
How the Marchand Mission was set up reflected a lack of co-ordination at the top of 
French government, and the extent to which determined pressure groups could decide 
policy.
374
 Such a group was the Parti Colonial, a loose band of deputies and 
administrators who sought to promote French Colonial expansion, and dominated the 
Ministry of Colonies. The only written authorisation for Marchand from the Quai 
d’Orsay was the fruit of a cabinet reshuffle at the end of October 1895. This brought the 
professional chemist Marcelin Berthelot to office, together with a new Minister of 
Colonies, the Egytptologist Guyiesse. This “pair of inexperienced left wing academics” 
fell easy prey to a redrafted proposal for the Mission, its objects now defined as the 
effective occupation of territory already acquired by France and the occupation of 
further lands to the west bank of the Nile with the consent of the local inhabitants, and 
its nature as devoid of “any military character and appearance”. Persuaded that the risk 
of any conflict was minimal, “a confused and incompetent Berthelot” gave his consent 
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on 30 November 1895 to this “visit by a group of anonymous European travellers 
without a national flag or government instructions”.375 
 
After some two years of arduous travel from the coast, Marchand’s expedition reached 
its objective on 10 July 1898. Attacks on Fashoda from Dervish gunboats were repelled 
on 25 August.
376
 Such were the communications of the time that Marchand remained 
unaware of preparations for Anglo-Egyptian forces to move south, likewise their defeat 
of the Mahdi’s successor at Omdurman on 2 September.377 Equally, Kitchener’s forces, 
although not unconscious of the possible presence of Marchand in the general area, had 
no means of being sure whether the European force reported in Khartoum to be at 
Fashoda was French or British.
378
 Moving south along the Nile, Kitchener met 
Marchand at Fashoda on 19 September 1898. Neither man on the ground would concede 
control of the fort to the other, leaving resolution of the dispute to Paris and London. A 
stand off between the French and an Anglo-Egyptian contingent, encamped beside 
Fashoda, ensued.  
 
Direct communication between the Marchand mission and the outside world was 
blocked by Kitchener, whose telegram first disclosed its whereabouts.
379
 Word of 
Marchand’s arrival at Fashoda reached French Foreign Minister Delcassé via the British 
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government on 26 September, so breaking the crisis. Once it had been confirmed to 
London that Marchand had the authority of Paris behind him, the next six weeks were 
marked by stiffening British demands for an unconditional withdrawal of his mission, 
before any negotiations could be contemplated. As this would mean no alteration of the 
status of Egypt, let alone other concessions, the main object of the Marchand expedition 
would be defeated by French acceptance of this demand. Awaiting first hand reports 
from Marchand’s subordinate Baratier, France maintained that, by virtue of the Egyptian 
evacuation of the Sudan in the mid 1880s, the territory had become Res Nullius and that, 
under international convention, ownership belonged to the first power effectively to 
occupy the ground.
380
 However, even in the event of a withdrawal being contemplated, 
British resolve not to enter negotiations before the recall was confirmed in cabinet on 27 
October. Without support from any third nation, crippled by cabinet instability and 
internal unrest, and confronted with a preponderance of British naval power, the Quai 
d’Orsay had ultimately little choice but to give way despite the lack of any other British 
concessions.  
 
Salisbury’s public announcement of the withdrawal, on 4 November, effectively ended 
the crisis although the threat of war lingered for several weeks. Marchand, choosing the 
tougher option to continue east via Abyssinia to Djibouti rather than steam in comfort 
north up the Nile in a British gunboat, maintained his mission in Fashoda until mid 
December. Once tempers over Fashoda had subsided in the new year, an agreement was 
concluded on 21 March 1899, delineating the extent of British and French possessions in 
central Africa, tied to the settlement of other, smaller, difficulties between the two 
European powers in West Africa.
381
 As Patricia Wright put it, “The Fashoda crisis 
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lanced the festering boil poisoning Anglo-French relations, although this was not 
apparent at the time or for some time afterwards”.382 In the meantime, another conflict 
involving British Imperial ambitions, this time in southern Africa, was escalating. 
The Course of the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902. 
 
There had long been confrontation between those, mostly of Dutch descent, who had 
settled in South Africa in the years directly after 1652, and the British, who established 
in the 1790s an official and military presence in the Cape subsequently ratified by the 
peace treaties of 1814-5. The nineteenth century was marked by a series of conflicts 
functioning on a triangular basis between the British, the Boer settlers, and the various 
indigenous black tribes in South Africa. Boer settlement and resistance by the middle of 
the century centred on the two inland areas, Transvaal and the Orange Free State, 
although some Boers remained in the more coastal areas where British dominance came 
to be asserted most forcefully. These formed the colonies of the Cape and Natal which 
were formally part of the British Empire. Disputes over the extent and nature of British 
control over the two Boer Republics had led to war in 1880-1, followed by the Anglo-
Boer conventions of 1881, which cited “British Suzerainty” over Transvaal, and 1884 
which did not, and allowed greater practical independence.
383
  
 
The region had already been to some extent destabilised by the 1870s discovery of a rich 
diamond seam at Kimberley, on the border between Cape Colony and Orange Free 
State, giving rise to a boom that transformed the area’s economy.384 A further discovery, 
of gold in the Transvaal, gave rise to a massive influx from 1886-7 into Johannesburg of 
foreigners, mostly British, to exploit the gold reserves.
385
 Further heightening the 
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tension, the 1890 occupation, by the British Chartered Company, of Rhodesia to the 
Transvaal’s north left the Boer Republics as an enclave entirely surrounded by British 
territory, save to the north east, where the Portuguese colony of Mozambique gave 
access to the sea via the port of Laurenço-Marquès.
386
 An incursion from Company 
territory into Transvaal by Dr Jameson on 29 December 1895 failed to secure control of 
the Republic. In view of the regular army officers and the 500 Chartered Company 
police accompanying Jameson and the backing of Cecil Rhodes for the attempted coup, 
this greatly embarrassed the British, but its failure did nothing to diminish interest in the 
Transvaal or its gold. Citing the Boers’ reluctance to grant civic or political rights to the 
foreigners, or “Uitlanders”, by the late 1890s numerically dominant in parts of the 
Transvaal, the Colonial Office in London pressed the Transvaal with various and 
successive complaints. Centring on the Transvaal’s attempts to control immigration in 
the form of the Alien’s Bill, these had nearly led to war in April-May 1897, with 
President Paul Kruger then backing down. Subsequent demands centred on issues of 
Uitlander naturalisation and the franchise, which were the subject of an unsuccessful 
conference at Bloemfontein in June 1899.
387
 Further pressure from London, encouraged 
and assisted by the High Commissioner for the Cape, Alfred Milner, culminated in 
Kruger declaring a refusal to compromise the Transvaal’s independence and rallying the 
smaller, less populous, Orange Free State to mobilise on 27 September, then starting the 
war against Britain on the expiry of a 48 hour ultimatum on 12 October 1899.  
 
Its military operations thus confined to Southern Africa, the war in essence broke down 
into three phases. Whereas Britain would take several weeks to summon and despatch 
troops from its Empire, and supplies from there and elsewhere, to South Africa, the 
Boers enjoyed the initial advantage of a quick mobilisation and ability to take the 
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offensive. Overrunning other border towns in the Cape, they surrounded British 
garrisons in Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking. The British had to wait until 
November before sufficient resources were on the ground to contemplate any offensive 
operations. However, they failed either to score a success against the Boers in open 
battle or to relieve the besieged towns. Advances in three columns, led by Lord Methuen 
to the west towards Kimberley and Mafeking, Omdurman veteran Gatacre in the centre, 
and Commander-in-Chief Buller in the east aiming for Ladysmith, resulted in defeats 
with heavy losses, respectively, at Magersfontein, Stormberg, and Colenso from 10-15 
December 1899. The new year saw no immediate improvement on this “Black Week”, 
with further humiliation awaiting Buller on 24 January 1900 when another attempt to 
relieve Ladysmith was bloodily halted by the Boers at Spion Kop. 
 
The second phase of the war was heralded by the arrival of further British 
reinforcements and a new Commander in Chief, Lord Roberts, with Kitchener as his 
Chief of Staff. The run of major British defeats that had characterised the first phase 
came to an end with the destruction of Kronje’s Boer force at Paardeburg across 17-27 
February. Roberts followed this up by advancing to Orange capital Bloemfontein on 13 
March, although disease, supply problems and continued Boer resistance slowed further 
progress. It took until 31 May-5 June to reach Johannesburg, then Pretoria.  The Boer 
armies in the field were not definitively beaten until after the last set piece battle of any 
size, at Bergendal on 27 August.
388
 With the flight of Kruger from Komatipoort into 
Mozambique, and the arrival of the British at this border town on 24 September 1900, 
many people assumed that the war was “practically over”.389 
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The hopelessness thereafter of confronting the British on a large scale, in a traditional 
battle, did not deter the Boers from continuing a guerrilla resistance. A third phase 
therefore went on for a further period of nearly two years, characterised by small scale 
Boer attacks, at times and in places of their own choosing. Mao Tse-tung later wrote that 
a guerrilla moves through the people like a fish moves through water; Kitchener, 
showing the same unflinching determination as in his two-year Sudan campaign, took 
the decision in 1900 to remove that water.
390
 So this period of guerrilla war was 
eventually marked by the systematic and exhaustive clearance of the former Republics’ 
countryside, being stripped of either the people-rounded up into concentration camps-or 
the food, animals and other resources upon which the remaining Boer commandos 
relied. Thanks to their mobility, many of these remained not only at liberty, but able, in 
small scale skirmish actions, to inflict embarrassing defeats on the larger British forces 
sent to hunt them down. Despite the persisting willingness of some Boer “Bitter enders” 
to carry on the fight, exhaustion drove a majority of Boer leaders finally to sign peace at 
Vereeniging on 31 May 1902. 
 
Fashoda and the Boer War in France. 
 
Although no European power had seriously contested British possession of the Cape 
after 1815, the discovery of diamonds and gold naturally attracted to the area workers 
and the money of investors from across Europe, including France.
391
 This sufficed to 
bring South Africa to fairly widespread attention even before tensions began to mount in 
the mid-1890s. When war broke out, the popular response across Europe, as Britain’s 
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diplomatic representatives were not slow to relay back to London, was almost entirely 
hostile towards the British position.
392
 Harold Nicholson later recalled: 
the burst of hostility aroused against us on the continent by the Boer War: there 
always occur moments when the British public realise with amazement that their 
country is not invariably, inevitably, naturally and universally beloved abroad. 
Such a moment occurred when we declared war on the Boer Republics. Our 
initial defeats were greeted with a general howl of Schadenfreude from Rotterdam 
to Memel, from Vigo to Irkutsk.
393
 
 
Where Fashoda had been an Anglo-French conflict, a year later sections of the French 
populace were able to join others across Europe to take up the Boers’ cause as their own. 
According to Robbins, there was “no lack of abuse directed at individual British people 
abroad” across all of Europe.394 On a mundane level, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
British visitors to France faced low level harassment. British tourists arriving at 
Newhaven in 1899 quickly noted the changed atmosphere at customs, and shopkeepers 
who, “while generally prudent enough to stay on the safe side of actual rudeness, did not 
forbid their children to call out ‘Goddamn’ at the passing British”.395 Even long standing 
provincial British expatriates in Dieppe, who could have had no part in the war, 
suffered, with minor harassments in the form of “a good deal of abuse and occasional 
stone throwing” and a girl having her feet trodden on.396 Local councils in Paris, Rennes 
and Vannes openly voted sympathy and resolutions in favour of the Boers.
397
 At the 
1900 Paris Exposition, the Boer Farmhouse was, reportedly, among the most popular 
exhibits, and, more generally, sympathy for the Boers found its expression in the 
wearing of felt hats “à la Boer”, with the St Cyr trainee officers’ 1900 cohort dubbed the 
                                                 
392
 See for example the despatches in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds), British Documents on the 
Origins of the War, Vol 1, (London, HMSO: 1927. hereafter BDW, 1), chapter VII. 
393
 Harold Nicholson, “The Origins and Development of the Anglo-French Entente”, in International 
Affairs, (Royal Institute Of International Affairs), Vol 30.4 (October 1954), 408-9.  
394
 Keith Robbins, Britain and Europe 1789-2005 (London, Hodder & Arnold: 2005), 174. 
395
 Simona Pakenham, Sixty Miles From England: The English at Dieppe, 1814-1914 (London, 
Macmillan: 1967), 183.  
396
 Pakenham, Dieppe (1967), 184, quoting Walter Samborne, writing on 8 March 1900. 
397
 Prochasson, “An English Crisis?”, Charle, Vincent & Winter (eds), Anglo-French Attitudes (2007), 
265. 
 96 
“Transvaal year”.398 American visitors to the Expo in summer 1900, conscious of the 
resemblance to French ears of their language to that of the British, “took to wearing in 
their lapels or on their dresses enamel pins that bore, unmistakeably, the stars and 
stripes”.399 
 
By contrast, the stance of European governments, even those claiming the closest 
kinship to the Boers, was more reserved. Kaiser Wilhelm II had, after the Jameson Raid 
in January 1896, not shied away from an open show of support for Kruger by sending 
him a contgratulatory telegram. Nearly four years later, faced with British official 
involvement in an international war, German policy was more cautious. However 
sympathetic to the Republics might be the noises coming from Berlin, Paris and 
Amsterdam, in practice neither these governments nor any of the other European powers 
proved willing to depart from a policy of official neutrality, despite the best efforts of 
the Boer representative in Europe, Dr Leyds, or the upswell of pro-Boer public 
sentiment which could never be entirely contained. 
Invasion Literature-an Amplified Message. 
An upsurge of invasion literature, such as  La Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe and Eugène 
Demolder’s L’Agonie d’Albion (1901), was brought on by the Boer War and Fashoda. 
These events fed off the history invoked by Plus d’Angleterre and Driant’s La Guerre 
Fatale France-Angleterre (as well as nationalist rhetoric more widely) as a means of 
constructing an idealised, aggrieved, nationalist France, as well as that country’s 
distinction from the perfidious, brutal British. Both based their books on a particular 
reading of history, which depicted Britain as “la Carthage moderne”, the British,  Driant 
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asserted, “un peuple de marchands” who rely on mercenary troops and bluff to bring 
them success.
400
 Despite some allusions to previous Roman and Norman invasions in the 
context of the topography occupied by the invaders, Plus had generally kept to the 
history of the last 100 years, whereas Driant, though not neglecting Napoleon, went back 
much further.
401
 Joan of Arc remained a motive for invading, as did humiliations 
executed in the name of Henri VI, as much as British executions, rapes and fires in 
Ireland in 1798.
402
  
 
Recent events in Sudan and South Africa built on the sentiments arising from Driant’s 
reading of previous history: “La guerre contre l’Angleterre était décidément, dans notre 
grand part militaire, la guerre populaire, depuis Fachoda surtout”.403 The years 1898-
1902 gave some scope for Driant to develop his line of thought further, notably 
supplying evidence of a duplicitous British master plan for aggrandisement at the 
expense of France. It falls to Petitet, as Driant’s hero in the Diplomatic Corps to clarify 
the larger picture by reporting that “l’Egypte, Fachoda, le Transvaal sont les étapes de 
cette marche orientée vers le continent africain et pendant qu’elle s’y adjugeait les 
territoires les plus fertiles, Lord Salisbury nous laissent généreusement en partage les 
déserts sahariens”.404 Contradictorily, Driant’s interpretation of the Boers as having 
taught Britain “un leçon d’honneur et de patriotisme” and exposed British weakness led 
him to conclude that it was more, not less, likely that those ambitions would be pursued 
by war.
405
 
Déchue de son omnipotence d’autrefois, couvant une rage indicible depuis ses 
inoubliables défaillances du Transvaal, elle cherche, depuis la paix bâtarde 
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qu’elle a conclue là-bas, un peuple à attaquer, une marine à détruire… De là ses 
provocations, ses insolences, comme à l’époque de Fachoda, avec cette différence 
qu’à Fachoda elle bluffait et n’avait pas envie de se battre, tandis qu’aujourd’hui 
elle le veut de toute sa colère, pour se refaire une réputation de puissance militaire 
et masquer par des victoires la lamentable faiblesse de son armée dans l’Afrique 
de sud.
406
 
 
Fears that, on the successful conclusion of the war, British forces might be turned 
against France were not limited to the nationalist right. Paul Cambon anticipated fresh, 
intolerable provocations to quarrel once Britain had had a year to recover after winning 
the war, whilst Elie Halévy wrote that the British would seek war for no specific goal 
but “as an energetic way to assert to others, and to themselves, that they do exist”.407 
 
The Boer War’s most novel contribution to Driant’s thought on Britain lay in how it 
impacted upon his evaluation of British military abilities. Centrally, he repeatedly 
asserted British military incapacity in South Africa.
408
 This drove the plot of La Guerre 
Fatale in the direction that Driant wanted, in making it more plausible, once French 
troops had landed in Britain, for them easily to progress. As Clarke rightly observes, 
“British troops prove to be as second rate and incompetent as any enemy general could 
hope… The fortunate invaders find that ‘the worst faults of Lord Methuen and Sir 
Redwers Bulwer in the Transvaal’ have been repeated on their home ground”.409 The 
competence of senior British officers was naturally challenged, for example a 
Commander-in-Chief who (in autumn 1900) had declared the Boer war was over when it 
was not.
410
 Driant’s contempt went beyond them to encompass Britain’s part-time 
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volunteers, in the recollection of the repeated failures of some Yeomen, and of others 
that:  
Lord Kitchener renvoyait au bout de quinze jours les pitoyables « yeomen » 
expédiés de la métropole, avait essayer de lever à prix d’or les mercenaires chez 
les peuples à temperament guerrier. Quelle fêlure cette pauvreté de soldats... On 
peut dire que cette guerre de Transvaal avait été pour l’Angleterre le 
commencement de la fin.
411
  
 
The army as a whole, including all of the cavalry, had been only too ready to surrender 
rather than fight.
412
 This in turn was related to one of the major themes in Driant’s 
treatment of the British army, linked to the idea of Britain as Carthage, their soldiers 
motivated to join up only by thought of their own economic gain. Officers and NCOs 
know and take advantage of this motivation to fill the ranks of “Cette armée, composée 
de rebuts de la population enrolés à six et neuf francs par jour par des sergeants 
recruteurs, chacun savait ce qu’elle valait”.413 Even when British efforts had been 
crowned with success, Driant inclined to question their real value, citing Kitchener’s 
“massacre des Madhistes à Omdurman” and Roberts’ dubious South African victories 
when his forces enjoyed a 10:1 preponderance, and scoffing at the financial awards 
made by parliament to both by way of reward.
414
 
 
For the most part, therefore, Fashoda and the Boer War simply provided a fresh 
opportunity to air what Driant would have been saying anyway. It was no coincidence 
that the general attacking Driant’s Tunisia was Brabant, who had previously “illustré au 
Transvaal des exécutions sans nombre, des incendies des fermes et des déportations de 
femmes et d’enfants dans les laagers des reconcentrados”.415 Such British treatment of 
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Boer civilians subsequently excited abuse as being an easy tactic to practice, “car le 
tigre, le chacal, le vautour et toutes les bêtes les moins sympathiques de la création la 
possèdent naturellement”.416 Driant placed French values, epitomised by “les nobles 
émotions” of Dhurr when first an officer, in explicit contrast to destroying a race in 
South Africa, and Britain’s real aim, the making of money.417 As well as demonstrating 
British brutality, the camps also furnished fresh evidence of British egoism, greed and 
hypocrisy: 
Sa démocratie froidement indifférente à tout qui ce n’était pas son intérêt et son 
bien être, n’avait plus d’idéal. Lord Kitchener pourrait sans soulever les cris 
d’horreur des sensibles ladies et des scrupuleux clergymen faire mourir 11,000 
enfants en six mois dans ses camps de reconcentration parce que le peuple anglais 
tout entier avait le regard hypnotisé sur les mines d’or.418 
 
Finally, there was the point that, in terms of its plot and outcome, La Guerre Fatale was 
not so very different from Plus d’Angleterre, produced long before the Boer War or 
Fashoda. As such, Driant’s effort paralleled the less well-known work by Alphonse 
Allais, Projet d’Attitude Inamicale vis-à-vis L’Angleterre (1900), which largely re-ran 
the fantastical plot of Mort Aux Anglais of eight years previously.
419
 Indeed, the 
evidence of Driant’s subsequent publishing career suggests that not even the advent of 
the Entente Cordiale was enough to dissuade him from propounding continued 
Anglophobic sentiments.
420
  
French Postcards: New Medium, New Ideas?  
Whilst the existing genre of invasion literature might have drawn little that was new 
from events in Africa, at the time of the Boer War another popular medium was 
emerging in France, in the form of postcards. Relative to other countries, notably 
Germany and Austria-Hungary, the postcard had come late to France, not officially born 
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until 1873, with none commercially available until the 1889 Exposition.
421
 The Dreyfus 
affair widened the popularity and reception of cards, in part used as a means of 
articulating the opposing viewpoints.
422
 The period 1898-1902 was therefore one of 
rapid development for the card industry, a first card collecting club founded in 1899 
blossoming to seven by 1901.
423
 The 1900 Exposition furnished a further stimulus.
424
 It 
is some indication of the reach of postcards that the French are estimated to have sent 60 
million of them in 1902, although this number was still dwarfed by the corresponding 
German and British figures, and the postcard had during the Boer War yet to attain the 
peak of circulation, and therefore currency as propaganda, to be reached in World War 
I.
425
 In the opening months of the Boer war, shops were already so “full of scurrilous 
postcards” that the British Consul at Le Havre felt moved to send a selection back to the 
Foreign office, together with leaflets designed for schools, featuring “the brave, 
primitively armed Boers routing the hideous red coated soldiers of Britannia”.426 By 
1902, the postcard had evidently achieved a sufficiently broad reception to indicate 
something of popular attitudes towards the war.  
 
Some cards served to fill an imaginative gap between the written press and what might 
otherwise have been ill-informed and unrealistic visualisations of what was going on, in 
an age when mainstream daily newspapers rarely published photographs. Illustrated 
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supplements went only some way to meeting the demand for pictures, and such pictorial 
material as they did produce was only as accurate and reliable as the artist’s fancy 
allowed.
427
 Conversely, by the 1890s postcard producers had the technical means to 
render fairly realistic depictions of what was to be seen in South Africa, either based on, 
or directly copying, photographic images.
428
 
 
Consistent with the punchy and simple message that the postcard form allowed, Boer 
War cards tended to follow a limited number of specific, readily grasped, themes. 
“Hommage à Kruger”, usually accompanied by an image of the President and a few 
respectful words, remained a consistent one from the very start, through Kruger’s 1900 
arrival in Europe, to the end.
429
 One variant on this, resonant for French nationalists, was 
the joint display, and therefore implicit association, of Marchand with Kruger.
430
 
Another was a restatement of the strictly materialistic, and impliedly dishonourable, 
motives of the British, in contrast to the Boer leaders.
431
 An obvious theme was the 
pillory of well-known British figures: Les Norwin’s cartoon series depicted a Queen 
“irritated by a persistent Kruger fly”, Lansdowne suffering the famine and war inflicted 
by his ministry on Transvaal and, of course, Chamberlain.
432
 There was glee at early 
Boer victories as well as caricature of ordinary British rank and file.
433
 In the context of 
previous French ideas, cards from early in the war drew on and perpetuated in this new 
context existing stereotypes of the British, underpinning criticism of unbridled British 
expansionism more generally.
434
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As the war dragged on, an increasing bitterness in tone emerged, as postcards 
appropriated wider criticisms of British conduct. The use of dum dum bullets was one 
aspect of this, a scowling Victoria for example depicted as “La Bonne Fermière”, 
sewing lead (the bullets) “pour récolter de l’or”.435 Far more widespread was the burning 
of farms and forced removal of their civilian occupants. Merely a grasping capitalist 
before the war, by its closing stages Chamberlain seems to have been perceived as a 
ruthless murderer, the commonest vehicle for that expression running along the lines of 
“Le Cauchemar de Joe Chamberlain”, pictorially confronting the politician with the 
deaths for which he was responsible.
436
  
 
However, in terms of their content, these cards on the war, like invasion literature on this 
subject, were arguably not saying anything very new, but rather just re-stating, if to a 
more extreme degree than hitherto, and re-contextualising, ideas and representations that 
had been in circulation for a long time. Whilst the precise circulation of each postcard 
(together, often, with publication details) and the nature of their reception remains a 
subject for speculation, the final qualification to be borne in mind is the extent to which 
they represented a distinctively French conception of the British. Numerically, German-
produced postcards continued to dominate in 1900.
437
 Swiss, German, and other 
postcards were purposely produced not just for the home market but for sale and use in 
France. These Anglophobic expressions first aired outside of France did not necessarily 
reflect specifically French sentiments.
438
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In the same way, German and Austrian cartoons on Fashoda and the Boer War also 
made their way into France, some re-printed in Le Rire. Paul Cambon was quick to 
disassociate his country from this material, an approach indignantly echoed by Le Matin, 
in highlighting a cartoon showing Chamberlain herding British recruits into a shop, 
containing Victoria at la Caisse, with a frontage reading “John Bull Commerce de 
viande humaine à la dum dum”. This, it stressed, was from Ulk, Berlin, and like other 
offensive cartoons “ce n’est pas en France elles ont vu le jour: c’est en Italie, en 
Autriche ou en Allemagne”. The paper’s further protests that French papers, for all that 
they were criticised by London, “ont toujours respecté les cheveux blancs de la reine” 
were disingenuous to the extent that the actual cartoon was re-published (with the 
relevant labelling in French, not German) on the front page with the article.
439
 In the 
same way Cambon or Delcassé could not credibly deny that such cartoon or postcard 
images had no purchase in France if people chose to buy them. So the images, even 
when not produced in France, clearly had some importance, and constitute a permutation 
of one strand of hostile thought about the British. 
Les Crises Belliqueuses: The Sciences Po Writers and the Boer War. 
According to Prochasson, “the Boer War marked a moment of crisis not just in Franco-
British diplomatic relations, but also in the perspective of the majority of French 
intellectuals.”440 Although the war was of central concern to the British at all levels of 
society and occupied much space in French newspapers from 1899-1902, how far it or 
Fashoda commanded attention in ELSP writing at the time is open to question. So far as 
their full length works went, this was partly a matter of temporal coincidence, and a 
generational lull in the sense of liberal Orleanists such as Boutmy giving way to 
younger, more left wing, figures such as Halévy, who were to attempt to escape Taine’s 
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“naturalist and psychologistic schema” and whose aims in writing about Britain would 
differ from those of their predecessors.
441
  
 
Examining the older generation, at the war’s end Paul Leroy-Beaulieu had another 
fourteen years to live, but in his remaining life, he worked on various prefaces and 
L’Économiste Française, and devoted little time to specific consideration of Britain 
during the Boer War.
442
 With his most noteworthy work having been written in 1897, 
Demolins was dead within five years of Vereeniging, although he did publish a leaflet 
vindicating British actions.
443
 Boutmy, increasingly restrained by physical deterioration 
(in particular his eyesight), died the year before Demolins. Much of what Boutmy had 
had to say about Britain had been long since articulated in his lectures at the École, and 
publications of the 1890s; His Essai d’une Psychologie Politique du Peuple Anglais au 
XIXe Siècle, though its first edition happened to be published in 1901, represented the 
accumulated work of several decades, much of that work noted by J E C Bodley in the 
introduction to the English edition as having been heavily based on long established, 
often literary, texts.
444
 Subsequent major works focussed on America.  
 
However, Boutmy was able to respond more succinctly to the events of the moment in 
the perhaps less widely circulated columns of Annales des Sciences Politiques; as 
Crouzet noted, by 1901 he was hard on British diplomacy and colonial policy.
445
  In an 
examination of British foreign affairs, consistent with his elitist views on who should 
govern France and indeed the purpose of the ELSP, Boutmy identified “une diplomatie 
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sans scrupule” which he blamed on who was now in charge in Britain.446 Electoral 
reform had opened the way for voting by “des hommes qui n’ont personellement aucune 
culture”, so that “une question comme Fachoda sera tranchée en définitive par des 
paysans et des ouvriers qui n’ont guère changé despuis plus de quatre cents ans”.447 
Democracy was therefore responsible for “le personage inconscient et brutal d’un 
Chamberlain”, the politician through whom the national temperament found its aptest 
expression on the world stage.
448
 Fashoda and the Boer War consequently verified rather 
than altered Boutmy’s long established views on what that English temperament 
comprised: “le monde est aux anglais comme une immense matière à effort”, for “C’est 
l’idée de l’activité industrieuse et féconde qui occupe toutes les avenues de l’espirit”.449 
Paralleling his comments on attitudes towards the Irish, for foreigners (whether French, 
Boer or colonial subjects) there was no natural sympathy or pity from the British, just 
“une sentimentalité sincère” exemplified by religiously inspired anti slavery 
measures.
450
 Similarly, traces of what Boutmy had previously identified in the British 
constitution re-surfaced in “une indifférence cynique pour des formes”, when it suited 
British interests, at the Bloemfontein conference.
451
 Much of this was pitched in explicit 
contrast to “les races plus contemplatives” like the French, regarding their nation as “un 
membre de la grande famille humaine” with not activity but honour, loyalty and justice 
to the fore.
452
 
 
Boutmy’s attitudes were repeated and in some ways developed by less prominent 
Sciences Po writers in the Annales. Paul Hamelle added more venom in his pen portrait 
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of the man held to be behind the Boer War, but formed much the same conclusion that 
“ce radical imperialiste jingoiste, froidement impétueux, incisive, souple et tenace, 
mégalomane, charlatan, bluffeur, mélange de Palmerston et de Beaconsfield… est en 
parfaite harmonie avec les aspirations de ses concitoyens”.453 Two years later, he re-
focussed criticisms already made by Boutmy of Britain’s weak liberal opposition by 
pinpointing the failure of Liberal Imperialist Rosebery either to condemn “les passions 
d’un parvenu comme Chamberlain” or criticise the war, instead accepting that “la guerre 
était juste, puisqu’elle était utile et nécessaire”.454 Whilst sceptical of “la légende d’une 
agression de deux Républiques faibles” against “une Angleterre assoiffée d’or”, Hamelle 
ultimately recognised “une loi d’histoire en train de s’accomplir” in the war, whatever 
the iniquity. The Boer Republics were “un pittoresque anachronisme” in a contest 
between “deux âges de l’humanité” in which the older had to succumb.455 Behind the 
veneer of criticism, therefore, Hamelle implicitly vindicated British actions. 
 
Capitaine Malleterre (1858- ?) also wrestled with a paradox in his stance on British 
actions in Sudan. Having provided a balanced view of the pre 1896 situation when “les 
procédés traditionnels de prudence et d’économie” overruled any desire to revenge 
Gordon’s death, he praised the “exécution impeccable” of a campaign conducted with 
foresight, preparation and decisiveness by Kitchener, who, typical of the “prudence 
habituelle” of the British, had left nothing to chance.456 Malleterre separated ends from 
means, so “laissant du côté les griefs et les rancunes contre une politique brutale et 
déplaisante, nous pouvons admirer l’art et la méthode avec lequel les Anglais savent 
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frapper un coup décisif”.457  Another mode of reconciliation lay in criticism of the 
French government for imagining Britain had after 1885 forgotten about Sudan, and 
Malleterre’s concluding comments that both Kitchener and Marchand represented “les 
meilleurs exemples des expéditions coloniales,” and also, in different ways one assumes, 
“une leçon éclatante des résultats qu’on peut obtenir quand on mesure les moyens au 
but”.458  
 
More eccentric within the Annales was the anonymous MB, who contributed two 
articles on the British army, in so doing calling to mind more of what Driant was to say 
than Boutmy. Both drew on British stereotypes, which clearly influenced how MB wrote 
about the army and “la psychologie militaire de l’Angleterre”, incarnated in soldiers 
seeing themselves as a part of “la race dominatrice et envahissante par excellence”.459 
Lengthy technical appraisals of the army’s weaknesses as revealed by the war were 
garnished by Driant-like clichés, about the poor training and morale of “les soldats 
anglais, braves, disciplinés… des mercenaires sortis de la basse classe”.460 Cynical and 
brutal British diplomacy, possessed of “l’art suprême de l’intimidation”, could not 
negate threats to Britain’s mastery of the seas or British vulnerability to “un coup droit 
violent et décisif”.461 In MB’s opinion, English individualism and liberty, though assets 
to British commercial success, obstructed the formation “de nouvelles institutions 
militaires capables de donner à l’empire la force indispensable à son ambition et à son 
maintien”.462 This broad statement presaged Driant’s later remarks on the 
incompatibility of British economic and political culture with a much needed policy of 
conscription. Departing most emphatically from the ELSP line, MB saw in Britain the 
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overall weakness of one of “les colosses aux pieds d’argile” and, in much the same vein 
as La Guerre Fatale, claimed that the Fashodas of yesterday would carry on into 
tomorrow, perpetuating “des siècles de luttes… dans le sang des deux races les âpres 
rancoeurs des inguérissables blessures”.463  
 
From the younger generation, Elie Halévy’s research at and immediately after the turn of 
the century was directed to the longer term interaction of internal political, social and 
religious factors within Britain which had little to do with the specific events of the 
immediate moment.
464
 These were addressed, but in his Histoire du Peuple Anglais au 
XIXe Siècle which came out in five volumes (progressing chronologically from 1815 – 
1914) in the years 1912-24. This made no attempt to fudge Halévy’s view of Fashoda as 
preceded by “orgies of Imperialism” at Omdurman, “a massacre rather than a battle” 
followed by the unseemly desecration of the Mahdi’s tomb, and ending in a French 
unconditional capitulation without precedent.
465
   
 
At the time of the war, Halévy’s views typically cast the widespread calm with which 
early defeats were greeted in Britain in contrast to “how the news of a disaster would be 
received on the boulevards, how the press would comment it [sic], how the opposition 
would trade on it in parliament”.466 This picture of national unity in crisis mirrored 
typical ELSP views of Britain, and, implicitly, concerns about French disunity. In a 
permutation on Boutmy and Hamelle’s thought, Halévy interpreted Englishmen, taken 
individually inclined to “repudiate any solidarity with Chamberlain”, to be “as a body… 
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very grateful to Chamberlain to know how to initiate pieces of blackguardism, to which 
they unconsciously aspire, as a great nation”.467 Further comment on “Anglo-Saxon 
phlegm”, the self control of “this silent, fatalistic, optimistic nation, which dispenses 
with over excitement” and British lack of vindictiveness, were balanced by thoughts of 
the “brutal manners” of British diplomacy likely to be resumed after the war, and 
recurrent anxiety that the British would shortly fight France and possibly start a general 
war from which he saw “the English alone” as “sure of profit”.468 Despite Halévy’s 
personal antipathy towards “mountebanks in red breeches” like Driant, Crouzet goes so 
far as to argue that, oddly, Halévy did in 1899-1900 come to believe in the inevitability 
of war between Britain and France-La Guerre Fatale.
469
 Further, Halévy’s “distrust of 
British foreign policy”, if diminishing, persisted after the end of the war, into mid-1903. 
However, all of this was expressed in private correspondence not published at the time. 
Notwithstanding a hatred of Chamberlain that persisted into 1906, a self confessedly 
anglophile tone, buttressed by the idea that “during the last two centuries England has 
given Europe some lessons in politics”, had by then crept into his writing, and it was this 
which became more apparent in the greater bulk of what he later published.
470
 
 
Jacques Bardoux was therefore unique among the Sciences Po writers in formulating 
and publishing in a considered full length book form views on the war close to its own 
time, namely Essai d’une Psychologie de l’Angleterre Contemporaine: Les crises 
belliqueuses, (1906). Wide ranging as Bardoux’s treatment of movements within 
nineteenth-century Britain proved to be, his own interpretive framework, clearly set out 
in the book’s title, was never long overlooked in the construction of the text. Everything, 
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then, no matter how far apparently removed from war, was sooner or later evaluated as 
to the extent to which it engendered aggression and warlike tendencies in the British. 
For example, campaigns for social reform invoked “de l’honneur national, de l’orgeuil 
britannique”, their success stemming from British realisation of the inconsistency 
between the poverty and the dirty towns, and their national self image. The English 
trouva la premier la formule de la liberté et de la vérité religieuse, qui semblait 
destiné à guider, avec certitude les autres nations dans la voie du progrès 
politique et du progrès moral, est aujourd’hui celui qui tolère les spectacles les 
plus hideux, les souffrances les plus imméritées.
471
 
 
Largely overlooking any substantive benefits that legislative efforts directed towards 
reform might bring to the disadvantaged, Bardoux instead observed that the social 
remorse propelling the campaigns reappeared in new forms, which favoured the growth 
of Imperialism. Simultaneously, “en apaisant des souffrances et en réparant des 
iniquités, il contribue à enrayer la poussée libérale et prépare la réaction conservatrice”, 
which he dated to post-1874.
472
 Likewise, somehow “L’Idéalisme litteraire”, strongly 
depending on a “faculté de sentir”, earlier exhibited by figures like Dickens and Ruskin, 
peaceable as they may have been, fragmented into works by Tennyson, Kipling and 
others of a more bombastic cast.
473
 
 
This was a process of analysis that had its own limitations, but kept it to the forefront of 
the readers’ minds that nineteenth-century Britain was a country wracked by periodic 
“crises belliqueuses”, that is to say occasions when public opinion was disturbed by or 
goaded into a panic by the threat of war. Chapter VI listed the first of these as having 
taken place in 1823, 1833-5, 1845-8 and 1852.
474
 In each of these episodes, the animus 
was directed partly or in full against France, Bardoux blaming the bellicose tendencies 
of the aristocracy, led by Palmerston “le grande propriétaire jovial et sanguine, d’une 
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intelligence médiocre mais d’une volonté d’airan, penseur à court vue at orateur sans 
prétention, serviteur aveugle de son parti et son pays”.475 Despite the Crimean War and 
the panic of 1859-61, which Bardoux described at length, he depicted the years of 1854-
74 as ones of exceptional peacefulness.
476
 This was thanks to “le merveilleux essor 
qu’impriment à l’activité commerciale et industrielle de l’Angleterre les premières 
applications du libre échange”, and the rise of the Liberal party backed by middle 
classes partial to trade, and therefore peace.
477
 Conversely, the slump of 1875, and 
subsequent economic crises, created an atmosphere in which further crises belliqueuses 
could unfold in 1876-8, and in 1885 when, according to Bardoux, “les sans-travail 
aspirent à la gloire de l’uniforme, les industriels aux bénéfices des armaments”.478 
Disraeli proved to be “un homme d’état sans scruples” who artificially created crises in 
order “donner satisfaction aux tendances belliqueuses de la race anglaise”.479 Internal 
British problems drove him to “une sanglante diversion” which, in Bardoux’s thesis, was 
readily taken up because “l’arrêt des industries semble laisser sans emploi une certaine 
quantité d’energie nationale” that happily turned to these struggles instead.480 These later 
crises may have exhibited some new traits in relation to those prior to 1860, but 
Bardoux, like Paul Hamelle, placed Disraeli, then Chamberlain, as following in the 
footsteps of their more notable predecessor Palmerston as “ces apôtres de la combativité 
nationale”.481  The Boer War was merely the natural product of another such crisis, from 
1897 onwards, although the Fashoda incident was not mentioned at all in Bardoux’s 
lengthy work, up until the end of the book.
482
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Bardoux devoted his penultimate chapter to a discussion of British opinion in relation to 
the South African war. In so doing, he set himself the difficult task of reconciling Britain 
as a potentially amicable country whose friendship was worth courting, and appeasing a 
French public opinion up until very recently manifesting prominent signs of sympathy 
for the Boers. The first of these requirements was met by a seemingly impartial 
presentation of the British justifications advanced for the war. Bardoux drew heavily on 
The Times History of the War, as well as the Foreign Office Blue Book and sundry other 
sources such as La vérité sur la guerre en Transvaal, a “brochure de propaganda anglais, 
distribuée en France pour convertir l’opinion publique”, to detail, in turn, the historical, 
diplomatic and moral arguments espoused by London.
483
 These were then met with his 
own lines, showing that the foreign Uitlanders in the Boer republics were far from being 
blameless victims downtrodden by a uniformly unsympathetic Boer administration, 
contradicting the London line that the Boer leadership had done nothing to meet 
Uitlander grievances, was corrupt, and had deliberately provoked war in 1899, and 
contending that events since 1902 demonstrated the lack of any substance to British 
claims to have wanted to bring a higher civilisation to a backward “nation intolérante et 
routinière”, unfitted to any further colonists but “pasteurs isolés et nomades”.484 
 
All of this raised the question of how British public opinion could have so badly 
misjudged the rights and wrongs of the case when everything was, apparently, so clear 
to the French. His explanation went deeper than a mere conscious manipulation of 
opinion by the press in, for example, quoting selectively and therefore in an implicitly 
distorted fashion from the writings of Ruskin.
485
 The more profound answer lay within 
the interpretive framework established by Bardoux across the preceding nine chapters. 
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Drawing the contrast between “Un esprit français”, arriving slowly at a conclusion only 
after carefully weighing the arguments but easily dislodged from that conclusion on 
discovery of “Une erreur de logique, un manque de symétrie, une lacune”, Bardoux 
asserted that: 
L’intelligence anglaise n’éprouve pas le besoin et est incapable d’élever un vaste 
temple dont la logique dessine les lignes harmonieuses et que la clarté baigne de 
sa lumière…Elle croit à la vérité d’une idée avec un élan d’autant plus 
inébranlable qu’il est plus rapide. Ses convictions sont déterminées par un fait 
concret, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de la soumettre à un examen méthodique…Une 
fois formées, elles ont tout la solidité des blockhaus.
486
 
 
The contrast with France had no need to be so explicitly stated in comment on British 
disregard for international law, resonant as it was with events of less than one year prior 
to the war when they had disdained President Faure and others’ claims to Fashoda on the 
basis that, within the 1885 Conference of Berlin ground rules, it belonged to the first 
European power able effectively to occupy the place.
487
 By way of explanation, Bardoux 
identified some of the British arguments as sustained by an essentially religious sense of 
mission, and reiterated his views on British lack of empathy, now directed outwards to 
foreigners rather than between classes: 
La virtue morale et civique les empêchent d’admettre la nécessité d’une morale et 
d’une loi humaine. Leurs sensibilités lentes et refoulées, leurs pensées concrètes 
et insulaires ne leur permettent ni d’aimer ni de comprendre les autres peuples.488 
 
There was some novelty in Bardoux’s claim that the war would invigorate British levels 
of energy, hitherto held to be so high: “Émotions belliqueuses rendront aux industriels 
anglais leur énergie, aux commercants leur spirit d’initiative, aux consommateurs leur 
patriotisme”.489 However, references to “leur hypocrisie et leur brutalité” and to “le 
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besoin d’une lutte” for the sake of it, were consistent with more traditional and long-held 
views.
490
 
 
At one level, Bardoux’s stance on the war in South Africa therefore did not stray too far 
from the hostility shown towards Britain at the time of the war itself. He differed not 
only in seeking to take a more thoughtful approach to the war than those who produced 
invasion literature or postcards, or indeed the press, but also in looking to present, if not 
a balanced viewpoint, than at least one in which the British attitude became 
comprehensible to his readers. The end of Crises Belliqueuses may thus best be summed 
up as one of understanding condemnation, and further evidence of how a view of the 
ELSP writers as simply anglophile should be qualified. 
 
Prochasson maintains that 1898-1901 represented “a turning point... the positive signs 
turned to negative” in writing on Britain.491 Bardoux was one example of this. Whether 
coincidentally or not, events in the period 1895-1903 seem to have significantly altered 
the romanticised sentiments displayed in Memories of Oxford. Britain was now best 
epitomised in Bardoux’s judgment of Chamberlain: 
l’homme d’état par son horreur pour les idées générales et son utilititarianisme 
pratique, par son ardent chauvinisme et son indéracinable orgeuil incarne de la 
manière la plus complète les caractères de l’Angleterre contemporaine.492 
 
Addressing the nature of British Socialism, Bardoux transformed his previous 
comparisons of Oxford cricketers to Ancient Greeks into the contention that sport was, 
for social purposes, an essentially a conservative force restraining the working classes, 
diverting otherwise revolutionary energies and thoughts, as religion: “La noblesse des 
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chapelles puritaines, les violences de football auront été des agents de paix sociale”.493 
This viewpoint foreshadowed that expressed by Paul Dottin in the 1920s, suggesting that 
football served to divert British working class men, much as cinemas did their women, 
in a provision analogous with the Circenses et Panem of Imperial Rome.
494
 
 
To the peaceful and idyllic experiences of 1895 was juxtaposed a picture of “en fait une 
société particulièrement belliqueuse”, a mood fuelled by reserve, pride and knowledge 
of war derived only at second hand from sanitised press reports and poets, thanks to the 
lack of any recent invasion of Britain.
495
 The continuous emphasis on British bellicosity 
led to some paradoxes: Bardoux pitched British “sympathie pour les animaux” against 
their enjoyment of “un combat de boxe qui ressemble à une lutte des bouchers, à un 
match de foot-ball qui rappelle le corps à corps des batailles”.496 Bardoux further 
abandoned his previous views on British sensitivity, towards their own poor or 
otherwise. Weighing the role of willpower in the British character, he started his 1906 
work with the observation that “La force de volonté a pour corollaire nécessaire une 
certaine atonie de la sensibilité”.497 He went onto paint a picture of repressed emotions, 
phlegmatic authors, “le policeman impassible” and “La solidité d’un système nerveux” 
so emphatic that British subjects were deemed less dangerous to conduct surgical 
operations upon than others.
498
  
 
Most tellingly of all, praise for the Oxford students’ sympathy for the poor in 1895 gave 
way to later condemnation of the social inequality that had given occasion to the 
poverty. Drawing on 1880 figures to place the British example in an explicitly 
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comparative context, Bardoux concluded that ownership of land in Britain was even 
more concentrated into the hands of a tiny minority than in Germany, Austria-Hungary 
or Russia.
499
 He further cast Britain as backward next to “les sociétés civilisées” who 
had already achieved “une repartition plus harmonieuse des capitaux mobiliers”.500 The 
most extended contrast was with France, with its 3.5 million proprietors exploiting their 
own land across one quarter of the country, and the queues of small capitalists upon 
which rested “l’évolution démocratique de notre société”, as opposed to “la structure 
oligarchique, les conceptions aristocratique de la société anglaise”.501 Albeit largely 
deriving his material from second hand accounts, Bardoux remained consistent in 
disdain for the temperament and lifestyle of “La plèbe britannique, à dire vrai, elle forme 
un peuple distinct”. As to their neighbourhoods in Deptford, Bermondsey Walworth and 
Camberwell, “il est impossible de dire la laideur désolée de cette ville”, with nothing in 
France - again a comparison, again more favourable to France than he had been in 1895 
- that even approached them except perhaps “les faubourgs d’Armentières”.502 
Conclusion. 
 
Considering the wider diplomatic context, Fashoda and the Boer War were not the only 
events of 1898-1902 to impact on Anglo-French relations, but were central in creating 
an atmosphere of mutual rivalry. There were some developments that pointed towards a 
more conciliatory future for Anglo-French relations, but many others, parallel with the 
incident and war, which highlighted tensions. For example, British attitudes towards the 
Dreyfus case, placed by Tombs on a par with Fashoda and the Boer War, entailed 
disdain on the part of the British for the French and their institutions, in turn exciting 
indignant Anglophobic defences of France and counter-charges of British hypocrisy, 
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especially from the French anti Dreyfusard right.
503
 Even where there was potential for 
harmony, these overshadowing events tended to distort or sour what might otherwise 
have occasioned an assertion of shared ideals. Britain’s much publicised stance at The 
1899 Hague Conference, favouring International Arbitration and the ban on exploding 
bullets, gave later scope for French newspapers to contrast British rhetoric on these 
subjects to their practice relative to Transvaal, only months later up to and after the 
outbreak of war, so breathing further new life into the old accusations of English 
hypocrisy.
504
 
 
Given that France was a participant in the Fashoda incident, whereas there was no 
official French involvement in Britain’s South African conflict, it is paradoxical that 
French reactions to the Boer War seem to have been much larger in scale and more 
radical than those to Fashoda.
505
 Within invasion literature, the war gave a new lease of 
life to several old British stereotypes, and allowed authors like Driant to push their 
villainisation of the British further and more credibly. However, the war prompted little 
of substance that was different in La Guerre Fatale, the attitudes and action of which 
were in many ways merely a more detailed re-working of Plus d’Angleterre, published 
well before 1898. The new medium of postcards, despite its technical novelty and the 
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more realistic depictions of war scenes it could circulate, also tended to reflect those 
older stereotypes and re-work them in a new context.  
 
In contrast, for the Sciences Po writers events in 1898-1902 potentially posed a problem. 
If one takes them simply as Anglophiles, the ambiguity of their reactions to Fashoda and 
the war, events that clearly challenged any positive things that they might say about 
Britain, is difficult to explain. Whilst Bardoux’s account of the Boer War was not 
wholly unsympathetic to Britain, and Malleterre got around the problem of 
simultaneously admiring British actions in the Sudan and a sense of injustice at Fashoda 
by separating means from ends, the Annales des Sciences Politiques also gave vent to 
unmitigatedly critical views of Britain in MB’s articles. Some of what Boutmy, echoed 
by Hamelle, had to say struck at the heart of his previous arguments, for example on the 
benefits of the British constitution. Fashoda and the Boer War showed a British polity 
increasingly controlled by precisely the uneducated masses from whose influence the 
ELSP was meant to save France. The attitude of flexibility underlying the British 
constitution was now to be used for the cynical end of bullying foreigners when it suited 
British needs. It is unfortunate that, in the confined space of their articles, Boutmy and 
Hamelle were not able to avail themselves of the opportunity for a more wide ranging 
re-appraisal of Boutmy’s views on Britain, in light of contemporary events. However, all 
of these attitudes become easier to reconcile with previous Sciences Po writings about 
Britain if one accepts that these were by no means as anglophile as some, including 
contemporary critics of the ELSP, maintained. Although some ELSP writers shared 
Anglophile sentiments, these might be swayed or hushed by events such as Fashoda or 
the Boer War when Britain was judged to be acting in an anti-French or aggressive 
manner.   
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Illustrations (2). 
Chapter 3: Picture 3.1 The extract from Le Petit Journal on the cover of Bernard Lugan, 
La Guerre des Boers, 1899-1902 (1998), for example, showed the British under siege in 
unlikely looking spotless white trousers, topped by bright scarlet jackets the use of 
which had been abandoned in the field, in favour of the more practical khaki, some two 
decades earlier. 
 
Picture 3.2 Le Matin, 17 November 1899, attesting the French public’s appetite for 
images from South Africa, an advert for a book of pictures from the Boer War, with the 
artist unable to resist underlining British treachery by depicting Queen Victoria as a 
hissing serpent. 
 
 121 
Picture 3.3 Postcard (detail), explicitly linking Marchand to Kruger, from McDonald, 
Boer War Postcards (2001), 61. 
 
 
 
Picture 3.4 Summing up British motives for war, a postcard juxtaposing Boer leaders on 
one side of a card “Pour la liberté et le droit”, opposite British generals on the other 
marked “Pour l’argent et les diamants”, from McDonald, Boer War Postcards (2001), 
54. 
 
 
 
Picture 3.5 Postcard showing a distressed Chamberlain weeping over the money being 
wasted in pursuing the conflict, from McDonald, Boer War Postcards (2001), 100. 
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Picture 3.6 Postcard deriving pleasure from British Generals White and Yule getting 
thrashed by two hard bitten pipe-smoking Boers, from McDonald, Boer War Postcards 
(2001), 27. 
 
 
Pictures 3.7 & 3.8 Postcards depicting zealous General Booth leading his female 
Salvation Army “soldiers” to the rescue of the army in South Africa, and  “La Pieuvre 
Anglaise” of 1899 extending its tentacles around a wide range of other animal-nations, 
only to be defied by the symbolic Transvaal lion, from McDonald, Boer War Postcards 
(2001), 20 & 47.  
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Picture 3.9 Chamberlain’s nightmare, varying from the approach taken in 3.5 by 
reproaching him with responsibility for the death and suffering caused by the war, from 
McDonald, Boer War Postcards (2001), 117. 
 
 
Picture 3.10 Le Matin, 8 December 1899, the cartoon from Germany that the paper 
purported to condemn. 
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Chapter 4: Picture 4.1  Le Figaro, 22 January 1900, “La Balance”, Britain, Russia and 
the potential impact of the Boer War on the balance of military power on India’s 
borders. 
 
 
 
Picture 4.2 Le Figaro, 4 December 1899, “La Triplice de M. Chamberlain”. Caran 
d’Ache (1858-1909), a regular cartoonist for this paper after 1898, was clearly sceptical 
that fear of the Franco-Russian jack-in-the-box being wielded by nanny Chamberlain 
would suffice to overcome the trade rivalries of the British, German and American 
“babies” depicted in the drawing. 
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Pictures 4.3 & 4.4 Notable examples of Charles Léandre’s cartoons, from Le Rire, from 
2 December 1899 a less than flattering depiction of Victoria and Wilhelm II that 
expressed scepticism as to the supposed family, private, reasons, for the Kaiser’s trip to 
Britain whilst the scruffy Kruger figure in the background is ignored by both Monarchs, 
and, from 7 October 1899, a sarcastic comment on “L’Angleterre, Éternel Champion de 
la justice”, the drawing that caused most offence to the British royal family. 
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4: Irredeemable Foe or Potential Friend; Britain and the 
French Diplomatic Response to Fashoda and the Boer War. 
 
Introduction. 
The broader diplomatic context shaped the responses of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, at the Quai d’Orsay, to Fashoda and the Boer War. In the 1850s, international 
relations had been fluid, but the 20-year dominance of Bismarck after 1870 solidified 
allegiances and antipathies. Whilst reconciling Russia with a series of Reinsurance 
Treaties, Bismarck secured the international future of his newly founded Reich by 
means of forming a Triple Alliance in 1879-82 of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. 
This kept France, fundamentally unreconciled to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the 
1870-71 Franco-Prussian War, in a state of isolation, as Britain stood aloof from 
European alliances. After Bismarck’s dismissal in March 1890, the situation began to 
unravel, under the impulsive and destabilising influence of Kaiser Wilhelm II who fully 
intended to wield real power rather than allow free rein to his ministers. As Bismarck 
commented, the Kaiser was “like a balloon, if one did not hold him fast on a string, he 
would go no one knows whither”, and in the 1890s there was no one to hold him fast.506 
Consequently, the Reinsurance Treaties were allowed to lapse, giving France the 
opening to negotiate an Alliance with Russia over 1892-4, so that by 1898, the shifting 
nature of the international order symbolised by the deaths of Gladstone and Bismarck, 
there were three power blocs in contention-the Triple Alliance, the Dual Alliance and 
the British Empire. 
 
Within French policymaking circles after 1871, two currents of thought arose. Those 
favouring a strategy directly centred on the challenge of, and recovery of the lost 
provinces from, the united and powerful Germany, were the continentalists. This 
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tendency found most favour in the French Foreign Office, whereas the department run 
by the Undersecretary of Colonies was the centre of support for a colonialist strategy 
focussed on Empire outside of Europe. More colonies in Asia and Africa, enhancing 
France’s position as a world power, might in the longer run enable the country to 
confront Germany more effectively on the continent.
507
 Mindful that such expansionism 
was encouraged by Bismarck, continentalists maintained that colonies were a distraction 
from what was or should be France’s real objective. Although the 1890s saw France 
break out of its diplomatic isolation in Europe, a new wave of colonial acquisitions had 
been in progress for at least a decade. The rise of the colonialist current was signified by 
the foundation in 1890 of the Comité de l’Afrique Française, supported by Colonial 
undersecretary Eugene Etienne, the 1894 transformation of the Undersecretariat into a 
fully fledged ministerial post, and the demands new Undersecretary Théophile Delcassé 
made (and got accepted) in January 1893 that his department be transferred from within 
the Ministry of Marine to the Pavilion de Flore-new offices in the Louvre.
508
 
 
The implications of the two currents for Anglo-French relations were plain for all to see. 
Colonial expansion was bound (as Bismarck surmised and hoped) to put France on a 
collision course at multiple points across the globe with the peripheries of the larger and 
more established British Empire, generating friction and rivalry that would readily seep 
back into both metropoles. Indeed, many involved in the enterprise of French 
colonialism positively welcomed the prospect of such conflict. In contrast, and if with 
reservations notably over Britain’s non intervention in the Franco-Prussian War, the 
continentalists were more open to the idea of closer ties with Britain. Events in the 
1890s - the relative rise of the colonial tide in Paris, the 1894 Russian alliance which 
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lessened France’s sense of isolation in Europe and, hence, need for British friendship on 
the continent - if anything militated even further in favour of government imaginings of 
Britain primarily as an actual, permanent, foe rather than a potential future friend. Some 
individuals, notably the French ambassador in London de Courcel, remained willing to 
countenance the idea of friendship with the British, but they were in a distinct and 
overruled minority.
509
 
 
It fell to Delcassé, in 1898 as foreign minister, to deal with the difficulties created by the 
Fashoda Incident and the Boer War. Born on 1 March 1852 at Pamiers, in the Ariège 
about 70 miles from the border with Spain, Delcassé was 18 at the time of the Franco-
Prussian war, memory of which remained close to his heart and reinforced an already 
strong sense of patriotism. In Paris from 1875, he progressed from teaching to 
journalism, after 1877 at La Petite République then in 1879 at La République Française. 
In 1884, he became secretary to the Ariège deputy Hugues Massip, whose daughter he 
married in October 1887 (thereby gaining financial independence), then made repeated 
attempts to be elected to the chamber. He finally became deputy in September 1889 for 
Foix, in Ariège. A Gambettist Republican, Delcassé enjoyed two stints from January-
December 1893 and May 1894-January 1895 at what became the Ministry of 
Colonies.
510
 Throughout his journalistic career, his main interest lay in colonial 
expansion and foreign affairs. In this connection, he showed little restraint in attacking 
Britain; His pamphlet Alerte! Où allons nous? (Paris, 1882) both protested against 
British occupation of Egypt and criticised Jules Ferry for the French indecision and 
inertia that had allowed that occupation to go ahead.
511
 His November 1890 maiden 
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speech in the chamber was “Une longue philippique contre la ‘Perfide Albion’”, 
focussing on Egypt and demanding more firmness in dealing with Britain.
512
  
 
Delcassé’s opposite number across the Channel was the very experienced Lord 
Salisbury, British Conservative Prime Minister for a third time following the June 1895 
elections, and from then until October 1900 his own Foreign Minister. Opinions differ as 
to the ability of the British representative in Paris directly facing Delcassé, Sir Edmond 
Monson. Similar in age to Salisbury and with some 40 years of diplomatic service 
around the world behind him by the time he reached the Paris embassy in October 1896, 
according to the standard reference material of the 1920s, “Monson, calm and judicial 
by temperament, and grave and courteous in manner, avoided unnecessary irritation and 
was personally much liked by the French”.513 Langer judged him “one of the most 
cautious and circumspect of diplomats”.514 Later verdicts have been less kind. To 
Brown, Monson was “the sceptical and cautious British ambassador” who, in early 
1898, had declined to subscribe to the dire forecasts of Munster and Tornielli about 
French domestic tumults shortly leading to a foreign war only then in late October 1898 
to succumb to panic about France’s internal convulsions.515 Grenville reflected upon the 
“misfortune that the most senior post in the British Diplomatic service was filled by a 
man of such mediocre abilities as Monson”, and, not without justification, Bates derided 
his “long-winded despatches”, which revealed too much readiness to take offence.516 It 
is a reflection upon both the ambassador’s character and that of Delcassé that, after 
initial misgivings about the new Foreign Minister in June 1898, Monson should three 
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months later feel reason to reflect upon the calmness of Delcassé, which marked a 
significant contrast to the “petulance and hysterical sensibilities” displayed by his 
predecessor, Gabriel Hanotaux.
517
 However, Monson’s unconcealed contempt for the 
instability of Third Republic governments and their politicians generally, and 
condescension towards “the little man” (mixed with some surprise that he should be 
believable) in particular, were unlikely to be helpful to the cause of Anglo-French 
harmony.
518
  
Policy making at the Quai d’Orsay at the Turn of the Century.  
 
The structure of the Quai d’Orsay itself has been exhaustively and repeatedly 
analysed.
519
 The constitutional position of the Minister was that he was accountable to 
the formal Head of State, the President of the Republic, and more immediately to the 
Président du Conseil (Prime Minister) who presided over the cabinet of which the 
minister was a part. Ministries changed with a frequency that was dizzying from the 
perspective of foreign and domestic critics, but tended to draw on one pool of the same 
individuals to fill its posts.
520
 Of all the ministries, that of Foreign Affairs seems to have 
been the one that enjoyed most stability.
521
  
 
In the Delcassé era, parliament was largely ignored. Deploring and fearing the 
consequences of leaks from colleagues motivated by domestic political gain, he 
frequently kept the Cabinet in the dark as to his plans, although this was not uncommon 
for all Foreign Ministers.
522
 Successive Prime Ministers maintained Delcassé in office, 
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either taking little interest in foreign affairs or expressing a confidence in him that was 
shared by Presidents Faure who rarely intervened, and Loubet, even more loath to 
participate in policymaking and completely confident in him.
523
 
 
The bureaucrats of the Quai d’Orsay Centrale in Paris might have been expected to play 
a greater role in policymaking. In practice, their influence was limited by a Minister with 
firm ideas of his own. The Quai d’Orsay was still small enough for personality and 
personal attributes to play a more important role in shaping policies than machinery or 
sometimes theoretical lines of authority and subordination.
524
 Before 1905, little was 
done to reform a fundamentally old fashioned organisation that relied on personal 
contact and in which Delcassé was able both to bypass dissonant bureaucrats by simply 
taking on as much work himself as possible, and, over time, to place those he trusted 
most in the positions where they were able to support his policies. A case in point was 
the surprise appointment, as Political Director, of Gaston Raindre, whose support for 
France’s religious Protectorate in the Levant strengthened Delcassé’s pre-existing 
inclinations. Conversely, Raindre’s contrary notions on other matters were simply 
ignored by the minister. 
 
France’s diplomats abroad were not much more influential. Some ambassadors, 
Delcassé simply did not trust, bypassing de Noailles by working through the Russian 
foreign minister and, unofficially, his own agent Jules Hansen when sounding out 
German intentions regarding the Boer War in October 1899, a move of which (according 
to Andrew) de Noailles was not even informed until March 1900.
525
 Delcassé’s close 
collaboration with Jules Cambon in Madrid, after August 1902, contrasted strongly to 
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his dealing with Cambon’s predecessor, Patenôtre.526 Much has been made of the 
independence of action of the elite ambassadorial triumvirate, namely Camille Barrère in 
Rome, Jules Cambon in Washington/Madrid and Paul Cambon in 
Constantinople/London, and the self important nature of both Cambon brothers.
527
 
Delcassé, however, sharing the ambassadors’ Gambettist inspiration, inclined to work 
with rather than in opposition to individuals who were evidently capable, loyal and in 
broad agreement with him on most policy issues, in an atmosphere of mutual 
friendship.
528
 Consequently, the differences that arose were only minor. Paul Cambon 
acknowledged the principle of parliamentary and ministerial control. He advised, cajoled 
and could bring pressure to bear, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Delcassé 
decided policy on Britain and, had he so wished, he had sufficient strength of character 
to resist. In sum, Delcassé was responsible for broad outlines of policy, and kept either a 
strict control over others in the centrale or diplomatic corps, or ensured that their role 
was primarily one of filling in the details, or at best submitting ideas or initiatives for 
him to approve. 
 
The Parti Colonial, “alone among all political groups in France at the close of the 
nineteenth century in having a serious interest in foreign affairs”, was despite its small 
numbers potentially influential.
529
 After examining the extensive documentation of the 
Comité de l’Afrique Française, Brown asserted the decisive importance of the Parti 
Colonial in shaping French policy, structural weaknesses of the Third Republic making 
it “a happy hunting ground for the activities” of the pressure groups.530 Yet Delcassé’s 
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quarrel with Etienne (over Siam) furnished ample evidence that the Parti did not have 
things all their own way, and were unable to prevail if the minister was determined to 
disagree with their policies.
531
 
 
Historiography 1: The Old Views. 
 
The two main achievements of Delcassé’s period in office were the 1898-1902 
rapprochement with Italy and the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain. The second of 
these, at the time a more radical departure and with hindsight of more lasting 
importance, has tended to command the greater attention amongst historians. The 
principal questions relate to when, precisely, Delcassé decided to endorse the idea of an 
alignment with Britain and the colonial barter at the centre of the Entente, and the extent 
if any to which others’ influence induced him to this stance.  
 
Much room was left for debate by the nature of the foreign minister’s personality and 
working practices. He was universally agreed in childhood to have “acquired a habit of 
secrecy and self reliance which stayed with him throughout his public life”.532 His 
experience of confidential reports, written by him whilst Minister of Colonies, 
subsequently being published by his political opponents only served to exacerbate his 
pre-existing inclinations.
533
 With an eye on possible leaks to the press or directly to 
foreign powers from other politicians or his own officials Delcassé maintained an 
aversion to committing too much about his intentions to paper as Foreign Minister.
534
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Further, the Marchand-Fashoda files were personally weeded out by Delcassé in 
1904.
535
  Often reliant on his memory of meetings with foreign diplomats rather than 
paper records, if dealing with ambassadors he preferred to talk directly to them when 
they happened to be in Paris, or orally by way of trusted intermediaries such as 
Paléologue.
536
 Contemporaries were well aware of this facet of Delcassé.
537
 The 
documentation on his inner thoughts could therefore never have been anything but 
incomplete, and left considerable scope for differing interpretations. Fashoda historians 
Brown and Sanderson opined that there was a near absence of 1890s evidence as to 
when or why Delcassé changed his mind about seeking friendlier relations with 
Britain.
538
  
 
Viewed retrospectively, through the lenses of April 1904 and August 1914, the events of 
1898-1902 might suggest an aberration. Delcassé himself later publicly asserted that he 
had wanted an alignment with Britain from the very start of his time in office.
539
 This 
was naturally echoed by “le pieux récit” of Albéric Neton, characterised by Zorgbibe as 
Delcassé’s “fidèle secrétaire particulier”.540 Delcassé’s assertion was further articulated 
by the successive early French studies of Mévil, Pinon and Reynauld.
541
 In the 1920s, 
G.P.Gooch agreed that Delcassé had concluded that “France had one enemy already, and 
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she could not afford another. To quarrel with Great Britain was to play into the hands of 
Germany”, so confiding in 1898 his desire to stay at the Quai until “the bonne entente 
with England” was reached.542 Elie Halévy added that in June 1898 Delcassé “had lost 
no time in showing his desire to restore friendly relations between France and 
England… compromised by the fault of his predecessor”.543  
 
These views were backed by several later Anglophone accounts of his time in office, 
Eugene Anderson for example, relying on Delcassé’s repeated 1898-9 suggestions to 
Monson and Salisbury for “a cordial understanding between England, France and 
Russia” as evidence of his policy from the very start of his time in office.544 They 
persisted into the mid 1960s, in Herbert Tint’s assertion that Delcassé “got his priorities 
straight from the moment he took office”, having realised that see sawing between 
Berlin and London was neither intelligent nor feasible policy working systematically for 
an understanding with Britain throughout.
545
 Agreeing, Alfred Cobban stated that 
Delcassé was “already looking to Great Britain as a potential ally against Germany” as a 
means of explaining his unpopular concession over Fashoda.
546
 J.P.T.Bury’s assertion 
that Delcassé in 1898 “kept his head… and never lost sight of the fact that so long as the 
Germans continued to hold Strasbourg and Metz they were France’s only permanent 
enemy” was also consistent with this position.547 D.W.Brogan differed from this only 
slightly in contending that it was Fashoda that taught this “good Gambettist” his lesson, 
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namely “the need not to let the reach exceed the grasp, to reach an agreement with the 
odious nation which had just won so brilliant a triumph over France”.548  
 
Given the difficulty of reconciling a Delcassé desire for an alignment with Britain from 
June 1898 with events over the next 4 years, some however doubted that notion. 
E.M.Carroll interpreted Delcassé’s policy towards Britain as a simple product of his 
general lack of consistency, making him a man whose opinions changed with 
circumstances, “more of an opportunist than has been supposed”.549 To the mind of 
Frank Maloy Anderson, reviewing the newly published Documents Diplomatique 
Français for 1902-4, Delcassé was one of only several architects of the Entente 
“proceeding on their task in a hesitant and uncertain fashion”, with the absence of any 
documentary trace of “the large ideas (later) ascribed to them” pointing to a lack of 
those ideas amidst the detailed and determined haggling that preceded the agreement.
550
 
These were only two of several approaches to the “traditional” Delcassé inspired view to 
be traced by Leaman, ranging from a complete endorsement of Delcassé’s line to the 
contention that he was not committed to an Entente until 1903, and then only under the 
sufferance of pressure from public opinion.
551
 A.J.P.Taylor, conversely, re-asserted a 
form of the Delcassé line (if in contrast to Halévy) by interpreting Hanotaux and de 
Courcel’s 1894-5 negotiations as an early attempt to achieve an Entente, adding that by 
1898 “every French politician of any sense knew that Egypt had been lost for good… 
Their ultimate object throughout was to restore the ‘Liberal Alliance’ with Great 
Britain”.552 On this reading, Delcassé had “no great difference of principle” from his 
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predecessor, if before Fashoda with “no clear cut plan except to improve France’s 
diplomatic position” and during the Boer War unwilling to capitalise on popular anti 
British feeling to intervene.
553
 The implication therefore is that Delcassé favoured an 
alignment with Britain, but that it took time for that general idea to crystallise into more 
practical proposals. Grenville agreed that de Courcel had in the mid 1890s wanted to 
establish a “bonne entente générale” but disagreed inasmuch as he saw the ambassador 
by 1896 being restrained by Paris.
554
 Grenville, further, perceived in Delcassé’s actions 
in 1900 genuine hostility, to the extent of “thinking in terms of a preventive war” against 
Britain based on the fear that an Anglo-French war would, after the defeat of the Boers, 
be next on Britain’s agenda.555 
Historiography 2: After 1968. 
 
The most drastic difference of recent opinion lies between Christopher Andrew, whose 
1968 volume argued for a late conversion of Delcassé to the idea of an Entente, and 
Pascal Venier, working at Salford with J.F.V.Keiger.
556
 Andrew saw Delcassé, with his 
January 1893-January 1895 experiences at the Ministry of Colonies, as coming to the 
Quai in 1898 with no plans for alignment with France’s chief colonial rival Britain, and 
feelings that evolved into genuine antipathy during the Fashoda crisis.
557
 The order for 
Marchand’s withdrawal did not result in a complete or immediate dissipation of 
tensions, with the Minister of Marine still fearing a pre emptive naval strike.
558
 Andrew 
noted Delcassé’s warmer communications with Germans in November-December 1898, 
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and fluctuating expectations in 1899 as various other Anglo-French disputes rumbled 
on.
559
 These culminated in Delcassé’s August 1899 complaint to Monson about “the 
impossibility of keeping the relations with England on a friendly footing”.560 If 
Delcassé’s central aims remained both the colonisation of Morocco and ending British 
occupation of Egypt, it followed that Britain would be his opponent and Germany a 
potential supporter.
561
 The onset of the Boer War afforded opportunities for international 
intervention for which, according to Andrew, Delcassé was genuinely enthusiastic, 
seeing in them the potential for re-opening the Egypt question.
562
 German policy, 
meaning that any such “stand against England” could not be attempted, became a source 
of sincere regret.
563
 However, Delcassé was at the same time being urged to profit from 
Britain’s temporary preoccupation, and did so in early 1900 in the seizure of Touat, an 
oasis in a remote inland area on the Algeria/Morocco border.
564
 1901 having vexed 
Delcassé with British approaches to Germany for alliance, it was not until 1903, Andrew 
stated, that Delcassé inclined to take the first steps towards an Entente.
565
 This change of 
heart was due not least to pressure from the Parti Colonial, upon whom Andrew’s later 
work concentrated.
566
  
 
Venier suggests of subsequent literature on Delcassé’s foreign policy that “Andrew’s 
interpretation has generally been accepted for the past 30 years”.567 Such was certainly 
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the case for James McMillan, who emphasised the role of the Parti in persuading 
Delcassé in 1903 to come to terms with Britain.
568
 R.D.Anderson had also endorsed the 
ideas that Delcassé had been “not originally pro British”, and of the Parti Colonial 
changing its Anglophobe stance in light of Fashoda, to create the “late development” 
that was the Entente.
569
 Jamie Cockfield’s argument that, in the wake of Fashoda, there 
was a realistic chance that wiser German policymakers following a different course 
could have secured an alliance with France implicitly rested on Andrew’s reading of 
Delcassé’s policy.570 Keiger reiterated in 1983 Andrew’s view that it took until Spring 
1903 for the Parti Colonial and Paul Cambon to convert Delcassé to the idea of the 
Egypt-Morocco barter at the centre of the later Anglo-French Entente.
571
 However, 
eighteen years later, foreshadowing the work of his colleague Venier, Keiger had 
amended his position to the extent that he interpreted the March 1899 agreement as “a 
sign that Anglo-French differences were only skin deep”.572  Overall, Keiger asserted, 
“the strategy of improved relations with Britain evolved slowly”, if under the urging of 
the comité de l’Afrique Française, from early 1899, with any animosity over Fashoda 
appearing “an aberration in relations between the two countries” rather than typical of 
that relationship.
573
 
 
Elsewhere, variants of the traditional Delcassé view showed a surprising resilience. 
Despite being fully aware of Andrew’s work, P.J.V.Rollo asserted in 1969 that from 
before 1898 Delcassé “confessed to being haunted by the notion of an Anglo-French 
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alliance. Its achievement was his mission”.574 In his general survey of Belle Epoque 
France, Jean Baptiste Duroselle dated to February 1899 Delcassé’s decision “à se 
rapprocher de l’Angleterre”, if deferring any actual proposals until mid 1902, once the 
Boer War was over.
575
 According to Brown, in September 1898 Delcassé was “probably 
already dreaming of the day when Great Britain could be brought into the Franco-
Russian alliance”, if with contradictory indications over the winter of 1898-9 as he 
underwent a post Fashoda “sulk”.576 David Levering Lewis endorsed Andrew to the 
extent that it had been Etienne and the Parti Colonial who “prodded” Delcassé towards 
rapprochement with Britain, but in a course embarked upon by him directly after 
Fashoda.
577
 Raymond Massie’s attitude, from the same starting point as Pinon, Langer 
and Porter, was that Delcassé unambiguously worked towards an Entente from the time 
he arrived in office, external circumstances only forcing him and Cambon to play a 
waiting game until a more vigorous pursuit of a British alignment became possible in 
early 1902.
578
 Jacques Leygues’ very sympathetic biography adhered to the line that in 
June 1898 one of Delcassé’s 3 principal objectives was “négocier avec Londres afin de 
déblayer le terrain des derniers malentendus”, interpreting the March 1899 agreement as 
the real start of negotiations with Britain.
579
 The more dispassionate position of 
M.B.Hayne was that “his desire to achieve an Entente Cordiale stemmed from careful 
reflection during the years prior to his arrival in power”, that Delcassé regarded Britain 
as a more effective counterbalance to Germany than Russia as well as “the key to 
France’s aspirations in the Mediterranean”, quite apart from any liberal-political affinity 
between the powers, and that “his basic attitude” of wanting a resolution of conflicts 
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with Britain was consistent throughout.
580
 Rejecting any idea that the minister would 
have allied with Germany, Hayne concluded that circumstances alone had caused 
Delcassé to postpone any actual Anglo-French negotiations until 1903, and that, 
whatever outward appearances and flexibility he had had to display up to then, 
“revisionist attitudes need to be dismissed”.581 
 
Although Hayne directly attacked the Andrew interpretation, the most comprehensive 
critique of it nevertheless awaited Venier, whose 2001-2002 work perceives in the 
minister’s actions a lack of real hostility towards Britain, so paving the way for a later 
agreement. In the space of only 2 articles inevitably lacking the breadth of Andrew’s 
book, Venier concentrates on the period of the early Boer War, in a close analysis of the 
two attempts to form a continental coalition with the purpose of enforcing a peace upon 
Britain. Having emphasised the determination of French authorities in October 1899 “to 
refuse to follow any adventurous course and to stay aloof from any idea of a hostile 
intervention” and Delcassé going “probably as far as he could to promote a spirit of 
détente”, Venier re-interprets French incursions into Morocco from Algeria as the 
unauthorised actions of the men on the spot.
582
 Further, the “degraded” state of French 
domestic political climate, the unpreparedness of the French navy and the prospect of 
the 1900 Exposition inhibited any “adventurous policy”.583 The later 28 February 1900 
measures emphasised by Andrew were both purely defensive in nature and part of an 
already unfolding reform of military capacities, with the March 1900 diplomatic 
manoeuvrings seeing France follow the Russians only “with great caution”.584 Venier 
stresses both Delcassé’s attempt to involve the USA in the proposed intervention and the 
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friendly, humanitarian nature of what was planned.
585
 If anything, Delcassé had “a 
moderating influence on the Russian ally” and “may even have sought rapprochement 
with” Britain during the war.586 
 
Of more recent studies, Dunlop draws on Porter to maintain that “To Delcassé, the arch-
enemy was always Germany”, his “ultimate vision...triple alliance between France, 
Russia and England” as early as the 1880s, Zorgbibe and Clarke tend to back the 
Andrew argument, but Tombs endorses neither side.
587
 Despite Andrew’s critique of the 
Delcassé-inspired line that the minister had sought alignment with Britain from the very 
start of his time in office, or at least prior to the Boer War, it has never wholly 
disappeared. Venier’s work represents the most recent, cogent, published research on an 
important aspect of the problem, if, as he acknowledges, not covering the period after 
mid 1900 in any detail, so leaving unanswered questions for the ensuing 3 years.
588
 
French Diplomacy in the Fashoda Crisis. 
 
The first issue requiring consideration is what light Delcassé’s behaviour and utterances 
in the latter half of 1898 throws on his attitude towards Britain as he settled into office. 
The Niger negotiations having been completed by Hanotaux on 14 June, Delcassé’s 
main initial preoccupations were far removed from Britain. Successive notes from the 
Ministry of Colonies or Delcassé’s own department dated from 4 July to 4 September, 
seeking new instructions for the Marchand Mission, seem to have been ignored by the 
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Minister.
589
 His time was more absorbed first in the effort needed to mediate in the 
Spanish-American war, then, after 16 August, by a holiday in the Côte d’Azur.590 Two 
weeks later, new developments in the Dreyfus case compelled Delcassé not only to 
review his former belief in Dreyfus’ guilt but divert energy into reconciling still anti 
Dreyfusard war minister Cavaignac with now revisionist Prime Minister Brisson, to 
shore up the latter’s tottering grasp on office.591 By 1 September, Declassé had the 
additional irritant of his supposed ally Nicholas II, without first troubling to consult or 
even inform the French, airing a proposal for a Conference directed towards 
international disarmament.
592
 The confessed bewilderment of French public opinion 
(and, Monson correctly suspected, Delcassé himself) at the Tsar springing this 
unexpected idea was what provided the context for the ambassador’s report that 
Delcassé claimed that “every difficulty between England and France could by patience 
and by a conciliatory spirit be peaceably solved”; further, that he considered “eminently 
desirable a cordial understanding between England, France and Russia”.593  
 
Bates saw the delay in dealing with the Colonial Ministry, and the non committal reply 
that Delcassé did eventually render on 7 September, as part of the same devious ploy to 
cover up his own volte-face.
594
 But perhaps Wright’s reflection that “The long interval 
gives the impression that he was hoping Marchand would not succeed” was nearer the 
mark.
595
 The timing of the reply was unlikely to have been a coincidence. News of 
Kitchener’s success at Omdurman, which made the possibility of an Anglo-French 
collision on the Upper Nile into a near inevitability, had reached Paris on 6 September. 
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Up until that point, there had been the chance that stronger Mahdist opposition might 
defer, or altogether stop, the advance of the Anglo-Egyptians, so making cogitations on 
Marchand, in any case at the end of tenuous and lengthy lines of communication, of 
academic interest only. There remained the possibilities that Marchand had been pushed 
back/killed by the Mahdists, or had failed to reach Fashoda. Delcassé’s response to the 
Ministry of Colonies expressed the hope that Marchand, instead of moving onto 
Fashoda, might have gone no further north than the junction of the Nile with the 
Sobat.
596
 However, failing this, the minister now almost certainly had to face up to a 
confrontation in the very near future, and was left with no option but to start preparing 
for it, meanwhile still having to cope with the domestic complications and the cabinet 
instability generated by the Dreyfus case.
597
 
 
Delcassé was handicapped by the lack of prior diplomatic preparation for a 
confrontation on the Upper Nile on the part of his predecessor.
598
 Hanotaux’s apologia , 
in Fachoda, maintained that had he stayed in office he - unlike Delcassé - would have 
responded favourably to German overtures (the Munster note) for a possible future carve 
up of Portugal’s African possessions, and that this would have sufficed to secure 
German support against Britain.
599
 Instead, Germany reached agreement on the same 
subject with Britain, but even had either Hanotaux or Delcassé not considered it 
impossible to deal with Munster there was no guarantee that German co-operation on the 
Upper Nile would have followed.
600
 Germany, like Italy, had in the early 1890s 
voluntarily signed away any pretensions of her own in this region in return for 
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concessions elsewhere. Likewise, the Russians, unimpressed by French lack of support 
for their expansions in the Far East, were sufficiently assuaged by British behaviour not 
to offer France more than verbal support on the Upper Nile.
601
 
 
Delcassé’s first instinctive response to the possibility of a clash on the Upper Nile was to 
play down the significance of the mission, and therefore, it might be hoped, the tension 
consequent on its presence at Fashoda. Hence, Marchand was initially written off to 
Monson as “nothing but an emissary of civilisation” with no authority to decide the 
questions of right that lay with the governments in Paris and London.
602
 Delcassé further 
aired the hope that “all outstanding differences between the two countries might be 
amiably arranged by the exercise of patience and conciliation”.603 In the first stage of the 
crisis, Delcassé certainly seems to have been sincere enough in his anxiety about an 
armed conflict between Kitchener and Marchand, and relieved when it emerged that 
there had been none.
604
 Once it had been ascertained that both sides had abstained from 
fighting, he was faced with the question of how, if at all, advantage could be taken of the 
French presence on the Nile without resort to war. Relief over the lack of violence 
melded seamlessly on 28 September into expansive statements reported by Monson 
about future prospects for Anglo-French relations, as Delcassé “reiterated that it is the 
desire of the present French government to make a friend of England, adding that 
between ourselves he would much prefer an Anglo-French to an [sic] Franco-Russian 
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alliance”.605 Delcassé’s own record of their dialogue, stating that “j’ai constaté de 
nouveau l’esprit d’entente dont on paraissait également animé des deux côtés”, did not 
go quite as far, because this “esprit d’entente” was explicitly stated as a context for 
resolution of the immediate problem, i.e. as a background enabling the French “à ne pas 
nous refuser à certaines concessions, si nous les jugions possibles”.606  
 
Delcassé’s own note, covering his next meeting with Monson on 30 September, whilst 
leaving a wide scope for conciliation, clearly asserted the limits of his own willingness 
for co-operation:  
Il ne faut pas que le gouvernment de la reine se méprenne sur mon désir d’entente 
avec l’Angleterre, dont vous avez vous-même reconnu le sincérité, ni sur mes 
sentiments conciliants... Je puis faire à l’entente franco-anglaise le sacrifice 
d’intérêts matériels: dans mes mains, l’honneur national restera intact. Nul autre, 
à cette place, ne vous tiendra un autre langage...
607
  
 
This time, the more reserved account came from the British side, Monson making less of 
French goodwill than Delcassé’s unofficial declaration that “it is impossible for the 
French government to give up Fashoda... France would, however unwillingly, accept 
war rather than submit”.608 Underlining the essentially confrontational nature of his 
ongoing engagement with Monson, Andrew made the further point that faulty 
intelligence had misled Delcassé into expecting a British ultimatum at this meeting, 
hence the minister’s “impassioned plea for an honourable settlement”, and subsequent 
optimism when Monson did not deliver the ultimatum that he did not in fact have.
609
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Pending receipt of Marchand’s report by the French government, for the time being 
reliant solely upon telegrams from Kitchener via London for news of their own Mission, 
Delcassé persisted in attempting to wring concessions from Britain. Baron de Courcel, 
on leave in Paris, was sent back to London with instructions to negotiate on the basis of 
a withdrawal of Marchand in return for other territorial concessions.
610
 Despite denials 
from the British press and politicians that the dialogue started prior to the withdrawal 
constituted negotiations, elsewhere it was commonly recognised to amount to just 
that.
611
 By 11 October, Delcassé confessed to Monson that “he was sick of telling me 
that he is sincerely anxious to avoid a rupture... knowledge of his friendly disposition 
towards us is injuring his position here”.612 Again, this remark should be interpreted in 
its immediate context-with the underlying aim of forcing concessions in Africa under the 
threat that Delcassé might otherwise have to resign over Fashoda, and any minister 
replacing him would be less agreeable to Britain. So expressions of goodwill served as a 
lever for Delcassé to avoid the choice of resignation, “humiliation… which he 
personally cannot accept” or “a war with England… alike contrary to his avowed policy 
and repulsive to his principles”.613 
 
The turning points in the crisis were, though, played out across the Channel. British 
press coverage on Fashoda was complemented by increasingly uncompromising 
speeches from British statesmen, inspired by Salisbury’s release of a Blue Book.614 
Spanning the political spectrum, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hicks Beach through 
Liberal leaders Rosebery and Grey, to Asquith, and Harcourt on the left, lined up after 
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11 October to declare British resolve, so decreasing any inclination to concede on the 
part of public opinion or those in government who might otherwise waver.
615
 When 
Courcel met Lord Salisbury on 12 October, a long discussion ensued. The very different 
understandings of their conversation became painfully apparent when Courcel’s 
subsequent letter to Salisbury, claiming that concession of territory as an outlet for the 
Congo as far as the left bank of the Nile had been considered, met with a prompt and 
firm disavowal from Salisbury, not only refusing the validity of such pretensions but 
stating “The claim asserted... is quite new to me, and, as far as I know, has never been 
officially made on behalf of the French government”.616 Delcassé’s nerves, already tried 
by repeated reports from Britain of naval and military preparations for war, were not 
helped by ambiguous despatches from Marchand. If anything, the situation was 
worsened by the arrival in France on 26 October of Marchand’s subordinate Baratier, 
who travelled up to Paris to a hero’s welcome and, failing to affirm that the mission was 
in the state of desperation and disease portrayed by Kitchener, did not scruple to stir up 
trouble for the government amongst the colonialist lobby until ordered to return to 
Fashoda.
617
 
 
As Delcassé’s hopes for what he might be able to negotiate out of the British in return 
for Fashoda diminished, so also did his inclination to air generalised opinions on the 
future of Anglo-French relations. Both had clearly rested on “le ton très amical et très 
conciliant” perceived, particularly in Salisbury, by Courcel and Delcassé.618 In view of 
the intransigence of the British Cabinet meeting on 27 October, such assertions had 
ceased to carry any value as a lubricant to negotiating, because there was to be no 
                                                 
615
 Sanderson, Upper Nile (1965), 347-8 & Bates, Fashoda Incident (1984), 154-155. 
616
 BDW, 1, 180, Courcel to Salisbury, 12 October, and Salisbury to Courcel, 13 October in what Bates, 
Fashoda Incident (1984), 156, characterised as “a letter of frigid Englishness” as “prospects for a 
negotiated settlement dimmed” - Brown, Fashoda Reconsidered (1970), 101. 
617
 Sanderson, Upper Nile, (1965), 353, Brown, Fashoda Reconsidered  (1970), 114 & Bates, Fashoda 
Incident (1984), 149-51 & 159. 
618
 DDF 1, xiv, 640, Delcassé to Courcel, 8 October. 
 150 
further negotiation until Marchand had been withdrawn. Delcassé and Courcel hesitantly 
tried to seek a face-saving formula whereby a Commission Mixte to determine territorial 
borders might be appointed simultaneously with Marchand being told to evacuate, but to 
no avail.
619
 Even ordering the withdrawal on 3 November failed to prompt the 
immediate negotiations for which Courcel had pressed. The Prime Minister maintained 
that these were neither possible nor desirable until such time as “historical and 
geographical information which we do not fully possess” had been acquired, and “l’état 
des esprits dans les deux pays” had calmed.620 
 
Advocates of the Delcassé line have cited his 1898 declaration that “je ne voudrais pas 
quitter ce fauteuil sans avoir rétabli la bonne entente avec l’Angleterre”.621 Even 
Andrew allowed the claim that the minister already had an Entente with Britain in mind 
at the time of Fashoda, citing his private correspondence of 6 and 7 October 1898, in 
which Delcassé owned up to “the desire for an agreement with England, very freely 
expressed by me since I became foreign minister”.622 It was not surprising that among 
those on the receiving end of such ideas was British ambassador Monson during 
September and early October 1898, as an attitude of conciliation was the most sensible 
one for any French Foreign Minister to take in the circumstances.
623
 However, all of the 
statements to Monson should be read in the context of the vigorous arguments between 
the Minister and Ambassador as to who had the right to ownership of Fashoda, 
something readily acknowledged by the Briton as “His Excellency remained as 
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determined as ever upon the right of France to occupy territory practically abandoned by 
Egypt and contested the right of Great Britain to warn off other powers”.624 An abstract 
and generalised desire for an agreement might be one thing, but a consistent and 
coherent resolve for, or master plan to work towards, an alliance would be another 
altogether, and cannot reasonably be extrapolated from Delcassé’s behaviour and 
utterances of the moment during the crisis.  
 
Taking into account the nature of the Fashoda incident, it might seem paradoxical that in 
late 1898 anyone in the Quai should be contemplating friendly overtures to Britain. Such 
a hypothesis hangs not on the substantive outcome of Fashoda. Delcassé had accepted 
by 7 September that Etienne’s idea of using Marchand as a means of reopening the 
question of Egypt, or even making substantial territorial gains, was impracticable.
625
 In 
the absence of any concessions from Salisbury, by mid October, he noted that France 
was “absolutely incapable of carrying on, even with Russian help” a war at sea against 
Britain, and that an unconditional withdrawal, as the only alternative, might have to be 
ordered.
626
 Delcassé knew, as did British policymakers, that most of the Russian fleet, 
based in the Baltic, would be immobilised in port from November until April.
627
 The 
withdrawal, the French acceptance that they were not to have an outlet on the Upper 
Nile, still less an opportunity to overturn British control of Egypt, and a subsequent 
negotiation of a boundary between British and French spheres of influence in eastern 
Africa, were all foreseeable. They followed from the defeat of the Khalifa and meeting 
of Kitchener and Marchand, the failure of any supporting French/Abyssinian expedition 
from the east to reach Fashoda via the lands of the fickle Menelick, and the 
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disproportion of strength at Fashoda and globally. Then there was the realisation in Paris 
from Marchand’s own reports that the upper Nile had neither much commercial potential 
nor any viable port sites, so dictating a pragmatic conclusion to the crisis.
628
 Even if 
these factors had not, Brown makes the point that Delcassé’s freedom of action was 
severely prescribed by domestic factors, in particular divisions arising from the Dreyfus 
affair which exacerbated industrial disputes and threatened ministerial crises or even 
perhaps an overthrow of the Republic, and the collapse of the Brisson cabinet on 25-6 
October, which at a crucial juncture left Delcassé as a temporary caretaker minister.
629
 
 
In the early stages of the crisis, although the British maintained that they would not 
negotiate, the talks that went on pending Delcassé’s receipt of news from Baratier and 
Marchand amounted to negotiations. Even in mid-October, when the British tone was 
stiffening and the crucial Salisbury-Courcel misunderstanding had taken place, London 
had the option, whilst insisting on the evacuation of Marchand in reality before any 
negotiations, of not imposing what from the French side would be viewed as a 
humiliation. The ambassador went so far as to report of Delcassé that “that if we would 
make things easy for him in form he would be conciliatory in substance”; where 
Delcassé had real cause for grievance was in the refusal of the British Prime Minister, 
after cabinet on 27 October, to offer him anything at all along the lines of the face-
saving “golden bridge for that retrograde movement” to which Monson referred.630  
 
Post-Fashoda Diplomacy. 
 
It seems quite possible that, without the urging of Faure, Delcassé could well have 
availed himself of the opportunity presented by the Brisson cabinet collapse to 
relinquish the Quai d’Orsay, so avoiding personal responsibility for ordering Marchand 
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to leave Fashoda.
631
 That he returned to office under Dupuy on 1 November and 
accepted the humiliation cost Delcassé political capital to an extent that would be hard to 
reconcile with a sustained enthusiasm for Britain. Faure’s later assessment was that 
“Cette décision… coûtait beaucoup, tous ses amis étant du parti Chauvin et lui - même 
ayant toujours eu une attitude très ardente”.632 Monson also recognised the cost to 
Delcassé of staying in office, now he was exposed to “a certain loss of popularity” and 
“the disagreeable experience of defending in the tribune the policy”.633 Hayne, accepting 
that the foreign minister felt personally aggrieved at the way he had been treated by the 
British, advises more bluntly that Delcassé in some circles subsequently became known 
as “the gnome of Fashoda”.634  
 
Orders for the withdrawal of Marchand served to relieve much, but by no means all, of 
the tension in relations between Britain and France. In the immediate wake of Fashoda, 
Monson reported that:  
 There is no doubt that this country had been intimidated by the attitude of 
England…France appears to me to be staggered; and in consequence calls herself 
humiliated. I should like to think that the feeling of resentment will be transitory; 
but the contrary is, I fear, the more likely.
635
 
 
The French wondered why the British continued to maintain their fleet on the war 
footing that it had by early November achieved. German diplomats (excepting Hatzfeldt) 
remained convinced of the ultimate inevitability of the Anglo-French war that the Kaiser 
discretely continued to encourage until February 1899.
636
 Monson reported French 
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“apprehension… that England is looking out for a pretext for declaring war against 
France”, originating in the conviction, in government and legislative circles among 
others, that the British “are of the opinion that it is folly to allow France to have leisure 
to increase her naval strength, and to secure still further sympathy, if not chances of 
support, from Continental Powers”.637 Such warlike preparations, if in an unfortunate 
conjunction with continued inflammatory speeches from Chamberlain, have been 
explained away in terms of a desire to intimidate into silence any continental power 
otherwise tempted to object to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement determining how the 
Sudan would in future be governed.
638
 Salisbury and Cromer, determined to avoid 
replicating the situation in Egypt itself, whereby the French and Russian delegates could 
obstruct British proposals on the Caisse de la Dette, and the Wilhelmstrasse could 
blackmail Britain into securing the co-operation of the German and Austrian delegates, 
imposed a Condominion Agreement whereby the Khedive’s authority over Sudan was 
reduced to nothing more than a ghostly shadow, with Britain running the province 
largely in form as well as in practice.
639
 Sanderson makes a convincing case for “a very 
close and surely significant connection in time” between the final signing and 
promulgation of this after 19 January 1899, and the start of British demobilisation a few 
days later.
640
 Given Russian distance from or disinterest in Egypt for its own sake, 
Italian reliance on British support in Africa, and German desire to stoke up Anglo-
French conflict, his suggestion that the naval preparations were not primarily directed 
against France, and correctly understood at the time to be directed as such, is somewhat 
less convincing. Persisting Anglo-French tensions were further exacerbated by 
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Monson’s own gaffe. Criticisms in his speech on 6 December to the British Chamber of 
Commerce of the “pin-pricking” against British colonial policy practiced by short lived 
French ministries for their “ephemeral gratification”, and of the “intemperate language” 
used in some parts of the French press, invited allegations from the Chamber of 
Deputies and the press that the Ambassador was interfering in French internal politics.
641
 
 
Simultaneously engaging in prolonged negotiations over an exit route for Marchand, 
whose expedition finally left Fashoda on 13 December and travelled back via Abyssinia 
and Djibouti, the Quai d’Orsay’s response to the overall situation was two fold. 642 
Complementing French defensive naval preparations, Delcassé sought to avoid giving 
any provocations to Britain. In an interview to Russian paper Rossia, in December, he 
admitted the possibility of Britain desiring “war in order to destroy our own fleet before 
it became even stronger than it is now. But such a war is not as easy to make as one 
imagines. A war like that is never made without a pretext, and we shall never supply a 
pretext”.643  This interview also pointed his second line of action, to suggest that other 
continental countries would in the event of war rally to France’s support. In his talks 
with Monson, Delcassé hoped to deter any attack by warning that “if France had to go to 
war with England, she would not consider that it would be enough to have the support of 
Russia alone, but that she would seek for and obtain that of Germany also”.644  
 
Such threats should have been given added plausibility by relations between Delcassé 
and German contacts. Andrew cited at length the report of German agent Arthur Von 
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Huhn, advising the Wilhelmstrasse of his meeting in early December with Delcassé in 
which the latter “indicated a rapprochement with Germany as an aim to be pursued by 
all means” for “a common policy against English encroachments”.645 At face value, such 
sentiments appear damning for the later Delcassé line, but it is equally possible to 
interpret these strictly unofficial feelers to a German journalist as a superficial show, or 
nothing more than “a tactical move designed to make the British think twice before 
launching a preventive war”.646 In mid December, Monson put the “curious” 
phenomenon of “the court now being paid to Germany by a portion of the French press, 
and probably also by the French government” down to motives other than a desire for an 
anti British diplomatic combination. The easing of Franco-German tensions would 
enable both sides to effect reductions in their armies, in the French case now “grown 
into such vast and ponderous proportions as to threaten the existence of those 
constitutional liberties which are dear to the great majority of Frenchmen”. If the French 
were eager to save money and stabilise the democracy of their Republic, the Kaiser 
might welcome the opportunity for reductions in light of his fears about “the spread of 
Socialistic doctrines” among his subjects.647 Whilst Monson owned that such 
improvements in Franco-German relations would not enhance Britain’s position, it is 
therefore apparent that they were presently not deemed inconsistent either with British 
goodwill towards France, or vice versa. By this time, however, Munster, of the opinion a 
month earlier that Britain had become more hated in France than Germany had ever 
been, had already concluded that a Franco-German alignment would be impossible. The 
insuperable obstacles were the “quite remarkably impractical ideas” still harboured in 
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France, on wresting Alsace-Lorraine from German control.
648
 This had been an 
awkward subject for Delcassé, who had largely skirted around it in conversation with 
Von Huhn rather than trying to confront it.
649
 
 
The ambiguity of the motives behind Delcassé’s overture to Berlin is reflected in the 
contradictory evidence about the tone of Anglo-French relations after Fashoda. Meeting 
the new Dupuy government, Monson remarked that “I could not but be struck with the 
courtesy, and I may say cordiality, displayed in every instance by the Ministers, and by 
their professed desire to be on the best of terms with England”.650 Even whilst the war 
scare persisted, there was cordiality shown during the visit to Paris of the Duke and 
Duchess of Cornwall without “anything disagreeable or disobliging said of England” 
nor, Monson noted, any deliberate hostility subsequently, for “the bulk of the French 
nation had no such feeling towards England”. 651 The willingness of Delcassé to advise 
on how to “put a stop to all further trouble and to the proposed parliamentary question” 
excited by Monson’s Chamber of Commerce speech was relayed by the ambassador to 
London.
652
 Perhaps most importantly of all, Delcassé had chosen Paul Cambon for the 
London embassy in the knowledge that Paul had been an advocate of closer Anglo-
French links since at least 1888, during an embassy in Madrid that left him with the 
feeling that British influence was needed to counter German in the Mediterranean, a 
sentiment enhanced still further by the convergence of British and French interests, as 
against those of Russia, in the Ottoman Empire during his tenure in Constantinople.
653
 
That the appointment was in mid September explicitly proposed to Monson on the basis 
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of “the character and disposition of M Cambon, who is well known as being a friend to 
England” might, again, be interpreted as Delcassé seeking to create an amiable ambience 
in which the British might be more amenable to negotiations over the Upper Nile.
654
 
Such conciliatory impressions persisted though into the post Fashoda period. Monson 
relayed that Cambon went “empowered to propose… that all outstanding questions in 
dispute between England and France should be dealt with as much as possible 
simultaneously, and a general arrangement come to for a comprehensive settlement”.655 
To his mind, this was evidence of the sincerity of Faure, Delcassé and their colleagues 
for more cordial relations, although, as Andrew related, any expectations of important 
discussions immediately following Cambon’s arrival in London were not met.656 
  
The end of 1898 found Cambon reflecting on the courtesy with which he had been 
received in London, and the hostility to war of the Queen, Balfour and Salisbury, but 
also the Prime Minister’s failure to capitalise on French conciliatory intentions and the 
power of certain “influences belliqueuses” incessantly at work. Mindful of the clear and 
categorical opinions of the naval and military attachés that Britain was ready for war and 
awaited only “le premier prétexte pour nous surprendre”, Cambon concluded that, 
despite some pacific currents within the Liberal party, “Nous sommes donc en face d’un 
danger plus ou moins prochain, plus ou mois éventuel, mais qu’il est impossible de 
nier”.657 On the British side, Salisbury’s pessimistic assessment for Anglo-French 
relations was that “a mutual temper of apathetic tolerance may be cultivated on both 
sides… anything like a hearty goodwill between the nations will not be possible”.658 
Conceding a temporary quiescence, covering the lead up to and unfolding of the 1900 
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Exposition, Monson forecast that “An entire change of policy, consisting in the frank 
endeavour to establish really friendly relations with England, however much it may be 
desired by a few sensible people in France, does not appear to me to be within 
measurable distance of realization”.659 
 
Having previously declared himself patient, because “nous avons tout à gagner à 
attendre”, the new ambassador in London decided the time was ripe in the New Year to 
take up negotiations on British and French boundaries in central Africa.
660
 Formally 
notifying Salisbury that Marchand had now departed Fashoda, Cambon raised the 
question of the Sudan-Congo frontier on 11-12 January 1899.
661
 Despite the best urgings 
of Delcassé for concessions of territory in the Bahr El Ghazal, Cambon was unable to 
induce Salisbury to let the French into the Nile valley.
662
 The agreement eventually 
reached on 21 March confined French influence to the watershed of the Congo to the 
west, with the border determined midway between the watershed of that river, and the 
Nile from which France was therefore excluded.
663
 Andrew highlights four other 
difficulties, among them the proposed French lease of a coaling station at Muscat on the 
Red Sea, attempts to expand French influence in Shanghai, and the already long running 
dispute over fishing rights in Newfoundland.
664
 These could not always be resolved 
amicably. British opposition to the tariffs imposed in Madagascar by the French met 
with the observation from Cambon and Delcassé that it was not in their power to alter 
them.
665
 That Monson continued to be struck by Delcassé’s willingness to discuss all 
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Anglo-French differences, in a “spirit of conciliation, and with the intention of 
conceding what they properly can”, did though imply that any disharmony was neither 
complete nor permanent.
666
 
French Diplomacy during the Boer War.   
 
By August 1899, the continued disagreements were exacerbated by a Royal Navy 
warship attacking a French fishing vessel off Dungeness, killing one fisherman. In light 
of his latest dialogue with Monson, Delcassé wondered to Cambon whether a mutually 
beneficial “politique d’entente” with Britain was at all possible.667 The same long 
interview over Muscat and Shanghai, as Monson admitted, “at times extremely 
animated” in tone, left Delcassé reported as deploring London’s “deliberate intention of 
being unfriendly to France in every way”, and pleading for the ambassador to do all in 
his power “to facilitate the maintenance of a good understanding between France and 
England”.668 Meanwhile, Monson, increasingly mindful of the implications should 
Anglo-French relations become more tense, continued to be preoccupied by what he saw 
as the “very overt court” paid to France by the Kaiser, whose “proffer of peculiarly 
intimate friendship” to Loubet was welcomed by many French.669 Consideration was 
already being given in St Petersburg, where Delcassé visited the Tsar and his ministers 
from 4-9 August, and Berlin, to the potential for a joint intervention in the event of war 
breaking out between Britain and the Boer republics.
670
   
 
In autumn 1899, much the same geopolitical factors prevailed as in the autumn of 1898. 
Of the major continental powers, France was the most vulnerable to British hostility, 
whether in the form of disrupted trade or in the more direct, military, sense of being 
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physically closest to Britain with a large number of African and far eastern colonies 
susceptible to naval blockade, internal disorder or external invasion. As Monson 
reflected, “the brunt of a rupture would fall chiefly upon France”.671 Even the 
extravagant fantasisations of Driant acknowledged that, in the event of war, the fall of 
distant possessions such as Madagascar, Djibouti, Indo-China, could not be foreseeably 
avoided.
672
 After the painful reminder of Fashoda, those in government were well aware 
of the inadvisability of acting alone.  
 
The same episode had served as a lesson on the potential ineffectiveness of the alliance 
with Russia, an Empire with no direct interest in African territory. Nicholas II may have 
privately opined that, with the merest mobilisation of troops on the frontier of India, he 
could “change the course of the war” and bring it to a halt.673 However, strong though 
his forces may have been on the land mass of Europe or northern Asia, he had no power 
to intervene directly in the Boer War, nor to protect French possessions other than by the 
indirect means of attacking India through Afghanistan. To everyone in France outside of 
those extreme nationalist circles least connected with reality, therefore, a French 
intervention in the Boer War, solo or with Russia, was out of the question. In these 
circumstances, the attitude of Germany became crucial, as the only continental coalition 
with the potential to impose a peace on Britain was that of France, Russia, and Germany 
(in whose wake Austria-Hungary and Italy might be expected to follow). There was in 
fact a substantial pre-history of hints at Franco-German collaboration over southern 
Africa at British expense. In the wake of the attempted overthrow of the Transvaal 
government of the Jameson Raid, in January 1896 the Germans several times raised the 
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possibility of collaboration with a view to checking “l’insatiable appétit de 
l’Angleterre”, but met with a distrustful response from Berthelot.674 Despite the 
publicity attached to Chamberlain’s notions of an Anglo-German alliance, and later 
indications that the Kaiser was not as supportive of the Boers as had once been the case, 
it was not wholly unrealistic to suppose that German policymakers in 1899 might be 
interested.
675
 
The First Intervention Attempt. 
By early October, the European press, much of it strongly pro-Boer in sympathy, was 
alive with speculation of a continental coalition, perhaps ostensibly animated by the 
ideals of The Hague, formed to compel an end to the Boer War and the imposition of a 
peace unlikely to be welcomed in London. The days directly preceding the war found 
the Russian foreign Minister Count Muraviev in Spain, where he met the Spanish 
President Francisco Silvela. Fuelling further speculation, he continued from San 
Sebastian into France on 6 October, for extensive talks with Delcassé from 10 October, 
then Loubet on 27 October on the eve of his departure, before arriving in Berlin in early 
November with the Tsar to meet the Kaiser and von Bülow. Taken to have shared the 
Anglophobe leanings of his predecessor Lobanov, Muraviev has often been cast as the 
would-be architect of any anti British coalition, possibly backed by a Russian military 
machine that regarded 1899-1900 as a good moment to strike in Persia and Turkey.
676
 
More recent studies have cast doubt on his motives and certainty of purpose, stressing 
the need for a period of prolonged consolidation after “the dramatic step forward by 
Russia in the Far East” of 1897-98 which left the Tsarist government temporarily 
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overstretched.
677
 Nevertheless, and notwithstanding urges to caution from colleagues, it 
seems clear that (however tentatively) Muraviev did raise the idea whilst in Spain and 
Paris of a continental coalition, and did subsequently go to Berlin with a view to 
sounding out German policymakers as to their willingness to participate in such a 
coalition.
678
 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Monson’s mistaken willingness to believe that Delcassé 
could draw on Russian diplomatic and military support during Fashoda, a year later he 
would prove more sceptical of a France-Russia combination acting against Britain.
679
 
Prior to the war, Delcassé had already denied that France had been one of the three 
powers asked by Boer representative Dr Leyds to intervene in Britain’s dispute with 
Transvaal, and gave Monson to understand that “he should not listen to any such 
suggestion”.680 With the sole qualification being the need for French investments in 
South Africa to be protected, the ambassador passed on these assertions without 
questioning their sincerity, if critical of hostility from the French press towards 
Britain.
681
 Muraviev’s visit was inevitably a source of comment, with initial emphasis on 
the private purpose of his presence being superseded by more malign explanations.
682
 
Warned by Tornielli of the “mischievous” motives behind the presence of the Russian 
minister rendered all the more dangerous by his “mediocre intelligence”, Monson also 
relayed the Italian Ambassador’s opinion of there being “no likelihood that Franco-
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Russian blandishments would be successful at Berlin”.683 More alarming was an account 
from Austrian Chargé d’Affaires Dumba, whose “failure to pick up any trustworthy 
information” about Muraviev in Paris did not prevent him from passing on a third hand 
report, originating from the Austrian Chargé in Madrid, detailing the welcome given to 
the Russian by Silvela in San Sebastian and Muraviev’s expectation of an “ultimate 
agreement” for a four power intervention.684 From this, Dumba inferred that Muraviev 
must have raised the same subject with Loubet and Delcassé. However, he also relayed 
Muraviev’s perception of a reluctance on the part of the French government for the time 
being to “engage themselves very positively”, not least from fear of divisions in 
domestic opinion.
685
  
 
At the same time, Monson’s direct impressions were not negative. Successive reports to 
London stressed the “marked cordiality” of Loubet “not animated by the anti-English 
sentiments which, if one could believe the French press to represent public opinion, are 
unanimously felt towards us”, as well as that of Waldeck Rousseau.686 Monson relied 
upon the forthcoming Paris Exposition “to chill” French responses to the designs 
imputed to Muraviev, and was not alone in following this line of reasoning.
687
 Attitudes 
within the French government were not perceived as deteriorating, with Loubet mindful 
of “the interest of France in keeping on good terms with a neighbour who took one third 
annually of her total exports” and therefore embarrassed by a hostile French press bent 
on undermining the well-being of his own country.
688
 The same was true of Delcassé, 
admired through December for showing “so much firmness and determination in 
resisting abuses” against Britain from the French press, noted despite his offence at 
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Chamberlain’s “threats against France” to “favour cultivating friendship with England”, 
still “exceptionally moderate in tone”, and unlikely to succumb “to the temptation of 
taking advantage of… a serious embarrassment” to Britain such as the defeats recently 
sustained in South Africa.
689
 
 
Any consideration as to Delcassé’s actual intentions in the last three months of 1899 
meets with a central documentary void that makes the forming of any definitive 
conclusions near impossible. The published Documents Diplomatiques contain almost 
nothing of relevance written by him in October-November 1899.
690
 Delcassé’s October 
conversations with Muraviev must clearly be pivotal in any judgements, yet no records 
were kept of what they said when they met. It may have been a reflection on the extent 
of French agency behind the scenes that, after Patenôtre had been approached in April 
by Silvela, it had been Delcassé who in August had suggested Spanish involvement in 
any continental coalition to Muraviev.
691
 Andrew further stressed the differing and 
discrete ways in which Delcassé had been more or less indirectly pursuing Germany for 
a joint initiative against Britain in summer and autumn 1899.
692
 Whereas Andrew 
interpreted French support for an intervention in the Boer War as a means of forcing an 
end to British occupation of Egypt, Grenville felt that Delcassé was “thinking in terms 
of a preventive war” to forestall a post-Boer War British attack on France.693 However, 
extreme caution was advisable for France whatever its policy, both for geopolitical 
reasons should France find itself out on a limb, exposed to British hostility alone, and in 
view of the vacillating signs coming from the German leadership which, it should not be 
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forgotten, had only a few months previously been doing its utmost to ferment a Franco-
British war over the Upper Nile. Given that Germany was too powerful for any 
continental coalition to overlook and the personal friendship between the Tsar and 
Kaiser, it also made sense that it should be the Russians rather than the French who 
broached any notions of an intervention with Germany.
694
  
 
A brief résumé remains of Muraviev’s 27 October discussion with Loubet, who was 
indeed sounded out as to French willingness for “joint action without, if not against, 
England” in order to “moderate” a settlement of the war.695 That Delcassé also discussed 
intervention in the Boer War with Muraviev, and agreed to the Russian approaching the 
Germans, is apparent from his own retrospective account: 
 
Vous savez que, pendant le dernier séjour du comte Mouravieff à Paris nous nous 
étions mis d’accord… pour tenter de mettre fin au moment opportun à la guerre 
anglo-transvaalienne. Le comte Mouravieff, qui devait voir à Potsdam 
l’Empereur Guillaume et M de Bülow s’était chargé de sonder le Gouvernement 
impérial… Ils lui parurent telles qu’aucune conversation ne put s’engager à ce 
sujet.
696
 
 
The inference of a genuine welcome for the Russian foreign minister’s proposal is 
reinforced by Delcassé’s personal impression of how, at dinner with Muraviev in 
October, “L’amitié personnelle se greffe sur les liens politiques”.697  
 
Frequent and varied indications of German intentions were reaching the Quai d’Orsay. 
Boutiron’s reports of the German press disinclined to involvement in any war, an 
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attitude of non intervention determined by German economic interests in South Africa, 
had been echoed by that of Richtofen on behalf of a government that affirmed its 
“neutralité absolue”.698 Once the war had commenced, Bülow treated De Noailles to 
another lecture on “l’identité de nos intérêts dans les différentes parties du monde” and 
reportedly advised the Russian ambassador of “la main absolument libre dans la 
question du Transvaal” enjoyed by Germany.699 Further mixed messages emanated from 
Wilhelm II himself on 27 October, fulminating against the solely economic motivations 
of the English who “no longer make war except for money... gangrenous and utterly 
corrupt; the highest society is now only a society of jobbers”.700 In the next breath, he 
went onto explain why intervention was out of the question- “during the last four years 
the English have developed their navy to such an extent that I am paralysed. It is 
impossible to take risks against them; my commerce, Hamburg and my ports are too 
exposed”.701 On the eve of the Tsar’s arrival in Potsdam, as Noailles related to Delcassé, 
an Agence Wolff press release stated that Russia, France and Spain had been ready to 
send a collective note proposing arbitration, but this had been thwarted by German 
refusal to join them.
702
 In view of the lack of interest thus indicated, it was no wonder 
that Muraviev abstained from even raising the subject of an intervention, try though he 
did to persuade the Kaiser that British naval strength would in the event of war have to 
be too thinly spread to achieve local mastery anywhere, and had therefore been 
overestimated.
703
 The German response to Muraviev’s proposal can further be attributed 
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to dynastic considerations, in the form of Wilhelm’s long planned visit to his 
Grandmother Victoria, a trip that, whatever may have been protested about it being “a 
purely family affair”, could not, when entailing the Kaiser and Bülow meeting 
Chamberlain and Balfour, but publicly take on a political aspect “as a gesture of Anglo-
German friendship”.704 As Grenville and others have argued, what finally sealed the fate 
of Muraviev’s overture was the progress being made towards an Anglo-German 
agreement over their respective spheres of influence in the Samoan islands, announced 
on 14 November, prior to the Germans’ departure for Windsor, after which the Kaiser 
irritated the Prince of Wales with unsolicited advice on how to beat the Boers.
705
 
  
This first attempt at intervention having failed, Andrew maintained that Delcassé was 
genuinely and bitterly disappointed that Muraviev “ran up against a brick wall” in 
Germany.
706
 It is impossible to say what he would have done had Germany responded 
positively to Muraviev and his bluff been called, but for the moment he took steps to 
rein in Noailles to “une extrême circonspection” not permitting him to expand on 
Bülow’s hints about Franco-German identities of interest, or even  “aucune initiative” 
here.
707
 Ignoring Dutch newspaper speculations as to the existence and desirability of a 
continental coalition to end the war and “une circulaire allemande imprimé à Leipzig” 
addressed to the mayor of Dieppe urging Franco-Russian collaberation to stop the war 
and use the opportunity to raise Egypt at the negotiating table, Delcassé had largely to 
                                                 
704
 Grenville, Lord Salisbury (1964), 279, Rollo, Entente Cordiale (1969), 103-104 & Martin Kroger, 
“Imperial Germany and the Boer War”, Wilson (ed), International Impact (2001), 33; see also Lamar 
Cecil, Wilhelm II Prince and Emperor 1859-1900 (London, University of North Carolina Press: 1989), 
333-334 & Wilhelm II 1900-1941 (1996), 75 and Kiste, Wilhelm II (2001), 103-104.  
705
 Grenville, Lord Salisbury (1964), 274-279 & also Cecil, Wilhelm II 1859-1900 (1989), 327-328. See 
for examples GP 1871-1914, 15, 553 & 559, Wilhelm to Prince of Wales, 4 & 23 February 1900. 
706
 Andrew, Delcassé (1968), 164. 
707
 DDF 1, xv, 514, Delcassé to Noailles, 11 November 1899. 
 169 
wait on events.
708
 This did not preclude either persisting emollience when dealing with 
Monson, or a continued state of alert for signs of German attitudes.  
The Second Intervention Attempt.  
Although irked and embarrassed by Chamberlain’s 30 November 1899 Leicester speech 
clumsily proposing an Anglo-German alliance, von Bülow was reported “tout disposé à 
vivre avec elle [Britain] en paix et en bonne entente sur la base d’une pleine 
récipocité”.709 Whilst Chamberlain’s initiative alarmed some sections of the Paris press, 
Noailles’ reports continued to confirm “l’hostilité unanime de la presse allemande contre 
l’Angleterre”, despite German concern that trouble for Britain in Egypt or India might 
benefit France and Russia, but not Germany.
710
 Muraviev therefore began to despair of 
the possibility of an intervention.
711
 Two elements conspired to bring a European 
initiative on the Boer War back to prominence. British reverses in November-December 
had made Bülow begin to wonder if the British navy were not as unfit for war as the 
British army had been in South Africa.
712
 Secondly, in its bid to stop supplies reaching 
Transvaal via neutral Portuguese territory, the Royal Navy overzealously stopped three 
German mail steamers. Although they were rapidly re-released and compensation paid 
this episode triggered a very public outcry in Germany.
713
 It was a combination of these 
factors that seems to have prompted Bülow, though persisting in his complaints of the 
weakness of the German fleet, and Wilhelm, to make approaches to the Russian 
ambassador in Berlin in January 1900.
714
 On 26 January, Bülow aired to Noailles the 
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desire for “une entente qui sera à l’avantage des deux pays”.715 Delcassé was further 
encouraged by rumours of an anti British mutiny in the Egyptian army that promised to 
tie down troops there, and even sparked rumours that London might call for the 
assistance of Italian troops in Egypt, to endorse the idea of re-raising the neutralisation 
of the Suez Canal, and hence British occupation of Egypt.
716
  
 
Andrew is in no doubt as to the strength of “Delcassé’s desire to profit from England’s 
difficulties”, citing in support a report of 31 January from the Russian Ambassador in 
Paris, Urussov, to Muraviev, that “France was ready to follow us as far as we were 
willing to go”.717 An article in Le Matin, seemingly inspired by the Quai, argued that the 
time was ripe to re-open the question of Egypt, encouraging Germany to join in action 
on this.
718
 However, Delcassé remained circumspect in his approach and wary of 
German motives. Having queried the implications of the Anglo-German accord of 
August 1898 for German reactions to any British encroachments on Portuguese 
Mozambique, he continued well into February to receive indications as to the 
determined neutrality of the German government.
719
 Montebello interpreted the “réponse 
évasive” of Germany to Russian overtures as part of a consciously obscurantist policy; 
“L’Empereur Guillaume, fidèle à la tactique qu’il suit à notre égard et vis-à-vis de la 
Russie, cherche à se rendre de plus en plus impénétrable”. As “un concours réel et 
efficace de l’Allemagne en aucun circonstance” could not be relied upon, the best that 
could be done was to wait, whilst not appearing too impatient.
 720
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On 28 February, Delcassé was approached by Prince Urussov, who told him that it was 
time for further overtures to Berlin, in search of a definitive statement of German policy. 
Paradoxically, Urussov indicated that the timing of this idea stemmed from the face 
saving success, at Paardeberg, that Britain had now begun to enjoy in the war.
721
 On this 
reasoning, “l’Angleterre, dont l’amour-propre a cessé de saigner”, should be more 
amenable to an intervention. Dressing up his assent in terms of the Republic’s peaceful 
nature, humanity and the Hague Convention, Delcassé endorsed such “une démarche 
tout amicale”.722 The Russians having been emphatically left to approach alone the 
Kaiser in Berlin, Montebello later stressed “c’est au nom de la Russie et la France 
solidaire que le c’te d’Osten Sacken parlera”, adding that it would be only after German 
assent had been given that any decision could be reached on the form of “l’intervention 
amicale” and possible American involvement in it.723 
 
The Quai d’Orsay had then to wait for news from the Russians. On 6 March, the initial 
German response reached Delcassé, by way of a note confirming the idea of “une 
démarche collective” had been welcomed by the Kaiser, but only on condition that 
Russia first sound out the response of London to it; Muraviev, in St Petersburg, 
maintained that “Toute démarche, auprès du Gouvernement anglais devrait 
essentiellement être solidaire, simultanée ou collective, témoignant de l’accord 
parfaitement établi entre les grandes Puissances”.724 Further discussions in Berlin 
coincided with a Boer appeal for international intervention to bring a durable peace on a 
basis mutually acceptable to both sides which Delcassé, expressing no opinion himself, 
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circulated for comment to his representatives on the continent.
725
 News of a second 
German condition then reached Delcassé and Montebello, that “les puissances… 
devraient se garantir, pour un temps à determiner, l’intégrité de leurs territoires 
européens”.726 This effectively meant that, in order to secure the vital German co-
operation, Delcassé would have been obliged publicly to re-affirm the Treaty of 
Frankfurt, and therefore the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Such an idea ran entirely contrary 
to his reportedly heartfelt sentiments on the ultimate recovery of those provinces.
727
 The 
lack of plans in the foreseeable future to win them back notwithstanding, for any French 
statesman to renounce the provinces would have been political suicide. The Russians 
therefore did not press the French to accept the German condition, and the second major 
attempt at intervention thereby foundered. 
French Diplomacy and the Boer War after March 1900. 
Delcassé now hastened to give open reassurances of French neutrality. Confirming that 
the Boer presidents had requested intervention from the powers to bring a peace 
acceptable to both sides, he stated on 15 March that, in view of the fundamental 
cleavage between the combatants as to the independence of the republics, it would be 
superfluous to ask whether France would help to mediate. In a hint of his displeasure at 
how things had recently gone, he added that France might second anyone else’s efforts, 
but would not initiate its own “après tant de dures expériences et de si profondes 
modifications dans l’équilibre des forces européenes”.728 This met with congratulations 
from Salisbury, and was followed up by Delcassé’s telegram, referring to the British 
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parliament’s rejection of US good offices, advising French ambassadors of the 
pointlessness of further initiatives.
729
  
 
More privately, Delcassé, reviewing German behaviour up to mid March 1900, had 
reason to reflect to Noailles upon appreciating “l’importance de l’expérience ainsi 
acquise”.730 That importance was also not lost in his comments to Loubet, who shortly 
started to believe him right to distrust Germany.
731
 Whilst the primacy of Alsace-
Lorraine as a pre-condition for support from Germany should already have been 
apparent in Delcassé’s post-Fashoda contacts, the failure of intervention in the Boer War 
seems to have smarted far more, leaving the minister permanently disinclined to treat 
with the Kaiser or his diplomats.
732
 In becoming profoundly alienated from the idea of 
negotiating with Germany, Delcassé opened the way to an understanding with Britain, 
but only in the long run. For the time being, Wilhelm hastened to tell London of his 
responsibility for the failure of the intervention plan (which his equivocations had 
encouraged in the first place), as Paul Cambon had predicted he would.
733
 Throughout 
the remainder of 1900, reports of a continued subsiding of tensions between Berlin and 
London reached the Quai d’Orsay.734 Delcassé and Cambon sought to play down the 
importance of an Anglo-German Accord on 16 October over China.
735
 However, worries 
returned to the danger of an Anglo-German rapprochement, that (in Noailles’ words) 
“Trafalgar et Sédan se donnent la main”.736 
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Whilst talks went on between London and Berlin into 1901, Delcassé reverted to the 
overt policy declared in December 1898, of not giving provocation or excuse for 
hostility from the British. On the conclusion of the second major intervention attempt, 
Delcassé could console himself with the thought that France had maintained sufficient 
distance from the plans for intervention to avoid too close an association with them:  
La proposition russe n’était… qu’une suite donnée aux suggestions répétées de 
l’Empereur Guillaume et de M de Bülow. Il est essential aussi de marquer que 
c’est l’ambassade de Russie seul qui a parlé au nom de la France et de la Russie 
solidarisées.
737
  
 
Paul Cambon’s relief that any future improvement in relations with Britain had not been 
jeopardised was stated more explicitly “Tout projet d’intervention est donc coulé: C’est 
regrettable mais quoique la chose n’était point réalisable, il est heureux que nous soyons 
sortis de là sans nous compromettre”.738 
 
Although Cambon relayed opinion in London, when the fall of Pretoria was imminent, 
that the war was all but over, it dragged on.
739
 Consequently, the Quai d’Orsay was 
subjected to intermittent pressures to intervene in order to bring peace. Some of these 
came from the Boers themselves, despite the realisation on Leyds’ part that France and 
Russia alone were not strong enough to force a peace on the British.
740
 Rather more 
originated from a plethora of French philanthropic organisations.
741
 Delcassé remained 
impervious to all of these, likewise in autumn 1901 Belgian and Dutch promptings 
which he met with criticism of the dilatory response to Boer petitions of the court at The 
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Hague, and the comment that no offer of good offices could now usefully be made.
742
 
This last was confirmed by the vague responses elicited in European capitals by Russian 
feelers in early 1902, leaving Europe impotent to bring Britain to make peace.
743
  
 
The Kaiser remained uninterested in intervention, despite the breakdown in Anglo-
German alliance negotiations, and feelings roused in November 1901 in the open 
“tempêtes d’indignation” occasioned by Chamberlain, annoyed by foreign criticism of 
British treatment of Boer civilians, making a speech pointing out that the Germans had 
been equally forceful in their dealings with the French in 1870-71.
744
 The row was 
prolonged by the defiant response some 3 months later in the Reichstag from Bülow.
745
 
By late 1901, preoccupations in Paris had reverted to the role of Morocco in Anglo-
French relations.
746
 Anxiety that upon the conclusion of the Boer War, Britain might 
turn upon France diminished on the basis that the cost, financial and human, of South 
Africa, had reminded the British for the first time in decades of what war actually was 
like.
747
  
French Neutrality in Practice.  
 
France could not, though, altogether escape dilemmas arising from the war, many of 
them stemming from the sometimes uncontrollable expressions of domestic public 
opinion. In January 1900, despite rumours coming from The Times journalist Blowitz, 
Monson had remained convinced of Delcassé’s “usual cordiality”, adding that “his 
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manner and his language were both of a character so friendly and straightforward that I 
could detect no symptom of his having entered into an international conspiracy against 
us”.748Although the foreign minister remained “as cordial as ever” at the end of the 
month, Delcassé suffered a further embarrassment.
749
 British sensibilities, sharpened by 
their reverses to date, generated what Paul Cambon described as “L’affaire Léandre”. 
Charles Léandre (1862-1934) was a French artist whose cartoons appeared in satirical 
journals such as Le Rire and L’Assiette au Beurre. Many were Anglophobic, the several 
directed at Queen Victoria personally including a depiction of her at the time of Wilhelm 
II’s visit to Britain as a chubby tartan-stockinged grandmother luring the German 
Emperor away from his former sympathy for Kruger; more offensive still was that 
depicting Kruger climbing out from underneath her skirts.
750
 In early February 1900, 
when Delcassé’s cabinet colleague Leygues, at the Ministry of Interior, arranged for the 
artist to be invested with the Legion of Honour, Monson was instructed temporarily to 
leave Paris, in protest.
751
 Paul Cambon, attributing the withdrawal to a personal 
intervention by the Prince of Wales and critical of the press attention given to it, 
bemoaned that “Tous ces petits riens finissent par créer un état d’espirit très fâcheux”.752 
Delcassé was equally unhappy about it, but was not in a position actively “to lower the 
temperature”.753 However, Monson quietly returned to Paris and the affair had died 
down by March.
754
 
 
Whilst doing as little as possible had been the most tactful course for Delcassé relative 
to Léandre, this was not an option when, after Kruger’s departure from South Africa by 
                                                 
748
 BDW, 1, 247-248, Monson to Salisbury, 19 January 1900. 
749
 NA, FO 27/3493.49, Monson to Salisbury, 1 February. 
750
 See Pictures 4.3 & 4.4. 
751
 Eubank, Paul Cambon (1960), 67 & Grenville, Lord Salisbury (1964), 269-270. 
752
 P.Cambon, Correspondance tome 2, (1940), 33-34, Paul Cambon to Jules Cambon, 20 February 1900. 
753
 Rollo, Entente Cordiale (1969), 105.  
754
 Eubank, Paul Cambon (1960), 67. 
 177 
way of Laurenço-Marquès, the old president came to Europe.
755
 One biographer of 
Wilhelm II claims that, in a France still embittered by Fashoda, Kruger “received a 
rapturous reception from the government”.756 However, this was the case only compared 
to the behaviour of the Kaiser and Tsar, who subsequently refused to receive Kruger at 
all. In reality, Loubet and Delcassé’s response was highly reserved and circumspect, in 
line with the advice of the Centrale’s bureaucrats; “Le gouvernement de la République 
doive observer une certaine réserve et notamment éviter des démonstrations de nature à 
préjuger ses résolutions ultérieures”.757 When Kruger landed at Marseilles on 22 
November 1900, the local Prefect greeted him and tried to get Leyds to dissuade him 
from taking up an invitation to the local council.
758
 According to the report to Delcassé 
“sympathiquement acclamé, sans incident” in Marseilles, Kruger progressed north, 
closely watched by the local prefects, through Lyon where the crowds assembled to see 
him broke out into “une fâcheuse bouscalade”.759 Acutely sensitive also as to the extent 
of Anglophobia among those greeting the visit, Delcassé routed Kruger’s procession 
through Paris away from the British embassy, and Loubet chose to receive him, despite 
his now being the president of a country that had, technically, ceased to exist (by virtue 
of its annexation by Britain).
760
 In private politely declining Kruger’s suggestion for 
another attempt at arbitrating an end to the war, with reference to the failure of previous 
attempts, Delcassé committed himself to nothing.
761
 In public, the meeting went some 
way to assuaging pro-Boer sentiment which the Comité pour l’indépendance des Boers 
had not lost the opportunity to whip up during Kruger’s “voyage triomphal” to Paris on 
24 November.
762
 Delcassé’s meeting also gained some credit in the press of other 
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continental countries, especially when compared to Germany’s attitude.763 At the same 
time, his actions had been sufficiently well-judged to avoid antagonising the British, 
who according to Cambon would interpret European demonstrations surrounding Kruger 
in terms of domestic affairs, and greeted the visit to France with “plus de curiosité que 
de réel intérêt”.764 
The Role of Consuls in France and Southern Africa. 
A similarly circumspect and tactful approach characterised Delcassé’s handling of 
several nasty little incidents, involving local consular representatives, which could have 
escalated to jeopardise Anglo-French relations. Despite Renault’s view on “le caractère 
plus adminstratif que politique des functions consulaires”, Consulates could sometimes 
carry a distinctly political, and even contentious, charge.
765
  From the early 1890s, a 
desire for separate consuls, commensurate with the demands of a region whose 
population included a large merchant navy, became a major grievance in Norway that 
was repeatedly frustrated by the Swedish King. That the joint Swedish-Norwegian 
consulates were dominated by Swedes continued to fuel Norwegian claims for 
independence until Stockholm conceded the split of the joint Sweden-Norway monarchy 
in October 1905.
766
  
 
The French consular service encompassed representation within the 10 powers with 
French ambassadors, as well as within Imperial possessions. Whilst French Consuls in 
Southampton, Liverpool, and elsewhere in Britain were at liberty to send Delcassé 
detailed accounts of troops, supplies and horses being shipped out to South Africa, the 
post of British Consul in provincial France was potentially more hazardous. After a 
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lecture sympathetic to the Boers in Bordeaux on the evening of 7 March 1900, feelings 
ran so high that several of the audience, reportedly shadowed by two policemen, 
proceeded to the nearest British Consulate to demonstrate. Stones were thrown, injuring 
one of the Consul’s servants.767 Delcassé hastened to Monson with a private note of 
regret, even before asking for more details from the Ministry of the Interior.
768
 The 
incident was happily sorted out on the ground, in the sense that the Consul was mollified 
by the subsequent attitude of local Mayor, Prefect and police, and short prison terms for 
12 of the offenders.
769
 Less easily pleased, Monson, noting that the demonstrators had 
come “fresh from listening to an inflammatory pro-Boer harangue”, attacked both the 
authorities for allowing such lectures, and police inertia as the demonstration took 
place.
770
 Showing his determination to avoid antagonising the British, Delcassé, already 
on the alert for any further anti-British incidents, and keen to point out to his Prime 
Minister British satisfaction at how Bordeaux had been resolved, chose this juncture to 
declare French neutrality in the Senate.
771
 The Ministry of Instruction was prevailed 
upon to publish a circular requesting that lecturers abstain from political subjects.
772
 
Meanwhile, further incidents occasioned by a lecture in Lyon, and in Nice, passed off 
more peacefully.
773
 This was in part due to a more energetic police presence.
774
 
  
The Third Republic’s world-wide network of Consulates included several posts in 
Southern Africa. Of these, the most important in the Boer War period were at Pretoria 
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(Transvaal), Cape Town (Cape Colony), Durban (Natal), and Laurenço-Marquès 
(Portuguese Mozambique) with lesser posts at Johannesburg and Bloemfontein (Orange 
Free State) filled for only part of the relevant period. Raffray was Consul at Cape Town. 
As such, despite being the furthest removed of any of the southern African Consuls from 
actual fighting, he (and his Gérants) took responsibility for sending the longest and most 
detailed accounts of the conflict to Paris, but was also the least troubled by it. In an 
environment that remained safely in British hands, Raffray was therefore capable of 
some sympathy for the British, notably the “spéctacle lamentable dont j’ai été témoin 
moi-même” of the Uitlander refugees arriving from Transvaal packed into cattle 
trucks.
775
 This did not, however, stop him from adopting a sceptical attitude towards the 
competence or motives of British policymakers.
776
 
 
 In complete contrast was the less regular, but hardly less voluminous, correspondence 
sent from Pretoria by Georges Aubert, who “had spent 16 years among the Boers, whose 
language he spoke and whose character and customs he had come to appreciate”.777 
When war became imminent, Delcassé instructed the Consuls to observe both neutrality 
and reserve.
778
 This did not prevent Aubert’s daughter from training for, then engaging 
in, service in a Boer ambulance.
779
 The unquestioningly pro-Boer attitude of Aubert 
himself was plain from his unvarnished praise for Boer ingenuity and bravery, whilst 
stories of British troops raising white flags in apparent surrender to draw out Boer 
marksmen, then charging the Boers with bayonets, were passed on without any attempt 
to check them.
780
 Later impassioned despatches on privations within the Concentration 
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camps, and Aubert’s efforts to help, were equally biased in tone. These may have been 
carefully read in Paris, but seem to have generated no protests to London. The symbolic 
raising or lowering of a national flag may have been important in the Sudan in 1898, but 
an equally blind eye was turned by Delcassé when reports reached him of a tricolour 
being stolen from on top of the French Consulate in Bloemfontein on 27-8 April 1900, 
or when Castle Line employees got into the French Consulate at Durban on the day 
when Mafeking was relieved in order to raise a British flag.
781
 Some months later, he 
finally got around to writing to Durban, stating that in view of the lack of any 
repetitions, and with no documents stolen, he was not going to pursue the matter with 
the British government.
782
 When the Bloemfontein Consul was arrested then briefly 
imprisoned, and his status as a Consul in a now annexed Republic was questioned, 
Aubert was left to sort out a compromise with the British authorities on his own.
783
 
Conclusion. 
 
Unfortunately, Delcassé’s disinclination to commit “any extended explanation of the 
reasoning behind his policy decisions” must leave some room for doubt in interpreting 
his motives and intentions.
784
 However, to re-consider the debate over how and when 
Delcassé came to favour the idea of a comprehensive settlement with Britain, the 
contentions of both Andrew and Venier suffer from important difficulties.  
 
The statements made by Delcassé from September 1898 onwards, favouring the idea of 
closer ties to London, were numerous and recorded by various sources. Andrew’s 
argument cannot be fully reconciled with these. Further, his case rests on the assumption 
that, in contrast to Fashoda, the Boer War presented the Quai d’Orsay with real choices. 
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As to whether France could have intervened on behalf of the Boers, several authors, 
agreeing with Lord Salisbury’s view at the time, have contended that intervention in the 
Boer War was never practical politics, or that the actions of its protagonists were merely 
for show.
785
 In this connection, Andrew does not explain how Delcassé’s well 
documented, strong, feelings on German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine could be 
squared with a desire for closer co-operation with Germany in 1898-1900 - Andrew 
simply assumes that they were.
786
 As Venier points out, that “the question of Alsace-
Lorraine remained an insurmountable obstacle to any understanding between the two 
countries” had already been made clear to Delcassé by December 1898.787 Andrew does 
not acknowledge the lasting impact of German policy on the lost provinces until early 
March 1900, but, whether Delcassé abandoned the idea of closer links with Germany 
then, or earlier, what other diplomatic options did France have? True, Barrère was 
patiently chipping away at Italian adherence to the Triple Alliance, but neither this nor 
the sometimes unsatisfactory Russian Alliance could entirely counter French problems 
in Europe or the world. The obvious solution was to await the possibility of a 
reconciliation with Britain. In the meantime, Fashoda had made French policymakers 
well aware of how ill-equipped they were for a confrontation with Britain; even a 
staunch nationalist like Driant had to admit the complete vulnerability of French 
colonies strung out across the globe to British attack, whilst the idea of a cross-Channel 
invasion of metropolitan Britain remained a fantasy as long as the Royal Navy 
predominated. Both from the point of view of not risking a war, the brunt of which 
would fall on France not Germany or Russia, and keeping future options open, it was 
essential to avoid unnecessarily annoying the British.  
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Andrew lays great stress on the apparently uncoincidental fact of Delcassé on 28 
February 1900 receiving a fresh approach from Prince Urussov on intervention in the 
Boer War, and discussing in cabinet new defence works in the colonies in anticipation 
that any future “guerre avec Angleterre, si elle ne peut être évitée, ne saurait être de 
notre part purement défensive”.788 Venier has shown that, by virtue of the cabinet 
meeting having taken place earlier in the day than the encounter with Urussov, this 
really was a coincidence.
789
 Further, Venier contends that the positions Delcassé took 
did not necessarily denote a hostile position against Britain. This argument would be 
supported by preparation for war being not something to which even Paul Cambon was 
averse. In December 1899 warning against complacency about British post-war 
intentions, he said “je ne cesserai de répéter que le meilleur moyen de vivre en bons 
termes avec nos ambitieux voisins est de ne négliger aucune … précaution militaire”.790  
So such preparations can be interpreted merely as the actions of prudent statesmen who, 
naturally ignorant of what the future might hold, were understandably determined in the 
context of rumours about a preventive war initiated by Britain against France to take 
appropriate steps to secure their own country. The same may also be said of the “anti-
English twist” of the Protocol of 2 July 1900 added to the Franco-Russian Alliance, 
which remained “intrinsically defensive”.791 
 
That Delcassé and his peers lacked knowledge of the future is one of the principal flaws 
in the Delcassé line, as re-articulated by Venier. The long drawn out nature of the Boer 
War, and its impact on British policy, were utterly unforeseeable even in mid-1900, 
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when everyone still expected a comprehensive and relatively quick British victory. In 
1898-1900, with Lord Salisbury in power, unenthusiastic about definitively tying Britain 
to any other power, they simply had no means of knowing whether British policymakers 
would ever incline to the idea of any alliance. In as much as anyone in the British 
cabinet did, it was Chamberlain, but, much reviled in France as a Francophobe 
dilettante, he strongly advocated Germany, not France, as the potential ally. Again, no 
one could foresee that German behaviour would frustrate preliminary moves towards a 
wide Anglo-German agreement, leaving Britain open by 1902 to the notion of an 
agreement with the French, or indeed who might succeed Salisbury whether within the 
Conservative party or at the 1900 election. In the meantime, France needed the support 
of both Germany and Russia in case of a preventive war breaking out. In common with 
Andrew’s thesis, Venier’s suffers from the contradictory signals given out by Delcassé, 
and perhaps labours too hard, especially relative to the February-March 1900 
intervention proposals, to stress that these were offers “of bons offices meant as a 
peaceful and friendly démarche”.792 Delcassé was well aware that previous offers of 
mediation had been rejected by London, and that anything less than a complete 
annihilation of the Boer Republics’ independence would be regarded by the British as a 
defeat, so that any compromise would have to be forced on them.
793
 Too much is also 
made of the French idea for associating the USA with any approach, to stress the lack of 
hostility in such an intervention, as this was by way of an afterthought, and American 
diplomats were not involved in discussions about it.
794
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For any newly appointed Foreign Minister to say “je ne voudrais pas quitter ce fauteuil 
sans avoir rétabli la bonne entente avec l’Angleterre”, and actually mean it in mid-1898, 
would have taken either remarkable foresight or an equally remarkable conceit married 
to formidable will power.
795
 In June 1898, in addition to the various other lesser niggling 
disputes with Britain, a clash on the Upper Nile was readily foreseeable in the next few 
months. However this was resolved, Anglo-French relations would take months if not 
years to approach the state of cordiality a prerequisite to negotiations being initiated. 
There was no guarantee that Delcassé would remain continually in office for long 
enough for any such circumstances to obtain; even Hanotaux’s four years at the Quai 
had suffered a six month break in 1895-6. More importantly, there were far too many 
imponderable factors that lay quite beyond the reach of French diplomacy. In 1898, no 
one could be sure that the British cabinet would come round to the idea of a general 
agreement, still less an alliance, at any juncture in the foreseeable future. Inasmuch as 
such a notion was entertained then, the preferred partner was German. The mercurial 
and erratic behaviour of German leaders, especially the Kaiser himself, was quite 
beyond anyone’s control or prediction. Had a more flexible German negotiating posture 
been adopted after Fashoda or in the early stages of the Boer war, a rapprochement with 
France, encouraged by St Petersburg, might have become plausible, dispensing with the 
need for a cross-Channel entente. Conversely, a less bullish determination on the part of 
the Kaiser and Wilhelmstrasse to squeeze London for every last possible drop of 
concession as the price of an alliance might up to 1901 have resulted in the Anglo-
German alignment so dreaded in Paris. One must also wonder whether, had the Boers 
proved less doughty and succumbed to British arms within one year (as was widely 
expected), British policymakers, still as confident of their own strength as in autumn 
1898, would have been so anxious to seek resolution of their worldwide colonial 
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differences with France then Russia in 1903-7, or to slip into alignment with either of 
the continental power blocs before 1914. 
 
The notion that Delcassé pursued an agreement along the lines of the Entente Cordiale 
from the start of his time at the Quai d’Orsay should therefore be dismissed. Amidst the 
welter of contradictory statements and spur of the moment comments, it is difficult to 
trace any coherent line on an underlying ambition for Entente in 1898-1900. The most 
obvious feature of Delcassé’s utterances and actions is the lack of consistent attitude 
towards Britain that they convey. It is tempting to conclude that the Minister’s consistent 
policy was to have no consistent policy. However, what Delcassé did constantly do was 
to give Britain not the slightest excuse to fall out with or seek war with France, 
something underlined even at the height of tensions over Fashoda by what Monson 
praised as his calm manner-seemingly a welcome change from the more hysterical 
Hanotaux. Over time, this created a relationship in which it became possible for 
negotiations gradually to become a plausible and desirable prospect. The context- 
Britain’s excessively hard won victory over the Boers, German diplomacy towards both 
France and Britain, anxiety over German military and naval strength, and both powers’ 
desire in April 1904 not be dragged by the Russo-Japanese War into fighting each other- 
further impelled the agreement made possible. Delcassé’s policy could perhaps best be 
interpreted, in the literal sense of that word, as one of opportunism. That work towards 
an Entente Cordiale became possible so soon after the violent feelings stirred in France 
against the British and their leaders by Fashoda and the Boer War, rather than any 
supposed foresight and inflexible master plan, is perhaps the most remarkable 
achievement of Delcassé at the Quai d’Orsay. 
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5: A Case of Misremembered Animosity? The Paris Press and 
the Fashoda Incident.    
 
Introduction. 
The unfolding of the Fashoda Crisis and the diplomatic aspects of the Boer War were 
handled by the Quai d’Orsay to a constant background of press coverage. The 
importance of this should not be overestimated, inasmuch as press opinions were not, 
contrary what one early study implied, synonymous with public opinion.
796
 It is also true 
that, when considering the interplay between what was in the press and what people 
actually thought, issues of reception arise, and these ultimately are irresolvable.
797
 
Nevertheless, and in the absence of any other mass medium so readily and immediately 
reflective of events of the moment, the press represents the most important gauge of the 
public response to what was happening in Africa.  
 
French feelings towards Britain have often been depicted as having plumbed in autumn 
1898 their greatest depths since the demise of Napoleon. The meeting of Marchand and 
Kitchener at Fashoda “took the mythology of Franco-British rivalry a step further” and 
represented “The high water mark of Anglo-French competition in Africa”.798 
Chassaigne and Dockrill maintain that the “crisis may have quickly sunk into almost 
total oblivion in Britain, in France to mention the very word of ‘Fashoda’ has long been 
sufficient to unleash Anglophobia to an uncontrollable degree, along with the burning of 
Joan of Arc, Napoleon’s exile to St Helena or the ‘treason’ of Mers El Kebir”, leaving 
(according to Bell) “deep scars” on the French and a lasting, latent resentment of their 
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neighbours.
799
 Local councils in France lost no time in memorialising the incident by 
(re)naming streets.
800
 To this day, Rue de la Mission Marchand remains tucked quietly 
away in Paris’ sixteenth Arrondissement, behind Avenue Mozart.801 Driant ended his 
1903 novel by making Marchand the new Governor of Sudan, “Lui même relever le 
drapeau qu’un diplomatie pusillanime avait abaissé devant le ‘bluff’ anglais” as part of 
the fictitious defeat of Britain.
802
 The impression of lasting animosity is further affirmed 
by the world view of De Gaulle, “whose childhood had been marked by the word of 
‘Fashoda’ uttered around him”, and who still, meeting fellow countrymen whilst in exile 
in Britain in 1942, “kept raking over old history as though these were the days of 
Fashoda”.803 Laying out his vision of France, De Gaulle’s Memoirs later reflected:  
Rien ne m’attristait plus profondément que nos faiblesses et nos erreurs révélées à 
mon enfance par les visages et les propos: abandon de Fachoda, affaire Dreyfus, 
conflits sociaux, discordes religieuses.
804
 
 
From the other side of the wartime divide, Vichy saw the publication of what Keiger 
aptly described as “several hagiographies of Commandant Marchand”.805 Even after the 
war, Fashoda wormed its way into Pierre Daninos’ best-selling humorous evocation of 
an archetypal Englishman abroad, observing:  
For a Frenchman, there are always two men in every Englishman, a good one (the 
Oxford-v-Cambridge one) and the bad one (the Fashoda one). Everyone knows 
that the really authentic enemy of France is Germany, but... the hereditary British 
enemy [remains] the most steadfast and cordial antagonist of the Frenchman in 
peace.
806
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Consistent with de Gaulle’s retrospective sentiments, it has not been uncommon to 
characterise the French public of late1898 as “stirred to a deep and resentful bitterness 
by a vitriolic press” in resurgence of hate for “l’ennemie héreditaire” next to whom 
Germany was but an accidental, temporary enemy.
807
 There has though more recently 
been some attempt to challenge the view of Fashoda as “part of a litany of incidents said 
to characterise Anglo-French rivalry and conflict from Waterloo to Mers-El-Kébir and 
with it justification for latent Anglophobia”, asserting instead that the French response 
was surprisingly moderate.
808
 
 
The Paris Press in 1898. 
 
This crisis coincided with the middle of what many regarded as “the golden era of the 
press” in France.809 Fuelled by technical innovation, increased levels of education and 
therefore literacy, and the prolonged impact of the more liberal press laws of 1881 (but 
before the advent of radio), the papers held a unique place of influence.  
 
Press reports might be expected to be at the forefront of the “violent flare-up of 
nationalism in Paris” widely attributed to Fashoda.810 Smith affirms that in Britain and 
France, up to 1898 tensions over colonies were exacerbated by the media, “almost 
exclusively represented by the press; newspapers played a large part in determining 
public attitudes and in setting the mood of the country were capable of influencing 
government decisions”.811 Press power was reflected in the diversity of papers available 
and numbers sold. Though information on press circulation figures is patchy, they rose 
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from around one million in 1870 to 5 million by 1910.
812
 By this juncture, the press was 
dominated by the big four, in order of circulation Le Petit Parisien, Le Petit Journal, Le 
Journal and Le Matin. It was, further, not the case that the influence of these four was 
limited to the capital; provincial sales of all of them commonly ran somewhere in excess 
of 60% of their total circulations.
813
 
 
Table 1: Circulation of Selected Titles from the Paris Press. 
 
Newspaper/Date of 
Founding. 
Circulation: July 1880.
814
 Circulation: November 
1910.
815
 
La Libre Parole.       1892 
L’Autorité.               1886 
L’Intransigeant.       1880 
Le Soleil.                 1873 
L’Echo de Paris.      1884 
  - 
  - 
  71,601 
  45,190 
  - 
  47,000 
  24,000 
  70,000 
  24,000 
120,000 
Le Figaro.                1854 
Le Gaulois.              1868  
Journal des Débats. 1795 
Le Temps.                1861 
Le Petit Journal.       1863 
Le Matin.                 1884 
104,922 
  14,854 
    6,935 
  22,764 
583,820 
  - 
  37,000 
  30,000 
  26,000 
  36,000 
835,000 
670,000 
Le Radical.   1871-2 & 1881 
L’Aurore.                  1897 
Le Siècle.                  1836 
La Lanterne.              1868 
La Petite République.1871 
  - 
  - 
  15,082 
150,531 
196,372 
  29,000 
    8,500 
    5,000 
  33,000 
  67,000 
 
An “Official” Press. 
On the other side of the Channel, Le Temps was the most “credited with close relations 
with the French foreign office”.816 Even its rivals in Paris conceded it special status as 
prime source for “les informations officieuses”, and it was indeed among those co-
operating with Delcassé to publish what he wanted.
817
 However, it was by no means the 
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only daily paper to be used by those in the highest ranks of government in this way. 
Daily circulation figures of Le Temps, at 30,000 in 1884 and 35,000 in 1904, came to be 
dwarfed by Le Matin, from 33,000 copies per day in 1887 rising to 100,000 in 1900.
818
 
One relevant factor was a writing style on the part of Le Temps that was widely regarded 
as leaden, if not actually boring in comparison to the paper taken as its closest rival.
819
 
Le Matin was further distinguished not only by having an exceptionally high proportion 
of foreign news in its columns but also as being a forum in which Delcassé felt inclined 
to float less formal “Trial Balloons” than would be possible if they had the weight of Le 
Temps behind them.
820
 He avoided personally having to bear the weight of direct public 
castigation if his ideas were rejected or proved unpopular. Britain’s ambassador in Paris 
was privately under no illusions about Le Matin serving as “mouthpiece” for the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
821
 
The Four “feuilles de qualité”. 
 In addition to Le Temps, Le Journal Des Débats, Le Figaro and Le Gaulois had 
circulation levels below those of the big four but were noted for the quality of their 
reporting.
822
  Unlike Le Matin, which made a point of opening its editorial columns to 
writers of widely differing political sympathies, Le Gaulois was unashamedly partisan in 
tone, Bonapartist in 1871 and rallying to Boulanger in 1888-9. Although its columns 
were also employed by ministers from time to time, this paper was self-consciously 
aimed at a less universal constituency than Le Matin, bearing as it did a distinctively 
royalist tone by 1898.
823
 Reverence for royalty also extended to a more general 
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veneration for any elevated social status of conservative origin.
824
 Although also 
conservative in tone, formerly monarchist Le Figaro was suffering from a defection of 
readers to Le Gaulois and L’Echo de Paris, thanks to the pro-Dreyfus pieces it published 
from 14 November to 4 December 1897.
825
 Whereas Le Figaro was down to 20,000 
copies a day by 1901, circulations in the region of 30,000 at the time of Fashoda gave Le 
Gaulois a significantly farther reach.
826
 Both Le Journal Des Débats and Le Figaro 
printed material directly furnished by Delcassé.
827
 
The Nationalist Press. 
To the right of the broadly conservative “feuilles de qualité” were numerous other 
avowedly partisan papers, not specifically aimed at an establishment or haute-bourgeois 
audience. Le Soleil, Royalist and aristocratic in tone, was in decline, suffering from the 
effects of a more radical right wing press.
828
 L’Echo de Paris, from 1892 the organ of 
the Ligue des Patriotes, had military influences and rose in popularity.
829
 However, 
many of the sharply nationalist papers, not always economically viable, fared less well 
and tended to be dominated by a single editor, like Paul De Cassagnac’s Bonapartist 
L’Autorité.830 L’Intransigeant mirrored the political evolution of Rochefort, from the 
left, via Boulangism, to nationalism and anti-Semitism by 1898-1900.
831
 Most violently 
anti-Semitic was La Libre Parole, edited by Edouard Drumont and in halting decline.
832
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The Press of the Left. 
As prolific in the number of its titles as the right, this has tended to be neglected by 
historians examining Anglo-French relations in 1898-1902. As well as the more 
colourful invective employed against Britain by the nationalist press, this is perhap, due 
to the left’s reputed preoccupation with French domestic affairs.833 Of the Radical 
Republicans, the best covered has been the firmly Dreyfusard Le Siècle, due to the 
singularly Anglophile attitude displayed during Fashoda and the Boer War by Yves 
Guyot, its editor from 1892. Its level of interest in foreign affairs was unusual but, 
despite a proportionately large dissemination to provincial France, its circulation was in 
decline and dwarfed by L’Aurore, La Voltaire and Le Radical.834 
 
Further to the left were Socialist papers such as La Petite République and La Lanterne. 
Both were well behind the big four but La Petite République compared better with the 
four “feuilles de qualité”. It was a paper in a state of perpetual flux, known as La Petite 
République Française until 1893 when its Radical stance was abandoned. At the time of 
Fashoda, the ensuing infighting in a lull, La Petite République had opened its columns to 
all shades of Socialist opinion.
835
 Its infrequent citation in secondary literature may be 
attributable to the view that Socialists of the 1890s took little active interest in foreign 
affairs.
836
 Contrary to what its relative neglect by historians might lead one to expect, La 
Petite République did come to air a distinctive voice of its own as the Fashoda crisis 
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unfolded, even if the individual readers targeted were not as politically influential as 
those of the feuilles de qualité or Le Matin. 
 
In addition to the general daily press, specific interest papers such as La Depêche 
Coloniale, the most important of some 32 publications dedicated to promoting 
colonialism, were influential.
837
 British Ambassador in Paris Edmond Monson, 
repeatedly supplied by the British military attaché Dawson with disturbing examples of 
Anglophobe sentiment in France Militaire, a journal directed at the army, dutifully 
forwarded these to London.
838
 It is, however, less easy to quantify what popular reach 
these enjoyed in the absence of circulation figures or, necessarily, in the case of the Parti 
Colonial, a desire to achieve a genuinely popular audience. Although not generally daily 
publications, satirical magazines like L’Illustration or Le Rire enjoyed growing 
popularity in the 1890s.
839
 
The Sample. 
Le Temps having already been covered comprehensively by Keiger, the remainder of 
this chapter will concentrate on four Paris papers’ approach to the Fashoda Incident. The 
first of these, Le Matin, was distinguished both by fact of its being in “the big four” and 
carrying an unusually high proportion of foreign news generally. Le Gaulois entered 
Keiger’s “roll call of this chauvinistic press”, whereas Le Figaro did not.840 By virtue of 
the nature and the extent of coverage given to Fashoda, these two are of interest because 
they illustrate both the seamless melding, and therefore shifts possible, between 
Bourgeois, stridently “Nationalist”, and conservative attitudes. They further suggest that 
during the crisis itself Anglophobic expressions were surprisingly modest. Finally, 
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representing the Left, La Petite République incorporated the widest range of Socialist 
views and enjoyed the farthest reach.  
 
Fashoda and the French Press. 
 
The months up to September 1898 saw a general lack of coverage of Marchand and 
events in Sudan, or commentary when factual reports were published.
841
 Brown advises 
that “during the first 3 weeks of September, the Dreyfus affair still captured the 
headlines but interest in the changing situation in the Sudan had begun to rise”, with the 
first commentaries after Kitchener’s victory over the Mahdists.842 Coverage of Fashoda 
as a crisis therefore originated in French press reports of the battle of Omdurman, 
followed by rumours that a European expedition was present to the south of Kitchener’s 
Anglo-Egyptian forces. 
  
The table illustrates the amount of press column space given to Fashoda over 10 weeks, 
from the period directly preceding the crisis until the week after its conclusion.
843
 
Ironically, for an incident of such reputed gravity and lasting resonance, up to the end of 
the crisis period on 3 November only in one week did coverage in any of the papers 
exceed 8% of the available space. This was in Le Matin, its emphasis on foreign affairs 
borne out by its average of 5.33% space on Fashoda and the Sudan, relative to Le Figaro 
and Le Gaulois at 3.75% and 3.48% respectively. In editorials dealing substantially with 
Fashoda, there was a more even match between Le Matin, Le Figaro and Le Gaulois, at 
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five editorials each (out of a possible 70). Showing least interest with 1.225% column 
space and only three editorials was La Petite République. 
 
Table 2: Press Space Covering the Battle of Omdurman and the Fashoda Crisis. 
 
Week of:  Le Matin Le Gaulois Le Figaro La Petite 
République. 
1-7 September 2.66 columns/ 
2.11% 
2 columns/ 
1.59% 
2.2 columns/ 
1.31% 
0.83 columns/ 
0.66% 
8-14 
September 
3.87 columns/ 
3.07% 
1.66 columns/ 
1.32% 
4.93 columns/ 
2.93% 
0.2 columns/ 
0.16% 
15-21 
September 
6.53 columns/ 
5.18% 
2.58 columns/ 
2.05% 
4.18 columns/ 
2.49% 
1.5 columns/ 
1.19% 
22-28 
September 
3.37 columns/ 
2.67% 
2.12 columns/ 
1.68% 
5.73 columns/ 
3.41% 
0.75 columns/ 
0.6% 
29 September-
5 October 
2.6 columns/ 
2.06% 
2.95 columns/ 
2.34% 
3.56 columns/ 
2.12% 
0.33 columns/ 
0.26% 
6-12 October 7.65 columns/ 
6.07% 
4.83 columns/ 
3.83% 
4.5 columns/ 
2.68% 
0.53 columns/ 
0.42% 
13-19 October 4.25 columns/ 
3.37% 
4.92 columns/ 
3.9% 
6.62 columns/ 
3.94% 
0.45 columns/ 
0.38% 
20-26 October 15.55 columns/ 
12.34% 
7.92 columns/ 
6.28% 
12.32 
columns/ 
7.33% 
3.25 columns/ 
2.58% 
27 October-2 
November 
7.0 columns/ 
5.56% 
5.12 columns/ 
4.1% 
6.9 columns/ 
4.11% 
1.45 columns/ 
1.15% 
3-9 November 13.73 columns/ 
10.90% 
9.82 columns/ 
7.79% 
12.03 
columns/ 
7.16% 
6.17 columns/ 
4.85% 
 
The amount of press coverage at any juncture was only partially determined by the 
availability of hard news relevant to Fashoda. Initial reports from Dervish POWs, who 
had participated in the attack on Fashoda, suggested that the Europeans defending the 
fort were French, as did the nature of the bullets found in the hull of the Dervish 
gunboats.
844
 Even before it was certain, the French press, including Le Journal des 
Débats and Le Temps, despite their reserve, were quick to jump to the conclusion that 
Marchand was present at Fashoda.
845
 British papers quoted from freely by Le Matin 
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made similar assumptions.
846
 Stimulated by the bullish tone of their British peers, the 
French press proved eager to argue over the rights and wrongs of a possible French 
occupation of the upper Nile well before the facts had been confirmed.
847
 Nevertheless, 
confrontation over a far off fort in central Africa continued to struggle for column space, 
especially with the Dreyfus case and strikes in Paris. Indeed, reports of Anglo-French 
military co-operation, keeping the peace between Greeks and Turks in Crete, at first 
appeared almost as frequently as Fashoda.
848
 Most absorbed by other news, especially 
ongoing developments on Dreyfus, was La Petite République.
849
 Reports of the battle of 
Omdurman appeared a day after those of Le Matin, and were word for word similar.
850
 
Remaining space was later on dominated by news of the navvies’ strike and ensuing 
wider industrial unrest, supported by it and L’Aurore.851  
 
By the time confirmation of the encounter on the Nile had percolated through to the 
journalists, the press had exhausted itself, coverage in three papers of Fashoda actually 
falling in the fourth week of September then into October. The slight rise in coverage 
from 6-12 October and, more emphatically, from 20-26 October is explained as much by 
the publications of government documents, from which the papers were able to 
reproduce verbatim extracts, as by the fulsomeness of the journalists’ commentaries.852 
Following another lull from 27 October-2 November during which the fall of the 
Brisson cabinet and the formation of its successor preoccupied the newspapers, it was in 
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the week after Marchand’s withdrawal was decided that coverage of Fashoda peaked. 
By this stage, it was too late for commentary to have any effect on the outcome of the 
crisis, making opinions not the less bitter, and tending to affirm the status of Fashoda as 
an episode that excited more interest and animosity with hindsight than at the time. 
 
Views of Britain and the British through the Fashoda Crisis. 
 
If the quantity of press reporting during Fashoda does not match the expectations that 
might be raised by some subsequent depictions of the feelings raised by the incident, 
what about its content? Keiger is not the only one to have recognised that elements of 
the Paris press showed some moderation at points during the crisis.
853
 Whilst outright 
hostility to Britain and anger over Fashoda could be expected from La Libre Parole, 
L’Intransigeant and L’Autorité, the attitudes of Le Figaro and Le Gaulois, surprisingly if 
not always consistently, struck a note of restraint. Their stances together with that of Le 
Matin were not least influenced by the Parti Colonial. By late September 1898, 
Etienne’s lead, contending that the time had now come for “serious diplomatic 
negotiations” over the entire future of Egypt, had been followed by much of the right 
wing press (Le Gaulois, Le Soleil, La Patrie and L’éclair), “as well as influential 
moderate journals like Le Figaro, Le Temps and Le Matin”.854 Government attitudes 
were more important, if lacking in consistency. Minister of Marine Trouillot summoned 
a Le Gaulois journalist to Pavillon de Flore to brief him on otherwise undisclosed facts 
on Marchand and Kitchener’s encounter. The “sharply anti British” article generated on 
28 September overruled efforts of both foreign ministers “to keep the details of their 
                                                 
853
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discussions on the level of cabinet diplomacy”, prompting increased public debate and, 
in October, rival publications of Blue books and a Yellow book.
855
  
 
Meanwhile, Monson observed to Salisbury on 30 September that “I have noticed latterly 
an increase in the bitterness against England even in the newspapers that may be called 
serious whilst the journals of the meaner sort indulge more than ever in scurrilous 
attacks upon us”.856  The Delcassé inspired defiance of “La Seule Réponse Digne de la 
France” on 5 October was forwarded to London by the British ambassador.857 
Continuing a close watch on subsequent publications, he complained of “the 
irresponsible press on this side of the water”, succumbing like British papers to 
“opinions of the type to which, in the current vernacular, the epithet ‘jingo’ has been 
consecrated”.858 An abrupt change was signalled by Matin on 10 October, the Delcassé 
inspiration behind it acknowledged by Monson who commented that “in view of the 
tone previously adopted by that organ… [it] almost verges on the ludicrous, so sudden 
and complete is the change of front taken up. ‘The abandonment of Fashoda is perfectly 
compatible with the preservation of the national honour’; such is the pith of the 
article”.859 Le Matin had indeed gone so far as to suggest that Marchand’s potential 
acquisitions were about as accessible, and as useful to other French colonies, as 
mountains on the moon.
860
 This cry, as Monson put it, was subsequently taken up by 
“the whole pack”, or much of it, for the very next day he was able to report that the tone 
of the French press (in contrast to London’s) had “become singularly moderate”.861  
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On the left, the approach taken towards Fashoda throughout was mixed in tone. Among 
the radical titles, Le Siècle condemned the entire Upper Nile project as ‘senseless’ and 
demanded Marchand’s immediate recall.862 As for L’Aurore, “there was never any doubt 
of the journal’s opposition to colonial expansion and its advocacy of a conciliatory line 
toward Great Britain”.863 Clemenceau’s 25 October “Méditations sur Fachoda” 
maintained that France should not fight for the marshes of Fashoda whilst Metz and 
Strasbourg remained in German hands.
864
 
 
Where the right could interpret Britain’s victory over the Mahdists as one of European 
civilisation as a whole, the joint civilisation and codes of conduct ascribed to Britain and 
France were modified in two ways on the Socialist left. However, they still essentially 
identified British and French interests and ideas with each other. Firstly the use or 
morality of colonisation per se was challenged. In Petite République, Maxence Rhodes’ 
analysis of the incident, attributing divisions of class more importance than those of 
nation, questioned the value of colonies at all for the happiness or wealth of “la masse 
travailleuse au lui laissera l’honneur de fournir des victimes au charnier coloniale”. 
Having wondered at the benefit of owning Fashoda to the workers and unemployed of 
France (or Leeds, London and Manchester) Rhodes concluded that “le conflit n’est pas 
entre deux peuples, mais entre deux minorités capitalistes”.865 The paper went on to give 
support to British socialists opposed to government  policy, in a visceral antipathy for 
“les marchands de rhum falsifié…les trafiquants de munitions de guerre, de ‘cant’…les 
financiers” on both sides of the channel, as well as the mostly anti-Dreyfusard 
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chauvinists of the French press.
866
 Rhodes doubted that “une tâche tout d’humanité et de 
justice” in Sudan would be undertaken by a Britain that had already depopulated 
Tasmania, left India in famine and massacred natives in South Africa. In his opinion, 
various massacres and “nos brigandages coloniaux” left France in no better position to 
claim civilising influence; both countries had equal title-or lack of it- to civilise the 
Sudan.
867
  
 
The second and less drastic line implied a separation from other European powers. 
France and Britain were the two nations of Liberalism and progress. As the crisis wore 
on, La Petite République’s emphasis changed to one of standing for the sacred interests 
of humanity by not putting to death the world’s largest liberal power for the sake of a 
few wind-blown areas of sand.
868
 If resentment of British policy was not absent from La 
Petite République, latterly it was deemed more important to avoid “une guerre 
fratricidale” fatal to worldwide ideas of liberty, and to demand peace, accompanied by a 
dissipation of the prejudices or secret animosities shown by both peoples towards each 
other.
869
  
 
Press criticism of British policies on Fashoda varied, from cartoons to dissection of the 
inconsistencies of successive public comments of British statesmen on the upper Nile, 
published on 12 December by Le Figaro.
870
 Debate of such specific points was framed 
within a wider context of public attitudes towards Britain which also assumed 
prominence during the crisis. Persistent speculations as to a preventive war started by 
                                                 
866
 La Petite République, 28 September. 
867
 La Petite République, 1 October. 
868
 La Petite République, 21 October. This stance was mirrored in The Truth, quoted in Le Gaulois, 3 
November, stating that, as France was the sole democracy on the continent, only autocrats would rejoice at 
an Anglo-French war.  
869
 La Petite République, 3 & 4 November. 
870
 Le Figaro, 12 December. 
 202 
the British became more credible in the case of a country whose situation had recently 
been described by Le Figaro as follows:  
L’Angleterre s’ennuie au milieu de sa splendeur. Elle est puissante comme elle ne 
l’a jamais été. Chaque année elle s’arrondit sa domaine coloniale des nouvelles 
conquêtes, et comme tout lui réussit, on a peine à découvrir ce qui lui manque... 
Elle se plaint, elle gémit et elle reclame de son gouvernement des allures plus 
bruyantes et moins pacifiques.
871
 
 
Several tropes about Britain repeatedly cropped up in the French press during the 
Fashoda crisis:  
 
1. British Arrogance, Brutality and Treachery. 
Across the nineteenth century, Britain was commonly portrayed as overbearing, 
arrogant, aiming to dominate the globe through “l’empire absolu et exclusif des 
mers”.872 Such ideas drew on long memories. For example, in a hypothetical situation 
calling to mind the 1851 Don Pacifico incident, Le Figaro imagined a British, a Russian 
and a French sailor in Odessa; were the latter to be slapped across the face the French 
ambassador would claim compensation from the Tsar, but any insult to the Briton would 
result in a fleet arriving to bombard the town. The willingness of the Russian sailor to 
provoke such retribution lay in the fact that he had never seen a ship in his entire career, 
whilst in sorry contrast to the French sailor: 
Le mot du matelot anglais est admirable. C’est le mot du Romain autrefois. ‘Civis 
sum Romanus’…L’anglais de même et de là son audace à marcher de l’avant sa 
superbe confiance à se jeter à travers toutes les résistances.
873
 
 
This self-confidence was linked to older allegations of behind-the-scenes British 
treachery. The seventeenth century charge of “Perfide Albion” found fresh life in the 
circumstances of 1898. British sympathies for the USA during the Spanish-American 
War had elicited “much bitterness” in France, the suspicion that the Americans would 
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sell the Philippines to Britain, and that the British had compromised the moral unity of 
Europe.
874
 Before and after Fashoda, Le Journal des Débats openly blamed British 
propagandists for US-French estrangement.
875
 Explicitly linking the conflict to British 
policy towards France, Le Gaulois published claims that British money was behind the 
war, and efforts to exacerbate French internal difficulties.
876
 Conveniently overlooking 
their own government’s agency in authorising the Marchand mission, Le Matin and Le 
Petit Journal seriously maintained that Britain had deliberately chosen the moment of 
highest internal dissent within France to defeat the Mahdi, and assert their dominance in 
the Nile Valley.
877
 They did not go as far as L’Autorité in asserting that Britain, once it 
had gone to the trouble of enormous war preparations, would take the opportunity to 
burn Brest and Cherbourg without first bothering to declare war.
878
 However, even the 
more restrained Le Matin wondered if words of friendship uttered by British statesmen 
during the crisis would prove to be real, or pretence.
879
 Le Gaulois feared British 
treachery in Abyssinia, a kingdom whose ill defined boundaries abutted the upper Nile 
to the east.
880
 The British were accused by Le Matin of having pushed a tribal chieftain 
to rebel against the Negus, possibly in collaboration with Italy against whom the French 
had secretly armed the Abyssinians.
881
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Allied with underhand actions against France and its sympathisers were portrayals of 
British brutality, demonstrating Anglo-French differences as well as the dangers of 
opposing Britain. Kitchener personified a thirst for blood, one report stating that he was 
presented with the Mahdi’s embalmed head to serve as an inkpot, another that an officer 
had taken it for public display in the British Museum. It may not have been true that all 
Britons welcomed such acts, but Le Matin’s concluding observation that “John Bull sera 
ravi” presumably corresponded with what many French believed, or wanted to 
believe.
882
 The British civilian population was depicted as keen on bloodshed for the 
sake of it, wishing there had been more carnage at Omdurman.
883
 The idea that sections 
of the British public mourned the small size of “the butcher’s bill” was sufficiently 
prominent to attract the attention of Monson, who seems to have been especially pained 
by it in his despatch to London about reactions to the battle.
884
 An attitude of taking war 
as good sport was apparent from the publication in Britain of odds for or against war, 
which reached French papers.
885
  
 
Arrogance, brutality and treachery might excite French antipathy, but, equally, could 
work to vindicate Delcassé’s decision to withdraw Marchand. They were combined in 
the press with other stereotypical characteristics, a certain temperamental distance and 
coldness, or sang froid.
886
 Married with traits of thoroughness, so recently displayed in 
the Sudan campaign, and “le sens pratique inhérent à la race”, these made the British a 
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worrying potential antagonist.
887
 This characterisation possibly suited Delcassé as the 
best way to vindicate the policy he felt bound to adopt on Fashoda. Withdrawal in the 
face of certain destruction from a homicidal nation became inevitable, and therefore 
excusable.
888
  
 
Opposed in temperament to Britain, France was portayed as a small, harmless, victim.
889
 
This trope was most pronounced in the cartoon on the front of Le Petit Journal Illustré, 
depicting France in the feminine, childish role of Miss Red Riding Hood, about to 
present an object marked “Fashoda” to a creature in bed bearing a face mask of an old 
ugly old crone with large teeth, its military helmet clearly visible against a bed curtain 
made of a Royal navy ensign, and its paws/sharp claws resting poised on the bed 
spread.
890
 The press happily gave licence to bestial imagery when assessing British 
ambitions, overlooking the actually somewhat diffident attitude to acquiring more 
colonies shown by some in government.
891
 On the face of it, therefore, Fashoda afforded 
the opportunity for the press to attack British arrogance and brutality. 
2. Lessons from the Past. 
Behind the mutual antipathy epitomised by Fashoda stood centuries of history cited in 
many papers. Le Gaulois, initially invoking a sentimental attachment between France 
and what was once “notre plus belle colonie”, recorded the enthusiastic reception of 
Quebec’s inhabitants for a visit from Washington of Jules Cambon. In highlighting the 
lost province whose heart had never ceased to beat for its real mother country, 
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comparison was made with Fashoda.
892
 The implication was that France should not 
make the same mistake in Africa. Was it entirely coincidental that Le Figaro should 
publish an editorial reciting the history of Quebec as evidence of French past, and 
continuing, civilisation, valour, and  heroism when outnumbered ten to one by the 
British, on the day when Marchand’s presence at Fashoda was confirmed?893 Le 
Figaro’s line, recalling both Dupleix and Montcalm, was taken up by Le Gaulois 
arguing that France now had its eyes open and should not make the mistake of 
abandoning Marchand given “l’égoisme et la mauvaise foi qui président à la politique 
britannique”.894 A month later, the drama of 1759 still resonated for Le Gaulois readers 
of 1898, inasmuch as it presented similar spectacles of France having its interests far 
away defended against Britain by an outnumbered and ill-supplied hero figure 
(Montcalm in 1759, Marchand in 1898), his perseverance undermined by internal 
divisions weakening metropolitan France, whilst the British concentrate all thought and 
force on achieving their objectives.
895
 The less sentimental Le Matin printed a call for 
national unity, comparable to that of Britain, from the Duc d’Orléans, pointing to France 
struggling for apparently worthless bits of snow in 1759 and again for bits of sand in 
1898. The lesson in both cases was that France should be not so much worried about the 
dubious intrinsic value to them of the territory at issue as determined not to create the 
dangerous precedent of being cowed by threats.
896
 In other words, the substance of 
giving up Fashoda no longer mattered, but concessions should still if possible be 
obtained elsewhere. On the conclusion of the crisis, L’Autorité trenchantly reminded its 
readers of the no fewer than 500 years of intimidation from across the Channel, of which 
Fashoda represented the most recent episode, and looked forward to the day when 
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Science would enable France to hold London to ransom.
897
 More sorrowful than 
aggressive, Desmolins’ reflections, entitled “Open Wound”, reminded Le Gaulois’ 
readers of previous Ententes Cordiales (of Louis Phillippe and Napoleon III) and the 
need to choose between “politique continentale ou coloniale”, if finding it difficult to 
take the hand that had just hit France.
898
 
 
Antagonism was not, therefore, the whole story. Anglo-French history was directed to 
conciliatory ends, even when the opportunity for engendering enmity presented itself.
899
 
On the day of Trafalgar’s anniversary, Le Gaulois had anticipated in London a day of 
illuminations and celebrations “avec un éclat tout particulier”, in a show of chauvinism 
fermented over the last 12 months by Fashoda.
900
 Two days later, reports, under the 
heading “Une Foule Indifférente”, reported the gathering “beaucoup moins considérable 
que l’année dernière, circule absolument silencieuse autour de la colonne et s’éloigne 
sans manifester le moindre impression”. Only hotels near to the column were flying 
flags, and the column itself had been festooned not by enthusiastic private patriots but a 
company with a chain of London restaurants, primarily interested in generating some 
trade on a Friday evening.
901
 
3. Britain as a Commercial Nation. 
The contrast in values (Britain perceived as a country of commerce and pragmatism, 
relative to French notions of honour) served to explain how Fashoda was unfolding, but 
again did not necessarily imply hostility towards Britain. According to Le Gaulois, 
where France sent flags, Britain and Germany despatched commercial travellers. Here, it 
was the French who were open to criticism. Portrayed as an economic victim, a net 
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importer with depleting gold and silver reserves, France became anaemic in an image 
that clearly fed into a wider discourse of national decline that encompassed dénatalité, 
internal political divisions, diplomatic isolation and military weakness since 1870. 
Having observed that “Notre industrie…Elle est frappée”, the article concluded that the 
world was being invaded by American goods.
902
 This represented another traditional 
French/Anglophone contrast, not necessarily of Anglophobe connotations, if 
nevertheless a cause of concern in France. Even Marchand himself, prior to his 
expedition, had to apply not to French manufacturers for cloth suitable for barter trading 
with Africans but those of Manchester and Liverpool able to supply materials specially 
tailored for African tastes.
903
 
 
If colonial disputes symbolised French economic inadequacy, France’s colonial rivals 
might offer a potential counter model. Africa could be a possible solution to European 
economic and social problems. Unfortunately, France was unprepared for this, to the 
extent that even the Belgians ran their section of the Congo more efficiently and 
productively than the French did theirs, because would-be investors were exasperated by 
“les minuties et les taquineries administratifs” of the French colony.904 Le Matin partly 
attributed the problem to structural defects in French colonial administration. Its 
employees had no personal interest in the prosperity of the areas they governed, all too 
often there for too short a period of time before recall from Paris. Partly the problem was 
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French commercial culture, of small (family) based firms and wealthy individuals 
reluctant for their wealth to leave France. This was different from Britain, with its long-
serving officials having their own commercial interests in their provinces, and to the 
concentrated capital of the large British colonial companies happy to send talented 
young men overseas for long stretches to make their fortunes.
905
 One conclusion drawn 
from this by Siècle was that the French should abandon colonial expansion and instead 
put their efforts into developing the colonies they already possessed.
906
 In remarking 
“Après avoir vu tout ce qu’on fait les Belges sur leur rive, il est dur de constater que sur 
le notre il n’y a rien!”, Le Figaro suggested that everything had been put into the 
despatch of military missions outside of the Congo when the priority ought to be 
development, like building hospitals, of colonies presently owned by France.
907
 These 
sentiments drew on the Colonialist lobby’s “exploitationist” wing, lacking the ambitions 
of their “expansionist” colleagues and more naturally inclined to placate Britain.908 If 
there was a suggestion that Britain had spent too much money on armaments not to 
realise the fruits of this investment by waging war, equally British pragmatism might 
dictate that a war would not be a commercially viable course of action.
909
 Such was the 
interpretation of Le Matin for British reluctance in 1877 to go to the trouble of avenging 
a defeat in South Africa, at a time when the value of the South African mines was not 
yet known.
910
 
 
Commerce shifted the emphasis from unbridled, potentially fractious, expansionism 
towards economic development but also offered another peaceable conclusion, in the 
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form of Anglo-French mutual dependence. After the crisis, “Si Nous Avions Eu La 
Guerre” painted an apocalyptic picture not of death or violence but, without British 
buyers, economic desolation across textile industries in north and east France, for food 
producers of Normandy and Brittany, and all producers of champagne, even if Paris 
might have insistently continued its pleasures.
911
 In sum, “war with England would have 
been bankruptcy for large numbers of our manufacturers and merchants, and starvation 
for many of our peasants”.912 Even during the crisis, one writer might find it paradoxical 
that the two countries with which France enjoyed most trade were also those with whom 
she had “les relations plus pénibles”, and another saw British and German imports 
aligning to flood Siam, a more imaginative approach drew the readers’ attention to the 
potential for friendship.
913
 If French exports to Britain were worth over 1,300 million 
Francs annually, whereas those to Russia were barely 50 million, was there not much to 
be said for British friendship being just as worthy as that of France’s favoured ally?914 
4. A Question of Honour and Conciliation. 
Ideas of national “honour” punctuated conservative discourse on French policy. At the 
start, Le Gaulois insisted that, with official backing for Marchand and the tricolour 
flying at Fashoda, the stand off could not but be a matter of honour on Paris’ side, with 
the public assured that French national honour would remain intact in Delcassé’s hands 
during negotiations.
915
 “Honour” could most obviously be invoked to justify nostalgic 
notions of an idealised past in which foreign policy was run by (implicitly aristocratic) 
men disinterested in anything as sordid as commerce - an interesting counterpoint to Le 
                                                 
911
 Le Gaulois, 6 November. 
912
 Times, 7 November, quoting Le Gaulois. 
913
 Le Matin, editorial 18 October, Le Gaulois, editorial 18 October. 
914
 Le Matin, 17 October. 
915
 Le Gaulois, 11, 13 & 24 October.  It was ironic that, when it became politic to soften up public opinion 
by airing the idea of withdrawing Marchand, this too was framed in terms of keeping, or even promoting, 
honour- Le Matin, 10 October & quoting Le Figaro on 2 November. Le Gaulois, 7 November, also 
vindicated government policy for showing a reserve and wisdom that had been lacking in 1870. 
 211 
Matin’s analysis of the reasons why French colonies, in contrast to Britain’s, lay 
undeveloped.
916
 
 
However, more often until the end of the crisis the concept of honour served to unify 
and stress underlying shared values of Britain and France. Following the earlier battle at 
Atbara, Le Temps, having praised the manner of Kitchener’s victory, had joined “en 
toute sincerité avec l’ensemble du monde civilisé” to rejoice in his success.917 The 
implicitly Christian basis of French support manifested itself in the further description of 
Omdurman: “C’était une scène du temps des croisades”.918 These sentiments were 
accompanied by much praise for Kitchener’s skills.919 Reports of the Mahdists stressed 
that “la bravoure de ces barbares était incroyable” but, in the end, barbarians were all 
they were.
920
 Concepts of “international law”, taken to presume the idea of Kitchener 
not fighting Marchand, impliedly did not apply to the Mahdi, or any native African 
powers.
921
 Notions of honour and courtesy shown by Marchand and Kitchener were cast 
against the savage nature of the Mahdist regime on whose defeat both countries’ 
aspirations depended. In the hostile environment of the Sudan, Marchand would, it was 
speculated in advance of confirmation of his presence, behave as befits one European to 
another in a territory where they had just overcome barbarism.
922
 Their two countries 
were in the “avant-garde du monde civilisé”.923  
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Notions of honour and courtesy continued to infuse reports on the men at Fashoda, 
whereas in reality the initial encounter between Kitchener and Marchand, according to 
some eye witness reports, was animated by anger and gesticulations.
924
 The “haute 
courtoisie” of both governments was reflected in repeated praise for the gentlemanly 
way in which Kitchener met French expectations that the Marchand expedition would be 
dealt with politely.
925
 On the basis of Kitchener’s despatch and Baratier’s reports, the 
French press did not stint in their praise for the courteous and restrained way in which 
both sides conducted themselves during the stand off.
926
 Marchand and Kitchener having 
exhibited bravery and chivalry, “Kitchener est homme de parole”.927 The press had also 
not forgotten that Kitchener had as a young officer fought for the French in 1870 and 
carried an account of his fervent enthusiasm at the time to serve France.
928
 This did not 
mean that there was a complete conciliation of British and French interests. News of the 
trade off between the rival forces of fresh vegetables for champagne undermined 
elements of Kitchener’s despatch by demonstrating that Marchand was more than 
adequately supplied, and able to remain at Fashoda without sustenance from Anglo-
Egyptian quartermasters.
929
 That Marchand’s expedition had planted and grown fresh 
vegetables showed their initiative and, more subliminally, the capacity of the land 
around Fashoda for fertility and the process of being rendered distinctly French.
930
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The divide between Le Matin, Le Figaro and Le Gaulois on one hand, and La Petite 
République on the other, was most emphatic in the question of values, but an attitude of 
conciliation was by no means the monopoly of Socialist or Pacifist rhetoric. Le Temps 
opined at the start of the crisis that: 
Il est un point qui est un quelque sorte un article de foi et c’est qu’une rupture 
entre les deux grand puissances libérales de l’occident serait un désastre 
irréparable pour la masse de l’humanité et du progrès.931  
 
Four days later, Temps averred, in terms even more reminiscent of La Petite République, 
that it would be “un crime contre la civilisation et qui violeraint leurs meilleures 
traditions si elles laisseront romper de gaîté de coeur la solidarité nécessaire entre les 
deux grandes puissances libérales de l’occident”.932 Le Figaro hoped that an appeal to 
the spirit of equity animating the British government would mean sensible 
negotiations.
933
  
 
When the French did claim for themselves a role in the forefront of civilisation, citing 
help for blacks against slave traders, this was neither a distinctively French aim nor was 
it implicitly directed against Britain.
934
 Depictions of Marchand as an emissary of 
civilisation were not necessarily pointedly anti-British, with Delcassé’s protest, that all 
his mission had done was take Fashoda from Barbarism, as an adjunct for a proposed 
entente in Africa.
935
 The commonality of French and British values and interests 
therefore remained a recurrent theme on the right. 
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Placing values of civilisation in opposition to those of military strength, Le Matin even 
argued that Britain’s industrial supremacy, and moral and intellectual superiority, “sont 
en raison directe de son inaptitude militaire”. This was evidenced by its inferiority in 
“hommes de guerre” and, in common with France, the lack of importance attached to the 
military or to men from the army since the time of Napoleon and Wellington.
936
 This 
view, however, was less representative than the abundant commentary on Britain’s naval 
strength relative to that of France. The press was well aware of, and commented on, the 
disparity in naval strengths between the two nations.
937
 Whatever the shared values, 
ultimately many French journalists would have agreed with the political scientists who 
later classified Britain as the “bully” of Fashoda.938  
5. Dissecting British Society. 
Each paper varied in how it assessed the (potential) conflict between different sections 
of “les Anglais”, according to its own pre-conceived political stance. La Petite 
République naturally inclined to interpret the crisis explicitly in class terms, as a struggle 
not of one nation against another but between small elites in both countries; “Le conflit 
n’est pas entre deux peuples, mais entre deux minorités capitalistes”.939 A far commoner 
approach was to fasten upon the distinctions between the British government, the British 
press, and the British people/public opinion. In adopting the view that, at any given 
juncture, one faction (or elements thereof) might be more amenable to making 
concessions than others, the French press challenged the impression of the single, 
monolithic “Angleterre” upon which they themselves had implicitly expounded 
elsewhere.  
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Le Gaulois initially placed its faith in an interaction between two sensible governments 
wanting to preserve relations “de haute courtoisie”, ready to study calmly the complex 
questions raised by the meeting of Kitchener and Marchand at Fashoda.
940
 The contrast 
was drawn between the equitable British cabinet, as courteous as Kitchener himself, and 
the precipitate, inflexible views of the British press to which it was not listening.
941
 As 
the crisis wore on without resolution, the tone of reassurance remained in the columns of 
Gaulois, quoting an anonymous diplomat stating that it was the intention of neither 
government to make things worse, or arguing that neither the tone of the press nor that 
of certain “hommes d’état d’outre manche” meant that the government would push 
things to the extreme of threatening French honour.
942
 This was tempered by criticism of 
the “discours imprudents” by several British politicians.943 In Le Matin, it was argued 
that Lord Salisbury was no longer in full control of British policy on Fashoda, having 
lost power to the press.
944
 Even the end of the crisis found ambiguous reactions towards 
the attitude of the British government. Where Le Gaulois remarked on the measured and 
courteous tones of Salisbury’s speech at the Guildhall, Le Temps, looking forward to 
further talks, considered him a “généreux vainqueur” pushed to the line he had currently 
taken by his own cabinet.
945
 Conversely, Le Figaro deplored Salisbury carving up dieing 
empires with the USA and accused the cabinet of being infused with the spirit of 
Bismarck, if also hoping to appeal to a spirit of equity within the British government.
946
 
 
British “Public Opinion” was at first equated with the press, led by and synonymous 
with the “grands organes de l’opinion publique anglaise”.947 Le Gaulois, in keeping with 
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its class sympathies, maintained throughout a simple cause-and-effect relationship 
between the papers being “suréxcités” and thus too the public, then the press later on 
calming the public.
948
 It clearly felt disregard for both British public opinion and 
extreme chauvinists, declaring that neither decided British government policy.
949
 
Similarly, Le Figaro held that the British public “perdit son équilibre” under the 
encouragement of press and some politicians.
950
 Examining the crisis with longer 
hindsight in December, Villars went further in commenting “J’ai souvent dit qu’il n’y 
avait pas de peuple plus copieusement et plus mal renseigné comme le peuple anglais”. 
However, there was the hope that in future British people might demand “un plus 
d’exactitude et de franchise” from the press and the men of state who had deceived 
them, nearly launching them into a war against a people with whom they had no cause to 
quarrel.
951
 
 
Le Matin was more sophisticated, making some attempt to distinguish between public 
opinion and that of the press, if contradictory as to the direction of popular sentiment. It 
accepted that the press of both nations had a role to play in calming public opinion and 
therefore facilitating a friendly resolution and was, too, not above labelling the Anglo-
French press as “organs of public opinion”.952 Nevertheless, the British populace was 
not always taken as merely the passive recipient of press or politicians’ messages: 
Depicted one day as provoked to the most visceral anger by mere mention of the word 
“Fashoda”, the next they were claimed to be mostly peaceful, desiring only a 
satisfactory end to the crisis without humiliation for anyone.
953
 Influenced by 
“mensonges et provocations” as bad as anywhere else, “la foule en Angleterre” 
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presented dangers but was portrayed as perfectly capable of resisting appeals to its less 
generous sentiments by chauvinists and politicians in search of popularity.
954
 To the end 
of the crisis, Le Matin balanced the need to show Britain’s resolve, by way of fears of 
national pride making its way into diplomacy, or the effervescence of public opinion 
bearing on Salisbury, with a desire to play down the threat of war, claiming British 
people were openly anxious about it, desirous of peace, and unnerved by war 
preparations.
955
 Despite some condescension towards the British public, whose opinions 
it sought to explain to a French public whose “sagesse et volonté” would in light of that 
explanation allow it to sustain the actions of the French government, Le Matin 
recognised the British people as an active entity in its own right, distinct from press or 
politicians, and tending towards conciliation.
956
 
 
The most frequent and hearty castigations were directed at the British press, deemed an 
autonomous power in its own right. Before the Fashoda crisis had properly begun, Le 
Matin, not content with just passing on reports from British papers, could complain of 
the “ton arrogant, comminatoire, passioné avec lequel les organes traitent l’affaire de 
Fachoda”.957 Le Temps agreed on “la réelle violence” of all British papers, save for The 
Manchester Guardian.
958
 It went on to berate the intransigent, intimidatory and 
tendentious tone of the press, miscalculating the mood of the French public “qui 
envisage l’affaire de Fachoda avec calme, mais aussi avec fermeté”.959 Likewise, Le 
Journal des Débats opposed “la courtoisie française à la rage et la haine qui se 
manifestent de l’autre côté de la Manche”.960 Le Gaulois, agreeing that the language 
from London was extraordinarily violent, set the tone of self justification for the French 
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press for the next seven weeks by determining not to follow the British press “sur ce 
terrain scabreux”.961 If deploring that “la presse anglaise continue sa campagne de 
menaces et d’intimidation”, La Petite République later concurred that “le mieux est de 
ne pas répondre”, in the interest of calming French opinion.962 Monson would have 
welcomed such stances, deploring “the inevitably bad effect of the language indulged in 
by certain organs of the British press” and how “press indiscretions” tended “to ignore, 
as seems to be the case more extensively in England than in France, the legitimate 
susceptibilities of the ruling classes in either country”.963  
 
Some backlash in Paris was inevitable, but surprisingly restrained. Lagging behind the 
others, Le Figaro remained surprised that the British papers were not too irritated at the 
end of September, but by 6 October, in condemning the British press as bullish and 
violent, had joined Le Matin’s attacks on the British papers’ inability to see there were 
two sides to the Fashoda question.
964
 But a week later Le Matin evidenced its 
moderation by a continual quest for a moderating voice across the Channel, balancing 
news of Rosebury’s “Appel aux patriotes anglais” with that of the spirit of conciliation 
in which Delcassé had received Monson, then deeming the true patriots those on both 
sides seeking a peaceful solution.
965
 However, Le Matin remained critical of a press 
perceived as trying to prepare the British people for war, adding on repeated occasions 
that British papers were mostly intransigent, if still courteous in the case of the 
Westminster Gazette.
966
 Le Journal des Débats deemed it imprudent to reproduce 
excerpts from the British papers, such was their uncompromising and wounding tone. 
This was not least from a desire not to provoke anger, or risk the appearance of France 
                                                 
961
 Le Gaulois, 19 September. 
962
 La Petite République, 12 & 13 October. 
963
 NA, FO 27/3397, 533, Monson to Salisbury, 21 October. 
964
 Le Figaro, 27 September & 6 October, Le Matin, 6 October. 
965
 Le Matin, 13 & 14 October. 
966
 Le Matin, 18, 21 & 23 October. 
 219 
as an aggressor in Britain.
967
 More forthrightly, Le Gaulois commented on the hypocrisy 
of the British press and its uncompromising stance.
968
 The paper was now caught 
between taking credit on behalf of the French press for its self restraint and reserve in 
contrast to that of Britain, and indulging in Marchand’s success such that “les journeaux 
français s’indignent, exultent, triomphent”.969 
 
Towards the end of the Fashoda crisis, the mellowing tone of the British press was 
acknowledged in Le Matin, successively moderating and no longer threatening war, 
continuing “à devenir un peu plus radouci”, more friendly, and finally perhaps the 
friendliest in years.
970
 Quoting extensively from the London press to agree this 
modification of tone on 1 November, Le Gaulois though argued that the British press 
had been responsible for the absolute intransigence of the cabinet, a view consistent with 
Le Temps’ retrospective claim that the press had managed “envénimer cette querelle”.971 
 
Examining the British as a whole, at a time when A Quoi Tient la Supériorité des Anglo-
Saxons was still in people’s minds and subject to debate, the press showed little more 
inclination than Demolins himself to take race seriously as an immovable, intrinsic set of 
characteristics, or a factor in the crisis.
972
 Discussion of the British was explicitly rooted 
in essentialist views only occasionally, for example when Le Gaulois referred to 
“l’atavisme du sens pratique inhérent à la race”, and the “crânerie qui est une des 
caractéristiques de la race anglo-saxonne”.973 More usually, concepts of race played a 
role that was surprisingly minor in extent and diffuse in application, often employed 
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rhetorically to push strictly extraneous points, for example on French attitudes towards 
their black colonial soldiers, in contrast to the sense of detachment allegedly 
characterising British views on their own.
974
 
6. The Conclusion of the Crisis. 
Latterly, papers on both sides of the Channel abounded with reports of fleet movements 
and miscellaneous other military manoeuvres on the part of their would-be adversaries. 
A febrile atmosphere infused reports on British war preparations and armaments, and the 
brief report shared by several Paris papers on the arrest in Dover of a suspected French 
spy.
975
 After the end of the crisis naval manoeuvres continued by the British sparked 
apprehension in Le Gaulois. In one article, they were interpreted as evidence of a pre-
meditated plan of aggression, whilst another argued, given the French show of goodwill, 
that in the event of any war the rest of Europe would side with France.
976
 The blunt 
verdict of L’Autorité was that the French were to leave Fashoda not because they were 
wrong but because they were weak, hence a call for a new “élan unanime contre la 
perfide albion”.977 According to Arié, a perceptible shift took place in the columns of 
L’Autorité and Le Gaulois, away from antipathy for Germany towards that for Britain.978  
 
Even as the chances of fighting over Fashoda receded, the press could foster fears of 
hostilities on some other occasion; Monson was perplexed to note that the argument was 
pursued further, to the line that his country was seen to be “desirous of forcing on a 
quarrel… in order to profit by the existing superiority of naval strength and annihilate 
the French power at sea”.979 L’Intransigeant suspected that, having failed to pick a 
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quarrel over Fashoda, Britain would find another pretext for war.
980
 Fashoda was 
interpreted even outside of the most stridently nationalist papers on occasion not so 
much as a potential cause of war but rather the pretext for which Britain had been 
searching to wage a preventive war. Le Figaro speculated that the Royal Navy would 
have benefited from destroying the French navy in 1898 to the extent of guaranteeing 
itself at least another 25 years of omnipotence.
981
 To even less enthusiasm from 
Monson, there was also speculation as to how, despite the strength of British numbers at 
sea, “le Péril Anglais” could not only be thwarted by adequate coastal fortifications but 
be brought down by a “Guerre de Course” directed at its maritime commerce, with a 
view to forcing metropolitan Britain into starvation.
982
 The highest levels of anger were 
directed at Britain not during the crisis, even towards its climax from 27 October-3 
November, but after its end, when the real danger of war had receded. 
 
For all that they could no longer have direct impact on the now concluded crisis, these 
reflections were not unchallenged. Re-interpreting British naval manoeuvres, Le Matin 
sought to calm French fears by casting them as a harmless sop by the British 
government to their own public opinion, and an exercise to ascertain the strengths and 
weaknesses of their mobilisation procedures.
983
 Le Gaulois contradicted its own 
apprehensions and counselled against reciprocating British manoeuvres and armaments, 
adding that they were probably exaggerated.
984
 Papers on the left remained muted in 
tone. During the crisis, Clemenceau in L’Aurore had argued that France would not fight 
for African marshes whilst Strasbourg and Metz remained in German hands, a line 
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implicitly endorsed in Le Rappel’s later criticism of the Germanophilia displayed by 
Anglophobes.
985
  
 
Britain was not the only, or principal, target of frustration. French internal disunity was a 
common theme. The British model was there to be followed. Where the French happily 
criticised their own nation to foreigners, a Briton would choose to ignore “les faiblesses 
de sa nation, il dira ou proclamera toujours que tout est parfait et supérieur en 
Angleterre…Il jettera sur sa patrie, devant l’étranger, un riche manteau de poupre et 
d’hermine”.986 Henri d’Orléans contended that, in the face of a weighty foreign question, 
France should be unified like the British, with no Conservatives, Radicals, Opportunists 
or Socialists but only Frenchmen.
987
 Further, even the free publication by the French 
press of details on French preparations for war were contrasted by that press to the 
silence preserved by the usually much criticised British press on British naval/military 
moves. Consequently, Britain ceased to be constructed as an enemy so much as an 
example of national discipline and unanimity that the French would do well to imitate.
988
  
 
Self-castigation engendered by Fashoda extended to the incompetence of French 
politicians in having launched the expedition without international support, and the 
nature of the Third Republic itself. Le Radical made the obvious correlation between 
weakness during the crisis and the unseating of the French government for up to 10 
days, leaving no one with full authority to talk or negotiate.
989
 Impending humiliation at 
Fashoda was interpreted by Le Matin as France’s just reward for not having adhered to 
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potential anti-British coalitions over past years.
990
 At the time of withdrawal, it lost no 
time in attaching blame to the structure of French government, specifically “un des jolis 
mensonges conventionels de notre méthode gouvernemental” which left the present 
Foreign Minister to explain what must, to him, have been the inexplicable policies of his 
predecessor. In what may well have been a Delcassé inspired piece, particular criticism 
was directed at Hanotaux for having failed to range Europe on France’s side or to secure 
German support prior to the expedition, whereas mention of Delcassé’s own pre-June 
1898 role in approving Marchand’s mission was studiously omitted.991 The tone 
differed, in Le Gaulois’ generalised attacks on France’s bumptious, incompetent and 
flighty men of state, together with calls for greater future accountability for their past 
failures and use of public funds.
992
 This line was hardly abated in later criticism of the 
stinginess and smallness of a foreign policy below the dignity of a great country, and an 
extensive attack on the mission as a foreseeable disaster with the men who ought to have 
realised this still in power.
993
 
 
The press had been broadly supportive of Delcassé’s hints of assistance from other 
European countries in seeking a re-opening of the Egypt question, or else concession 
from London in return for withdrawal.
994
 The visits to France of Witte and General 
Kourapatkin demonstrated the continued vitality of the Dual Alliance.
995
 Latterly, Le 
Matin resigned itself to the lack of foundations to the rumours that Russia would involve 
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itself in anything but an advisory role.
996
 It tried to salvage from the Russian press signs 
of modest recognition of Delcassé’s wisdom.997 However, Le Gaulois moved the focus 
to Dupuy’s clarity and firmness, whilst Le Figaro, claiming Russian awareness of the 
common threat to French and Russian interests posed by British aims, endorsed Russian 
policy in preference to French inasmuch as Russia had, not unwisely, urged moderation, 
not bellicosity, on Paris.
998
 On the left, the Fashoda incident became a vehicle for 
criticism of Russia, taken to have let France down. Anti-Russian lines, always most 
natural to the Socialists, had been consistent throughout the crisis. Jaurès had long been 
unhappy at “Le Rôle Subalterne” played by France to an autocratic power that, 
committed to expansion in Asia, needed stability on its western frontier and thus 
German benevolence.
999
 Then there was the disarmament conference about which 
France had not been consulted in advance, the suspicion being that the peace sought by 
Russia had no humanitarian motives but rather was a ploy to allow time for completion 
of the trans Siberian railway.
1000
 Withdrawal from Fashoda prompted the reflection that 
alliance with Russia had hypnotised successive governments, whereas in reality French 
isolation was being perpetuated.
1001
 Provincial Republican opinion resented Russia as 
“la grande muette”, who “nous envoie de très loin ses bénédictions”.1002 
 
Conclusion.  
 
Examination of Paris newspapers Le Gaulois, Le Figaro, Le Matin and La Petite 
République, during the months of the Fashoda crisis yields many different ideas about 
the British. British characteristics might imply an opposition to French perceptions of 
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themselves, but could equally suggest a fundamental identification of French values with 
British. Many perceptions clearly contradicted each other, for example as to Britons 
being bloodthirsty and warlike on the one hand, or reserved, cold, courteous, and 
civilised to the extent of being unmilitary on the other. Attempts were made to 
distinguish between the attitudes of different elements within British society. It can only 
follow that there was no one predominant attitude towards the British in the Paris press. 
Currents rose and ebbed within the period, partly related to the nature of whatever 
particular information happened to reach the journalists at any given juncture. So, for 
anxiety about an Anglo-German alliance to be newsworthy, there had to be evidence of 
speeches or negotiations to fuel speculation. Amidst the differing concerns linked to 
Fashoda, on the part of these papers and others, it is impossible to discern the 
widespread, consistent and stridently Anglophobe mood that some past historiography 
might lead one to expect. Fashoda functioned just as much as a vessel for the airing of 
other grievances, both domestic and foreign.  
 
Keiger’s argument on French press attitudes toward Fashoda made some progress in 
revising traditional ideas on uncompromising French hostility during the crisis. He 
contended, firstly, only the “chauvinistic press” were moved by “implacable hostility to 
British policy in the Nile Region”. Secondly this press was not as popular as the 
remainder, which, thirdly, comprised “more widely circulated dailies” whose views 
were “characteristic of opinion at large”.1003 Whilst these claims are correct to the extent 
that they point centrally to an undue past emphasis on the “chauvinistic and 
Anglophobic elements in French opinion”, they are in other ways potentially 
misleading.
1004
 Keiger had to concede that Le Petit Journal, one of the chauvinistic 
papers he listed, was not unpopular. Moreover, circulation figures for Le Gaulois and 
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L’Intransigeant, also listed in his “roll call of this chauvinistic press”, were by no means 
negligible. Certainly, those two were both on a level with two of the three dailies said by 
Keiger to epitomise the moderate section of opinion, Le Temps and Le Journal des 
Débats, and the third of these Le Matin was inferior in circulation to Le Petit Journal.  
 
Keiger’s conclusions were based on a close analysis largely restricted to Le Temps. A 
reading of Le Matin and Le Gaulois among others pushes his conclusions further, to 
suggest that there was no hard and fast distinction between either ideas current in one set 
of papers as opposed to another, or indeed necessarily the views they expressed about 
the British. One can only say that if there is an “overall” view that one can take of how 
Fashoda was reported, contemporary newspapers took the incident as one of less 
significance compared to other events of the time, notably the Dreyfus case, than has 
often been maintained. The period when most anger was articulated was not during the 
crisis itself but directly after Delcassé’s order for withdrawal, by which juncture any 
press commentary was too late to affect the outcome. Anger over Fashoda extended 
beyond just Britain to other targets, internal and external. Whether by Le Matin/ Le 
Temps, conservative Le Figaro/ Le Gaulois or Socialist La Petite République, reporting 
on the incident tended to display reactions that were more ambiguous and contradictory 
than merely an unalleviated animosity towards Britain. Notwithstanding what de Gaulle 
had to say about Fashoda, Tombs’ judgement is that personal relations at points of 
confrontation such as the crisis were “lacking in bitterness and real hatred”, with more 
general currents of resentment in some circles on both sides matched by admiration in 
others.
1005
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Outside the respective governments and a few limited, nationalistic circles in both 
countries, perhaps Fashoda had less contemporary significance than was subsequently 
attributed to it. Lack of parliamentary scrutiny was by no means unusual for foreign 
affairs in this stage of the Third Republic.
1006
 It is nevertheless worth noting as odd, for a 
crisis supposedly so grave, that Fashoda failed at the time to occasion so much as an 
interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies.
1007
 This may be less attributable to any 
insincerity in Delcassé’s proclaimed desire to explain himself than to his ability to do so 
perfectly effectively outside of the Chamber. Through press items, Delcassé was more 
than capable of exonerating himself, attacking his predecessor Hanotaux, and 
lampooning as criminal or incompetent the individuals who had authorised Marchand 
prior to June 1898.
1008
  
 
Later impressions of Fashoda may have been shaped, and distorted, by the memories 
aired by De Gaulle after 1940. In the years directly following Fashoda, his biographer 
wrote, De Gaulle did not join the army because of lasting Anglophobia but rather to 
escape the Third Republic’s atmosphere of chaos and irreligion for a place of “order, 
structure, a solid mass of certainties”.1009 As to others who were to rise to prominence in 
future decades, in the Belle Époque, “The Dreyfus affair was Blum’s political 
initiation”, formed an early influence on Daladier, inspired Herriot to enter politics, and 
dominated Briand.
1010
 This point was stressed in all four cases by their writings or later 
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biographies, only Briand’s making mention of Fashoda at all, and then to remark how it 
was overshadowed by Dreyfus. For every De Gaulle attributing importance to Fashoda, 
there was a Herriot, Blum, or Briand for whom the overwhelming issue and inspiration 
of the time was the Dreyfus case, or indeed a Jean Monnet for whom neither Fashoda 
nor Dreyfus became a passion.
1011
 This interpretation would tend to support the 
contention that for the majority of those who occupied the French political scene when 
De Gaulle was not pre-eminent, it was matters of internal French divisions that provided 
their motivation. The issue of the late 1890s that most epitomised those divisions and 
was closest to French hearts was not Fashoda but the Dreyfus case. 
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Illustrations (3). 
Chapter 5: Picture 5.1 Photograph of Rue de la Mission Marchand, Paris.  
 
 
 
Picture 5.2 How Fashoda was later epitomised on the front cover of Bates, The Fashoda 
Incident (1984), employing a cartoon from Le Petit Journal, Supplement Illustré, 20 
November 1898, published safely after the end of the crisis. 
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Picture 5.3 From the time of the crisis itself, one of several small cartoons on various 
subjects from Le Figaro, 4 November 1898, squeezed in above some social news, in 
contrast, merely indulges in harmless wordplay.    
 
 
Chapter 6: Pictures 6.1 & 6.2 Chamberlain by the piano, leading Queen Victoria in 
playing the Dum Dum Polka, and as a joker, in Le Rire, 14 & 21 October 1899.  
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Pictures 6.3 & 6.4 A war of money and gold, Le Figaro, 25 September and 12 October 
1899. 
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Picture 6.5 Le Rire, 23 September 1899, stung by international criticisms of France 
inspired by the Dreyfus case, retaliated by lampooning not just British but a wide range 
of perceived foreign hypocrisy. 
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Pictures 6.6 & 6.7 Taking up the theme of international schadenfreude at Britain’s initial 
failures against the Boer forces, Le Rire, 11 November 1899, and Le Figaro, 14 
December 1899, employing the “well-worn metaphor of ‘the giant with clay feet’”. 
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Picture 6.8 Le Matin, 11 December 1899, Chamberlain as misbehaving child, as other 
nations look on in mockery or irritation. 
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Picture 6.9 Le Rire, 23 December 1899 with Salisbury, Chamberlain and Rhodes 
engaging in a form of alchemy – the creation of gold\coins from blood shed in the war. 
 
 
 
Picture 6.10 the more macabre take on the relationship between blood and money taken 
up by Caran d’Ache of  Le Figaro, 29 January 1900. 
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Picture 6.11 Le Figaro, 14 December 1899, and the bereaved John Bull, if still taking a 
swipe at Chamberlain, well known for the orchids that regularly adorned his buttonhole.  
 
 
 
Pictures 6.12 & 6.13 German and Austrian cartoons laughing at the British army, 
reproduced for the French public in Le Rire, 2 December 1899. 
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Picture 6.14 Le Figaro, 6 November 1899, the bolting mules of Ladysmith. 
 
 
 
Picture 6.15 L’Assiette au Beurre, 28 September 1901, from www.vub.ac.be/C-
HIM/Abstracts.htm  .  
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6: Le Déshonneur de l’Angleterre: The Paris Press and the 
Start of the Boer War.          
 
Introduction.  
Histories centred on the war itself tend to concentrate most heavily upon German 
responses to the conflict.
1012
 Popular French attitudes towards the Anglo-Boer War have 
also generally been neglected in histories of France, hence Horne’s passing allusion to 
the Paris of 1903 “still piqued by the imperial humiliation of Fashoda, alienated by the 
Boer War and instinctively anti-England”.1013 When depicted at all, they most often ride 
on the coat-tails of responses to Fashoda, Robbins, for example, linking the “enthusiastic 
crowds” who greeted Kruger’s 1900 arrival in France to the “bitterly resented” 
humiliation of 1898.
1014
 According to Bell, the war was interpreted in France as another 
example of British arrogance and brutality, directed towards a tiny opponent.
1015
 
Andrew’s chapters on Delcassé’s policies in 1899-1902 were an exception, but even 
these, their emphasis upon diplomacy, admitted that: 
Few episodes in the diplomatic history of the early twentieth century have 
remained so obscure as the schemes for continental intervention in the Boer War. 
This is especially true of the part played by France.
1016
 
 
Even before the war, one French journalist paused to reflect on the attention being 
lavished upon how the Anglo-Boer conflict was reported in Germany and Russia, in 
contrast to the neglected work of his colleagues, asserting “Quant à la France…elle 
n’existe pas. Personne ne s’inquiète de son opinion”.1017 Equally, German and Austrian 
opinions and cartoons were prominent among the material published by French papers 
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on the war, bringing into question how far there was a distinctively French response to 
it. 
 
Although Andrew observed that “Anglo French relations have never since been as bad 
as at the beginning of the Boer War. France was swept by sympathy for the Boer cause”, 
perusal of the Paris press in the six weeks leading up to the commencement of hostilities 
on Thursday 12 October 1899 discloses, as in autumn 1898, no shortage of other news 
or controversies.
1018
 A strike at the Creusot works, intermittent letters from Paul 
Déroulède in prison following his further plotting in the summer, the siege at Rue 
Chabrol concluding on 27 September 1899 with the police forcing a surrender from 
Jules Guérin and his anti Semitic group, and, inevitably, the Dreyfus case culminating in 
a re-condemnation at Rennes on 9 September, then 10 days later a presidential pardon 
for Dreyfus, all preoccupied the press. Whilst there was some variation between 
individual papers in the amount of coverage allocated to the Anglo-Boer conflict, the 6 
page Matin true to form devoting more space to news of this than, for example the 4 
page Petite République Socialiste, in all cases in late 1899 that coverage was 
nevertheless surprisingly significant, and almost daily. The tone was predominantly 
sympathetic to “les pauvres Boërs”, “cette patriarchale et honnête population des 
Boërs”, “ce petit vaillant peuple” who were “résolu à vendre chèrement son 
indépendance”.1019 Much the same near unanimity was evidenced in criticism of “la 
guerre inique et lâche d’un empire de trente-huit millions d’hommes contre un état de 
trois cent mille âmes”, one “qui serait le déshonneur de l’Angleterre”, initiated thanks to 
“la criminelle politique” of Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain.1020 
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The near unanimity of anti-British, pro-Boer declarations in Paris had already registered 
in August with Edmund Monson, who reported “The tone of the general press is at the 
moment most hostile to England. The Transvaal question is the theme of constant notice 
in the Paris newspapers, and its merits are completely transformed and disguised by 
French journalists”.1021 A month later, in a vein not dissimilar to that of his reaction to 
French press reports on Fashoda, he stressed that the “unanimous support of the French 
press is given to the Transvaal”, adding that the journalists:  
accuse the suzerain power of bullying, disingenuousness, and unjust conduct. 
Even journals ordinarily temperate in style and relatively fair in appreciation, 
such as the Temps, the Journal des Débats, and the Matin, cannot find a word to 
say in justification of the Imperial government, while the newspapers of less 
consideration not only teem with abuse, but with expressions of regret at the 
impossibility of giving the Boers material help.
1022
 
 
In contrast to their approach to the Fashoda crisis, French newspapers therefore tended 
to converge on much the same destination, but the path which each individual paper 
took to reach its Pro-Boer/Anti-British stance was determined by its own 
preoccupations. Consequently, there was considerable variation in the language used and 
nature of the sympathies expressed. 
Why the Attention to the Boer War. 
 
The lack of any substantial, direct, French interests in the Anglo-Boer conflict, unlike in 
the Fashoda crisis, made it odd that press coverage should have been more voluminous 
and its tone of criticism more sharp and unanimous in autumn 1899 than it had been a 
year earlier. There were several reasons for this seeming paradox. 
 
In 1898, the French (notwithstanding Delcassé’s hollow claims to Monson that France 
would not be unsupported if Britain forced a war over Fashoda) were standing alone. 
Conversely, a year later, the Paris press could feel emboldened by the world-wide, often 
                                                 
1021
NA, FO 27/3459.382, Monson to Salisbury, 14 August 1899, and BDW, 1, 213, Monson to Salisbury, 8 
September 1899. 
1022
 NA, FO 27/3459.405, Monson to Salisbury, 15 September 1899. 
 241 
Anglophobic, sympathy evidenced for the Boers, especially in Germany and Russia 
whose support had not been forthcoming over Fashoda.
1023
 In terms of domestic French 
politics, sympathy for the Boers was uncontroversial and promised less serious 
consequences than a stance on Fashoda. In the weeks leading up to the war no one 
seems seriously to have advocated an official, unilateral, and armed intervention from 
the French government.
1024
 Equally, there was no question of the conflict having been 
caused by a prior miscalculation on the part of French officials or politicians. The name 
of Delcassé hardly entered the papers at all.
1025
 Almost all shades of opinion on the left 
and right could therefore happily unite in criticising British policy (albeit in different 
ways), safe in the knowledge that the conflict did not find France alone nor did its 
origins potentially raise questions as to French governmental competence.  
 
There was an added moral imperative to write in support of the Boers. The coincidence 
of the war breaking out right at the end of the century gave some cause for reflection.
1026
 
In the twelve months since Fashoda, Tsar Nicholas II’s efforts for peace and 
disarmament had yielded an international agreement at The Hague (May-July 1899), 
making these themes topical. It seemed that Britain, in pressing the Transvaal to war or 
vassal status was, for all its rhetoric about right and justice, flagrantly disregarding the 
ideas current at The Hague.
1027
 It was widely anticipated that, in breach of The Hague 
Agreement, Britain would use “Dum-dum” bullets against the Boers.1028 British success 
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at Omdurman had been hailed as a victory for civilisation. It could even be argued that 
Kitchener’s advance had saved Marchand’s small force from destruction at the hands of 
the Dervishes.
1029
 No such excuses were applicable in South Africa. It was not “une 
guerre civilisatrice” against “de misérables populations soudanaises” because “les Boërs 
en effet, sont des blancs, comme nous, comme les Anglais. Ils ont colonisé au sens strict 
du mot le pays où ils sont implantés”.1030  
 
The lack of major French economic or political interests at stake in the Transvaal helped 
to affirm the moral position of the press of a country which had nothing much directly to 
gain from a British back down or defeat. Further, espousing the Boer cause underlined 
the French national self-image of acting as the natural repository for the hopes of the 
downtrodden everywhere, and served to back a rhetorical call that this universalist role 
should prompt more action. Reflecting on a cartoon showing France surrounded by her 
enemies, including English hypocrisy, from the Dublin Weekly Freeman, La Libre 
Parole was moved to remark “Nous avons donc quelques amis dans le monde. Ce ne 
sont pas ni les puissants ni les riches, ce sont les persecutés d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, ceux 
pour qui nous avons trop peu fait”.1031 
 
Thirdly, and in apparent contradiction of France acting as disinterested advocate of 
Transvaal, elements of the press endeavoured to stress a link of common ancestry 
between the Boer people and the French. This was reminiscent of the sentimental and 
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racial links with Canada mentioned by Le Gaulois in the course of the Fashoda crisis.
1032
 
Although the Dutch and the Germans could also claim links of kinship with the Boers, 
others felt “that they were still essentially French”.1033 Bolted onto notions of racial 
kinship was the suggestion in some sections of the press that French values of liberty 
prevailed in the Boer republics. They were posited as “une nouvelle petite France”.1034 
Across the French press appeared reports of a complete mobilisation of the Boer people, 
young or old, rich or poor, in terms of a Napoleonic levée en masse in a “fièvre 
patriotique”.1035 This alignment was not lost on the British either, Conan Doyle 
subsequently commenting that “Napoleon and all his veterans have never treated us so 
roughly as these hard bitten farmers”.1036 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, commentary on the Anglo-Boer conflict offered 
opportunity for further reflection on French internal preoccupations. Apparently 
unrelated to South African affairs, but sharpening French Anglophobia, was British 
condemnation of the Dreyfus verdict at Rennes. Moves in Britain to boycott the 1900 
Exposition resulted not from the French attitude towards the Boer War but rather from 
disgust at the Dreyfus case. The anti-Dreyfusard press made the greatest linkage 
between the two issues. There was an element of irony here, inasmuch as the boycott 
movement, and the sentiment which sustained it, was not restricted to Britain. Sympathy 
for Dreyfus was shared just as much worldwide (except in Russia and Spain) as 
sympathy for the Boers (outside of the British Empire and the USA). The rather 
contradictory result of this was that elements of the French press, whilst hastening to 
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condemn the hypocrisy of all foreign countries (Belgium, the USA, Italy, Germany) 
critical of Rennes as a means of demonstrating that such foreign opinions were not 
worth attaching value to, were happy to report pro-Boer protests in and quote from the 
newspapers of the same countries in order to validate French sympathy for the Boers. 
 
Marchand’s Return: A Prelude to the Boer War? 
 
It has been claimed that French press hostility to Britain in 1899 stemmed from 
humiliation in 1898, which “had given a particular edge to local pro-Boerism”, and 
indeed that, in resurfacing Anglophobia after Fashoda, “The French took their revenge 
by openly sympathising with the Boers during the war”.1037 If those suppositions are 
correct, one might have expected that the feelings engendered directly after Fashoda 
would persist throughout mid 1899. It is further evidence of the moderation of much of 
the Paris press that there is little evidence of this having been the case. Government 
influence pushed in the same direction. Provisions for the return of the Marchand 
mission, which, having passed through Abyssinia, left Djibouti on a French cruiser, were 
handled with extreme care. In view of Déroulède’s attempted coup at President Faure’s 
funeral on 23 February, there was a real fear that nationalists would hijack the occasion 
of Marchand’s return for their own political ends. From Marchand’s arrival in Toulon on 
30 May, through his itinerary on reaching Paris on 1 June, to a final parade of the entire 
mission at Longchamps on 14 July, no effort was spared in muting any anti-Republican 
impact of Marchand in metropolitan France.
1038
 Marchand was unquestionably popular, 
attracting huge crowds, but a mixture of his own reluctance to become an Anglophobic 
figurehead and adroit crowd handling by the authorities ensured that nationalist disorder 
                                                 
1037
 Lowry “Wider Impact”, Lowry (ed), South African War (2000), 207, & Keiger, France and the World 
(2001), 165 & 163. 
1038
 Wright, Conflict (1972), 206 & 216, Bates, Fashoda Incident (1984), 180-1 & 183-5, Smith, Unknown 
Frenchman (2001), 129 and Berny Sèbe, “From Thoissey to the Capital Via Fashoda: Major Marchand, 
Partisan icon of the Right in Paris”, in Jessica Wardhaugh (ed), Paris and the Right in the Twentieth 
Century (Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars: 2007), 30-34. 
 245 
was limited to shouting, directed mainly against traitors and Jews.
1039
 Nevertheless, in 
the extensive space given by the press to covering the celebrations occasioned by his 
return, the absence of Anglophobic undertones was remarkable, in some cases without 
even any mention of Britain, or any British figure.
1040
 
 
In the weeks leading up to the Boer War, it might have been tempting to refer back to 
the events of 1898 and, as Driant did and Demolins would have accepted, interpret both 
Fashoda and the Boer War as part of a single common British plan to take over Africa. 
Sudan did crop up in September-October 1899, but in many if not most instances 
allusions to it comprised short, factual, reports on Kitchener’s continued  military 
operations against the Khalifa and his dwindling band of followers, or else adverts for 
and reflections upon holidays on the Nile.
1041
 It was only on the strident right and left 
that Fashoda was taken up in the context of the Boer War. Ernest Judet questioned what 
would happen if Britain had simultaneously to face a Fashoda and trouble from Russia 
in Asia, therefore lamenting France’s disunity but without apparent reflection on any 
link to the Boers.
 1042
 La Petite Republique contrasted “La criminelle politique de M. 
Chamberlain” towards Transvaal with the civilising mission in the Sudan, whilst La 
Libre Parole, like Judet relating the crises back to France’s internal state, repeatedly 
cited the courage and defiance of the Boers as an example to Delcassé of what his 
attitude should have been in November 1898, and to France as a whole.
1043
 Such paucity 
of pieces explicitly linking Fashoda to the Anglo-Boer confrontation would suggest that 
any chain of causation between the two was either not made, or only implicitly assumed. 
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Chamberlain’s Work: Outbreak of War, 1 September-14 October 1899. 
 
Whilst there were some parallels between September-October 1899 and September-
October 1898, notably the continued prominence of agonising over the Dreyfus case, the 
outbreak of war in South Africa was constructed in a very different way from the stand-
off on the Nile. Across most of the press, journalists deemed the 1899 confrontation as 
Chamberlain’s very personal affair, whereas Fashoda had not been Salisbury’s. The 
ongoing tensions were posed in terms of a duel between the very distinctive and 
colourful figures of Kruger and Chamberlain, a theme cropping up repeatedly in Le 
Matin, visualising the leaders pointing rifles at one another, and La Petite République 
arguing “c’est l’esprit de rivalité personnelle qui anime le ministre anglais”.1044 
Imagining the confrontation in these terms opened up the possibility that the pair were as 
bad as one another: “Cette guerre, Chamberlain la désire, le war office la veut, et 
M.Kruger, chez lequel la rouerie du patriarche semble avoir fait place à la soif du 
martyre, fait tout ce qu’il peut pour la hâter”.1045  
 
However, there can be no doubt that Chamberlain suffered far more in French 
newspapers than anyone else. Criticisms piled on almost daily. To take Le Gaulois as an 
example, it attacked “la politique imprudente et inique” of a man of “témérité”, a cynical 
minister of “prétentions exorbitants”, and by mid September “il s’agit pour cet 
ambitieux, hanté par un vision d’un impérialisme sans frein, d’étouffer le mouvement du 
sympathie qui se dessine… autour du Transvaal”.1046 Focus then shifted to his 
willingness to threaten war.
1047
 Finally noting “les conditions draconiennes formulées 
par M Chamberlain, qui sembleraient aux yeux du monde civilisé comme une atteinte 
par trop flagrante au droit des gens”, Le Gaulois deemed the Colonial Secretary “le 
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mauvais génie de l’Angleterre”.1048 More vituperative was La Libre Parole, from the 
start lampooning the “mélange de mensonges audacieux et de contre-vérités perfides qui 
font de M.Chamberlain le premier charlatan politique du monde”.1049 
 
How meaningful this might be when considering French attitudes towards the British as 
a whole becomes clearer where the criticisms locate Chamberlain in a wider context. Le 
Matin briefly mooted the idea that, were Chamberlain (and Kruger) simply to be 
removed from negotiations and replaced by “des hommes d’Etat impartiaux”, this alone 
might suffice to extricate Britain from a confrontation the scale of which Chamberlain 
did not fully appreciate.
1050
 It was, however, more common to place the Colonial 
Secretary into broader stereotypes of British greed and rapaciousness. Sitting squarely 
within ideas of the British commercial drive, Le Gaulois cited the determinant of 
Chamberlain’s policy as the motto “time is money”, greed and arrogance subsequently 
driving the whole cabinet towards war.
1051
 The cynicism “du syndicat Chamberlain-
Rhodes-Jameson et cie” apparent in 1896 was still at work but, as the phrasing suggests, 
Chamberlain was not solely responsible.
 1052
 So what Pakenham identified as “the thin 
golden thread running through the narrative” was not just seen as a personal issue. The 
Boers were doomed as soon as “le surprise funestre” of gold under their feet became 
publicly known, bringing in British individuals keen to exploit it.
1053
 Many of “les 
Anglais convoitent les mines d’or du Transvaal et voudraient se les approprier”, and 
were driven by “la soif d’or” according to M.Pertuisent, consulted by Le Soleil as expert 
on South Africa.
1054
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The idea of the Anglo-Boer conflict as one of money was common across the entire 
political spectrum, but with differing undertones. Le Temps, criticising the determination 
of “une compagnie de spéculateurs sans scrupules” to grab the Rand’s treasure, and Le 
Matin identifying as motives the desire for gold and commerce, were typical of the 
moderate conservative press in neither elaborating very much nor attacking Chamberlain 
personally.
1055
 In contrast, La Libre Parole first railed against “Une guerre douteuse” 
initiated thanks to the business interests of Chamberlain, Rhodes and the Jews allegedly 
behind them.
1056
 This later broadened into the judgment “un Anglais n’a jamais reculé 
devant un crime profitable… un Anglais n’est jamais arrivé à comprendre qu’une action 
profitable peut être un crime”, then the reflection “un Anglais équitable, désintéressé, 
plein de Coeur, est un phénomène rare…un honnête homme entre mille Anglais”.1057 
Rather than take up this explicit racial/national typology, satirical cartoons retained at 
their centre the personal element directed against Chamberlain.
1058
 In the case of Le 
Figaro, they remained capable of making wider points about the dominance of money in 
British society, for example echoing Le Radical in its claims that Britain fielded “une 
armée de mercenaires stipendiée par des spéculateurs”.1059  
 
Further to the left, La Petite République reinterpreted the idea of the Boer War as a war 
between races through the lens of its own continuing preoccupation with class. Whereas 
the Boers “ont colonisé au sens strict du mot le pays où ils s’étaient implantés…les 
uitlanders… ne sont que des aventuriers venu au pays d’or…les boers vaincus, ce serait 
le triomphe de la rapacité capitaliste sur le travail honnête et féconde”.1060 The uitlander 
cause was championed, as pretext for war, by Britain’s acquisitive aristocracy and 
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bourgeoisie, both profiting from the dangerous and painful working conditions endured 
by those actually having to dig the gold up.
1061
 The conflict was therefore more than just 
Chamberlain and Kruger, but rather another manifestation of the trans-national struggle 
between economic groupings- with money remaining at the centre of the narrative.  
 
Class was also a central theme of Boer War coverage in the columns of L’Echo de Paris, 
but re-framed to meet the political worldview of the right, and once more focussed on 
the Colonial Secretary. Whilst Le Gaulois left implicit any disdain for Chamberlain on 
the basis of his class, Hector Depasse dwelt repeatedly on the social origins “du 
cordonnier de Birmingham”, scorning the “ambition démesurée” of the ideas in the head 
of a “fils d’un cordonnier de la cité de Londres, et lui-même ancien fabricant de vis et 
d’écrous”.1062 Grandiose ideas originating “dans la tête quelque peu tumultueuse et 
romantique d’un Disraeli” degenerated in Chamberlain’s hands into “un torrent de 
vitriol impérialiste assez vaste pour empoisonner tout un peuple”.1063 Where Demolins 
had aired a dream of national progress through encouraging limitless individual 
initiative, L’Echo de Paris interpreted Chamberlain as the nightmare of what happens 
when an ambitious self-made man, his progress facilitated by democracy, displaces 
those with traditional privilege. Secondly, tying in with the fin-de-siècle ambience was 
the notion that talking about vassals at all was outmoded and inappropriate for the end of 
the nineteenth century.
1064
 Affirming that “L’opinion de l’Europe civilisée s’est 
prononcée avec éclat contre la prétention gothique et barbare de M Chamberlain à la 
suzerainté du Transvaal”, Depasse jibed that this was the first time that Britain had 
actively sought to export something of the “gothique et suranné” to be found in 
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“l’edifice du parliamentarisme anglo-saxon”.1065  Unlike Boutmy, therefore, he found 
little to admire in the old roots of Britain’s constitution. The modernity of a Chamberlain 
made it all the more incongruous that he had become “ce personnage moyen-âgeux” 
haranguing the Boers in a “style Gothique” to become “les fidèles vassals de Londres” 
in a fashion that called to mind the Ottoman Empire.
1066
 Paradoxically, Chamberlain 
married modern industrial methods with mores “digne des Attila et de Genséric” in 
order to get his way.
1067
  
 
Treatment of others in power was more consistent across the spectrum of the French 
press. In 1898 the leading political figure on the British side, Lord Salisbury, having 
escaped relatively lightly in the columns of the French press, in 1899 he and the Queen 
were seen as potential brakes on British policy.
1068
 Excepting Le Temps, critical as early 
as mid-July of the “vieux, fatigué, indolent, sceptique” Salisbury and his nephew 
Balfour who had capitulated to Chamberlain’s “simplisme brutal”, at the start hopes 
were high that Prime Minister or the Queen would avert war.
1069
 La Petite République 
anticipated the selfish desire of an old minister who “hésite à clôturer par une guerre 
sans gloire sa longue carrière politique”, Siècle echoing this.1070 On the right, 
expectations were shaped by personal qualities, “la prudence reconnu et l’esprit de 
modération de Lord Salisbury” explicitly pitched against Chamberlain.1071 True to the 
value which it attached to social status, Le Gaulois, like Le Figaro, pinned its hopes for 
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British restraint most forcefully in September on the “haute sagesse” of Lord Salisbury 
backed by the Queen.
1072
  
 
As war loomed, Le Gaulois’ hope of a solution via “du caractère et de l’envergure de 
Lord Salisbury” in arbitration did not disappear.1073 However, the increasingly dominant 
current was that “la vieille diplomatie de Lord Salisbury” had succumbed to the new, 
populist, jingoistic politics of Chamberlain.
1074
 René d’Aral was convinced by 30 
September that Salisbury had been converted to the ways of “son jeune et impétueux 
collègue”, following the lead of Le Soleil which interpreted Salisbury as “un honnête 
homme” whose hand had been forced by the pushy Chamberlain.1075 The ineffectiveness 
of forces opposing conflict with the Boers was seen in some quarters as a failure on the 
part of the checks and balances which, according to Boutmy, were meant to moderate 
British behaviour. Le Gaulois’ acceptance that “la reine règne, et ne gouverne pas”, in 
“son rôle muet comme de reine constitutionelle” prompted debate in Le Matin.1076 
Contradicting claims that the Queen was powerless, Paris’ English colony argued, citing 
examples of Victoria’s past influence on British foreign policy, that she could stop the 
conflict, but her inertia was attributable only to a lack of good advisers.
1077
 Having aired 
these views, Le Matin let the matter rest with their London correspondent’s arguments 
that the Queen, though commanding deference by virtue of her long personal 
experience, now as in the days of Palmerston could not rely on her title to prevail against 
the will of her own government.
1078
As to the Prime Minister, Le Figaro summed up the 
move towards war as a victory for “M.Chamberlain, soutenu avec ardeur par le 
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sentiment public, devant lequel s’est incliné à son tour Lord Salisbury, malgré ses 
répugnances originelles”.1079 
 
There was little attempt to explain how a political system lauded by some ELSP writers 
could have given such rein to a politician, who drew comparisons with Bismarck.
1080
 Le 
Figaro produced an assessment of British colonial plans reminiscent of Demolins’ 
introduction, but, beyond this, the story was at least outwardly one of Sciences Po ideas 
ignored or repudiated.
1081
 Le Journal des Débats commented that “les choses étrangères 
ont un attrait merveilleux pour les Français…pris d’une passion exagérée pour les 
institutions d’autres pays, les institutions britanniques surtout”, as well as “les moeurs 
anglaises, les habitudes anglaises, l’éducation anglaise”, when Britain, in return, 
regarded “damned” foreigners with suspicion at best and, more commonly, outright 
disdain.
1082
 Reporting a tumultuous British anti-war meeting, Le Matin denied any 
fundamental difference between British and French politics, stating “les procédés de 
discussion dans les réunions publiques sont les mêmes chez nos voisins que chez nous”. 
Divisions based on social class rather than nationality were to the fore, in the sense that 
Matin, scorning the crowd in both countries, concluded “quelle que soit la latitude, 
l’esprit humain a la même tendance à simplifier les questions”.1083 
 
Fancying that things would be different were “cet honnête grand homme” Gladstone still 
alive to waken consciences as to what was just, Le Soleil interpreted the Anglo-Boer 
conflict in terms of traditional notions about the British being bloodthirsty, and 
characterised by “le Pharaïsme élevé à la plus haute puissance”.1084 Ideas of duty 
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comparable to those in the writings of Bardoux and others, but distorted ones amidst 
press urgings “de rosser les Boërs”, completed the explanation in early October:  
Il faut rendre cette justice aux anglais, ils sont les esclaves du devoir. 
Malheureusment, ils ont une tendance fâcheuse à confondre leur devoir avec leur 
intérêt…La difficulté souvent n’est pas de faire son devoir, mais de la 
connaître.
1085
 
 
Whilst the press ostensibly contradicted Sciences Po contentions, it did employ their 
conceptualisations and anticipate points made subsequently by ELSP writers.
1086
 In its 
unfavourable comparison of the political system in Britain to that of Transvaal, Le 
Matin, for example, might have been drawing directly on Boutmy’s survey of the British 
constitution in its depiction of “le pays de tradition” locked into the past.1087 Even more 
explicit, and telling, claiming that Chamberlain controlled the British press Le Gaulois 
pilloried “une anglomanie ignorante” of “les très nombreux Français qui croient en le 
dogme de l’individualisme anglais, à l’indépendance de jugement qui caractérise chaque 
sujet de la reine”. The same editorial went on to argue (like Bardoux) that social 
groupings and common opinions created a society that was in fact conformist, and (like 
Taine, among others) that the British were uninterested in ideas or theories unless 
applied in practice, hence “rien en Angleterre ne rappelle la délicieuse anarchie 
intellectuelle qui afflige notre pays et le rend charmant”.1088  
 
The Boer War as a Focus for French Internal Preoccupations.  
 
The terms in which the press in Paris evaluated both sides in the emerging conflict 
suggest much about continuing French concerns. On the right, British economic 
progress was partly explained by the ruthless colonial acquisitions made by companies 
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acting on private initiative at the expense of French interests, but on the left economic 
progress was explicitly linked to political progress,  British agricultural advances, 
compared to France, attributed “à la grande liberté politique” enjoyed for so long in 
Britain.
1089
As at the time of Fashoda, there was some praise for the national unity and 
sense of purpose presented by British public opinion showing “une résolution froide, 
bien caractéristique”.1090 Britain also, of course, in implicit contrast to France, remained 
“une nation essentiellement pratique”, energetic and determined, if now gripped by a 
new ambitious imperialism “qui gonfle d’orgueil la race la plus orgueilleuse du monde”. 
1091
 
 
Significantly, many of the qualities praised in the Boers were similar to those once 
identified with the now unpopular British, and implied, similarly, lessons for France. 
Previous unfavourable Le Gaulois commentary on the Boers had characterised Kruger 
as “le vieillard obstiné” who stood in the way of desirable reforms.1092 Kruger’s laws, 
enforcing price fixing for dynamite, proved an illogical arrangement with profit from the 
monopoly passing into commercial hands, whilst Transvaal’s emissary Dr Leyds toured 
Europe begging a loan for his government.
1093
 In autumn 1899, Le Gaulois reinterpreted 
Kruger as a laconic sage “avec beaucoup de modération, de logique et de clarté” in 
drawing up his ultimata, an epitome of stoicism by way of an anecdote about how, on 
accidentally shooting himself, he had twice cut off the end of his finger to stop 
gangrene, and someone who preferred to listen rather than speak: “Quand il parle, c’est 
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pour dire beaucoup en peu de mots. C’est concis et plein”.1094 As to the civilisation built 
up by Kruger within half a century, its occupants, in a fashion reminiscent of 
commentaries on the British, were an antithesis of French disunity and dénatalité, living 
in a rural idyll “attaché au sol et à la vie de famille… les femmes sont fécondes. La 
moindre famille est composée de dix enfants, tous élevés en vue de travail et de la 
défense du sol”.1095 The rest of the press was less effusive, but in repeatedly stressing 
Boer piety, determination and, occasionally, welcome of conflict echoed ideas 
previously aired about Britain, notably in press coverage of Fashoda, and ELSP 
works.
1096
 
Anti-Semitism. 
 
Given continued French preoccupation with Dreyfus, links could be made between the 
affair and the Anglo-Boer confrontation, and it is tempting to assume that they were. It 
was a hallmark of much right-wing press commentary that almost every foreign country 
was hypocritical in its criticism of Rennes.
1097
  Le Journal des Débats proved the most 
generous in the case of Britain, placing “l’amour de justice” at the top of the list of seven 
factors determining British attitudes. Added to this, though, were a hypocritical “goût, 
particulier à l’Anglais, qui le porte à prêcher et à faire la leçon aux autres”, an 
“ignorance et… mépris des institutions des autres pays…les Anglais sont convaincus 
qu’il n’y a pas de justice véritable que chez eux”, and simple “no popery” prejudice.1098 
Reflecting its own attitude of ennui towards the furore generated by the continuing case, 
Les Débats argued that for any country to condemn the affairs of another was futile, but 
without reference to the Boer conflict: “Ils oublient que pendant quatre-vingt-dix ans, la 
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conscience humaine a été révoltée de la façon dont l’Irlande était traitée. Est-ce que 
l’indignation du monde entier a produit le moindre effet sur eux?”1099 
 
All factions observed London’s Sunday 17 September Hyde Park rally, in favour of 
Dreyfus, with interest. It was mostly Dreyfusards who tended to report a calm protest 
with no police intervention required.
1100
 Conversely, Le Matin’s correspondent remarked 
on the prominent presence of Whitechapel Jews, and (drawing on ideas of British 
gluttony as well as tumultuousness) the violence latterly directed at some “honorables 
Français” by “jeunes énergumènes, dont le moins qu’on peut dire est qu’ils avaient fait 
honneur à leur déjeuner”. “Parmi les défenseurs du droit et de la justice” he concluded, 
had been someone who had stolen his watch.
1101
 Le Matin was worried that the London 
press’ “virulentes attaques contre notre honneur et des excommunications définitives à 
notre adresse” might lead to a boycott of France.1102 Nevertheless, the amused tone with 
which the meeting had been reported was extended to description of British boycott 
activity, centring on The Daily Mail.
1103
 Such levity was absent from anti-Dreyfusards 
still trying to tap into stereotypes of disorderly and vociferous Britain to taint their 
opponents. L’Echo de Paris typified them as people who violently dispersed French 
expatriates gathered in Soho to vindicate Rennes, or the “troupe de ruffians” who had 
torn to pieces a mannequin representing Mercier in Brick Lane.
1104
 Older stereotypes 
and concerns also meant that Charles Laurent placed British concerns over Dreyfus in 
the context of convicts being disposed of at Tyburn and Botany Bay, or Kitchener’s men 
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throwing the decapitated body of the Mahdi into the Nile, rather than the Boers.
1105
 The 
Journal des Débats approach, in common with Le Matin perceiving the Dreyfus case as 
an opportunity for British Francophobes to air their generalised dislike of France, 
demonstrates that although a link between Dreyfus and the Boer War could be explicitly 
made, for the most part it was not.
1106
  
 
The exceptions to this were the papers whose preoccupations were the most anti-
Semitic. Such was the case for L’Echo de Paris which spanned the political and class 
gap between the most radical nationalist papers and the more refined, if still nationalist, 
Le Gaulois, Le Figaro and Le Soleil. Anti-Semitism was directed at foreign Jews as well 
as French, in the assertions that most of the foreign press “est dans les mains Israëlites”, 
and particularly vitriolic attacks on The Times Correspondent Blowitz as “un juif 
d’Hongrie, aux gages des Anglais, naturalisé français pour être tranquil”, which served 
to explain (and discredit) opinion abroad on Dreyfus.
1107
 Firmly anti-Dreyfusard, 
Gabriel Syveton, citing criticisms from The Times, Telegraph and Contemporary Review 
as well as the German press, contended that “L’Europe n’a donc pas, à vrai dire, 
d’opinion à elle sur l’affaire Dreyfus. Elle a adopté toute faite l’opinion des Dreyfusards 
français”. The suggestion that foreign interests were so obviously served by Dreyfusism 
that it must have originated from abroad was incorporated within wider contemporary 
preoccupations over French vulnerability; the notion that foreigners were deliberately 
setting out to weaken the French army, leaving France open to invasion, was expressly 
articulated, thereby rallying support of a generalised, xenophobic nature, centred on the 
army as the core of the French nation.
1108
 Relative to the Dreyfus issue, the Boer War 
played a subordinate role, as it merely illustrated a range of traditional British vices and 
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practices, the boasting about British chivalry, liberty and justice, invoked for Dreyfus 
but hypocritically put to one side when it was a case of British commercial interests and 
“insatiable cupidité”.1109  
 
None of this came anywhere near forwarding Jewish plotting as the all-embracing 
explanation that distinguished the outpourings of La Libre Parole from all others on the 
conflict. An identification of pro-Boer with anti-Semitic sentiment has long been noted 
by historians exploring currents in British anti-war sentiment.
1110
 As a means of 
generating opposition to the war, those on the left in Britain happily played on ideas of 
“Jews as orchestrators of world wide imperialism”.1111 The position of La Libre Parole 
differed from left-wing British opponents of the war for “the various socialists, radicals 
and labourites” were primarily against what they deemed an immoral war, enlisting 
prejudice against “Jewish finance” as a (subordinate) means to that end whereas 
Edouard Drumont and his associates were staunch anti-Semites using the conflict as a 
means of further justifying anti-Semitism.
1112
  
 
Hence the war was just a manifestation of a wider global struggle; Jules de la Haye 
readily aligned, in global terms, “l’alliance des réformés de France avec les réformés 
d’Angleterre et d’Allemagne”, and all three in turn with freemasonry and Jews.1113 The 
war was reinterpreted as primarily a Jewish phenomenon. It was necessary “pour sauver 
Chamberlain et ses filibusters qui lui sont associés, les banquiers juifs ou les 
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concessionaires de mines de Johannesburg”.1114 Rhodes was advised by the Jewish 
millionaire Alfred Beit in the 1890s. Now Balfour was obliged to consult Rothschild on 
policy, wealthy Jews having bought British politicians and public opinion.
1115
 La Libre 
Parole, further, quoted an unnamed English colonel, unwilling to fight noble Boers, 
unafraid to be called “paysans”, at the behest of a press owned by Jews-“Ces sont eux 
qui ont lentement préparé et rendue inévitable cette guerre inique contre ce petit peuple 
boer”.1116 Equally, it circulated the socialist Hyndman’s assertions that “les juifs 
capitalistes, courtiers de la bourse, la plupart étrangers, demandent la guerre”, so the 
British press, all owned by Jews, was, whether Tory, Liberal or Radical otherwise, 
inciting Jingo demonstrations and pushing for war.
1117
 
 
Jewish grand influence in Britain was matched in South Africa, where Johannesburg 
boasted no fewer than 17 synagogues for a town of 60,000 souls, thus a “Fléau Juif au 
Transvaal”, as elsewhere.1118 Uitlanders were aligned with the Jews, La Libre Parole 
focussing on the Jewish origin of “volontaires anglais” who had formed a “corps de 500 
hommes montés, qu’on appelle le Imperial Light Horse”.1119 Uitlander Jews were 
“furieux que les Boers leur aient refusé le droit de citoyens”, but the Boers’ worry about 
Jews taking office was justifiable, given “ce sont les Juifs qui ont corrompu ce pays par 
les pots-de-vin, demandes de monopoles, etc”. Britain was therefore making war on 
Transvaal to satisfy Jewish greed there and in London.
1120
 However, La Libre Parole 
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engaged in little praise of the Boers themselves, underlining the extent to which the 
main preoccupation in its coverage was, as always, anti-Semitism. 
 
The link between Dreyfus and the Boers was also made with unusual directness: 
L’Angleterre, qui s’est fait dans le monde l’exécutrice des basses oeuvres de la 
Juiverie cosmopolite, agit à Pretoria comme elle agissait à Paris. Ici, Dreyfus, là -
bas les Uitlanders. Pour les Juifs, l’un comme les autres ne sont qu’un prétexte.1121  
 
In sum, “La guerre en Transvaal est une ‘affaire’ juive comme l’affaire Dreyfus”.1122 
 
The Question of French Intervention; a Case Study in self-image. 
 
To Monson, the Paris press represented a groundswell of opinion in favour of 
intervention to stop a widely decried war. Nationalist L’Intransigeant, L’Autorité, and 
Ernest Judet in Le Petit Journal had the most straightforward lines to take. Judet’s 
railing that “l’intolérable tyrannie des Anglo-Saxons commettra un crime du plus sous 
les yeux des nations impenément braves” was echoed by De Cassagnac in L’Autorité, 
condemning the war.
1123
 Having already urged France as a matter of duty to send money 
and volunteers to the aid of Transvaal, with barbs against the neutrality of other nations, 
he fulminated: 
Les Anglais, en essayant de conquérir Transvaal commettent un crime que rien, 
rien ne justifie. Le bandit qui attend un voyageur au coin du bois, et lui demande la 
bourse et la vie, est moins méprisable.
1124
  
 
It was natural that such circumstances should raise the question of what the French could 
do to stop the British, and therefore reflections on France’s own (in)capacities to act, 
much as had been the case after Fashoda. The same themes cropped up. De Cassagnac, 
looking back to a nostalgic past, bemoaned French internal affairs as too preoccupying: 
“Donc la vieille France, jadis si noble, la France des paladins, n’enverra ni un homme ni 
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un écu aux boers”.1125 The implicitly anti-Republican nature of this sentiment was 
explicit four days later in castigation of the cowardly, miserable and indifferent policies 
practiced by “notre malheureux pays… tombé au-dessous de tout grâce à la 
République”.1126 
 
These attitudes of self-disgust were not universal. Looking outwards, Le Soleil not only 
accepted the sense of non-intervention but, far from taking Boer intransigence as an 
example to emulate, argued against behaviour likely to lead to a war that would only 
result in a more powerful Britain in charge of the gold mines.
1127
 In contrast to the more 
nationalistic papers of the right, Leudet was unapologetic about official French policy of 
“la neutralité la plus absolue”, in citing British press reports of Kruger searching for 
Italian assistance suggesting that the Kaiser’s 1896 telegram to him “n’a pas peu 
contribué à faire naître dans l’esprit du président du Transvaal de dangereuses 
illusions”.1128 The interests of peace would be better served by Kruger realising that no 
European support would be forthcoming.
1129
 
 
On the left, the focus shifted in two directions. Firstly, there was the suggestion that 
France should intervene as mediator. Le Radical argued for verbal intervention from 
Loubet to stay British aggression.
1130
 Lack of any such initiative prompted some 
domestic criticism in La Lanterne’s reflection that France was not being dishonoured 
from without as Britain was by Chamberlain, but rather from within by its own 
“politiciens les plus méprisables et les plus vils”.1131 However, the second main focus 
was on the absence of any international action. Whereas Fashoda had principally 
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broached the inertia of individual nations, in 1899 The Hague Conference could be 
placed centre stage, making the Anglo-Boer conflict the occasion for a collective inertia. 
The idea that Germany and Russia would accept territorial concessions in return for 
acquiescence to British aggression inspired La Petite République’s observation “Quant à 
l’attitude générale des gouvernements européens, elle passe les bornes de cynisme…et 
cela moins de six mois après la clôture de la conférence de la paix”.1132 This paper took 
the new gun developed at Woolwich arsenal as one of the “premiers résultats de la 
conférence de la paix”, with the sarcastic conclusion “C’est ainsi que la vieille ‘queen’ 
se prépare au désarmament”.1133 More detailed resort to The Hague was left to Le 
Radical, whose rhetorical question “Que penser des gouvernements européens qui vont 
laisser s’accomplir une agression criminelle quelques mois après la conférence de la 
Haye?” had turned by the eve of the war into an attack on participants at the conference 
for not invoking their own arbitration procedures.
1134
 On the left, Europe-wide 
reflections transformed into a vehicle for criticism of Imperial Russia of a quality only 
slightly removed from that which followed Fashoda. Bitterness hardly short of that 
directed against “la politique belliqueuse du cabinet qui mène M Chamberlain” was 
reserved for the Tsar, “le pompeux promoteur du désarmament général, l’évocateur 
attendri des bienfaits de la liberté et de la justice entre les nations pourvu qu’il ne 
s’agisse pas de celles qu’il maintient sous un joug de fer”.1135  
 
This merged into a more generalised lament not so much (as on the right) for a missed 
opportunity for France to benefit directly and elsewhere from Britain’s South African 
preoccupation as a continent-wide failure to recognise and act on the “devoir moral” of 
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mediation.
1136
 Having already remarked that “Europe est dans un état tel de veulerie que 
les plus grandes crimes peuvent se commettre sous les yeux, sans qu’elle fasse un effort 
pour les prévenir”, Le Radical mournfully observed that “L’Europe n’ose bouger, 
intervenir; chaque gouvernement a peur de son ombre”, but this was when it came to 
imposing an arbitration rather than intervening directly to break British power for their 
own benefit.
1137
 
 
Revenge for Fashoda? December 1899-January 1900. 
 
Nicholson’s later recollection that “Our initial defeats were greeted with a general howl 
of Schadenfreude from Rotterdam to Memel, from Vigo to Irkutsk” would suggest a 
hardening of the Paris press’ tone towards Britain in the early stages of the war.1138 
Examination of the Paris press concentrated on “Black Week” (10-20 December 1899) 
and the week after Spion Kop (24-31 January 1900) confirms that, as the war 
progressed, press reports altered not only in content but, to a degree, tone. As with 
coverage of Fashoda during the incident itself, this was not however always in the one, 
obvious, direction. 
 
That there was some malicious pleasure derived from reports of British defeats, together 
with understandable cynicism about press releases from London that tried to put the 
most favourable gloss on them possible, was foreseeable. On the right, what had begun 
as a David and Goliath confrontation became after Spion Kop the comeuppance of “eux 
qui ont un si haute idée d’eux-mêmes, qui croient si ardemment à leur supériorité et à 
leur omnipotence”.1139 Keeping to size as a metaphor, Le Gaulois revelled in world 
disapproval of “le colosse britannique se ruer sur le pygmée boer”, but most abundant of 
all throughout were cartoons and commentary depicting Britain as “le colosse aux pieds 
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d’argile”, and a source of amusement to the rest of Europe.1140 This did not escape the 
attention of Monson, wearying of the “use of the well-worn metaphor of ‘the giant with 
clay feet’ which does duty in every newspaper comment upon England’s present 
position”.1141 Faced with “cette réalité consolante de l’Angleterre impuissante, succèdent 
à la legende terrifiante et fausse de l’Angleterre invaincue”, it was the nationalist right 
that, predictably proved most vituperative.
1142
 L’Autorité’s idea that the Boers should 
hang “prisoners man for man with the Boers killed by Lyddite shells” particularly 
appalled Monson.
1143
 However, this was not entirely new, Henri Rochefort having 
suggested along similar lines in L’Intransigeant, as the war began, that Kruger’s first 
mistake had been to abstain from shooting Jameson and his accomplices in 1896, his 
“magnanimité” having instead left British politicians with an impression of Boer 
“faiblesse”.1144 
 
Linkage with Fashoda arose more often. Ernest Judet marked the first anniversary with a 
piece lambasting “les politiciens surpris en flagrant délit d’imprévoyance, d’ignorance et 
de lâcheté” whose worry over war, unnecessary given British reliance on “mercenaires... 
d’acheter la puissance avec de l’or”, had caused them to accept defeat.1145 The 
nationalist right continued to maintain of the Boers that:  
ils auront donné une fière et mémorable leçon à cette Europe lâche qui hait 
l’Angleterre et n’ose rien contre elle... Il y en a surtout pour nous, pour notre 
gouvernement qui dans la question de Fachoda s’est exécuté par la honteuse fuite 
que l’on sait.1146  
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Boer-Fashoda linkage seeped, too, into the mainstream conservative papers, when Le 
Figaro gave Eugène Etienne licence to argue that both events were orchestrated towards 
the Cape-Cairo rail link and, more generally, the “plan grandiose Cecil Rhodes-
Chamberlain” to assure “la suprématie de la race anglo-saxonne”.1147 Le Gaulois 
followed, claiming Boer successes as French, to trace a line of confrontations through 
Fashoda, a recent boxing match and the siege of Ladysmith, to echo Etienne in arguing 
that Delcassé should take advantage of British distraction to wring some concessions out 
of London on Egypt.
1148
 By the time of Black Week, the easy victory at Omdurman had 
become a reason why the British had expected the quick victories in South Africa that 
had in actual fact eluded them.
1149
 
  
The importance of Chamberlain receded in press coverage of South Africa, with 
perceptions of him, and of themes linked to him, evolving with the war. Considered by 
L’Autorité to be the one really running the British government, he remained “ce 
dilettante fanfaron, avec son langage provocant”.1150 Le Figaro, looking forward to a 
revival in Salisbury’s power, agreed that Chamberlain was running the government 
though not fit to do so, but Le Gaulois differed, in discarding him after Spion Kop as 
“l’idole d’hier”.1151 In distinguishing between Chamberlain and “les hommes d’état 
anglais, au sens traditionnel du mot”, Valfrey followed the lead of Le Journal des 
Débats whose antipathy lay not so much in Chamberlain’s Britishness as a conservative 
distaste for his populist approach to politics and his ruffianly “diplomatie nouvelle”. 
Chamberlain’s ascendancy marked a more general rise of language “de la réunion 
publique ou d’un journalist sans mandat”, at the expense of the prudent and circumspect 
“bon ton” of old diplomats. That the Chamberlain speech prompting these judgements 
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contained advances to Germany, Russia, Japan and the USA did, however, reaffirm 
Alcide Ebray’s view of Chamberlain as both an “agitateur gallophobe, partisan de la 
guerre”.1152  
 
In one permutation of this, a Figaro cartoon expressed its condescension by depicting 
Chamberlain as a misbehaving child, surrounded by symbolic national figures-Russia 
and Marianne amused, Uncle Sam and Germania scowling, hands over their ears and 
therefore, presumably, impervious to his overtures.
1153
 Continuing criticism of 
Chamberlain through the lens of class was matched by another, still drawing on 
perceptions of British attitudes towards money, that related his quest for personal profit 
to the war, hence in the cartoon the roll labelled “actions mines d’or” protruding from 
his pocket. Even the relatively moderate Matin could not resist repeating claims that the 
momentary delay in news from Spion Kop had been motivated by the desire to sell mine 
shares at inflated values – “c’est à dire que les protégés de M. Chamberlain, et peut-être 
M.Chamberlain lui-même, ont profité d’une sanglante défaite de l’armée de leur pays 
pour opérer un fouteux coup de bourse”.1154 The Figaro’s cartoonist, taking an 
altogether more macabre approach after Spion Kop, interpreted British casualties as a 
distraction to the minister, if still pinpointing money or shares as the latter’s overriding 
preoccupation.
1155
  
 
On the left, inasmuch as Le Radical concerned itself with Britain, it endeavoured to 
engage with it in a wider framework of a common humanity, one part of which was an 
explicit, if inconsistent, challenge to Tainean notions of Britishness. Rather than ignore 
national stereotypes like La Petite République, Le Radical made a mould-breaking 
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attempt to escape from them in an impassioned plea against the depictions of the typical 
Englishman, especially in cartoons, as “invariablement un homme de deux mètres de 
haut, avec des cheveux roux hérissés, avec des dents en touches d’orgue et des pieds qui 
n’en finissent pas”, with similar “caractères grotesques” attributed to the women. 
Defying anyone to find on the streets of London “dix exemplaires de ces anglais 
légendaires”, it concluded with the comments that “les hommes au point du vue moral 
sont partout les mêmes”, with no physical differences enough “pour entretenir les haines 
internationales”.1156 In consideration of British opposition to the conflict, explicit 
reference to the religious motivations that drove Gladstone and others would not have 
been in place within the anti-clerical columns of Le Radical. Conversely, with the 
outbreak and progress of the war it did fall back on traditional descriptions of a 
temperamental reluctance to abandon long-prepared plans for seizing control of “La 
partie la plus productrice, la plus riche du continent noir”, the Boers in face of “un 
adversaire implacable et sans scrupule”, Britons notable for “le sens pratique 
développé”, and their “sang froid”, despite the profound emotion of defeat.1157 
 
Unlike Le Siécle, Le Radical was in no doubt that the cause of “le brave petit peuple 
boer” was that of justice, arguing that “Chamberlain n’est pas éternel et l’Angleterre 
peut recouvrer la raison”, but as the war developed it staked out a position of more 
explicitly universal humanitarianism.
1158
 This emerged most clearly in its reactions to 
the first major defeats of the British army of December 1899: 
 Ce n’est pas sans une profonde impression de tristesse que, tout en faisant des 
voeux pour les armes de troupes républicaines, on pense aux soldats anglais qui 
tombent là-bas, aux nombreuses familles qui pleurent leurs enfants, aux résultants 
effroyables de l’ambition de Lord Chamberlain qui, devant l’histoire, portera 
l’effroyable responsabilité des désastres qui accablent son pays, du sang humain 
répandu à flots.
1159
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This was followed after Spion Kop with the comment that: 
 
Les Anglais qu’elle envoie…se faire démolir sur les bords de la Tugela sont des 
victimes, au même titre que les Boers, et c’est pourquoi je ne puis, sans un 
frémissement d’horreur et de pitié, lire les chiffres de tués et blessés dont 
l’arithmétique couvre de la chair humaine.1160 
 
Reflecting French internal preoccupations, Le Radical used such comments as a 
springboard to attack those who took the authors of any reflections on the horrors of war 
as “sans patrie”, and army haters. If by reverting to stereotypes of overeating Britons, Le 
Radical expressed both sympathy for “les soldats anglais qui, atteints par les balles 
boers, gisent, pantelants et râlant dans les ambulances”, in direct contrast to the largely 
unconcerned Chamberlain, claimed to be “à l’heure où ils agonisent, en train de dîner 
d’un succulent romsteck”.1161 Le Figaro, too, responded to the casualties of Black Week 
arguably with a degree of sympathy for the bereaved, if again lacing this with criticism 
of Chamberlain, and depicting a typically corpulent John Bull figure as the archetypal 
Englishman.
1162
 
 
The British ambassador remarked that many French journalists were only echoing their 
Russian colleagues in “the agreeable prospect of doing mischief to England whilst she is 
hampered by her engagements in South Africa”.1163 Such a prospect continued initially 
to be approached with the same mix of internationalism, idealistic nationalism, historical 
Anglophobia and self-interest as before, epitomised in mid-November when Le Gaulois 
aired what Monson castigated as “a puerile production” entitled “le Rêve de Bonaparte”, 
in which Napoleon rose from his tomb to demand an invasion of Britain to impose terms 
on “L’Anglais, l’éternel ennemi”.1164 More than a military victory, international justice, 
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or Britain’s withdrawal from Egypt and South Africa, this role as “les vengeurs 
d’humanité” would achieve for the French a return to their national character. Acting 
thus:  
La France, revenue à elle-même, rentrée dans sa voie naturelle, humanitaire par 
destination, justiciaire par vocation, attend qu’il plaise à quelques-uns de ses fils 
égarés de reconnaître que la république militante, audacieuse et fière est plus 
belle, plus noble, plus comptée, plus respectée que la république affalée tendant le 
dos au monde afin d’ être sûre d’y recevoir des coups de pied.1165 
 
Citing Britain’s weakness and Europe-wide unpopularity, L’Autorité pressed for 
intervention throughout the first three months of the war.
1166
 On the moderate right, 
however, by 10 December 1899 far from advocating intervention Le Figaro was giving 
space to minister of Marine, Lockroy, pointing to the weakness of the French navy and 
colonial defences, and the preponderance of British ships over France and the Triple 
Alliance combined, to argue for the impossibility of intervention. In a veiled reference to 
nationalists of L’Intransigeant, L’Autorité, and La Libre Parole ilk, determined to insult 
the Queen and her ministers, Lockroy’s fervent desire was “qu’ils se calment… et qu’ils 
se taisent”.1167 
 
Whereas coverage of the question of intervention was partly dependent on the 
availability of news relevant to such a proposal, and “Black Week” and Spion Kop 
prompted elaboration on Le Radical’s universalism, at La Libre Parole the war’s course 
had little impact on the paper’s preoccupations. It remained “une guerre juive, une 
simple opération financière”, and a stick with which to beat Dreyfusards, Le Siècle, and 
Delcassé for not asserting himself against Chamberlain.
1168
 The usual conspiratorial 
paranoia persisted, whether it was the British doing a deal, with the Jews to get Lanessan 
appointed to the French Ministry of Marine in return for which Britain would lend its 
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support to Dreyfus, or “la guerre de dépossession et de piraterie financière” orchestrated 
by “l’Albion, judaisée dans son organisme gouvernmental”, or Chamberlain as 
“l’instrument de Cecil Rhodes et sa séquelle juive”.1169 Above and beyond what were, in 
large measure, domestic preoccupations projected onto a conflict abroad, La Libre 
Parole fell back on precisely the sorts of national stereotypes that Le Radical professed 
to abhor-hence “le pharisaisme protestant de la nation la plus collet–montée du monde 
entier”, or indeed “l’Albion aux dents longues”.1170 Hypocrisy remained a leading 
theme, from Drumont’s early November piece linking British criticism of French 
officers at Rennes to the far greater wrongs being carried out by their British 
counterparts in South Africa, through another “bel exemple de ce pharisaisme 
protestant” in December, to Spion Kop’s aftermath.1171 Most frequently, it cropped up in 
combination with other traditional ideas: 
Aux deux côtés de la statue colossale qui personnifiait l’Angleterre…veillant 
l’egoïsme et l’hypocrisie. Devant elle rampant le léopard, symbole et gardien de 
perfidies, l’icône monstreuse foulait aux pieds de la justice et la vérité enchaînées. 
D’une main elle semait l’or, destructeur des consciences, de l’autre elle tenait la 
Bible ouverte et cette Bible éblouissait les croyants tandis que l’or aveuglait les 
autres.
1172
 
 
On the right as a whole, much the same ideas were aired, with bestial imagery, as in 
1898, much in evidence. Hence L’Autorité exposed “la nation de proie au pilori de 
l’histoire”, revelling in the early setbacks of “la féroce et lâche fauve qu’est le léopard 
anglais”, then self-consciously going onto declare “Nous ne relèverons pas, pour la 
centième fois, l’hypocrisie de cette attitude qui s’efforce d’imputer aux Boers la 
responsabilité de la guerre”.1173 Le Gaulois too insisted that “l’egoïsme a été toujours le 
règle de sa conduite internationale”, if in the same piece commenting less critically, 
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though hardly less stereotypically, on British pragmatism in the hope that this would 
outweigh imperial pride in persuading the British to negotiate an early peace.
1174
 
 
Perhaps the most prominent example of old traits finding new life in the circumstances 
of war was embodied in reporting of reactions to the early defeats. Le Matin having 
previously remarked on how “le public anglais… accueilli avec un phlegme parfait la 
nouvelle que cette guerre n’était désormais plus qu’une question d’heures”, even Paul de 
Cassagnac had to admit the dignity of the British in November, observing “du calme, du 
sang-froid partout, et au fond une froide résolution, qui certainement ira jusqu’à 
bout”.1175 Monson was duly pleased by the “ungrudging acknowledgements of the 
tenacity and equanimity under adverse circumstances for which the British have always 
been remarkable”, which went on into December.1176 The reflection on how French 
behaviour contrasted, implicit in Le Gaulois remarking “ils se montrent très dignes dans 
la crise qu’ils traversent. Aucune récrimination, aucune révolte, aucune violence, aucune 
signe exterieur de la vanité blessée”, became explicit in L’Autorité, as a lesson and 
example to France.
1177
 Black Week occasioned more sang froid, a simple “hommage à 
l’attitude calme et digne du peuple anglais” relayed from the Berlin press through Le 
Matin’s columns, as Le Gaulois praised “le bon sens et le sang froid britannique”, and 
Le Figaro “la dignité qui convient à un race impériale” and “la résolution et le calme des 
Anglais”, whereas L’Autorité could not resist questioning what lay behind the public’s 
apparent calm: “il n’est pas plus inaccessible aux émotions que celui des autres peuples; 
seulement la froideur de tempérament qui caractérise la nation britannique permet de les 
dissimuler plus facilement”.1178 Echoing 1898’s concern over France’s internal 
instability, Spion Kop, again, prompted explicit reflection on French excitability relative 
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to British calm over the loss of “une colline de quelques metres en hauteur... Est-ce une 
raison pour faire des manifestations dans les rues, comme de simples français?”1179  
 
Less flattering were the torrents of commentary on the British army. To an extent, there 
was little about this that was either original or distinctively French, hence German or 
Austrian cartoons mocking Britain’s military performance were freely repeated in the 
Paris press from a very early stage in the war.
1180
 Little difference in tone can be 
distinguished between these and, say, their equivalent in Le Figaro, making play of an 
early attempt by British troops to break out of Ladysmith that was frustrated by the 
bolting of some mules, assigned to carry artillery pieces and ammunition.
1181
 These 
rebellious creatures were the subject of repeated attention across the spectrum of the 
right. Reporting British purchases of 7,000 new pack animals in New Orleans, 
L’Autorité wryly commented “Souhaitons pour leur acquêreurs que ces mulets n’aient 
pas d’histoire se rendent moins célèbres que les fameuses mules de Ladysmith”, with 
René d’Aral, and later Le Matin, remarking that escaping mules could constitute no 
reasonable excuse for the defeat at Magersfontein, referencing them.
1182
  Prefiguring La 
Guerre Fatale, one repeated theme on the nationalist and conservative right was that of 
British troops being mercenaries, men who were lured to volunteer by promises of food 
and money rather than belief in their cause, and who therefore readily surrendered or 
retreated rather than stand and fight.
1183
 L’Autorité went further, in its repeated 
insistence that officers on the battlefield, in shedding all visible signs of their office to 
avoid the attention of Boer snipers, lost prestige and were somehow dishonouring their 
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profession.
1184
 All of this fed implicitly into French domestic debates about the nature of 
their own army, rendered topical by Dreyfus. More broadly, there was abundant, more 
or less sober, reflection on the unexpectedly poor quality of the British army, and 
analyses as to why the Boers were enjoying success.
1185
 This did not, though, preclude 
the formation of moral judgements as to the state of mind of the British military -  
L’Autorité and La Libre Parole were foremost in criticism of British cowardice, but 
other sections of the press followed, across to the left.
1186
 
Counter currents? 
 
Criticisms of the Boers, before and after the war began, were by no means wholly absent 
from elements of the French press. Notably, Le Figaro drew on German reports to argue 
that “c’est mal servir les interêts de la paix de faire croire au président Kruger qu’il peut 
compter sur un seul appui en Europe”, questioning his competence as the outcome of 
any fighting, if the Republics were alone, could not be in doubt to him.
1187
 Leyds later 
protested against Le Figaro’s disrespect and “attaques injurieuses proférées contre un 
chef d’état que son grand âge, la vénération dont il est entouré par ses concitoyens et sa 
noble conduite à l’heure présente sur la théâtre de la guerre auraient dû suffire à garantir 
contre de telles offenses”.1188 It was one of two papers styling themselves the champion 
of French investors involved in South African businesses. The other was Le Soleil, 
which highlighted the likelihood of war occasioning theft, destruction and dislocation of 
industries in which French citizens had invested. With Britain in no hurry to end any 
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war, as British troops assembled and Boer funds ran out, the paper anticipated in the 
interim mines ceasing to work, and rising crimes committed by blacks at the expense of 
international capital.
1189
 Le Soleil’s weekly “La Vie à Londres” column added fears that 
gold and mines would be appropriated by the Boer authorities as well as individual 
potential vandals, openly urging the Transvaal to protect their French investors.
1190
 It 
questioned why, taking into account that Transvaal was for practical purposes 
independent in its internal affairs, Kruger had raised the issue of sovereignty, thus 
drawing British attention to dormant rights of Suzerainty that had not been used,  urging 
“les nécessaires concessions” on “le ruse vieillard” to avoid a suicidal war. 1191 
 
On the whole, however, there can be little doubt of the prevalent hostility towards 
British policy. The nearest to a sympathetic approach came from Le Siècle,  
subsequently depicted as having taken a “pro-British line”, as the only one of the 
Parisian dailies to defend the British cause against the Boers.
1192
 Some of this perception 
may be attributable to the right-wing press of the time, de Cassagnac of L’Autorité 
pillorying its editor as “Yves Guyot, l’ami des Anglais”.1193 This castigation seeped into 
the columns of Le Siècle itself, but reflected French internal preoccupations as much as 
the war, as Guyot endeavoured to refute de Cassagnac’s description of “Le Siècle, 
organe des Anglais et des juifs en France”.1194 Its “pro-British” position had less to do 
with the Boer War than with its stance on French internal politics. Above all others, the 
Dreyfus case was the issue that most filled the columns of Le Siècle. It was in this 
connection that a British alignment arose most forcefully in the column “Le Bon Renom 
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de France”, quoting fulsomely from Dreyfusard British newspapers, petitions, and 
published letters.
1195
 Whilst using British opinions to validate the paper’s virulent 
hostility to “le jugement de lâcheté”, Le Siècle made no attempt at a comprehensive 
apology for or endorsement of Britain’s policy on Transvaal.1196 Instead, it discussed 
domestic British opposition to war, attacked “les excès belliqueux de la politique de M. 
Chamberlain”, and echoed its peers in emphasising the inconsistency between his stance 
towards South Africa now, and that articulated in his past speeches.
1197
 
 
In sum, in Le Matin and others to its right, there was a prevalent and discernible 
hardening line towards Britain by the end of January 1900, opening the way for their 
reporting of the Léandre affair of February 1900. Even Le Radical, despite its attempt to 
stake out its own humanitarian line, was not immune. Whilst initial expressions of faith 
that the British political system might ultimately work to stop Chamberlain’s crime 
against Transvaal becoming the crime of the whole nation would not have been out of 
place in many ELSP writings, on the right the preoccupations and language applied to 
“l’hydre des mers... la grande île maudite” were increasingly more akin to something 
prefiguring Driant’s massive invasion novel.1198 
 
Conclusion.  
 
The extent of coverage of the Boer War by French newspapers might tend to contradict 
the view that most of the time “French people and their parliaments were almost totally 
apathetic to foreign and colonial affairs”.1199 This coverage was especially remarkable 
given that this was a conflict in which no fundamental French interests were at stake, 
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suggesting therefore a high degree of interest in Britain as well as the war. The hostility 
to Britain shown in 1899 was sharper than in 1898, ironically given that at Fashoda the 
French were direct participants in the crisis. That hostility, though mitigated by the 
persistence of other non controversial news and some intermittent moderation notably 
on the radical left, focused initially on the figure of Chamberlain, but often extended to 
wider, sometimes blatantly Anglophobic, consideration of Britain more generally, 
leading to criticisms of Sciences Po-style preoccupations with the British as a potential 
model, even as ELSP writers reassessed their feelings on British politics and foreign 
policy.  
 
Supporting the impression of French disinterest in foreign affairs, though, is the point 
that, in the Paris press, the significance of both Fashoda and the Boer War lay in their 
role as a site where French domestic politics were played out, despite the broad 
unanimity of newspapers’ sympathy for the Boers. The nature of the republic and its 
politicians were reflected in both episodes, mediated by the Dreyfus Case most 
obviously on the right, and perceptions of France’s international standing/power and 
international morality in the centre and on the left.  
 
When French popular responses to the Boer War are considered positively by historians 
at all, the picture presented is usually unmitigated hostility, one not discouraged by the 
growing literature on Anglophobia as a persisting political phenomonen.
1200
 Reports on 
South Africa in the six weeks preceding the outbreak of war and in response to British 
defeats in December 1899-January 1900, for all that Monson disparaged them, were 
more textured than this, paling for the most part next to what is most often taken to 
epitomise Paris press attitudes - the February 1900 Léandre affair, disrespectful 
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caricatures of the royal family, and coverage of the concentration camps, notably in 
satirical magazine L’Assiette au Beurre on 28 September 1901.1201 Popular though this 
latter edition may have been, it should be borne in mid that, in common with short-lived 
1901 paper Le Cri Du Transvaal which launched a subscription fund supported by 
Barrès, Rochefort and Drumont, these episodes were ephemeral.
1202
  
 
Whilst this chapter can only hope to address in limited time frames relatively small 
portions of the voluminous Paris press coverage of the Boer War, this suffices to throw 
other more dramatic episodes into relief, likewise to challenge the notion that 
Anglophobia (though without doubt present) was the predominant motivation of all 
journalists. As a hangover from the war, some shouts, invoking the Boer War, were 
audible from the crowds on Edward VII’s 1 May 1903 official arrival in Paris.1203 By 
day four, these had turned predominantly to cries of “Vive notre roi!”, or “Vive 
Édouard!”.1204 The lack of lasting depth to feelings on the war is apparent not only from 
the relative absence in the Paris press, especially outside of the nationalist right, of an 
explicit Fashoda/Boer War linkage in 1899-1900, but also, for all the copious newspaper 
coverage of the conflict and the more unified tone towards the British, the role of the 
war in subsequent French memory, far less prominent than Fashoda.
1205
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7: The French Boer War Volunteers: Confused Motives and 
Contested Memories.  
 
Introduction. 
The Boer war was not merely fought between troops of the British Empire and the Boers 
but also entailed the involvement on both sides of thousands of foreigners. Frenchmen, 
Germans, Dutch and Irish, among many others, fought alongside the Boers as well as 
acting in other support roles to the troops of the Republics.  
 
The fluctuating tides of war and status of each individual across time make it notoriously 
difficult to calculate the numbers of French volunteers who fought for the Boers. The 
nearest that they ever came to being assembled in one place with a formal military 
organisation was in the two weeks prior to the death of their newly appointed 
commander, Colonel Georges de Villebois-Mareuil (1847-1900). Two French platoons 
were formed, one under Comte Pierre de Bréda, and the other Olivier d’Etchegoyen who 
estimated that Villebois-Mareuil could have led an international legion of 1,500-2,000, 
inclusive of all European national volunteers (the majority of whom were Dutch or 
German) in the Republics. In fact, he got about 200, of whom 125 set off with him on 
his final foray.
1206
 Later estimates of foreign volunteers in Boer ranks vary wildly, 
depending on the sources employed and the exact defining criteria, between 1,100 and 
2,800 in total, including between 60 and 231 Frenchmen.
1207
 
 
The French volunteers were so numerically few that they were unlikely to prove 
militarily significant in the balance of the war on a grander scale, and have therefore 
been either sidelined or altogether ignored in Anglophone histories of the war, with the 
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notable exception of Roy McNab, The French Colonel, Villebois-Mareuil And The 
Boers, (1975).
1208
 They were nevertheless well known, and created an impact in France 
out of all proportion to their small numbers. Villebois-Mareuil had already been a public 
figure in his own right, thanks to his distinguished French army career, the journalism 
and books that he had had published, and as a founding member of Action Française. 
Tombs adds that Villebois-Mareuil “appeared to be a sterotypical French hero”, and had 
possibly been the model for the character of Cyrano de Bergerac (1897), written by his 
cousin Edmond Rostand.
1209
 After a trickle of individuals leaving in autumn 1899 on 
their own initiative, later volunteers were most often openly recruited by Parisian 
organisations, notably the Comité d’Action de la Jeunesse Française, who had sent some 
50 by mid February 1900.
1210
 Royalist Colonel Monteil, previously a presidential 
candidate and involved in Déroulède’s attempted February 1899 coup, founded the other 
principal source of volunteers in October 1899, the Comité français des républiques sud-
africaines, which sent among others de Charette and d’Etchegoyen.1211 The unrelenting 
press attention and the outpouring of pamphlets and books elicited by the war naturally 
included the volunteers’ exploits (and later imprisonments).1212 However, the extent to 
which interpretations of their actions were sunk into the war, as opposed to strictly 
French concerns, can be questioned. An embarrassment for a government trying to 
emphasise its neutral credentials, the volunteers, especially Villebois-Mareuil, achieved 
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a popular resonance most obviously among military circles and on the right, but also on 
the left.  
 
Who Were the French Volunteers? 
 
Multiple problems of definition arise in considering the French who volunteered to fight 
on the Boer side. The line between “French” and “Boer” was one blurred, often 
intentionally, not only by a French press keen to stress the sentimental links of France to 
the Republics but by the volunteers themselves. The most prominent among those 
volunteers, Villebois-Mareuil, convinced that the Boers were “essentially French”, wrote 
that with them “l’air de famille s’est conservé et les coeurs ont gardé toute leur fierté, 
tout leur élan français”.1213 Shortly before his death, in the interest of rallying men to his 
newly forming International legion, Villebois-Mareuil publicly proclaimed “Le sang qui 
coule dans les veines de ce peuple est en partie de sang français”.1214  
 
There was in effect, rather than a hard and fast distinction, a series of gradations, starting 
with the likes of General Joubert whose ancestors had left France centuries earlier and 
who were in terms of language, customs, religion and behaviour the same as the Boers 
of Dutch origin, but for their surnames. It was common for less thoughtful journalists in 
passing to claim kinship with Joubert as one of France’s own on the basis of his name 
alone.
1215
 Whilst maintaining that “du sang français coule dans les veines de beaucoup 
de ces heroiques combatants”, Le Matin had to concede that the French arrivals in 1688-
90 had, not least through deliberate policy of the preponderant Dutch settlers, become 
“rapidement denationalisés”.1216 Others might have settled in the course of the long 
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nineteenth century.
1217
 Most numerous were very recent arrivals, attracted to the 
Transvaal by the economic opportunities created by diamond and gold mining. Often 
they installed themselves, permanently or temporarily, directly in these industries. A 
number worked in spin-off businesses, running shops and hotels or staffing banks. Some 
of these newer arrivals fought for the Boers, but others were not even necessarily pro-
Boer. Enjoying a similar (non) status to Uitlanders of British origin, all had migrated 
with a view to making as much money for themselves as possible, and it followed from 
this overriding consideration that some sympathised with British criticisms of Boer 
backwardness and corrupt, heavily taxing or economically restrictive government.
1218
 
Finally, there were those who were motivated to come to South Africa by the war, 
without any pretension of being anything other than Frenchmen there to assist the Boers.  
 
Defining those who volunteered and who fought presents further difficulties. Frenchmen 
who had become naturalised Boers were as obliged to fight for the Republics, on pain of 
financial and prison penalties, as any other Boer, regardless of whether they had lived in 
the Republics for a few years or could trace South African ancestors back two centuries. 
To the consternation of the Quai d’Orsay, there were moves by Transvaal Secretary of 
State Reitz to coerce non combatant Frenchmen to act as policemen. This might have 
released more Burghers for purely military duties and therefore jeopardised official 
French neutrality.
1219
 Equally, the definition of “policemen” was potentially 
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problematic, given the blurring of lines between all Boer civilians and Boer soldiers, and 
the fact that one of Transvaal’s few uniformed, elite, units was known as the 
Johannesburg Police.
1220
 The strong reactions that the war provoked across all of 
continental Europe gave rise to the despatch to South Africa of several ambulances from 
Holland and Russia, like the one accompanying d’Etchegoyen on the last leg of his sea 
journey to Lourenço Marques.
1221
 These were, ostensibly, humanitarian efforts, but at 
least one Irish Ambulance Corps, purportedly attached to the Red Cross, went equipped 
for a full combat role.
1222
 The nature of the war, especially as the Boer armies retreated 
in March-June 1900 and organised Republican government ceased to exist, further 
blurred the already unclear civilian/soldier divide. Boers on Commando wore no 
uniform, and free of any but a shadow of the formal modes of discipline common to 
European armies could and did do largely as they pleased. Whilst Boers could slip back 
to their farms when things went badly after March 1900, most foreigners, left to their 
own devices, divested themselves of volunteer fighter status to seek temporary work in 
the mines or new police units, either awaiting a favourable opportunity to return to the 
field like d’Etchegoyen, or else to raise sufficient funds for their own passage home.1223 
After June 1900, with shipping lines no longer willing to risk taking would-be 
volunteers, Monteil and other Boer supporters in Europe were not in a position to send 
any more.
1224
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Why did the Volunteers Go? 
 
At the start of the war, the Transvaal authorities had made it clear that foreigners 
wishing to serve the Republics had to travel there at their own expense and risk, without 
repayment from the Boers.
1225
 Those foreigners who were not obliged to fight, or not 
even in South Africa on the outbreak of war, might choose to come for all kinds of 
reasons-The Times History of the War in South Africa depicted them as a mixture of 
“enthusiasts, soldiers of fortune and desperados”.1226 
 
Economic motives predominated for many Frenchmen in the Boer armies. Le Siècle 
inclined to write off French volunteers in general as “des déclassés, des aigris, des 
maladies, des aventuriers”.1227 This echoed the British line about the foreigners’ ranks 
including “a very strong contingent of cosmopolitan rascality, gathered together for the 
opportunities of loot and swindling which war affords,” some later staying in Pretoria to 
trade horses and outfits.
1228
 Demange, French military attaché to the Boer armies, agreed 
that some foreign volunteers were no more than “pillards et écumeurs” there to profit 
through theft or by selling arms and horses.
1229
 The French unit led by Ernest Gallopaud 
by April 1900 was notoriously undisciplined, its members prone to violence towards 
each other as well as thefts.
1230
 Even hard core volunteers like d’Etchegoyen had to 
acknowledge the lure of easy wealth as particularly potent in the vicinity of Rhodes and 
the mines:  
Parmi les assiégants de Kimberley, nous avons, en effet, trouvé toute une bande 
d’aventuriers que nous ne reverrons nulle part pendant la campagne. De toutes 
nationalités, un grande nombre même connaissant la ville, pour y avoir travaillé 
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dans les mines, sont venus avec l’espoir de trouver dans le désordre des 
exploitations brusquement interrompues quelque diamant sans maître.
1231
 
 
Echoing d’Etchegoyen’s feelings, Villebois-Mareuil condemned French volunteers out 
only for free meals, “new clothing, equipment, saddlery, horses, etc”.1232 In sight of 
perhaps more modest rewards were other French, with the technical abilities needed to 
crew the six-inch “Long Tom” artillery pieces manufactured by Creusot.1233 Outside 
Kimberley, “The manipulation of such a gun was beyond the Boers, and it was manned 
by a detachment of French mercenaries” who escaped with the gun when the town was 
relieved on 15 February 1900.
1234
 
 
Beyond those who came to South Africa and engaged in war to line their own pockets 
were some, probably in a minority but of greater interest, whose avowed motive was not 
of a material nature. As Georges Thiébaud was astute enough to ask, what led men like 
Villebois-Mareuil - fervently Catholic, schooled for a professional army, and with 
Royalist leanings - to fight for stolidly protestant Republics defended by a citizen 
militia?
1235
 Complicating a potentially simple picture presented by the likes of Captain 
Driant of French patriots disinterestedly spending their money and risking their lives to 
press the cause of justice against the expansionism of the British Empire, the most well 
known volunteers came for a variety of reasons, of which dislike of Britain seems to 
have been only a minor one. Whilst d’Etchegoyen, ostensibly writing his memoir 
anonymously, remained silent as to any personal motivations he may have had, the 
timing of Villebois-Mareuil’s departure was remarkably convenient from the point of 
view of his family life and reputation. Widowed five years previously, he had been 
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repeatedly seen in public with a married woman, Madame de Hochon, so “il voulait 
quitter la France à un moment où sa vie personnelle devenait compliquée”.1236 Whereas 
Villebois-Mareuil’s death served to absolve his name of any scandal, other volunteers 
were less fortunate. Participation in the war seems on the part of a certain Le Gall to 
have served as an avoidance strategy for more than a mere dalliance. Accused of 
defrauding his employer in 1897 and condemned in absentio to 10 years’ imprisonment, 
he was captured by the British and kept in captivity on St Helena.
1237
 One of eighteen 
French POWs for repatriation in 1902 on board the Goorkha which docked in Britain, 
rather than face onward transmission to Le Havre courtesy of the French Consul in 
Southampton, Le Gall absconded, only later to be re-arrested and re-tried in France.
1238
 
 
More generally, the war offered an opportunity for real soldiering that had been 
conspicuously lacking in the peacetime of metropolitan France for decades. 
Consequently, the first volunteers that Demange came across in the Boer ranks were “un 
vingtaine d’officiers français, la plupart démissionaires, certains en congé”.1239 De 
Bréda, d’Etchegoyen, Gallopaud and Villebois-Mareuil among others answered this 
description.
1240
 For the Colonel, “sa vie militaire, restée inactive depuis quelques années, 
allait de nouveau retrouver sa plénitude et cette mission lui redonnait un sens”.1241 Part 
of this motivation stemmed from a too-long stifled love of action. Villebois-Mareuil’s 
past career had been marked by an unswerving determination to soldier embroidered by 
an impetuous desire to launch himself into any fight that came along; Le Figaro pointed 
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to the “irrésistable besoin d’action” of this, as McNab put it, “restless spirit”.1242 The 
failure of the army to post him to Madagascar to take part in the war of 1895-6 had 
driven him to resign his commission.
1243
 Previously, posted from 1868 in Cochin China, 
Villebois-Mareuil had spent several months in 1870 persistently pestering his uncle until 
the latter agreed to authorise his return to France. Arriving too late for the decisive stage 
of the Franco-Prussian war, the young Lieutenant earned his status as a Chevalier de la 
Légion d’Honneur by leading a courageous if ultimately futile assault on Germans in 
Blois after the armistice had come into force.
1244
 The Boer War was a chance for 
otherwise inactive soldiers to practice a métier for which they lived. This sentiment is 
also apparent from the loving detail in which d’Etchegoyen wrote about the guns, 
equipment, horses and military organisations of both sides in the war.
1245
 According to 
the preface of his War Notes “a soldier by faith and vocation”, Colonel Villebois-
Mareuil was agreed by the Times History to be “Naturally Quixotic, he showed in his 
life and writings an almost Mediaeval delight in the glory of the soldier’s 
profession”.1246 
 
Fighting – for or against a cause? 
Part of the volunteers’ popular appeal was that they embodied ideals of justice and 
patriotism. Le Radical’s caricature of “types régressifs” for whom “tuer est le bien 
suprême”, seeking a fight for the sake of it with anyone, anywhere, was therefore a 
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misleading one when applied to some of the most prominent volunteers.
1247
 More 
widely, no one in France had volunteered to fight with the Abyssinians against the 
Italians in 1896 despite French influence and arms reaching the Christian African 
kingdom, nor is it likely that any would have volunteered to join the Mahdists to fight 
the British, had that been practicable. The poor organisation if heroic spirit of these 
primitively armed African powers relative to their European antagonists had not 
commanded widespread French sympathy whereas those of the outnumbered Boers did. 
A community of fellow Europeans who were as civilised as any other white group, the 
Boers were perceived as an agrarian, Christian (if Protestant) nation whose rights and 
independence were worth preserving and defending against British encroachments. 
 
However, the notion that the volunteers were primarily fighting for the Boers cannot be 
sustained, especially as the war progressed. As indicated in chapter 6, press coverage in 
France on Transvaal had included some negative comment about the Boer leadership in 
general, mostly thanks to the economically restrictive practices and taxes that impacted 
French commercial activity. Such negative press coverage had, directed against Kruger, 
continued into the war, particularly in Le Figaro. Coverage of the Boer population in 
general had not, though, suffered from such qualifications. They were, and continued to 
be, portrayed in an idyllic light, especially on the right, as a rural, prolific and hardy 
people who loved France.
1248
 In their remote, landlocked, Republics the Boers were in 
fact little known or understood by the French. The mere fact of their being in conflict 
with Britain generated a highly idealised vision of them within France. Even the 
relatively dispassionate and intelligent Matin, inspired by a photograph of grandfather 
65, father 43, and son 15, was not above floating into an ethereal reverie about the 
members of this army that nothing discourages or intimidates; “le Monde en effet peut 
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admirer ses héros…c’est le passé, le présent, et l’avenir qui font le coup de fusil 
ensemble”.1249  
 
Those French who actually went to spend some time in South Africa took a somewhat 
less rosy view. For most of the volunteers, their first acquaintanceship with the Boers 
came with their arrival at Laurenço-Marquès and their train journey to Pretoria for the 
purposes of the war itself. Villebois-Mareuil was one of the first to arrive. Initially 
employed as an adviser rather than a field commander, he noted with mounting 
annoyance that his advice was being ignored, by Joubert outside Ladysmith, and by 
Kronje outside Kimberley then directly before Kronje’s encirclement at Paardeburg on 
17 February 1900 and surrender 10 days later.
1250
 This disregard did not escape the 
notice of the French military attaché, noting the lack of position for Villebois-Mareuil, 
who “circule d’un théâtre d’opérations à un autre, d’un camp au voisin, pour s’aboucher 
avec les généraux et leur donner des conseils… Ses avis sont presque toujours compris, 
apréciés, mais rarement suivis”, nor the Pretoria Consul who criticised “l’imprévoyance 
du général Cronje et son obstination de ne pas vouloir écouter les conseils ni suivre les 
avis de différents militaires étrangers qui se trouvaient avec lui”.1251 Villebois-Mareuil’s 
War Notes and correspondence to Monteil betrayed mounting discontent at Boer 
sluggishness and lack of decisive, military spirit.
1252
 In d’Etchegoyen’s memoir, an 
increasing element of disillusionment with “ces grands enfants qu’on appelle les Boers” 
became apparent as his war progressed, for their indolence, slow if stubborn nature, and 
negligent omission of even the most elementary fortification of key tactical landscape 
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features.
1253
 Like Villebois-Mareuil, he was accustomed to the discipline and structure 
of a professional European army. Both were clearly pained by the spectacle of a citizen 
army in which plans were voted on at War Councils, everyone elected the officers, and 
other ranks retained the option to disobey orders with which they disagreed. Villebois-
Mareuil saw in this democratic process a parallel with the French parliamentary system, 
in both cases a dilatory lack of leadership emerging.
1254
 No exception to the general 
disillusionment with those he had come to help and their “inexorable rule of wait, wait, 
wait, which makes Europeans chafe with impatience”, the Colonel was increasingly 
jaded by “his impression of the Boers as he came eventually to see them, stripped of the 
romantic veil that Europe had thrown about them”.1255  
The Boer leadership had previously pitched for sympathy from Europeans.
1256
 Despite 
this, it was at a loss as to what to do with the volunteer fighting men that this sympathy 
produced. General Joubert remonstrated to Pretoria that: 
Things are being made impossible for me here, mainly by the volunteer Corps of 
Irish, Russian, Dutch, French, etc. A lot of them are being sent here, unfamiliar 
with our language and customs, unfamiliar and unsuitable for our way of making 
war. They are costing the country a lot of money. Some of them get shot dead 
without any benefit to our cause.
1257
 
 
Reitz responded: “The arrival of the people you refer to also causes me a lot of trouble 
but what can we do? We cannot disown them”.1258 Once the unifying force of the 
Colonel had been removed, this became even truer.
1259
 The strains of war in early 1900 
had already brought home to the volunteers how they were seen by their hosts. Kronje 
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“se contente de répondre aux prévoyants conseils du Colonel du Villebois ‘Lorsque vous 
étiez enfant, j’étais déjà général’”.1260 In the direct wake of Villebois-Mareuil’s death, 
Demange reflected further that: 
 Le Colonel de Villebois-Mareuil n’a pas eu ici l’influence qu’on lui attribue en 
Europe… [sur]… les chefs boers, trop méfiants et jaloux de leur autorité… en 
guise d’un éloge funèbre, on insinue déjà que sa fin doit être celle des tous les 
étrangers qui veulent se mêler ici de choses militaires dans des conditions 
complètement en dehors de leur compétence.
1261
  
 
As the conventional phases of the war drew to a close in May 1900, Botha’s response to 
German volunteer de Malzan’s attempt to re-form a discrete Volunteer Corps was the 
widely reported comment “Les Européens peuvent rentrer dans leur pays, je n’ai pas 
besoin d’eux. Mes Burghers me suffisent”, which d’Etchegoyen took as a poor response 
to a Legion of 280 that had suffered 15 dead and 87 wounded.
1262
 An undercurrent of 
suppressed hostility was detected in Demange’s observation of himself and his 
colleagues that “nous sommes des touristes militaries qu’on tolère, non des attachés 
qu’on accepte et qu’on aide”.1263 For him, the “attitude glaciale et gênée” of General 
Botha personified “la méfiance invéterée des Boers envers les étrangers”.1264 Perhaps 
what underlay the attitude to all outsiders (British, French otherwise) of many Boers, 
especially Joubert and Kruger, was obscurantism and a visceral antipathy rooted in 
religion, forming a mindset that saw all foreigners as “créatures du diable”.1265 
 
If the Boers were ungrateful, introverted, ignorant and pious xenophobes lacking many 
of the martial qualities-discipline, cohesion, aggression, or a willingness to sacrifice 
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their own lives if necessary-essential to a successful waging of their war, this might 
leave open the possibility that the volunteers were primarily fighting against the British 
in accord with a negative, Anglophobic, agenda. The Times History of the War in South 
Africa interpreted the foreign volunteers as “a constant stream of adventurous spirits to 
take the field, not for the Boers but against the recognised enemy of their country”, 
encouraged by “obscene cartoons and hysterical leading articles” in the continental 
press.
1266
 However, a striking point to note is that a hate of all things and persons 
British, along the lines of a Driant, seems to have been conspicuous for its absence from 
the writings of the French volunteers, even when published well before the Entente 
Cordiale was in the air. Villebois-Mareuil’s brother Christian, remaining safely in 
France and writing in traditional terms of “the English, the hereditary enemy of France,” 
concluded his letter supporting George’s decision to go by saying “if I didn’t have this 
blessed gout, I would be tempted to go with you! All my hatred of the English is 
alive”.1267 The past history of the Colonel himself suggested little that was explicitly 
Anglophobe, with Tombs, to the contrary, noting his reputation as an Anglophile who 
had his clothes made in London.
1268
 In Algiers from 1888-91, “Il frequenta la société 
anglaise avec qui il pouvait converser facilement” and meeting English historian J.E.C. 
Bodley.
1269
 Villebois-Mareuil’s 1892 trip to India resulted, as a sharp contrast to Jules 
Verne’s opinions, in private and public praise for the British Empire.1270 Villebois-
Mareuil’s final evening in Europe was spent at dinner with his literary peer Bodley and 
other British visitors to Biarritz.
1271
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D’Etchegoyen prefaced his assessment of the British army in South Africa with the 
comment “Je ne suis pas anglophile et le fait de m’être battu huit mois avec les Boers le 
prouve suffisamment, mais c’est le devoir d’un soldat loyal de reconnaître les qualités de 
son adversaire”.1272 He took a gradated approach in his evaluations of the Britons he 
personally encountered. An instinctive inclination to respect other practitioners of the art 
of war, even opponents, came out during his transit to South Africa, sharing the ship 
with a Royal Artillery Captain: “cette prochaine hostilité n’empêche pas nos rapports… 
d’être des plus cordiaux. Le capitaine porte la médaille du Soudan ce qui rapproche 
encore nos sympathies”.1273 So a certain martial admiration crept in ; “Tommy Atkins, le 
régulier, froid, calme, avancera sous une grêle de projectiles, l’arme au bras, le pas 
cadencé, comme à la parade. Dédaigneux de danger, la tête haute, il semble dire ‘je suis 
Anglais, je passe’”.1274 Colonial troops shared the characteristics of Boers-good 
marksmen but with no discipline or cohesion. D’Etchegoyen gave a less flattering 
opinion of inexperienced yeomen, fed up with the hardships of campaign, all too keen to 
surrender at the first opportunity, whilst depictions of the British officer generally as an 
enthusiastic amateur who “ignore tout un officier doit savoir” were gilded by scoffing at 
senior officers Buller, Methuen and Warren in “un match de démence”.1275 His strongest 
condemnation was, though, reserved for those who could lay no claim to any mutual 
soldierly respect, especially:  
une bande d’Anglais qui viennent de Rhodesia pour s’engager comme 
voluntaries… Ils envahissent le salon avec ceux qui viennent les accompagner 
puis chantent ‘God Save the Queen’. Un certain nombre de Français répondent 
par la Marseillaise, la situation se tend, et par antithèse les poings se détendent.
1276
  
 
Witnessing Buller’s Colenso advance, Villebois-Mareuil agreed on the amateurishness 
of British officers: “The attack was very brave and methodical, but it was made without 
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the faintest idea of what war is”.1277 Lacking d’Etchegoyen’s first hand encounters with 
Britons in South Africa, he did not make such fine differentiations between British units. 
Subsequent reflections contradictorily stressed the tenacity of the British, but also dwelt 
at length on their “army without energy, ideas or tactics”, undermined at home “by 
degrading the military calling to the lowest degree” in a situation of general British 
decadence fatal to martial spirit and, potentially, empire.
1278
 His comments were 
therefore largely either technical in nature, examining the ability of the British to fight, 
or else, given the ongoing impact of the Dreyfus case and the discourse of decadence 
current in France, a reflection as much of his domestic preoccupations as his views on 
Britain.  
 
If Villebois-Mareuil’s “intervention in the Boer-British confrontation in South Africa, 
though he tried to rationalise it in his will and elsewhere, had no direct connection either 
with the Boers or the British”, then abstract questions of right and wrong might have 
motivated him and the other volunteers.
1279
 He was certainly an idealist, viewed by 
others as subject to “the attraction of a noble cause” that caused him to “take the cross”, 
the resonance with the crusades being extended to encompass others who had gone to 
fight for the freedom of Greece and America.
1280
 Amongst all of these sweeping 
abstractions, it might have been easy for the volunteers to lose sight of the implicitly 
Anglophobic nature of their actions.  
 
How the French impressed foreigners, especially the Boers, mattered greatly to the 
Colonel, who was therefore embarrassed by misdemeanours on the part of any French 
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civilians or volunteers on the Boer side.
1281
 This concern points to what was at the centre 
of the motivation of himself and the other volunteers, namely France itself.
1282
 Villebois-
Mareuil’s departure for South Africa demonstrated “The linkage between foreign 
military adventure and political crisis at home”.1283 J.E.C.Bodley’s opinion was that 
Villebois-Mareuil hoped by intervening in the war “to change the political situation in 
France and advance his own political career there”; a beau geste would serve to release 
new forces within France.
1284
 By early 1899, the scandals rocking the French political 
establishment left the country “treated with contempt by other nations… thought of as a 
sort of international sideshow, where the inventions of decadence and cosmopolitan 
customs witness the end of a nation’s genius”, according to Villebois-Mareuil who 
blamed parliament and politicians.
1285
 Aware that Marchand, after his return from 
Fashoda, had been to a large extent muzzled, the Colonel looked for another way to 
express his views.
1286
 Making an appearance in the war, and being seen to participate in 
it, was a means of demonstrating the worth and vitality of a particular vision of France 
that was of little relevance to the Boers or British, and had much more to do with the 
qualities needed to power a French national revival and foster a newly enthused 
patriotism. D’Etchegoyen recalled the day when: 
devant Kimberley, le colonel reçut de France une petite médaille d’or, qu’il me 
montra avec émotion et fierté. Elle portait ces mots ‘A un grand Français, les 
compagnes de sa fille’. Oui, à un grand Français! Car, en lui vivaient toutes les 
hautes pensées de devoir, d’abnégation, toutes les nobles vertus qui font un grand 
chef et un grande patriote. C’était un homme et un soldat!1287 
 
In Villebois-Mareuil’s will, his motivation was explained primarily in terms of a wish 
for service to his country. In this connection, a two-fold grievance was mooted, not only 
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against Britain but also the Third Republic: “I still think that I have served it in doing 
my duty as a soldier under a foreign flag against a nation that has done us much harm, 
conjointly with the baseness of our Governments”.1288 That said, in the heat of his 
moment of departure, he revelled most in being “able to do something out of reach of 
the swine who govern us, and in spite of them, that really whips up the blood!”1289 The 
service of the French volunteers in South Africa, and Villebois-Mareuil’s death, were 
intended as conduct of national redemption focussed on France, not the Boers or British. 
From the foreword of the Colonel’s War Notes, they were clearly understood as such at 
the time by sympathisers to the volunteers:  
He had but one object in view, one perennial thought which appears many times 
between the lines of his diary. This thought was no longer for the Boers but for 
France and her army. He had sworn to leave in the depths of Africa an 
imperishable recollection of French bravery: he had resolved to show all-friends 
or foes-how the soldiers of his nation could die. He kept his resolution at 
Boshof.
1290
 
 
Reactions; The Paris Press and Villebois-Mareuil’s Death, April 1900. 
 
Whatever the complexities of the motives of each individual volunteer, thousands of 
miles away and therefore accordingly remote from the realities of the war Metropolitan 
France was free to interpret the volunteers’ actions in accordance with its own domestic 
agenda. Coverage of the volunteers, constrained in 1899 given the secrecy surrounding 
the initial departures, increased in early 1900, perhaps reaching its zenith in the 
aftermath of Colonel Villebois-Mareuil’s death near the town of Boshof, at the hands of 
a detachment of Yeomen commanded by Lord Methuen, on Friday 6 April 1900. 
Subscriptions for the fallen Colonel at once sprang into life. Memorial services were 
organised in Paris for Wednesday 18 April at St Nicolas le Champs at 12pm, and at 
10am by the Comité de la Patrie Française packing Notre Dame with a congregation of 
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some 10,000.
1291
 This service, addressed by François Coppée, brought under one roof 
not only senior officers involved in the Dreyfus case but Colonel Monteil, Le Gaulois 
journalists Arthur Meyer and Georges Thiébaud, officers from the Marchand expedition 
Lieutenant Dyé and Captain Baratier, and Captain Driant, the latter two of whom left the 
scene together.
1292
 Driant subsequently worked into his Guerre Fatale the theme of 
revenge for Villebois-Mareuil, over whose grave Kruger pays homage in proclaiming 
the new South African republic rendered possible by Britain’s defeats, but the 
immediate impact of the death was more complex than this simple Anglophobic 
narrative suggested.
1293
 
 
News of the death reached France via Havas late on Friday 6 April.
1294
 A small element 
of doubt as to the facts persisted, pending confirmation from the Boers and of Robert’s 
telegram, but for practical purposes the first reactions of the press appeared on Saturday 
7 April. On the Nationalist right, sentiments were predictable: L’Echo de Paris saw 
Villebois-Mareuil’s South African adventure as intended “éveiller brusquement ce pays 
de sa torpeur et le mettre debout d’un sursaut… Il suivait toujours son idée d’une 
régénération de la France par l’action individuelle”.1295 This paper at once started a 
subscription to pay for a religious service and La Liberté (publisher of Villebois-
Mareuil’s letters from South Africa) started another to finance “un monument 
funéraire”.1296 Others confined themselves to generous words, La Libre Parole 
headlining “La Mort Héroique du Colonel du Villebois-Mareuil” and interpreting the 
enrolment of this “victime de sa généreuse ardeur” as “un acte français par 
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excellence”.1297 This identification of the Colonel with a true and more noble France that 
transcended the day-to-day politics of the Third Republic was pushed further by 
L’Intransigeant. In a personal attack on Delcassé, Rochefort, drawing a comparison 
between “Père Delcassé, en sa qualité d’huissier” expelling tenants and Kruger expelling 
foreigners from Transvaal, went on to comment that the French now “s’obstinent à 
élever des monuments aux Villebois-Mareuil et à jeter des pommes cuites aux 
Delcassé”.1298 Exceptionally bitter polemics, even by this paper’s standards, soon 
followed, not so much implying a governmental apathy towards the Boer War as an 
implicit identification of ministers with the British cause. Having vilified Yves Guyot 
and Jules Reinach, at the mercy of British shareholders in Le Siècle, “bien obligé… de 
cracher sur le cadavre de Villebois-Mareuil tombé sur des balles anglaises”, Rochefort 
went on to argue that what they wrote was also dictated by Waldeck Rousseau, 
Millerand and, above all, Delcassé.
1299
 
 
Re-affirming the shift towards a sharper, nationalist-right attitude since its autumn 1898 
coverage of Fashoda, Le Gaulois’ initial reaction to Villebois-Mareuil’s death was along 
similar lines to that of the avowedly nationalist Intransigeant. On 7 April 1900 
answering his own question as to why the Colonel had been involved in the South 
African war, Georges Thiébaud’s editorial placed him in opposition to Delcassé “le 
ministre mal élevé” for whom news of the death would be “un soufflet d’outre tombe”. 
Absorption of the death into the discourses of French internal politics was immediate, in 
light of Delcassé’s previous criticism of the “tartuffes de patriotisme”. Explicitly 
reflecting “Dreyfus libre et Déroulède en exil, voilà un enseignement”, Thiébaud 
countered domestic critics of Villebois-Mareuil’s actions: 
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Quelques sceptiques diront peut-être que rien n’obligeait le colonel de Villebois-
Mareuil à quitter son pays pour aller combattre au Transvaal mais la morale trop 
pratique de ces âmes desséchées par la culte de deux et deux font quatre ne 
triompera pas, dans la circonstance, du sentiment autrement empoignant qui 
étreint les âmes façonnées de l’autre sorte.1300 
 
As well as imputing to those critics a quality normally associated with Englishness 
(being practical and prosaic), this presaged an essentially romanticised view of 
Villebois-Mareuil, for  “Le Colonel était la modestie, comme il était tout ensemble le 
courage et la délicatesse”, combining tact with a noble determination to fight for what 
was right. To Le Gaulois, it was clear that he was “un exemple moralisateur” in more 
than one sense. Thiébaud went on to align France’s self-image with the cause of justice 
for which the colonel was perceived to stand, suggesting a groundswell of public 
sentiment favouring an international mission, perhaps peculiar to France, that a 
transitory government might mask, but could not hope to eradicate: 
 
Cette glorieuse mort… n’aura pas été inutile. Elle dégage la vrai France de 
l’attitude inexplicable que son gouvernement lui a fait prendre... La vrai France 
n’a pas cessé d’être le champion de la justice outragée, le champion des faibles en 
proie aux agressions.
1301
 
 
Themes of shameful, betraying, “odieux parlementaires” in opposition to “la 
magnanimité, génie de notre pays”, as embodied by the colonel, were replayed by 
François Coppée 2 days later, and a week after that it was the turn of Gaston Jollivet to 
ask Le Gaulois readers “Qui vengera Villebois?”, as there had been “silence dans les 
rangs”, so far.1302  
 
True to its governmental links, Le Matin attempted a detached tone by comparison. Its 
initial reaction intermixed ideas of abstract right and wrong with ones of national pride; 
Tombé au champ d’honneur... sa mort est une perte pour les Boers. C’est aussi 
une gloire pour sa famille et pour notre pays. Le sang généreux d’un officier 
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français sera fécond pour la triomphe de la liberté et du droit. L’exemple de ses 
talents et de son héroisme rehausse le renom de notre armée.
1303
  
 
Emphasis was laid on both the aristocratic origins of the Colonel and the disinterested 
nature of his actions, in the footsteps of a family “toujours distingué, sans s’enricher, au 
service des rois de France, et de la France”.1304 The next day, in the absence of any 
further news on Villebois-Mareuil, having seen a favourable report on the Basuto tribe at 
risk from Boer encroachments, it was not until 11 April that Le Matin passed on praise 
of the French officer from The Times, and 14 April that La Liberté’s comments about the 
Colonel having “une endurance et une vaillance toute française” were repeated.1305 
Publication of a factual, and relatively brief, report on the memorial services for 
Villebois-Mareuil could not be avoided on Thursday 19 April. Despite the first report 
suggesting themes of redemptive nationalism, the central aim of Le Matin seems to have 
been to minimise as far as practicable publicity for the volunteers, a helpful approach if 
unnecessary embarrassment to the French government’s policy of neutrality were to be 
avoided. 
 
Initial reactions on the radical left were reserved, if for different reasons, having to 
balance Villebois-Mareuil’s evident popularity with disdain for the well known politics 
of the Colonel, and his brother “un des plus ardents défenseurs de la réaction”. Affecting 
even handed generosity, Le Rappel’s avowed opposition to the pair “ne nous empêche 
pas de déplorer profondément sa mort et de se rendre à son courage un hommage mérité 
car, à l’inverse de ceux qui, demain, vont essayer de manifester sur son nom, nous 
savons être justes, même envers des adversaires”.1306 Injecting a personal element into 
the animosity, Urban Gohier of L’Aurore, acknowledging “une certaine estime” for the 
colonel, felt obliged to “rend hommage à sa mémoire, d’autant plus volontiers qu’il avait 
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jugé à propos, il y a quelques mois, de me lâcher une bordée d’injures puériles, d’une 
façon bien militaire”.1307 Such praise through gritted teeth was not for Le Radical, which 
felt at liberty to be far bolder. After giving a short, bland, biographical note on Villebois-
Mareuil, this subsequently published overt criticism of the colonel’s service with the 
Boers:    
Nous estimons grandement l’officier qui froidement, résolument attend l’heure où 
l’agression étrangère forcera son intervention, et qui lutte héroiquement pour ce 
qu’il sait être un droit de légitime défense… je dis que M.de Villebois-Mareuil, 
en quittant son poste dans l’armée française et en allant se faire casser la tête sur 
la crête d’un kopje, a manqué à son premier devoir, qui était de consacrer son 
énergie et sa vaillance à son pays.
1308
 
 
The Socialist paper Le Peuple said of Villebois-Mareuil that “Il a mis ses actes en 
accord avec son langage. De toute la bande nationaliste, il a été le seul qui voulut 
manger de l’Anglais autrement que par métaphores”.1309 By giving him credit for at least 
having had the courage to back his words with actions, the paper achieved the twin goals 
of honouring a dead hero, but casting upon the nationalist constituency from which he 
came the slur of being too lazy, cowardly or insincere to dare to do as he had. 
Dreyfus Intervenes. 
What drastically altered this state of affairs on the left was the conservative Figaro. 
There had been little distinctive about that paper’s initial reporting of Villebois-
Mareuil’s demise. Quoting Methuen’s despatch, Jules Cadorne’s otherwise prosaic 
opening report that “Un lamentable épisode de la guerre sud-africaine vient de plonger 
dans le deuil une famille française” concentrated on how the Colonel’s mother and 
daughter had chanced to hear about the death from news criers.
1310
 Moving on from this 
“human interest” angle on the story, on 8 April continuing doubts as to the fact of his 
death on the parts of J.Cornély and Cadorne were mixed with Villebois-Mareuil’s praise 
for the Boers. Hardly less uncontroversial were the words on the Colonel himself “Chez 
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lui, l’écrivain et le penseur étaient doublés d’un homme d’action”, a man of principle in 
contrast to the British.
1311
 However, anti-nationalist undertones were already apparent, 
and on 11 April Le Figaro sniped at the publicity-seeking Ligue de la Patrie Française, 
in organising the Notre Dame memorial, for disrespecting the provision in Villebois-
Mareuil’s will for there to be no religious service on his death.1312  
 
This was a preliminary to an all-out attack on 12 April, on politicians using the 
Colonel’s corpse for their own ends, “exploiter sa fin héroique et son exemple glorieux 
au profit de leurs haines”. But this was not just another polemic, for Le Figaro had 
correspondence written by the Colonel himself furnished by “un ami”, referring to his 
discontent with those leading the army, their decision not to post him to the 1895 
Madagascar campaign, and for no longer respecting the confidentiality of military 
archives now misused to discredit Zola. Most explosive of all, contrary to what might 
have been expected from his lionisation by the nationalist, anti Dreyfusard, press, a letter 
dated 13 September 1899 from Biarritz suggested that Villebois-Mareuil believed in 
Dreyfus’ innocence and favoured a revision of the case:  
Après Henry par Cavaignac, voilà du Paty par Zurlinden, sans plus d’explication, 
du reste. Et l’on croit donner satisfaction au sentiment publique ainsi surexcité! Je 
suis epouvanté de l’illogisme tant de Cavaignac que de Zurlinden comme 
ministres de guerre. Ils n’ont rien à voir à la revision… pourquoi la refuser?… 
J’accepte en principe la révision s’il m’est prouvé qu’elle ne recole aucun casus 
belli.
1313
 
 
From the material extensively quoted, the only proviso was that the false evidence 
should not put weapons into anyone’s hands. On 13 April, Le Figaro published a 
response from the Colonel’s brother, drawing attention to the confidential nature of the 
comments on the French army, and asserting that Villebois-Mareuil had approved 
“complètement et résolument l’attitude des témoins militaires et les arrêts rendus par ses 
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camarades des conseils de guerre de Paris et de Rennes”.1314 Beyond the comment that 
the very privacy of the correspondence was what lent it greater credibility, Le Figaro for 
now dropped out of the debate that it had precipitated.  
 
The left was afforded the opportunity to claim this soldier, of whose integrity and 
heroism the right had not ceased to sing, as a sympathiser if not one of their own. Battle 
ensued for the possession of the memory of Villebois-Mareuil.
1315
 In response to La 
Liberté’s subscription, the left would now argue that “il s’agirait d’un souscription 
nationale et non d’un souscription nationaliste”.  Ranc’s editorial in Le Radical led the 
way with a direct attack on assertions from François Coppée, of la Patrie Française,  that 
“le colonel Villebois-Mareuil était des nôtres; il est à nous, il nous appartient”. 
Displaying a somewhat different tone towards Villebois-Mareuil’s character and sense 
of duty than it had a mere three days earlier, Le Radical went on to crow: 
L’officier mort en combattant pour la juste cause des Boërs, celui dont les 
nationalistes veulent accaparer la mémoire, dont ils exploitent  cyniquement la fin 
glorieuse, dont ils volent le nom pour faire à leur faction un réclame bruyante, cet 
homme de grand Coeur et de grande âme, était revisionniste !
1316
 
  
Many of those at the heart of the Comité français des républiques sud-africaines, such as 
Jules Lemaître, François Coppée, Edouard Drumont and Henri de Rochefort, were 
avowed anti-Dreyfusards, so the ensuing controversy was unsurprising.
1317
 Le Gaulois, 
which had already defined those antipathetic towards the Colonel primarily in terms of 
internal politics, was not slow in responding to the letters.
1318
 Questioning where any 
such politicians using Villebois-Mareuil were, Desmoulins repeated that the 
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correspondence had been private. Furthermore, Le Figaro had interpreted the letter “de 
la plus singulière façon”, so that “Il lui prête des opinions qui ne furent jamais les 
siennes, des sentiments qu’en toutes circonstances il condamnait hautement”.1319 Further 
attacks on those critical of Villebois-Mareuil’s decision to fight in South Africa were 
published on the day of the memorial services, with a later plea for those outside Notre 
Dame after the service, whom “la police charge avec fureur bien inutile, puisque les 
manifestants ne se livrent à aucun acte blâmable”. This police action was prompted by 
acclamations for General Mercier - the former Minister of War who had urged on the 
cover up of the false evidence in the Dreyfus case - with Desmoulins claiming Generals 
in uniform among those attacked in “ce spéctacle ridicule et honteux”.1320  
 
Covering the same disorder, Le Figaro, criticising the “patriotes plus exaltés que 
réflechis” and, again, with the Ligue de la Patrie Française behind them, wondered 
whether the Colonel would have approved hitting a policeman with a lead tipped cane as 
the best way to honour the army. Of the Ligue followers, Cornély wrote : “Ils ont 
transformé le service funèbre célébré à Notre Dame en une apothéose de l’honorable 
général Mercier, pour lequel le Colonel défunt professait plutôt de l’antipathie”.1321 
More succinctly, Le Radical, remarking on the cries of ‘Vive la police’ from the 
demonstrators before the charge, was amused to note “la logique n’est pas ce qui  gêne 
nos bons patriotes”, also echoing the Figaro’s emphasis not so much on Villebois-
Mareuil’s actions in South Africa as Mercier and the Dreyfus case.1322 
 
From this short survey, it is apparent that initial reactions to the Colonel’s death ran 
along predictable lines for the nationalist right, the conservative right, and the left. The 
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disclosure of Villebois-Mareuil’s correspondence one week after his death, showing his 
political views in a new light, both re-energised the press coverage on him and placed 
him in the centre of the ongoing political divides within France. Rather than focus on his 
army career or his actions in South Africa, which were relatively uncontroversial, the 
press took the most important aspect of the disclosure as his attitude towards Dreyfus, 
thus re-affirming the importance of Villebois-Mareuil’s life and death in French internal 
politics. 
Reactions; The Quai d’Orsay Walks the Tightrope of Neutrality. 
 
In view of the attitudes towards the Boer War of the Quai d’Orsay discussed in chapter 
4, the spectacle of French citizens going off to fight for the Boers, then being killed, 
wounded or captured by the British, could hardly be anything but an embarrassment to 
the French government. Paul Cambon, in London, was the most explicit on this point, 
listing “des bureaux d’enrôlment” in Paris’ Latin quarter, together with pro-Boer 
demonstrations and town council resolutions, as things that the French would do well to 
abstain from if they did not want “des procédés vexatoires” from Britain once the war 
was concluded.
1323
 Worried that the example of Villebois-Mareuil would in the eyes of 
French opinion and the British press eclipse Delcassé’s work, he went on to write 
privately to his brother that : 
Les manifestations auxquelles on se livre en France à l’occasion de la mort du 
Colonel Villebois-Mareuil sont excessives, c’est encore une explosion 
d’anglophobie… Nous justifions la calomnie de la presse anglaise qui soutenait 
que l’armée boer était menée par des officiers français. A part Villebois-Mareuil, 
il n’y avait pas d’officiers à nous là-bas et en revanche il y avait beaucoup 
d’Allemands; Mais nous sommes si détraqués que nous ne pouvons nous tenir. La 
statue de Villebois-Mareuil servira à protester contre l’affichage du discours de 
Delcassé.
1324
 
 
In Paris, the question of the volunteers was potentially one of more conflicting impulses 
for the Quai d’Orsay. In essence, Delcassé had to attempt some semblance of sympathy 
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for the tide of public opinion, which the volunteers represented, whilst not actually 
doing or saying anything to antagonise Britain.  
 
Part of the solution to the problems created by the French volunteers might have been 
simply to denaturalise them. On the advice of Louis Renault, by the very act of taking up 
arms in a foreign army the volunteers would cease to be subject to the Civil Code, 
without even the need for an official declaration to this effect.
1325
 Effectively disowning 
the volunteers was, however, a risky business. Neither French pro-Boer nationalists 
eager to embrace such men as representatives of a true French nation, nor the British 
authorities, were likely to be much interested in such legal niceties when and if 
Frenchmen were killed or captured during the war. If anything, in the eyes of some 
nationalists, a visible distance between the Republican politicians and the volunteers 
might have enhanced the credibility of the latter.  
 
So for the most part during the war the Quai d’Orsay did what it could quietly to ignore 
the volunteers. Invited by the Consul in Johannesburg to define what attitude to take 
towards the formation of “un corps de volontaires français” directly prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities, Delcassé replied that, whilst they could not stop French nationals from 
volunteering, they should certainly not encourage any to do so, or intervene when such 
volunteers found themselves exposed or captured by the British.
1326
 In fact, the foreign 
minister aimed to prevent would be volunteers from ever reaching South Africa. A 
report from Laurenço-Marquès, on the difficulty of getting authority for people to cross 
the border into Transvaal, served as excuse to telegram the Prefect in Marseilles an order 
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to stop any further French from boarding ships bound for that port.
1327
 Similar efforts 
were made to prevent the recruitment of anyone in Tunisia into British ranks.
1328
  
 
Some doubt persists as to how meaningful were these efforts to dissuade French 
nationals from going to help the Boers. McNab sees the Prefect’s actions as “little more 
than a formality, a useful reference for the Quai d’Orsay to have on file to show the 
British ambassador”.1329 Conversely, Lugan argued that “les autorités françaises 
faisaient en effet tout ce qui était en leur pouvoir pour les dissuader de poursuivre leur 
voyage” and traced substantial successes on the part of French consuls in Portugal and 
Mozambique in stopping would-be volunteers from continuing to their destination.
1330
 
That these activities were genuine would tend to be supported by the lack of any effort 
made to confine them behind the scenes. The French press reported the boarding of the 
ship Yangtse, bound for Madagascar, by the Marseilles Prefect’s commissioner, there to 
tell travellers of the difficulty of obtaining Portuguese permission to pass from 
Mozambique to Transvaal. However, demonstrating to the British that a complete 
stoppage was impossible, it was also reported that 25 “sous officiers à bord, envoyé par 
le comité de Paris pour servir dans l’armée des boers, ont tous passé outre à cet avis, et 
ont demandé à effectuer quand même leur départ”.1331  
 
Later on, in London and South Africa The Times and Cape Argus carried the story that 
Delcassé had confided to Leyds on 9 October 1899 that “Le Transvaal pouvait compter 
sur l’assistance morale et matérielle de la France”, offering active assistance in the form 
of a free use of French diplomatic ciphers and the presentation of Villebois-Mareuil and 
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other French officers to serve in the Boer ranks.
1332
 This elicited an immediate telegram 
from Delcassé to Paul Cambon, denying any such connection, or that he had ever met 
Leyds save in the presence of Kruger during his recent visit to France.
1333
 Both Raffray 
and Cambon therefore refuted these reports, Cambon being at pains to stress the lack of 
importance attached to them at the British Foreign Office by Sir Thomas Sanderson.
1334
 
Although these denials were primarily for British ears, the lack of support for the 
volunteers could not be wholly concealed in France, and came to form one part of the 
wider right wing critique of Delcassé and French foreign policy. 
 
The government’s position seems to have been eased to an extent by British attitudes 
towards the volunteers. There was some suggestion of popular hostility in South Africa 
itself-“J’ai entendu des Anglais, ordinairement calmes et pondérés, user d’un language 
comminatoire pour les puissances et notamment pour la France, à laquelle on ne 
pardonne pas les canons de Creusot et les quelques officiers qui sont dans les rangs des 
boers”.1335 However, this seems to have been eclipsed by the generous response to the 
encounter at Boshof. Contrary their expectations, those foreigners taken prisoner were 
not shot out of hand.
1336
 On the orders of Lord Roberts, Methuen buried Villebois-
Mareuil with military honours in the presence of surviving French volunteers, including 
de Bréda who read a funeral address.
1337
 Smith-Dorrien later recalled that when news 
“that we had captured several Boers, and killed their leader Villebois” had reached him, 
word had had it that “from all accounts [he] was a fine soldier and a good fellow”.1338 
After the initial, brief, telegram advising of the death, Methuen did not shy from praise 
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of “an accomplished and gallant soldier [who] preferred death to becoming a prisoner” 
in a personal letter to Villebois-Mareuil’s daughter subsequently published in the Paris 
press.
1339
 Methuen personally paid for Villebois-Mareuil’s tombstone, whilst Monson 
visited the Colonel’s home to leave his calling card as a mark of respect.1340 The French 
press went on to reproduce praise from their London peers for the Colonel, with Conan 
Doyle publishing his not wholly uncomplimentary view of “the gallant Frenchman, who 
appears to have had the ambition of playing Lafayette in South Africa”, before the year 
was over.
1341
  
 
The French government’s own response to the Colonel’s death was marked by an initial 
lack of any official expressions of sympathy to his relatives, but “growing misgivings” 
at the numerous moves to perpetuate his memory by way of renamed streets and 
subscriptions towards public memorials.
1342
 Cardinal Richard having offered Notre 
Dame for a memorial service, the government’s hand was forced by a parliamentary 
interpellation on 11 April requesting permission for army officers in uniform to attend 
that service. That Lasies’ interpellation was couched in terms of French soldiers in 
essence saluting a heroic death to which the British army had already paid tribute 
pointed to the understanding that the potential importance of this event lay not in Anglo-
French relations but rather within French domestic politics. The understanding was 
mutual, to judge by the careful response of Gallifet, Minister of War, who, giving 
permission, sought to impose conditions; “It is not a question of politics. The officers… 
will not be mixed up in any demonstration that may arise”.1343 Government 
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representatives were seen to pay their respects by attending the St Nicolas le Champs 
service, but avoided rubbing shoulders with General Mercier or François Coppée, or 
getting mixed up in the demonstrations that did arise. That government motivation was 
not so much to avoid antagonising Britain as to prevent Villebois-Mareuil’s memory 
focussing nationalist, anti-Republican opposition forces was also perceived across the 
Channel. In a lengthy despatch, The Times explained to its readers that Ligue members 
and ex-supporters of Boulanger, rallied by the Dreyfus case, were “on the lookout for 
the famous homme sauveur” which the French state was determined to deny them, hence 
the government’s attitude towards commemoration of Villebois-Mareuil.1344 
 
Of those French volunteers captured, some were simply sent home. D’Etchegoyen’s 
career as a volunteer ended on 5 July 1900 when his detachment was surrounded by 300 
cavalry, remarking “Je suis remis entre les mains d’officiers anglais auprès desquels je 
trouve l’accueil le plus courtois qu’il soit possible de rêver”.1345 Thereafter, he was set at 
liberty, on parole, and departed within two weeks for France to write his memoir.
1346
 
The French government registered, but did not intervene to secure the freedom of others 
captured, who were shipped off with Boer POWs, in numbers of about 40.
1347
 By the 
end of the war, in addition to the 18 in St Helena (including de Bréda and the other 
Boshof survivors) there were 16 at Ceylon.
1348
 Shortly after the war’s end, the welcome 
likely to await returning POW volunteers in France could even represent a source of 
banter between an Under Secretary at the British Foreign Office and the French Chargé 
d’Affaires.1349 Britain had, during the war, happily paid the fares to enable French 
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nationals in South Africa to be repatriated, in some cases just free passage to the coast, 
for others all the way back to France, despite some of them having previously carried 
arms against the British.
1350
 This offer was not extended to French volunteer fighters still 
in British hands at the end of the war. Squabbles between the Foreign Office and Quai 
d’Orsay ensued over responsibility for the costs of repatriation, as well as the exact 
routes to be taken by the British ships and their timing, not assisted by some of the 
volunteers themselves-like Le Gall-who had good reason not to want to be repatriated at 
all. The POWs had long been released by the time the wrangling had concluded in April-
May 1903, with a final supplemental bill for £415 from Lansdowne being discharged by 
Paul Cambon’s office in London.1351 
 
The approaches of the French Consuls in South Africa, as might be expected in light of 
their previously discussed wider attitudes toward the war, were somewhat different from 
those of Delcassé or Cambon. The first consul with whom incoming French volunteers 
had to deal was in Laurenço-Marquès, Amyot, who helped get d’Etchegoyen into 
Transvaal, even while telling Delcassé of the difficulties being experienced by the many 
French arrivals in securing Portuguese authorisation to disembark from their ship, or 
cross the border.
1352
  However, the more important figure was Aubert, who had greater 
opportunity, as well as the motivation, to offer assistance. On the one hand, he presented 
a picture of absolute propriety to Paris, insisting that there was not “Une atteinte, même 
indirecte, à la neutralité,” from Transvaal’s French residents: 
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L’attitude des français est des plus correctes. Ils n’ont pas organisé de corps de 
volontaires comme les allemands, les hollandais et les américains et ne sont pas 
enrolés dans les troupes boers. Ceux qui ne sont pas employés activement dans les 
mines se sont joints, avec d’autres étrangers, à la police locale, non seulement 
pour la garde de leurs biens et propriétés mais aussi pour la protection des biens 
des anglais qui, pris de panique, ont fui le pays.
1353
 
 
On the other, Aubert was less than five weeks later sparing no effort to help Villebois-
Mareuil. On arrival at Pretoria station finding Aubert on the platform, on Saturday 25 
November 1899, the Colonel “received the warmest welcome from him and Mlle 
Aubert, who is thoroughly French like her father, speaks Dutch as he does and puts her 
energy and devotion into everything that may benefit France”.1354 Then on Sunday 26 
November “but for the friendliness of M.Aubert, the French Consul, and his family, who 
took possession of me from ten in the morning until ten at night, I should have had 
nothing to do”.1355 In a further departure from any pretence at neutrality, Aubert 
appraised the Colonel as to the progress of the war over a Sunday lunch shared with 
Irish nationalist Michael Davitt and openly advised him as to how best-in contrast to the 
less tactful approach of German officers already attached to Boer forces-he might go 
about dispensing advice.
1356
 It was also Aubert who arranged the meeting between 
Villebois-Mareuil and Reitz on Monday 27 November. Following an excursion to 
Johannesburg, Villebois-Mareuil met Aubert and Reitz socially for lunch on 2 December 
1899, before going to meet Kruger, then on to the front.
1357
  
 
Delcassé had expressly instructed Aubert “Si les hostilités éclatent, vous aurez à remplir 
conscieusement les devoirs de la neutralité”.1358 It is perhaps unsurprising that Aubert’s 
reports neglected to mention the hospitality he had extended to Villebois-Mareuil, still 
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less the content of their discussions.
1359
 When allusion to the Colonel became 
unavoidable, no hint of any close relationship was allowed to impinge and the 
description of his activities remained bland: “MM de Villebois-Mareuil, ancien colonel 
de 1er rég étranger, et Ernest Gallopaud, ancien officier des chausseurs qui suivent en 
amateur les opérations à Natal, ont assisté, m’assure-t-on, à la bataille”.1360 
 
Whereas Aubert’s scope for direct involvement with the French volunteers declined as 
the war progressed in 1900, that of the Consuls in Natal and Cape Colony began to 
develop as those volunteers started to be killed or captured. Raffray put his finger on the 
problem in seeking instructions for “la ligne de conduite” to be taken over a batch of 
POWs due for despatch to St Helena: 
J’ai des raisons de croire qu’il y a parmi les prisonniers des français. Je n’ai pas 
cru devoir faire, auprès du Haut-Commissaire, de démarche ni d’enquête à ce 
sujet, craignant de recevoir un refus et que mon intervention en faveur de français 
qui ont perdu légalement leur nationalité et dont nous sommes supposés devoir 
ignorer la présence ne fut prise en mauvaise part.
1361
 
 
Left to find his own solution to this conundrum, Raffray resolved to visit the POWs, 
vindicating his stance on the basis that he could do so in the wake of the German Consul 
who, without objection from the British, had already been to see German nationals taken 
prisoner.
1362
 Raffray’s stance remained generally reticent, in contrast to Aubert, who 
actively made efforts to free 2 French prisoners, “pris les armes à la main” by the 
British.
 1363
 As the fate of this pair illustrated - shipped off to Bermuda by the time 
Aubert had completed his report - in many ways there was little the Consuls could do for 
these individuals if the army was determined to detain them, although this did not later 
stop the Germans from boasting that their consular services were more effective in 
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freeing their POWs than the French were theirs.
1364
 The brunt of having to deal with 
most of the French volunteers who escaped both death and captivity fell to Amyot, who 
by 4 June was complaining that he had run out of money because “de nombreux français 
redescendent, demandent secours et repatriement”.1365 By this stage, the wider 
disruption occasioned by the war meant that the other Consuls had for the most part 
more pressing matters than stray volunteer fighters to contend with, but for the 
approximately 10 months that they were a significant presence the sympathies of the 
men on the spot, in particular Aubert, had once again become distinct from those 
apparent among their political and diplomatic masters based in Paris. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Regardless of their lack of impact on the Boer War as a whole, the French volunteers 
who fought on the Boer side enjoyed a disproportionately weighty influence in France. 
They stirred up sentiments, as much intrinsically nationalist as Anglophobic, that the 
government would far rather have been left dormant. What is apparent from examining 
all three groups is that, with differing emphases, relations with Britain were in different 
ways largely subordinated to other concerns. The agenda that the government in Paris, 
the press and the volunteers themselves had in mind, though not entirely neglecting 
France’s standing within the world as a whole, was one of that nation’s internal, 
domestic state more than its relations with Britain.  
 
The German army officer in Nantes in 1940 who took the trouble to read the inscription 
on Villebois-Mareuil’s monument spared it from destruction on the basis of the 
Colonel’s presumed Anglophobia.1366 The evidence points to the conclusion that this 
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was in large measure a misreading of the volunteers’ motivation and legacy. Among 
those fighting in South Africa not for purely financial reasons, some elements of pro-
Boer opposition to British imperialism were apparent but what far more dwarfed any 
such impulses was what the actions of the volunteers were meant to convey about 
France. Villebois-Mareuil, seconded by devoted lieutenants like d’Etchegoyen, intended 
his career in South Africa as an act of national redemption, and for it to be understood as 
such. Despite the volume of French press coverage allocated to the Boer War, and the 
sentiments roused on almost all sides against British policymakers and senior soldiers, it 
is equally apparent that by early 1900 France’s domestic affairs - in particular the 
Dreyfus case, the Paris Exposition, and the unending parliamentary and political 
turbulence - were firmly back at the heart of Metropolitan France’s concerns, if, indeed, 
they had ever gone away. Villebois-Mareuil and his death were rapidly absorbed not so 
much into an ongoing Anglophobic diatribe, cynical though the press remained about 
British progress in the war, as the very acrimonious and divisive discourse of French 
domestic politics, in the form of the Dreyfus case, which the Colonel had thought so 
damaging to France. Paradoxically, efforts were made on both left and right to 
appropriate Villebois-Mareuil’s memory, whilst the French government tried to avoid 
entanglement with the volunteers. Whatever its Consuls on the spot in South Africa 
might be doing, the volunteers were an embarrassment and a nuisance who, without 
really diminishing British power, potentially stood not only to damage Anglo-French 
relations and obstruct the way to any possible diplomatic rapprochement between the 
countries but also act as a nucleus for anti-Republican nationalist agitation. It would 
seem therefore that a group of men ranking as little more than a minor curiosity in the 
history of the Boer War as a whole saw themselves, were at the time seen as, and should 
now primarily be interpreted as, impacting on the politics of their home country. 
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Illustrations (4). 
Chapter 7: Picture 7.1 Le Matin, 7 April 1900, the original picture of the 3 Boer 
generations. 
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Picture 7.2 the Villebois-Mareuil statue at Nantes, from Keaney Le lion et le sanglier 
(1991). 
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Conclusion. 
 
The Entente Cordiale was, with hindsight, a landmark of enormous importance in 
relations between the French and British states which justified the centennial 
celebrations of 2004. However, the extent to which the atmosphere surrounding the 
Entente, during its negotiation, at its signing on 9 April 1904, and in the years 
immediately succeeding it, can be summed up as conciliatory or calm at any level, can 
be overstated. The sometimes heated differences of opinion over long-standing colonial 
grievances kept the signing of the Entente in issue throughout negotiations.
1367
 When 
Paul Cambon went directly from concluding the Entente to shout down the embassy’s 
new telephone to Paris “It’s signed”, it was in response to pressure from a Delcassé still 
worried at the possibility of a last-minute foundering of the agreement.
1368
 Thereafter 
the course of Anglo-French relations remained often tortured and fraught with 
misunderstandings up to August 1914 as statesmen on both sides of the Channel 
grappled with the extent to which the Entente was, or was not, a binding alliance.
1369
 
The influx of tens of thousands of British and Empire servicemen into France during 
World War I elicited strong, and mixed, reactions at all levels in France, sometimes to 
the extent of fearing that, once having occupied an enclave in Calais, the British army 
would never leave.
1370
 Nor, in the medium term future of the 1920s and 1930s, did the 
existence of the Entente eliminate the vicissitudes in Anglo-French relations that had 
been a characteristic of diplomacy across the nineteenth century.  
 
All of this was reflected in persisting attitudes from the very top to the bottom of French 
society, for all the efforts on the part of Loubet, Delcassé, Edward VII and others to 
inject a genuine streak of mutual international affection into the general publics of both 
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countries. If the calming effect of 1904 is to an extent a retrospective illusion, what of 
the “storm” of Anglophobia supposed to have preceded it in 1898-1902? 
 
French invasion literature, especially Driant’s, epitomised an enduring popular 
Anglophobia. This sentiment was only slightly altered, and developed, as a result of 
Fashoda and the Boer War, whether in the established medium of invasion literature or 
the new medium of postcards. Whilst some authors went on to accommodate the new 
diplomatic realities after 1904, Driant carried on preaching Anglophobia, despite “la 
duperie de l’entente cordiale”.1371 The Ecole Libre represented another long term 
influence, a contrast intellectually and in tone to invasion literature. The message of 
many of their serious commentaries, if stopping short of overt Anglophilia, was 
certainly more favourable to many aspects of British life. Greater change of emphasis 
and tone can be detected in the corpus of writing produced by the ELSP after 1898, 
when British behaviour on the international stage made Britain less tenable as an 
example of good practices. British foreign policy became more or less detached from 
the British institutions so attractive to some ELSP writers. Consequently, there was 
criticism of British actions during the Boer War (if not Fashoda), albeit in Bardoux’s 
dextrous hands rational and measured rather than Anglophobic in the true sense of the 
word. Arguably, generational change was more important in altering ELSP attitudes 
than these events. Bardoux and Halévy, if in one case losing the romantic youthful 
sheen with which he remembered Oxford and in the other growing cautiously from 
scepticism into a qualified Anglophilia, addressed concerns in their works that were not 
identical with Boutmy or Taine, if still coming to represent a fresh and regenerated 
approach, focused on and broadly sympathetic to Britain. What remained constant was 
that French internal concerns, however defined, continued to determine the focus of 
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ELSP writing even whilst it ostensibly addressed Britain. In its own way, invasion 
literature too, playing to the idea of Britain as an epitome of everything with which 
France did not identify itself, also placed French internal preoccupations centre stage. 
 
The approach of France’s diplomats and statesmen, excepting a few minor figures such 
as Aubert, was shaped predominantly by their rational conceptions of French self-
interest, not sentiments. Even the most supposedly Anglophile of them all, Paul 
Cambon, had been swayed by the fundamental Anglo-French identity of interest over 
Russian designs on Turkey, then German ascendancy, and was happy both to 
recommend armed preparation against Britain and to haggle tenaciously over the terms 
of the Entente.
1372
 Cambon’s marked reluctance to speak English throughout his 22 
years in London hardly suggests a desire to grow close to those whose allegiance he 
sought, or to ingratiate himself with them.
1373
 Notions of Anglophilia and Anglophobia 
are even more problematic when considering Delcassé. Entirely contradictory cases 
have been constructed to the effect that by June 1898 he was already bent upon reaching 
a major agreement with Britain that would attach it to the dual alliance, or that he 
became converted, slowly and reluctantly, to the idea of such an agreement only well 
after the end of the Boer War in May 1902, and in the meantime had wanted to align 
France with Germany against Britain. Neither case really seems to fit the facts. Capable 
statesman as he undoubtedly was, it seems far more likely that Delcassé was simply 
biding his time and kept his options open for a time when the best opportunity to 
promote French national interests, in whatever way, would present itself 
 
At first sight, the French press and the Boer War volunteers might suggest a more 
obvious manifestation of Anglophobic rage occasioned by the incident and the war. 
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However, press coverage of Fashoda at the time of the crisis itself, and of the early Boer 
War, was far less intemperate than later literature on both has implied. Whilst there 
persisted an Anglophobic fringe on the nationalist right, and indeed cartoons in the 
illustrated press and postcards, much of the press was surprisingly restrained. During the 
Fashoda crisis, the press was far more concerned with domestic news, especially the 
Dreyfus case, than Marchand or Baratier. Further, what coverage there was of Fashoda 
was ambiguous in tone and often reflected French internal preoccupations. Only after 
the withdrawal of Marchand had been ordered did Anglophobia achieve real 
prominence. In the opening stages of the war, prior to the Léandre affair, the tone of the 
newspapers was more hostile to Britain than it had been during Fashoda, but still by no 
means unmitigated. Once more, internal preoccupations, and Dreyfus, dominated their 
pages. Whilst the guerrilla war afforded less headline grabbing news, it was the mid-
1900 collapse of the Boer republics and the start of this final stage of the war which 
generated the most strident and memorable Anglophobic outbursts. Meanwhile, 
government action served to mute Marchand and the memory of Colonel Villebois-
Mareuil. Even more surprising than the press was the seeming lack of evidence for 
Anglophobic sentiment amongst the volunteers who deliberately risked their lives in 
support of the Boer cause. Leaving aside those merely there to line their own pockets, 
the predominant concern was not Anglophobe, pro-Boer or, even, the rights and wrongs 
of the war.  
 
Across the breadth of sources and individuals considered, the example of the volunteers 
brings out most emphatically the point that views articulated by the French about the 
British were above all else a product of French internal concerns. For Villebois-Mareuil 
and his closest companions, fighting in the war was about re-asserting a certain image 
of France abroad and regenerating a fresh sense of French identity and worth at home. 
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Such notions were explicitly stated in War Notes. Elsewhere the constant preoccupation 
with French affairs was no less evident for being sometimes only implicit. Whatever in 
British behaviour or values struck a French observer as remarkable necessarily implied 
that the French were characterised by more or less of the same thing. Publicly 
articulating that difference simultaneously insinuated that the observer’s readers already 
had some notion of the French “norm” and/or reinforced a new understanding of French 
qualities, relative to what was imputed to the British. Above and beyond this less 
tangible process, figures like Villebois-Mareuil, if admired by Driant, were rapidly 
absorbed by the mainstream into discourse centred on French internal politics, whilst 
Fashoda and the Boer War were subordinated to domestic problems, especially the 
Dreyfus Affair. 
 
As Romani acknowledged in undertaking his study of national character stretching 
across 164 years, a major methodological issue is that “a complete treatment” of 
international perceptions is not possible, potentially wide-ranging as they are.
1374
 This 
study, in taking selected long-term currents of opinion and casting them against a 
detailed examination of notable events at a crucial moment in Anglo-French relations, 
must therefore leave questions open. What it does point to, however, is the ambiguous 
and paradoxical nature of concepts such as Anglophobia and Anglophilia, the 
changeability of wider French opinions, the relatively small numbers of Anglophobes 
whose vociferous manifestations belied their numbers, and across the political spectrum 
the persisting, overriding, primacy of domestic concerns within most French 
commentary on Britain. 
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Appendices. 
Appendix 1. Chapter 1-Invasion!  
 
Storylines for the three works discussed. 
Mindful of Britain’s invasion of Egypt not 5 years previously, Plus d’Angleterre (162 
pages) opens with simultaneous Russian sponsored tribal revolts and advances in 
Afghanistan, and civil unrest in Cairo. The first diplomatic incident occurs in September 
1887 when British troops enter the French consulate, ignoring the Consul’s protests in 
order to seize and shoot three Egyptian insurgents in refuge there. French restraint is 
exercised until on 5 October a French ship carrying more insurgents is sunk in the Suez 
Canal, leading to a declaration of war. Thereafter, the action focuses on British and 
French homelands; naval bombardments and a battle precede a French landing between 
Hastings and Worthing covered by torpedo boats, battles at Hastings and Tonbridge, 
then occupation of London by 23
 
October, armistice, and the imposition of a peace 
treaty involving heavy reparations and the dismembering of most of the British Empire. 
French annexation of Dover, and a 14 milliard indemnity, enable the construction of a 
channel tunnel.
 1375
 France benefits further by handing over choice territories-Malta to 
Italy, Cyprus to Turkey, Gibraltar to Spain-in diplomatic prestige, causing Germany to 
see the wisdom of returning Alsace Lorraine.
1376
 
 
Where Plus had envisaged the complete military defeat of Britain in the space of  little 
less than one month from the start of hostilities, La Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe, (22 
pages) if equally as ambitious in scope, offered its readers a timetable that was only 
marginally less breathless. Here, the action begins on 16 July 1900 with the attack of 
British sponsored Afghans on Krub. Upon the refusal of the French President to 
guarantee his nation’s neutrality, a British attack on Granville is repelled, starting the 
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war. Faced with attacks from Russia, Menelick’s Abyssinia, the Ottoman Sultan, and 
rebels both in Egypt (who assassinate Cromer) and India, the British have to deal with a 
French landing at Brighton that, after a short fight, finds the French army marching into 
London on 20 September 1900. Again, this leads to armistice, again to the 
dismemberment of the British Empire, to the benefit of France, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, Italy, Holland and the Boers. Australia and India achieve independence, and 
Canada joins the USA.
1377
 Also of note in this story were the illustrations, not merely 
maps but pictures, in Clarke’s judgement giving the illusion of real photography.1378 
 
By far the longest of the three, Driant’s La Guerre Fatale France-Angleterre (1,350 
pages) was partly absorbed by the interactions of a host of fictitious characters, as well 
as giving more detailed attention to real life figures than either of the other works.
1379
 
The 6 month timescale is also more generous.  Volume 1 starts in March with the 
story’s hero, naval officer Henri d’Argonne, escorted by the French Consul on Malta 
Raoul Petitet to the coast, taking a hazardous trip to Bizerta with the object of warning 
the Tunisian authorities of British preparations for a surprise attack. This attack having 
duly taken place and been repelled, the rest of the volume is taken up with naval 
bombardments and clashes in the Mediterranean, and Argonne’s return to Paris. Volume 
2 shifts the action to the English Channel, placing stress on the role of submarines as a 
means of intimidating the Royal Navy, negating its superior numbers, and conducting a 
Guerre de Course, to starve Britain of the trade and supplies upon which it was so 
dependent. History combines with French perceptions of British arrogance in the 
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storyline, in Argonne’s mission to sink HMS Victory thus to destroy a naval relic shown 
“avec orgeuil aux étrangers”.1380 A somewhat lame sub plot covers the unsuccessful 
attempts of British agent Walter Smith (who had already tried to obstruct Argonne’s 
journey from Malta) and his web of spies to sabotage the factory manufacturing 
submarines and their supplies, thereby reflecting the preoccupations of French 
nationalists worried that an international network of British espionage extended into, 
and would subvert, everywhere, even metropolitan France. Volume 3 opens with 
“L’Expiation” of one of these spies, former French officer Louis Dhurr, confronting his 
old spymaster then returning to France to throw himself on the mercy of Argonne, who 
secures Dhurr a French army commission in time for him to participate in the first 
embarkation and landings over 10-11 September of 145,000 between Deal and 
Ramsgate, their ships protected by a fleet of submarines. The greater space of La 
Guerre Fatale allowed Driant to portray in more detail the landings and the climactic 
battles than Plus d’Angleterre or La Guerre Anglo-Franco-Russe, the outcome of these 
nevertheless being very similar. The triumphant entry of the French army into London 
was followed over 19-20 September by the complete defeat of other British units then 
the imposition in October of a peace in Paris. As well as the channel tunnel, this entails 
again the widespread carving up of British colonies, in the Americas to the USA and a 
new South American confederation, in Africa to France, Germany, Portugal, Abyssinia 
and a new South African confederation, and in Asia to France, Japan and Russia. India, 
Australia/New Zealand and (as in Plus) the Khedive’s Egypt all achieve 
independence.
1381
 
 
Most of the European developments, and indeed the course of Driant’s war, rested on a 
long series of happy coincidences, and the role of Russia. Driant elaborated on this by 
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transforming what would otherwise be an occasion for German friendship towards 
Britain (the French invasion) with the simultaneous and therefore unmissable 
opportunity for territorial gains for both Germany and Russia in the former Hapsburg 
Empire. German arms are thus preoccupied in central Europe at the same time as France 
confronts Britain. Russian strength and German gains in Eastern Europe make the loss 
of Alsace Lorraine something the Kaiser has to accept.
1382
 So France acquires not only 
Cyprus, but also the lost provinces, Belgium, and Morocco, with Russia remaining a 
permanent check on Japanese ambitions in the Far East and German in Europe.
1383
 Ever 
mindful of Anglo-French history, further, Driant did not omit to underline the justice of 
this settlement by making the parallel with England’s occupation of its former enclave 
at Calais, and offered his readers the claim that 10 milliards had been the sum that the 
British had in 1871 advised Bismarck to extract from France.
1384
 
A note on the timing and anachronisms of Driant’s future war.  
Despite the lack of any specified date in the title of La Guerre Fatale, hints throughout 
the books (for example alluding to the length of the Austro-Hungarian Emperor’s 
reign
1385
) suggest that the events they described were meant to have taken place in 1908, 
anachronistically given that by then many of the figures mentioned were incapacitated 
(Joseph Chamberlain, Prime Minister at the start of La Guerre Fatale, had undergone a 
series of disabling strokes from 1 June 1905 onwards), dead, or about to die (Campbell-
Bannerman, put up as Chamberlain’s October 1908 successor, in fact died on 22 April 
1908, as did soldiers William Gatacre in 1905 and Redvers Buller in 1908, both in any 
case having been retired from the army during the Boer War), and Roberts, depicted 
                                                 
1382
 Danrit, Guerre Fatale (1903), Vol 3, 74-86, also made the forecast of an Austrian internal collapse, 
with Germany acquiring many of the German speaking areas, and thus being reconciled to losing Alsace 
Lorraine to France.  
1383
 Danrit, Guerre Fatale (1903), Vol 3, 441-447. 
1384
 CF. Cornick, “Representations”, French Cultural Studies Vol 17.2 (2006), 152. 
1385
 Danrit, Guerre Fatale (1903), Vol 1, 394. 
 326 
killed leading a last desperate charge on 20 September, had resigned as Commander in 
Chief in 1904.
1386
 
Whither French Invasion Literature? 
Up to 1903, French and British invasion literature had pitched the armed forces of those 
two nations, with varying allies and outcomes, against each other. However, in Britain 
the orientation of invasion literature, as signalled by The Riddle of the Sands, was 
drastically and permanently altered, in recognition of the changing diplomatic position 
of the British. German invasion literature also reflected the new political reality, by 
positioning the French as allies of Britain.
1387
 The Entente Cordiale, in potentially 
robbing French invasion literature writers of their most prominent and long standing 
adversary, threatened to put those writers out of an often quite lucrative job: so, where 
was their genre to go? 
1388
 
 
There were two obvious responses, one of which was to focus exclusively on the 
imagined war of revanche against Germany.  Complementary to this, the other was to 
concentrate on the technical aspects of war. Before the 1880s, the small amount of 
literature, produced mainly by military men, contemplated war as a professional 
exercise for the benefit of other military men or interested civilians. Such less populist 
literature, once more forming a greater part of the French output after 1903, Clarke 
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records, demanded less by way of “exciting but improbable stories” especially at sea, 
and contemplated “a straightforward military affair” directed against Germany.1389 
 
Such changes were not universal. Driant was not immune from technical concerns 
focussed on a possible war with Germany. Carrying a self explanatory title, Vers un 
Nouveau Sédan (1906) warned of the consequences of lesser officers being left at 
liberty to choose between the various tactical theories propounded by several 
Generals.
1390
 But more characteristic of Driant’s response was to (re) explore new war 
orientated technologies for their own sake, taking them to new areas, hence Un 
Dirigeable au Pôle Nord (1910), and another to seek out new opponents. L’Aviateur du 
Pacifique (1909) combined the two, depicting a French inventor who circumnavigated 
the globe in his plane, and witnessed a surprise Japanese attack on US forces at 
Midway. 
 
The other part of Driant’s response to the new political reality was, simply, to reject the 
Entente Cordiale and British goodwill. Stating that after 1903 British authors turned to 
the idea of Germany as the main threat, with Britain and France potential allies, Tombs 
suggests that “Their French counterparts eventually did the same, eventually even fire-
breathing anglophobes such as ‘Capitaine Danrit’”.1391 But there is little evidence that 
Driant, even years after the Entente, had renounced his Anglophobia as Tombs 
suggests.
1392
 In L’Invasion Noire, (1894), he had already cast the British as subordinate, 
if not the less treacherous, villains whose simple love of money had impelled them to 
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supply arms to the Arabs and the blacks, then stand aside as the invasion of continental 
Europe took place. Five years after the Entente, this was a plot largely repeated in 
L’Invasion Jaune, (1909), with Britain and the USA arming the Asian powers. Driant 
continued to blame Britain for “l’affaire lugubre” of Dreyfus, and the work of French 
freemasonry in undermining (Catholic) France, perceiving in the new international 
alignment something that was wholly to the benefit of Britain: “Tous nos malheurs sont 
venus de cette Entente Cordiale qu’elle a transformé en alliance au seul profit de ses 
interêts et de ses rancunes”.1393 At the same time, further editions of La Guerre Fatale 
continued to be published, and to sell; Tombs and Serodes record very similar 
sentiments being expressed by Driant in the 1908 version, which alluded to the 
continued spread of Anglophobia among the general population “despite official 
pressure and the trickery of the Entente Cordiale”.1394 
 
Whilst Driant, starting with the monumental 14 volume Guerre Maritime et Sous Marin 
(1908), published no fewer than 11 new novels in the 6 years before 1914, it should also 
be remembered that not everyone in France or Britain had found the chauvinistic tone of 
invasion literature to their liking. In Britain, from 1908 the backlash took the form of 
several satirical pieces, for example by A.A.Milne and P.G.Wodehouse, and drawings 
by Heath Robinson ridiculing the scaremongering of Le Queux and the others.
1395
 
Again, there was a contrast between Britain and France in that at least some of the 
corresponding French critique was directed not at their own invasion literature but at the 
British. The Preface of a 1910 French Anthology of British invasion literature, entitled 
“A Powerful Latent Anxiety”, attacked the alarmist atmosphere of a country where wild 
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rumours of under sea tunnels and mysterious airships “which, in the most suspicious 
way, only appeared at night” were credulously circulated.1396 Partly for political 
reasons, “a large number of writers have exploited this permanent fear”, and in the 
opinion of Louis Capperon such exaggerated anxieties put the British in danger of 
losing their reputation for calm.
1397
 
 
Appendix 2. Chapter 2 – Les Sciences Po. 
 
ELSP – Total pupil numbers, composition and destinations. 
Pupil totals were 70 in 1872, 230 in 1880, 375 in 1889, 486 in 1896 and over 600 in 
1906.
1398
 According to Zeldin, “unique in its international outlook”, the ELSP always 
attracted foreign pupils.
1399
 From the start, with Lord Brabazon of the British embassy, 
there were foreigners at the ELSP, numbering 69 (out of a total of 586) by 1905.
1400
 
Austen Chamberlain was the only Briton in 1885-6, but “got to know a certain number 
of foreigners, especially from Balkan states”, who, along with others from Japan, China, 
India and Persia, seem to have been the more typical nationalities present.
1401
 
 
Reflecting something of what must have been the contemporary rhetoric of the École 
were the 1904 claims of Boutmy’s admirer, J.E.C.Bodley, that the 40 ELSP staff “give 
their services on such generous terms that their teaching is placed within the reach of 
students of modest resources by a system of almost nominal fees”.1402 In reality, the 
high annual fees of the ELSP ensured that, whilst it remained nominally open to all, 
                                                 
1396
 Louis Capperon, Les Fictions Guerrières Anglaises, (Paris, Bertrand: 1910), quoted by Clarke, Great 
War, (1997), 278 & 279. 
1397
 Capperon, Fictions Guerrières, (1910), quoted by Clarke, Great War, (1997), 280. 
1398
 Figures from De Foville, “Notice Historique” in Séances, Vol 65 (1911), 45, Levasseur, “Boutmy” in 
Sciences Politiques Annales, tome 21, (March 1906), 161, and Keiger, “Patriotism”, in Tombs, (ed.), 
Nationhood, (1991), 260. 
1399
 Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Vol 2, (1977), 343. 
1400
 Dammamme, “Genèse Sociale” in Actes de la Recherche, Vol 70 (Nov 1987), 31, and Levasseur, 
“Boutmy” in Sciences Politiques Annales, tome 21, (March 1906), 161. 
1401
 A.Chamberlain, The Years, (1935), 16, and De Foville, “Notice Historique” in Séances, Vol 65 
(1911), 46. 
1402
 Boutmy, English People, (1904), Introduction, x. 
 330 
without any formal academic entry requirement, in practice access to its teaching 
remained with few exceptions the preserve of none below the level of the Parisian haut 
bourgeoisie.
1403 Keiger estimated that high fees of 300 Francs p.a. meant that from 
1885-1913 over 92% of the pupils came “from the upper bourgeoisie”.1404  
 
Vanneuville records a continual increase in the number of courses offered by ELSP- 10 
in 1872, 17 in 1894, 36 in 1913- with an accompanying specialization in the courses, 
and from 1884 their sub division into four distinct sections, namely diplomatic, 
administrative, financial/economic and general.
1405
 Many ELSP alumni continued to 
end up in important offices of state. Ultimately, the ELSP came to enjoy virtual 
monopoly over entry into the diplomatic corps, Council of State, the finance 
inspectorate, and the court of accounts, with indirect influence on business & industry 
thanks to men who entered state service only later to resign for these other careers, 
hence its “outsized influence on the intellectual formation of the members of the 
Republic’s grand corps de l’état for three generations”.1406 
 
However, not all pupils were destined for such careers. Among those signing up in 
November 1890 to study courses led by Sorel, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, and Albert 
Vandal was Marcel Proust. His father, the eminent physician Adrien Proust, harboured 
(ultimately frustrated) plans for Marcel to enter the diplomatic service, hence his entry 
in the École.
1407
 Although he managed to pass the exams he sat there in mid-1892, the 
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pupil “did not shine through diligence” at ELSP.1408 His ELSP activities in 1893 
included attendance at a simulated parliamentary debate, and a dramatic production.
1409 
Methodology and Sources - Demolins A Quoi Tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? 
Sacrificing substance for the sake of a sufficiently exuberant if not provocative 
polemical tone that would resonate with his audience, Demolins’ work rested on a lesser 
and less well marshaled evidential base than the output of many other ELSP writers:  
1) A single citation of shipping figures through the Suez Canal did no more than hint at the 
levels of economic activity in British colonies so thoroughly examined by Bardoux.
1410
  
Bardoux carefully weighed the power of Britain, relative to several other countries, 
using multiple indicators (e.g. levels of production, shipping activity, balance of trade 
figures), concluding ten years after Demolins’ work that Germany represented the most 
dangerous and growing commercial rival to the British. Even if the Germans were not 
yet in a position to challenge Britain on equal terms, he concluded “l’Allemagne, voilà 
l’ennemi”.1411 Instead of assessing Britain in relation to American or German 
competitors like Bardoux, having summarily dismissed the future prospects of Germany 
Demolins preferred to lump the two English speaking “Anglo-Saxon” nations together. 
They were not so much considered as rivals to each other as one, joint, entity in relation 
to France. 
2) Neglected altogether were themes not only of Anglo-US rivalry but separatist sentiment 
in some of the colonies, perhaps played down by Boutmy’s Constitutional Law but later 
covered by Bardoux in a sophisticated fashion.
1412
 
3) Paradoxically, overlooking the avowed aims of Boutmy and the ELSP as it had evolved 
by the 1890s, Demolins took for granted the theoretical bent, and the want of initiative 
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and independence of thought, in state employees, to ram home the extent of the 
contrasts he wished to make.  
4) Similarly absolute according to him was the complete lack of material help and 
hereditary wealth given by Anglo-Saxon parents to their offspring, in dramatic contrast 
to French fathers “working like a horse” to endow their offspring, or practicing birth 
control.
1413
 
5) Demolins’ comments on “Anglo-Saxon” education were derived almost entirely from a 
single brochure, and a single school founded less than nine years previously with, by the 
headmaster’s admission, no more than 50 pupils.1414 It was, without further evidence, 
simply assumed following the brochure that “really a whole nation are brought up under 
such methods”.1415  
6) Chapter 2, mostly criticising the German education system, relied entirely on a single 
speech (undated and unattributed by the author) made by the Kaiser. 
Finally, whilst Demolins did signal his debt to Le Play and Taine, Charle states that was 
not the case for what he drew from Leclerc, L’Education des classes moyennes et 
dirigeantes en Angleterre (Paris, 1894), or Boutmy, as Demolins extensively “borrowed 
from them without acknowledgement”.1416 
 
However, this is not to assert that Demolins had nothing original to say. His 
uncompromising criticism of Germany, for example, was unusual in ELSP circles. 
Demolins was at variance with many leading academic figures, among them Durkheim 
and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, who praised the qualities of German science, in rejecting 
the idea that “if the Germans conquered us, it was because their schools were superior to 
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our own”.1417 Demolins considered the German education system, especially since 
1870, to have been not superior but unworkable, and completely inappropriate for the 
Kaiser’s stated and contradictory aims of both shaping the young to favour militarism, 
national unity and to “open the duel against democracy”, and to train “practical men, 
capable of shifting for themselves, and to endow them with a knowledge of the 
world”.1418 The results actually achieved from the education given tended to increase 
rather than diminish the German Middle class’ “native unfitness for the struggle for 
life” to which Demolins saw the British system as so well adapted.1419  
 
Demolins was equally dismissive of German commercial progress, commenting that it 
depended on cheap and common manufactured items, the success of which was 
sustained by low wages, the clients’ “lack of fastidiousness” at home, and facilitated 
transport to new markets, equally undiscriminating, in “backward countries with simple, 
half-civilised or half-savage consumers”.1420  
 
In sum, Demolins was convinced that a combination of Socialism and militarism would 
finish the German Empire off, given time. “The great peril, the great rivalry, are on the 
other side of the Channel, and on the other side of the Atlantic”, as the Anglo-Saxon 
settler with the plough promised a more subtle, but insidious and long-lasting, threat, 
than any German battalions or weapons.
1421
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Appendix 3. Chapter 3-Fashoda, the Boer War and their Impact. 
 
A Broader Anglo-French Landscape; Rival events of 1898-1902, part 1. 
Not all Anglo-French contact on the international stage necessarily entailed attention-
grabbing confrontation along the lines of the Fashoda incident: 
1) Ottoman Empire. Before arriving as ambassador in Constantinople in August 1891, Paul 
Cambon had already noted that Britain and France had a distinct identity of interest on 
the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Near Eastern Asia, as against Russian ambitions to 
profit from a destabilisation of the Empire.
1422
 Cambon overtly showed his inclinations 
in his close relationship with his opposite number Philip Currie on such issues as the 
Turkish massacres of Armenians in 1894-5 and the co-operation in 1898 between 
British and French troops sent to keep the peace in Crete whilst a suitable settlement 
could be worked out between the Cretans and Constantinople.
1423
 
2) Localised African agreements. In June 1898, Hanotaux finalised an agreement bringing 
localised frictions in West Africa to an end by defining respective British and French 
spheres of influence in the region.
1424
 After Fashoda, Cambon and Salisbury reached a 
parallel agreement for eastern Africa in March 1899. 
3) Other episodes invited Anglo-French collaboration as part of a wider international 
consensus, notably the May-July 1899 Hague Disarmament Conference, and responding 
to the Chinese Boxer Rebellion which, unfolding from late May 1900, displaced the 
Boer War for several months as a prime preoccupation in the press and at the Quai 
d’Orsay.1425  
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Broader Anglo-French Landscape; Rival events of 1898-1902, part 2 
There is, however, a case to be made that Fashoda and the Boer War embodied and 
accentuated a pre existing, persisting, dissonance between French and British attitudes 
and policies, both internal and external, a dissonance that persisted outside of those 
events;  
1) Dreyfus Case. Much of Britain was deeply critical of the French handling of Dreyfus, de 
Courcel warning Hanotaux that British public opinion was “unanimous in proclaiming 
that Dreyfus has been illegally condemned”.1426 This was true of the press and the 
political establishment, as witness the Dreyfusard demonstrations in London and the 
telegraph sent en clair to the British embassy in Paris by Queen Victoria, who later 
cancelled her customary holiday in France.
1427
 Whilst The Daily Mail campaign for a 
British boycott of the French Exposition, opening in April 1900, petered out largely 
ineffectually, such public displays were only likely to agitate an already embittered 
nationalist, anti Dreyfusard right still further.  
2) The American-Spanish War of April-August 1898. If Britain was only one among many 
foreign countries to earn condemnation in the likes of La Libre Parole for its criticism 
on Dreyfus, the British were unique among the European Great Powers for their pro-US 
sympathies during the war.
1428
 Delcassé and Jules Cambon, in contrast, sought to act as 
strictly neutral mediators, their aim to bring the war to the quickest conclusion, with the 
underlying objective of forestalling US attacks on metropolitan Spain, and thus US 
naval penetration of the Mediterranean.
1429
 This was at a time when ideas of Anglo-
Saxon hegemony, seriously entertained by the likes of Cecil Rhodes, and aired by 
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Joseph Chamberlain, prompted many in Britain such as Rudyard Kipling to welcome 
American expansionism.
1430
  
3) The Phantom alliance. When this rhetorical Anglo-Saxon goodwill was extended to 
Germans, in the notion of a proposed British diplomatic alignment not just with the 
USA but Germany, this provoked great anxiety in France. Chamberlain toyed with the 
idea of a wholesale alliance, repeatedly broaching such a possibility in well publicised 
speeches on 13 May 1898 and 30 November 1899.
1431
 Further evidence that Britain was 
as capable of coming to limited agreements with Berlin as it was with Paris came in the 
form of the 30 August 1898 treaty providing for an Anglo-German carve up of the 
Portuguese colonial empire in the event of the latter’s financial collapse.1432 All of this 
led to some rather tentative (if ultimately inconclusive) negotiations, looking to the 
creation of an Anglo German alliance, from late 1900 to early 1901.
1433
  
4) Italy - Whilst a Franco-German diplomatic rapprochement remained elusive, more 
tangible results were achieved in the case of Germany’s Triple Alliance partner Italy. 
The Italian government had looked to London rather than Paris for help after the defeat 
of its colonial forces at Adowa on 1 March 1896.
1434
 Thereafter, the dawning realisation 
of British weakness during the Boer war pushed Italian policymakers to conclude that 
they could no longer look to Britain for security of their interests in the Mediterranean. 
If Rome could not rely on British strength, then one solution was to turn to Paris 
instead. A process of incremental agreements, facilitated by Camille Barrère, French 
ambassador to Rome from 1897, covered commercial relations in November 1898, 
North African Colonial affairs in December 1900 and (threatening to undermine the 
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Triplice altogether) a mutual pledge in June 1902 that should either country be the 
subject of an act of aggression, the other would remain strictly neutral.
1435
  
5) Russia & Japan. French experience of Fashoda and fears more generally of British 
acquisitiveness led them to negotiate with Russia a new, anti British, slant to the Dual 
Alliance in 1901-2.
1436
 Simultaneous British worries that they no longer had the strength 
to project power to every point of the globe where Imperial interests might be 
threatened, a self-perception of weakness greatly accentuated by the war, again pushed 
British foreign policy into a position of indirect antagonism towards France in 
China.
1437
 Whilst the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 30 January 1902 was in effect a 
localised agreement not directly related to events in Africa, in the context of Anglo-
French relations it fostered implicit rivalry by aligning Britain explicitly with a leading 
opponent of the territorial ambitions of France’s main ally Russia.  
Appendix 4. Chapter 4-Irredeemable Foe or Potential Friend. 
 
The Governmental Structure of the Third Republic and the Quai d’Orsay.1438  
The Minister for Foreign Affairs was answerable to both the President of the Republic 
and the Prime Minister who headed the cabinet, of which the Minister was a member. 
The cabinet in turn was reliant on the support of a majority in parliament, comprising 
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The lack of formal party structure/discipline 
and the shifting, contingent nature of allegiances within the Chamber rarely guaranteed 
a government majority for very long, and therefore tended to generate relatively weak 
and often short lived ministries. However, Anderson laid stress on the essential 
continuity of Third Republic Governments which, though changing Prime Ministers, 
tended persistently to draw on the same pool of would-be Ministers. Thus, on the fall of 
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a Prime Minister, it was not unusual for some of the ministers from the former 
administration to be re-appointed, albeit in different jobs. A government involving no 
minister from its direct predecessor was a rarity, although one such was that of Léon 
Bourgeois (November 1895-April 1896).
1439
 
 
More than any other, the Foreign Ministry retained individual ministers for prolonged 
periods across several the tenure of different Prime Ministers. Gabriel Hanotaux’s 
period at the Quai d’Orsay, with the exception of Bourgeois’ ministry, stretched for four 
years from May 1894 until the June 1898 arrival of Delcassé, who in turn stayed for 
nearly seven years in which time he worked with five Prime Ministers, and two 
Presidents.  
Table 1: French Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, 1896-1905. 
 
President Prime Minister
1440
 Foreign Minister 
Jan. 1895 - February 
1899 Felix Faure 
April 1896 - June 1898 
Jules Méline 
30 April 1896 – 14 June 1898. 
Gabriel Hanotaux 
 June – November 1898 
Henri Brisson 
29 June 1898 – 6 June 1905 
Théophile Delcassé 
Feb.1899 – February 
1906 Emile Loubet 
November 1898 - June 
1899. Charles Dupuy 
 
 June 1899 – June 1902 
René Waldeck-Rousseau 
 
 June 1902 - January 1905 
Emile Combes 
 
Feb. 1906 – February 
1913 Armand Fallières 
January 1905 - March 
1906. Maurice Rouvier 
17 June 1905 - 14 March 1906. 
Maurice Rouvier 
 
Such longevity in ministerial office did not guarantee that the minister had a firm grip 
on policy. Hayne identifies the example of Stephen Pichon, whose extended stay of four 
years (October 1906-November 1910) at the Quai d’Orsay did little to vitiate his 
ineffectual character, his relative laziness, and willingness to delegate not just 
administrative tasks but policy decisions to high ranking bureaucrats such as George 
Louis and Philippe Berthelot on whose advice he remained heavily reliant. From 1906-9 
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therefore, the Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau was able to make his imprint on 
French foreign policy (as later did President Poincaré).
1441
 This raises the question of 
just how important a ministerial incumbent, and hence his desires, necessarily might be 
for the purposes of formulating policy. The answer seems to have lain in the character 
and motivation of each particular occupant of the Quai d’Orsay, and how they 
interplayed with those of his political colleagues and bureaucrats. 
Delcassé and his political peers. 
It seems to be agreed that in the Delcassé period, up until the Rouvier ministry in 1905, 
there is little evidence to suggest that Prime Ministers exercised much influence over, or 
had much interest in, foreign policy. For the entire three years of Waldeck-Rousseau’s 
time in office, Hayne can identify only one occasion of dissonance.
1442
 According to 
Andrew, Combes was simply ignored by his Foreign Minister, whereas Brisson, Dupuy 
and Waldeck-Rousseau all shared the Presidents’ confidence in Delcassé. The “limited 
and sporadic” participation of the President was marginally more marked under Faure, 
who influenced and eased, in the context of the gap between Brisson and Dupuy 
ministries, the decision to withdraw Marchand from Fashoda, than under Loubet, who, 
partly out of belief in limiting presidential powers, was loath to involve himself in 
policymaking.
1443
 In short, though, other ministers, and the President, neither sought nor 
were able to make a significant impact on French foreign policy before 1905 with 
Delcassé at the Quai.  
Delcassé and the Centrale. 
The diplomats and bureaucrats of the Quai d’Orsay were potentially another matter, 
possessing the motivation, knowledge and power to make a real impact on French 
policy. The Quai d’Orsay’s offices in Paris, the so-called Centrale, comprised six 
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divisions, of which the three most important were the Political division, the Commercial 
division and the Private Ministerial Cabinet.
1444
 Responsible for diplomats serving 
outside France, the Political division by the late 1890s was in broad terms losing ground 
to the Commercial division, which was responsible for Consular services, and the 
Private Ministerial Cabinet which functioned as a liaising body between the minister 
and other departments. In theory, the Chef du Cabinet should have had little influence, 
but here as elsewhere personality counted for more than (often theoretical) lines of 
responsibility. 
 
Under Delcassé, Quai d’Orsay administration remained less than rational. Even basic 
day to day things such as remuneration for Quai staff were mismanaged; pay came 
erratically, sometimes months or years late, for Raindre among others did not 
necessarily correspond to the calibre of work being carried out by the individual 
concerned, and, especially in the cases of the Constantinople, St Petersburg and Vienna 
embassies, failed to meet the unavoidable expenses of those serving abroad.
1445
 Such 
top posts therefore tended to remain in the hands of those with substantial private 
incomes, a situation hardly consistent with Republican efforts since the 1880s to reduce 
the aristocratic element amongst French representatives abroad. 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Delcassé’s own capacity for hard work and 
disinclination to delegate except to trusted individuals, systems for appointment of 
officials at the Quai and the atmosphere of the Centrale remained much the same. 
Personnel movements were determined by the chance of family and friendships rather 
than objective assessment of suitability. Entrance examinations introduced were 
                                                 
1444
 The other divisions were the Divisions des fonds et de la comptabilité, du Protocole, and des 
Archives- Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 10 & 12-19. 
1445
 Andrew, Delcassé (1968), 119-120 & Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 20. 
 341 
“designed to screen out the undesirables rather than to test qualities of diplomacy”.1446 
Decisions on entry into the Quai “remained liable to subjective judgments” and were 
shaped by patronage.
1447
 Delcassé, simply took on as much work himself as possible, so 
reforms in his period were piecemeal.
1448
 The limited number of those working at the 
Quai made possible the continuance of a “leisurely” family atmosphere.1449 Amateur 
working practices persisted in the Centrale, officials in the Division des Fonds and the 
Political division rarely working more than a 5 hour day.
1450
 The common class origins 
of many Quai men not only implied a common mentality but facilitated much 
socialising, which centred on the daily “thé de cinque heures”, the Political and 
Commercial divisions competing to see who could make the best tea.
1451
 
 
If Delcassé was allowed considerable latitude by Presidents and Prime Ministers, and 
proved able largely to ignore cabinet or parliament, a possible block to his imprint 
might have been the coherent influence of the permanent bureaucrats within the 
Centrale. However, the way that the Quai functioned arguably enabled a capable and 
well motivated minister with definite ideas of his own to shape policy by relying only 
on those who shared his views or commanded his respect. Where appointments in the 
Centrale were later to be a site of conflict between officials favoured by Paul/Jules 
Cambon and the Sciences Po old boys’ network, up to 1905 Delcassé proved able to 
influence personnel appointments so as to place those he trusted most in the positions 
where they were able to support his policies. In the minister’s earlier years, the grasp he 
soon acquired on his brief was symbolised by his surprise appointment, without 
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consultation of anyone else, of Gaston Raindre as Political Director, in which post he 
remained until mid 1902.
1452
 Opinions differ as to the reason for Raindre’s lack of 
impact on policy; Andrew wrote him off as “a non entity”, and at the time Paul Cambon 
derided Raindre as “a paper boy”, preferring to deal directly with Delcassé, but Hayne 
maintains that he was frightened by the responsibility of his new post.
1453
 Less 
convincingly, Hayne adds that Raindre was influential behind the scenes in certain 
restricted areas of policy-but, it seems, in strengthening Delcassé’s pre existing 
inclinations, in his case to support France’s religious Protectorate in the Levant. 
Raindre’s other notions, such as cordiality with Germany and an aversion to agreement 
with Italy on Tripolitania, were simply ignored by the minister when circumstances 
suited. 
 
Delcassé showed more confidence in Maurice Bompard, the Commercial Director he 
inherited from Hanotaux, to the extent that he had some involvement in drafting 
Commercial Treaties, notably that with Italy.
1454
 However, changes in personnel 
remained a feature throughout Delcassé’s time at the Quai, for example the appointment 
of Maurice Paléologue to the post of Sous Directeur du Midi, a subsection within the 
Political division in which, up until 1904, his career had been languishing. This was 
someone whose relations with most of his colleagues were “strained, to say the least”, 
about whom no one else in the Centrale seems to have had much of a positive word to 
say, but who was singled out for special treatment by the Minister.
1455
 In return, 
Paléologue, like Raindre, largely agreed with Delcassé’s policies, his little contribution 
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being to reinforce the minister’s pre-existing attitudes, especially antipathy for 
Germany.
1456
  
 
In sum, as Hayne accepts, the Centrale officials who were most influential with 
Delcassé “generally confirmed his wider reading of international relations”.1457 Any 
actual influence which they did achieve, as in the case of Bompard, primarily derived 
from specialist, technical knowledge which they could bring to bear on the tasks at 
hand. 
Delcassé and the Ambassadors. 
Abroad, the Quai maintained Ambassadors and staff in the ten powers deemed most 
important to French interests. Lesser nations, such as Holland, Belgium, and Portugal, 
were served by diplomatic legations. Parallel with this was a Consular service, generally 
attracting candidates who were either of a lesser calibre or who, like Louis and 
Berthelot, would later transfer to the Diplomatic Service. This provided a coverage 
remarked by Hayne to be remarkably broad in geographical coverage.
1458
  
 
Even before the reach of Sciences-Po old boys in the Centrale had achieved its pre 1914 
zenith, there were differences of opinion between officials in the Centrale and those 
serving abroad. The way in which the minister had to deal with his diplomats was 
different, not least by virtue of the potential autonomy that their physical location and 
direct contact with foreign statesmen afforded, but arguably Delcassé achieved results 
not dissimilar in nature to his dealings with the Centrale.  
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Jules Cambon was one of the three powerful ambassadors who emerged in the Delcassé 
period if from 1897-1902 in “the mild exile” of the French embassy in Washington, 
which temporarily curtailed his influence.
1459
 The others were his brother Paul Cambon 
in London and Camille Barrère, at Rome. It is beyond dispute that in negotiating 
agreements with Italy and Britain, Barrère and Paul Cambon in different ways exceeded 
or altered Delcassé’s instructions, and that the pictures they sent back to Paris of foreign 
statesmens’ intentions and enthusiasm for an agreement with France were distorted for 
the ambassadors’ own ends. The minister’s approach to the ambassadorial triumvirate 
was to accomodate them by recalling Barrère, Paul, and, later, Jules Cambon to Paris for 
consultations; they responded with confidence and respect, and, in the case of Jules, 
with refined correspondence appealing to the minister’s vanity.1460  
 
Whatever liberties may have been taken by the ambassadors in departing from their 
instructions on how and when to execute policy, though, the substance of that policy 
remained quite clearly authorised by Delcassé. He was capable of independent thought 
and where necessary of contesting the opinions of the triumvirate, despite the power and 
experience at their disposal. Notably, Delcassé was always far more enthused by the 
1894 Russian alliance than Paul Cambon, who though for the moment reluctantly 
accepted the lack of any alternative.
1461
 There was also strong disagreement with 
Barrère, who in 1900 baulked to make the explicit linkage between French consent to 
Italian encroachment into Tripoli, and increased French influence in Morocco, that 
Delcassé desired.
1462
 In this case too, Delcassé had his way. Whilst the extent of any 
such discord should not be overstated, and the influence of Paul Cambon in particular 
                                                 
1459
 Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 83. 
1460
 Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 88. 
1461
 Hayne, French Foreign Office (1993), 106-7. 
1462
 Andrew, Delcassé (1968), 139-140, according to which this difference stemmed from Barrère’s 
“desire to wrest Italy from German domination”, whereas Delcassé’s more limited aim was “to win Italian 
sympathies”, as much relative to Britain in the Mediterranean as Germany to the north.   
 345 
on policy towards Britain remains open to debate, Delcassé seems to have been the most 
influential man in formulating French foreign policy. 
 
Table 2: French, British and German Ambassadors from June 1898-June 1902. 
 
 
City French 
Ambassador
1463
 
British 
Ambassador
1464
 
German 
Ambassador 
Paris - Sir Edmond Monson, 
13 October 1896- 23 
February 1905.
1465
 
Count Zu Munster-
Ledenburg, 1881-
1899. Prince Hugo 
Radolin, 1900. 
London Baron Alphonse de 
Courcel, December 
1894 - December 
1898.  
Paul Cambon, 7 
December 1898 - 
1920. 
- Von Hatzfeldt-
Wildenburg, 1885-
1901.  
Graf Von Wolff-
Metternich, 1901- 
1912.
1466
 
Berlin Marquis Emmanuel 
de Noailles, 1896-
1902 
Sir Frank Lascelles, 
1895-1908.
1467
 
- 
Constantinople Paul Cambon, 1891 
to November 1898. 
Ernest Constans, to 
1909. 
Sir Philip Currie, 
December 1893-July 
1898. Sir Nicholas 
O’Conor, 1898-1908. 
Marschall Von 
Biberstein, 1897-
1912. 
Rome Camille Barrère, 
1897-1924. 
Sir Philip Currie, July 
1898-January 1903.  
 
St Petersburg Marquis Gustave-
Louis de Montebello, 
1891-1902. 
Sir Charles Stewart 
Scott, 1898-1904. 
Prince Hugo 
Radolin, 1895-
1900. 
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